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
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
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


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INTRODUCTION

TO THE

LITERATURE OF EUROPE,

IN THE

FIFTEENTH, SIXTEENTH, AND SEVENTEENTH

CENTURIES.

BY

HENRY HALLAM, F.R.A.S.

FOREIGN ASSOCIATE OF THE ACADEMY OF MORAL AND POLITICAL
SCIENCES IN THE FRENCH INSTITUTE.

De modo autem hujusmodi historiarum conscribendarum, illud imprimis monemus, ut materia et copia ejus, non tantum ab historicis et criticis petatur, verum etiam per singulas annorum centurias, aut etiam minora intervalia, seriatim libri præcipui, qui eo temporis spatio conscripti sunt, in consilium adhibeantur; ut ex eorum non perfectione (id enim infinitum quiddam esset), sed degustatione, et observatione argumenti, styli, methodi, genius illius temporis literarius, veluti incantatione quadam, a mortuis evocetur.—*Bacon de Augm. Scient.*

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PART II. — *continued.*

ON THE LITERATURE OF THE LATTER HALF OF THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, FROM 1550 TO 1600.

*Aristotelian Philosophers — Cesalpin — Opposite Schools of Philosophy — Telesio
— Jordano Bruno — Sanchez — Aconcio — Nizolius — Logic of Ramus.*

1. THE authority of Aristotle, as the great master of dogmatic philosophy, continued generally predominant through the sixteenth century. It has been already observed, that, besides the strenuous support of the Catholic clergy, and especially of the Sorbonne, who regarded all innovation with abhorrence, the Aristotelian philosophy had been received, through the influence of Melancthon, in the Lutheran universities. The reader must be reminded that, under the name of speculative philosophy we comprehend not only the logic and what was called ontology of the schools, but those physical theories of ancient or modern date, which, appealing less to experience than to assumed hypotheses, cannot be mingled, in a literary classification, with the researches of true science, such as we shall hereafter have to place under the head of natural philosophy.

Predominance of Aristotelian philosophy.

2. Brucker has made a distinction between the scholastic and the genuine Aristotelians; the former being chiefly conversant with the doctors of the middle ages, adopting their terminology, their distinctions, their dogmas, and relying with implicit deference on Scotus or Aquinas, though, in the progress of learning, they might make some use of the original master; while the latter, throwing off the yoke of the schoolmen, prided themselves on an equally complete submission to Aristotle himself. These were chiefly philosophers and physicians, as the former were theologians; and the difference of their objects suffices to account

Scholastic and genuine Aristotelians.

for the different lines in which they pursued them, and the lights by which they were guided.*

3. Of the former class, or successors and adherents of the old schoolmen, it might be far from easy, were it worth while, to furnish any distinct account. Their works are mostly of considerable scarcity; and none of the historians of philosophy, except perhaps Morhof, profess much acquaintance with them. It is sufficient to repeat that, among the Dominicans, Franciscans, and Jesuits, especially in Spain and Italy, the scholastic mode of argumentation was retained in their seminaries, and employed in prolix volumes, both upon theology and upon such parts of metaphysics and natural law as are allied to it. The reader may find some more information in Brucker, whom Buhle, saying the same things in the same order, may be presumed to have silently copied.†

4. The second class of Aristotelian philosophers, devoting themselves to physical science, though investigating it with a very unhappy deference to mistaken dogmas, might seem to offer a better hope of materials for history; and in fact we meet here with a very few names of men once celebrated and of some influence over the opinions of their age. But even here their writings prove to be not only forgotten, but incapable, as we may say, on account of their rare occurrence, and the improbability of their republication, of being ever again known.

5. The Italian schools, and especially those of Pisa and Padua, had long been celebrated for their adherence to Aristotelian principles, not always such as could justly be deduced from the writings of the Stagirite himself, but opposing a bulwark against novel speculation, as well as against the revival of the Platonic, or any other ancient philosophy. Simon Porta of the former university, and Cæsar Cremonini of the latter, stood at the head of the rigid Aristotelians; the one near the commencement of this period, the other about its close. Both these philosophers have been reproached with the tendency to atheism, so common in the Italians of this period. A similar imputation has fallen on

The former
class little
remembered.

The others
not much
better
known.

Schools of
Pisa and
Padua.

* Brucker, *Hist. Philos.* iv. 117. et post.

† Brucker, *ibid.* Buhle, ii. 448.

another professor of the university of Pisa, Cesalpini, who is said to have deviated from the strict system of Aristotle towards that of Averroes, though he did not altogether coincide even with the latter. The real merits of Cesalpin, in very different pursuits, it was reserved for a later age to admire. His "*Quæstiones Peripateticæ*," published in 1575, is a treatise on metaphysics, or the first philosophy, founded professedly upon Aristotelian principles, but with considerable deviation. This work is so scarce that Brucker had never seen it, but Buhle has taken much pains to analyse its very obscure contents. Paradoxical and unintelligible as they now appear, Cesalpin obtained a high reputation in his own age, and was denominated, by excellence, the philosopher. Nicolas Taurellus, a professor at Altdorf, denounced the "*Quæstiones Peripateticæ*" in a book to which, in allusion to his adversary's name, he gave the puerile title of *Alpes Cæsæ*.

6. The system of Cesalpin is one modification of that ancient hypothesis which, losing sight of all truth and experience in the love of abstraction, substitutes the barren unity of pantheism for religion, and a few incomprehensible paradoxes for the variety of science. Nothing, according to him, was substance which was not animated; but the particular souls which animate bodies are themselves only substances, because they are parts of the first substance, a simple, speculative, but not active intelligence, perfect and immovable, which is God. The reasonable soul, however, of mankind is not numerically one; for matter being the sole principle of plurality, and human intelligences being combined with matter, they are plural in number. He differed also from Averroes in maintaining the separate immortality of human souls; and while the philosopher of Cordova distinguished the one soul which he ascribed to mankind from the Deity, Cesalpin considered the individual soul as a portion, not of this common human intelligence, which he did not admit, but of the first substance, or Deity. His system was therefore more incompatible with theism, in any proper sense, than that of Averroes himself, and anticipated in some measure that of Spinoza, who gave a greater extension to his one substance, by comprehending all matter as well as spirit within it. Cesalpin also denied, and in this he went far from

Cesalpini.

Sketch of
his system.

his Aristotelian creed, any other than a logical difference between substances and accidents. I have no knowledge of the writings of Cesalpin except through Buhle; for though I confess that the "*Quæstiones Peripateticæ*", may be found in the British Museum*, it would scarce repay the labour to examine what is both erroneous and obscure.

7. The name of Cremonini, professor of philosophy for above forty years at Padua, is better known than Cremonini. his writings. These have become of the greatest scarcity. Brucker tells us he had not been able to see any of them, and Buhle had met with but two or three.† Those at which I have looked are treatises on the Aristotelian physics; they contain little of any interest; nor did I perceive that they countenance, though they may not repel, the charge of atheism sometimes brought against Cremonini, but which, if at all well-founded, seems rather to rest on external evidence. Cremonini, according to Buhle, refutes the Averroistic notion of an universal human intelligence. Gabriel Naudé, both in his letters, and in the records of his conversation called *Naudæana*, speaks with great admiration of Cremonini.‡ He had himself passed some years at Padua, and was at that time a disciple of the Aristotelian school in physics, which he abandoned after his intimacy with Gassendi.

8. Meantime the authority of Aristotle, great in name and respected in the schools, began to lose more and more of its influence over speculative minds. Cesalpin, an Aristotelian by profession, had gone wide in some points from his master. But others waged an open war as philosophical reformers. Francis Patrizzi, in his "Discussiones Peripateticæ" (1571 and 1581), appealed to prejudice with the arms of calumny, raking up the most unwarranted aspersions against the private life of

* Buhle, ii. 525. Brucker (iv. 222.) laments that he had never seen this book. It seems that there were few good libraries in Germany in Brucker's age, or at least that he had no access to them, for it is surprising how often he makes the same complaint. He had, however, seen a copy of the *Alpes Cæsar* of Taurellus,

and gives rather a long account both of the man and of the book. Ibid. and p. 300.

† Buhle, ii. 519.

‡ Some passages in the *Naudæana* tend to confirm the suspicion of irreligion, both with respect to Cremonini and Naudé himself.

Aristotle, to prepare the way for assailing his philosophy ; a warfare not the less unworthy, that it is often successful. In the case of Patrizzi it was otherwise : his book was little read ; and his own notions of philosophy, borrowed from the later Platonists, and that rabble of spurious writers who had misled Ficinus and Picus of Mirandola, dressed up by Patrizzi with a fantastic terminology, had little chance of subverting so well-established and acute a system as that of Aristotle.*

9. Bernard Telesio, a native of Cosenza, had greater success, and attained a more celebrated name. The first two books of his treatise, "*De Natura Rerum* ^{System of Telesio.} juxta Propria Principia," appeared at Rome in 1565 ; the rest was published in 1586. These contain an hypothesis more intelligible than that of Patrizzi, and less destitute of a certain apparent correspondence with the phænomena of nature. Two active incorporeal principles, heat and cold, contend with perpetual opposition for the dominion over a third, which is passive matter. Of these three all nature consists. The region of pure heat is in the heavens, in the sun and stars, where it is united with the most subtle matter ; that of cold in the centre of the earth, where matter is most condensed ; all between is their battle-field, in which they continually struggle, and alternately conquer. These principles are not only active, but intelligent, so far at least as to perceive their own acts and mutual impressions. Heat is the cause of motion ; cold is by nature immovable, and tends to keep all things in repose.†

10. Telesio has been generally supposed to have borrowed this theory from that of Parmenides, in which the antagonist principles of heat and cold had been employed in a similar manner. Buhle denies the identity of the two systems, and considers that of Telesio as more nearly allied to the Aristotelian, except in substituting heat and cold for the more abstract notions of form and privation. Heat and cold, it might rather perhaps be said, seem to be merely ill-chosen names for the hypothetical causes of motion and rest ; and the real laws of nature, with respect to both of these, were

* Buhle, ii. 548. Brucker, iv. 422.

† Brucker, iv. 449. Buhle, ii. 563. Ginguéné, vii. 501.

as little discoverable in the Telesian as in the more established theory. Yet its author perceived that the one possessed an expansive, the other a condensing power; and his principles of heat and cold bear a partial analogy to repulsion and attraction, the antagonist forces which modern philosophy employs. Lord Bacon was sufficiently struck with the system of Telesio to illustrate it in a separate fragment of the *Instauratio Magna*, though sensible of its inadequacy to solve the mysteries of nature; and a man of eccentric genius, Campanella, to whom we shall come hereafter, adopted it as the basis of his own wilder speculations. Telesio seems to have ascribed a sort of intelligence to plants, which his last-mentioned disciple carried to a strange excess of paradox.

11. The name of Telesio is perhaps hardly so well known at present as that of Jordano Bruno. Jordano Bruno. It was far otherwise formerly; and we do not find that the philosophy of this singular and unfortunate man attracted much further notice than to cost him his life. It may be doubted, indeed, whether the Inquisition at Rome did not rather attend to his former profession of protestantism and invectives against the church, than to the latent atheism it pretended to detect in his writings, which are at least as innocent as those of Cesalpin. The self-conceit of Bruno, his contemptuous language about Aristotle and his followers, the paradoxical strain, the obscurity and confusion, in many places, of his writings, we may add, his poverty and frequent change of place, had rendered him of little estimation in the eyes of the world. But in the last century the fate of Bruno excited some degree of interest about his opinions. Whether his hypotheses were truly atheistical became the subject of controversy; his works, by which it should have been decided, were so scarce that few could speak with knowledge of their contents; and Brucker, who inclines to think there was no sufficient ground for the imputation, admits that he had only seen one of Bruno's minor treatises. The later German philosophers, however, have paid more attention to these obscure books, from a similarity which they sometimes found in Bruno's theories to their own. Buhle has devoted above a hundred pages to this subject.* The Italian treatises

* Vol. ii. p. 604—730.

have within a few years been reprinted in Germany, and it is not uncommon in modern books to find an eulogy on the philosopher of Nola. I have not made myself acquainted with his Latin writings, except through the means of Buhle, who has taken a great deal of pains to explain them. The three principal Italian treatises are entitled, *La Cena de li Ceneri*, *Della Causa, Principio ed Uno*, and *Dell' Infinito Universo*. Each of these is in five dialogues. The *Cena de li Ceneri* contains a physical theory of the world, in which the author makes some show of geometrical diagrams, but deviates so often into rhapsodies of vanity and nonsense, that it is difficult to pronounce whether he had much knowledge of the science. Copernicus, to whose theory of the terrestrial motion Bruno entirely adheres, he praises as superior to any former astronomer; but intimates that he did not go far beyond vulgar prejudices, being more of a mathematician than a philosopher. The gravity of bodies he treats as a most absurd hypothesis, all natural motion, as he fancies, being circular. Yet he seems to have had some dim glimpse of what is meant by the composition of motions, asserting that the earth has four simple motions, out of which one is compounded.*

His Italian
works.

*Cena de li
Ceneri.*

12. The second, and much more important treatise, *Della Causa, Principio ed Uno*, professes to reveal the metaphysical philosophy of Bruno, a system which, at least in pretext, brought him to the stake at Rome, and the purport of which has been the theme of much controversy. The extreme scarcity of his writings has, no doubt, contributed to this variety of judgment; but though his style, strictly speaking, is not obscure, and he seems by no means inclined to conceal his meaning, I am not able to resolve with certainty the problem that Brucker and those whom he quotes have discussed.† Yet the system of Bruno, so far as I understand it from what I have read of his writings, and from Buhle's analysis of them, may be said to contain a sort of double pantheism. The world is animated by an omnipresent intelligent soul, the first cause of every form that matter can

*Della Causa,
Principio ed
Uno.*

* Dial. v. p. 120. (1830). These dialogues were written, or purport to have been written in England. He extols

Leicester, Walsingham, and especially Sidney.

† Brucker, vol. v. 52.

assume, but not of matter itself. This soul of the universe is the only physical agent, the interior artist that works in the vast whole, that calls out the plant from the seed and matures the fruit, that lives in all things, though they may not seem to live, and in fact do not, when unorganised, live separately considered, though they all partake of the universal life, and in their component parts may be rendered living. A table as a table, a coat as a coat, are not alive, but inasmuch as they derive their substance from nature, they are composed of living particles.* There is nothing so small or so unimportant, but that a portion of spirit dwells in it, and this spiritual substance requires but a proper subject to become a plant or an animal. Forms particular are in constant change; but the first form, being the source of all others, as well as the first matter, are eternal. The soul of the world is the constituent principle of the universe and of all its parts. And thus we have an intrinsic, eternal, self-subsistent principle of form, far better than that which the sophists feigned, whose substances are compounded and corruptible, and, therefore, nothing else than accidents.† Forms in particular are

* Thus Buhle, or at least his French translator; but the original words are different. Dico dunque che la tavola come tavola non è animata, nè la veste, nè il cuojo come cuojo, nè il vetro come vetro, *ma come cose naturali e composte hanno in se la materia e la forma.* Sia pur cosa quanto piccola e minima si voglia, ha in se parte di sostanza spirituale, la quale, se trova il soggetto disposto, si stende ad esser pianta, ad esser animale, e riceve membri de qual si voglia corpo, che comunemente si dice animato; per chè spirito si trova in tutte le cose, e non è minimo corpusculo, che non contegna cotal porzione in se, che non inanimi, p. 241. Buhle seems not to have understood the words in italics, which certainly are not remarkably plain, and to have substituted what he thought might pass for meaning.

The recent theories of equivocal generation, held by some philosophers, more on the Continent than in England, according to which all matter, or at least all matter susceptible of organisation by its elements, may become organised and living under peculiar circumstances, seem not very dissimilar to this system of Bruno.

† Or, quanto a la causa effettrice, dico l'efficiente fisico universale esser l'intelletto universale, ch'è la prima e principal facultà dell'anima del mondo, la qual è forma universale di quello. . . . L'intelletto universale è l'intima più reale e propria facultà, e parte potenziale dell'anima del mondo. Questo è uno medesimo ch'empie il tutto, illumina l'universo, e indirizza la natura à produrre le sue specie, come si conviene, e così ha rispetto à la produzione di cose naturali, come il nostro intelletto è la congrua produzione di specie razionali. . . . Questo è nominato da Platonicci fabbro del mondo. p. 235.

Dunque abbiamo un principio intrinseco formale eterno e sussistente, incomparabilmente migliore di quello, che han finto li sophisti, che versano circa gl'accidenti, ignoranti de la sostanza de le cose, e che vengono a ponere le sustanze corrottibili, perchè quello chiamano massimamente, primamente e principalmente sustanza, che risulta da la composizione; il che non è altro, ch'uno accidente, che non contiene in se nulla stabilità e verità e si risolve in nulla. p. 242.

the accidents of matter, and we should make a divinity of matter like some Arabian peripatetics, if we did not recur to the living fountain of form—the eternal soul of the world. The first matter is neither corporeal nor sensible, it is eternal and unchangeable, the fruitful mother of forms and their grave. Form and matter, says Bruno, pursuing this fanciful analogy, may be compared to male and female. Form never errs, is never imperfect, but through its conjunction with matter; it might adopt the words of the father of the human race: *Mulier quam mihi dedisti, (la materia, la quale mi hai dato consorte,) me decepit (lei è cagione d' ogni mio peccato).* The speculations of Bruno now become more and more subtle, and he admits, that our understandings cannot grasp what he pretends to demonstrate—the identity of a simply active and simply passive principle; but the question really is, whether we can see any meaning in his propositions.

13. We have said that the system of Bruno seems to involve a double pantheism. The first is of a simple kind, the hylozoism, which has been exhibited in the preceding paragraph; it excludes a creative deity, in the strict sense of creation, but leaving an active provident intelligence, cannot be reckoned by any means chargeable with positive atheism. But to this soul of the world Bruno appears not to have ascribed the name of divinity.* The first form, and the first matter, and all the forms generated by the two, make, in his theory, but one being, the infinite unchangeable universe, in which is every thing, both in power and in act, and which, being all things collectively, is no one thing separately; it is form and not form, matter and not matter, soul and not soul. He expands this mysterious language much farther, resolving the whole nature of the deity into an abstract, barren, all embracing unity.†

Pantheism
of Bruno.

* Son tre sorti d' intelletto; il divino, ch' è tutto; questo mondano, che fa tutto; gli altri particolari, che si fanno tutte . . . E' vera causa efficiente (l' intelletto mondano) non tanto estrinseca, come anco intrinseca di tutte cose naturali. . . . Mi par, che detrahano à la divina bontà e à l' eccellenza di questo grande animale e simulacro del primo principio quelli, che non vogliano inten-

dere, nè affermare, il mondo con li suoi membri essere animato. p. 239.

† E' dunque l' universo uno, infinito, immobile. Uno dico è la possibilità assoluta, uno l' atto, una la forma o anima, una la materia o corpo, una la cosa, uno lo ente, uno il massimo e ottimo, il quale non deve posser essere compreso, e però infinibile e interminabile, e per tanto infinito e interminato, e per conseguenza

14. These bold theories of Jordano Bruno are chiefly contained in the treatise *Della Causa, Principio ed Uno*. In another entitled *Dell' Infinito Universo e Mondi*, which, like the former, is written in dialogue, he asserts the infinity of the universe, and the plurality of worlds. That the stars are suns, shining by their own light, that each has its revolving planets, now become the familiar creed of children, were then among the enormous paradoxes and capital offences of Bruno. His strong assertion of the Copernican theory was, doubtless, not quite so singular, yet this had but

immobile. Questo non si muove localmente; per chè non ha cosa fuor di sè, ove si trasporte, atteso chè sia il tutto. Non si genera; per chè non è altro essere, che lui possa desiderare o aspettare, atteso che abbia tutto lo essere. Non si corrompe; per chè non è altra cosa, in cui si cangi, atteso che lui sia ogni cosa. Non può sminuire o crescere, atteso ch' è infinito, a cui come non si può aggiungere, così è da cui non si può sottrarre, per ciò che lo infinito non ha parti proporzionali. Non è alterabile in altra disposizione, per chè non ha esterno, da cui patisca, e per cui venga in qualche affezione. Oltre chè per comprender tutte contrarietài nell' esser suo, in unità e convenienza, e nessuna inclinazione poter avere ad altro e novo essere, o pur ad altro e altro modo d' essere, non può esser soggetto di mutazione secundo qualità alcuna, nè può aver contrario o diverso, che l' alteri, per chè in lui è ogni cosa concorde. Non è materia, per chè non è figurato, nè figurabile non è terminato, nè terminabile. Non è forma, per chè non informa, nè figura altro, atteso che è tutto, è massimo, è uno, è universo. Non è misurabile, nè misura. Non si comprende; per chè non è maggior di sè. Non sì è compreso; per chè non è minor di sè. Non si agguaglia; per chè non è altro e altro, ma uno e medesimo. Essendo medesimo ed uno, non ha essere ed essere; et per chè non ha essere ed essere, non ha parti e parti; e per ciò che non ha parte e parte, non è composto. Questo è termine di sorte, chè non è termine; è talmente forma, chè non è forma; è talmente materia, chè non è materia; è talmente anima, chè non è anima; per chè è il tutto indifferentemente, e però è uno, l' universo è uno. p. 280.

Ecco, come non è possibile, ma necessario, che l' ottimo, massimo incomprendibile è tutto, è par tutto, è in tutto, per chè come semplice ed indivisibile può esser tutto, esser per tutto, essere in tutto. E così non è stato vanamente detto, che Giove empie tutte le cose, inabitata tutte le parti dell' universo, è centro di ciò, che ha l' essere uno in tutto, e per cui uno è tutto. Il quale, essendo tutte le cose, e comprendendo tutto l' essere in se, viene a far, che ogni cosa sia in ogni cosa. Ma mi direste, per chè dunque le cose si cangiano, la materia particolare si forza ad altre forme? vi rispondo, che non è mutazione, che cerca altro essere, ma altro modo di essere. E questa è la differenza tra l' universo e le cose dell' universo; per chè nullo comprende tutto l' essere e tutti modi di essere; di queste ciascuna ha tutto l' essere, ma non tutti i modi di essere. p. 282.

The following sonnet by Bruno is characteristic of his mystical imagination; but we must not confound the personification of an abstract idea with theism:—

Causa, Principio, ed Uno sempiterno,
Onde l' esser, la vita, il moto pende,
E a lungo, a largo, e profondo si stende
Quanto si dice in ciel, terra ed inferno;
Con senso, con ragion, con mente scerno
Ch' alto, misura e conto non comprende,
Quel vigor, mole e numero, che tende
Oltre ogni inferior, mezzo e superno.
Cieco error, tempo avaro, ria fortuna,
Sorda invidia, vili rabbia, iniquo zelo,
Crudo cor, empio ingegno, strano ardore,
Non basteranno a fermi l' aria bruna,
Non mi porrann' avanti gl' occhi il velo,
Non faran mal, ch' il mio bel Sol non mire.

If I have quoted too much from Jordano Bruno it may be excused by the great rarity of his works, which has been the cause that some late writers have not fully seen the character of his speculations.

few proselytes in the sixteenth century. His other writings, of all which Buhle has furnished us with an account, are numerous; some of them relate to the art of Raymond Lully, which Bruno professed to esteem very highly; and in these mnemonical treatises he introduced much of his own theoretical philosophy. Others are more exclusively metaphysical, and designed to make his leading principles, as to unity, number, and form, more intelligible to the common reader. They are full, according to what we find in Brucker and Buhle, of strange and nonsensical propositions, such as men, unable to master their own crude fancies on subjects above their reach, are wont to put forth. None, however, of his productions, has been more often mentioned than the *Spaccio della Bestia Trionfante*, alleged by some to be full of his atheistical impieties, while others have taken it for a mere satire on the Roman church. This diversity was very natural in those who wrote of a book they had never seen. It now appears that this famous work is a general moral satire in an allegorical form, with little that could excite attention, and less that could give such offence as to provoke the author's death.*

15. Upon the whole, we may probably place Bruno in this province of speculative philosophy, though not high, yet above Cesalpin, or any of the school of Averroes. He has fallen into great errors, but they seem to have perceived no truth. His doctrine was not original; it came from the Eleatic philosophers, from Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists†, and in some measure from Plato himself; and it is ultimately, beyond doubt, of oriental origin. What seems most his own, and I must speak very doubtfully as to this, is the syncretism of the tenet of a pervading spirit, an *Anima Mundi*, which in itself is an imperfect theism, with

General
character of
his philo-
sophy.

* Ginguéné, vol. vii., has given an analysis of the *Spaccio della Bestia*.

† See a valuable analysis of the philosophy of Plotinus in Degerando's *Histoire Comparée des Systèmes*, iii. 357. (edit. 1823.) It will be found that his language with respect to the mystic supremacy of unity, is that of Bruno himself. Plotin, however, was not only theistic, but intensely religious, and if he

had come a century later would, instead of a heathen philosopher, have been one of the first names among the saints of the church. It is probable that his influence, as it is, has not been small in modelling the mystic theology. Scotus Erigena was of the same school, and his language about the first Monad is similar to that of Bruno. Degerando, vol. iv. p. 372.

the more pernicious hypothesis of an universal Monad, to which every distinct attribute, except unity, was to be denied. Yet it is just to observe that, in one passage already quoted in a note, Bruno expressly says, "there are three kinds of intelligence, the divine, which is every thing; the mundane, which does every thing; and the particular intelligences, which are all made by the second." The inconceivableness of ascribing intelligence to Bruno's universe, and yet thus distinguishing it as he does from the mundane intelligence, may not perhaps be a sufficient reason for denying him a place among theistic philosophers. But it must be confessed, that the general tone of these dialogues conveys no other impression than that of a pantheism, in which every vestige of a supreme intelligence, beyond his soul of the world, is effaced.*

16. The system, if so it may be called, of Bruno, was essentially dogmatic, reducing the most subtle and incomprehensible mysteries into positive aphorisms of science. Sanchez, a Portuguese physician, settled as a public instructor at Toulouse, took a different course; the preface of his treatise, *Quod Nihil Scitur*, is dated from that city in 1576; but no edition is known to have existed before 1581.† This work is a mere tissue of sceptical fallacies, propounded, however, with a confident tone not unusual in that class of sophists. He begins abruptly with these words: *Nec unum hoc scio, me nihil scire, conjector tamen nec me nec alios. Hæc mihi vexillum propositio sit, hæc sequenda venit, Nihil Scitur. Hanc si probare scivero, merito concludam nihil sciri; si nescivero, hoc ipso melius; id enim asserebam.* A good deal more follows in the same sophistical style of cavillation. *Hoc unum semper maxime ab aliquo expetivi, quod modo facio, ut vere diceret an aliquid*

* I can hardly agree with Mr. Whewell, in supposing that Jordano Bruno "probably had a considerable share in introducing the new opinions (of Copernicus) into England." *Hist. of Inductive Sciences*, i. 385. Very few in England seem to have embraced these opinions; and those who did so, like Wright and Gilbert, were men who had somewhat better reasons than the *ipse dixit* of a wandering Italian.

† Brucker, iv. 541., with this fact before his eyes, strangely asserts Sanchez to have been born in 1562. Buhle and Cousin copy him without hesitation. Antonio is ignorant of any edition of "*Quod Nihil Scitur*," except that of Rotterdam in 1649; and ignorant also that the book contains any thing remarkable.

perfecte sciret; nusquam tamen inveni, præterquam in sapiente illo proboque viro Socrate (licet et Pyrrhonii, Academici et Sceptici vocati, cum Favorino id etiam assererent) quod hoc unum sciebat quod nihil sciret. Quo solo dicto mihi doctissimus indicatur; quanquam nec adhuc omnino mihi explêrit mentem; cum et illud unum, sicut alia, ignoraret.*

17. Sanchez puts a few things well; but his scepticism, as we perceive, is extravagant. After descanting on Montaigne's favourite topic, the various manners and opinions of mankind, he says, Non finem faceremus si omnes omnium mores recensere vellemus. An tu his eandem rationem, quam nobis, omnino putes? Mihi non verisimile videtur. Nihil tamen ambo scimus. Negabis forsân tales aliquos esse homines. Non contendam; sic ab aliis accepi.† Yet, notwithstanding his sweeping denunciation of all science in the boldest tone of Pyrrhonism, Sanchez comes at length to admit the possibility of a limited or probable knowledge of truth; and, as might perhaps be expected, conceives that he had himself attained it. "There are two modes," he observes, "of discovering truth, by neither of which do men learn the real nature of things, but yet obtain some kind of insight into them. These are experiment and reason, neither being sufficient alone; but experiments, however well conducted, do not show us the nature of things, and reason can only conjecture them. Hence there can be no such thing as perfect science; and books have been employed to eke out the deficiencies of our own experience; but their confusion, prolixity, multitude, and want of trust-worthiness prevents this resource from being of much value, nor is life long enough for so much study. Besides, this perfect knowledge requires a perfect recipient of it, and a right disposition of the subject of knowledge, which two I have never seen. Reader, if you have met with them, write me word." He concludes this treatise by promising another, "in which we shall explain the method of knowing truth, as far as human weakness will permit;" and, as his self-complacency rises above his affected scepticism, adds, mihi in animo est firmam et facilem quantum possim scientiam fundare.

* P. 10.

† P. 39.

18. This treatise of Sanchez bears witness to a deep sense of the imperfections of the received systems in science and reasoning, and to a restless longing for truth, which strikes us in other writers of this latter period of the sixteenth century. Lord Bacon, I believe, has never alluded to Sanchez, and such paradoxical scepticism was likely to disgust his strong mind; yet we may sometimes discern signs of a Baconian spirit in the attacks of our Spanish philosopher on the syllogistic logic, as being built on abstract, and not significant terms, and in his clear perception of the difference between a knowledge of words and one of things.

19. What Sanchez promised and Bacon gave, a new method of reasoning, by which truth might be better determined than through the common dialectics, had been partially attempted already by Aconcio, mentioned in the last chapter as one of those highly-gifted Italians who fled for religion to a Protestant country. Without openly assailing the authority of Aristotle, he endeavoured to frame a new discipline of the faculties for the discovery of truth. His treatise, *De Methodo, sive Recta Investigandarum Tradendarumque Scientiarum Ratione*, was published at Basle in 1558, and was several times reprinted, till later works, those especially of Bacon and Des Cartes, caused it to be forgotten. Aconcio defines logic, the right method of thinking and teaching, *recta contemplandi docendique ratio*. Of the importance of method, or right order in prosecuting our inquiries, he thinks so highly that if thirty years were to be destined to intellectual labour, he would allot two-thirds of the time to acquiring dexterity in this art, which seems to imply that he did not consider it very easy. To know any thing, he tells us, is to know what it is, or what are its causes and effects. All men have the germs of knowledge latent in them, as to matters cognisable by human faculties; it is the business of logic to excite and develope them: *notiones illas seu scintillas sub cinere latentes detegere aptèque ad res obscuras illustrandas applicare.**

20. Aconcio next gives rules at length for constructing definitions, by attending to the genus and differentia. These rules are good, and might very properly find a place in a

book of logic; but whether they contain much that would vainly be sought in other writers, we do not determine. He comes afterwards to the methods of distributing a subject. The analytic method is by all means to be preferred for the investigation of truth, and, contrary to what Galen and others have advised, even for communicating it to others; since a man can learn that of which he is ignorant, only by means of what is better known, whether he does this himself, or with help of a teacher; the only process being, a notioribus ad minus nota. In this little treatise of Aconcio, there seem to be the elements of a sounder philosophy, and a more steady direction of the mind to discover the reality of things than belonged to the logic of the age, whether as taught by the Aristotelians or by Ramus. It has not, however, been quoted by Lord Bacon, nor are we sure that he has profited by it.

21. A more celebrated work than this by Aconcio is one by the distinguished scholar, Marius Nizolius, "*De Veris Principiis et Vera Ratione Philosophandi contra Pseudo-Philosophos.*" (Parma, 1553.) It owes, however, what reputation it possesses to Leibnitz, who reprinted it in 1670, with a very able preface, one of his first contributions to philosophy. The treatise itself, he says, was almost strangled in the birth; and certainly the invectives of Nizolius against the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle could have had little chance of success in a country like Italy, where that authority was more undoubted and durable than in any other. The aim of Nizolius was to set up the best authors of Greece and Rome and the study of philology against the scholastic terminology. But it must be owned that this polite literature was not sufficient for the discovery of truth; nor does the book keep up to the promise of its title, though, by endeavouring to eradicate barbarous sophistry, he may be said to have laboured in the interests of real philosophy. The preface of Leibnitz animadverts on what appeared to him some metaphysical errors of Nizolius, especially an excess of nominalism, which tended to undermine the foundations of certainty, and his presumptuous scorn of Aristotle.*

* Nizolius maintained that universal terms were only particulars—collective sumpta. Leibnitz replies, that they are particulars—distributive sumpta; as,

His own object was rather to recommend the treatise as a model of philosophical language without barbarism, than to bestow much praise on its philosophy. Brucker has spoken of it rather slightly, and Buhle with much contempt. I am not prepared by a sufficient study of its contents to pass any judgment; but Buhle's censure has appeared to me somewhat unfair. Dugald Stewart, who was not acquainted with what the latter has said, thinks Nizolius deserving of more commendation than Brucker has assigned to him.* He argues against all dialectics, and therefore differs from Ramus; concluding with two propositions as the result of his whole book: — That as many logicians and metaphysicians as are any where found, so many capital enemies of truth will then and there exist; and that, so long as Aristotle shall be supreme in the logic and metaphysics of the schools, so long will error and barbarism reign over the mind. There is nothing very deep or pointed in this summary of his reasoning.

22. The *Margarita Antoniana*, by Gomez Pereira, published at Medina del Campo in 1554, has been chiefly remembered as the ground of one of the many charges against Des Cartes, for appropriating

*Margarita
Antoniana of
Pereira.*

omnis homo est animal means, that every one man is an animal; not that the genus man, taken collectively, is an animal. Nec vero Nizolii error hic levis est; habet enim magnum aliquid in recessu. Nam si universalia nihil aliud sunt quam singularium collectiones, sequitur, scientiam nullam haberi per demonstrationem, quod et infra colligit Nizolius, sed collectionem singularium seu inductionem. Sed ea ratione prorsus evertuntur scientiæ, ac Sceptici vicere. Nam nunquam constitui possunt ea ratione propositiones perfecte universales, quia inductione nunquam certus es, omnia individua a te tentata esse; sed semper intra hanc propositionem subsistes; omnia illa quæ expertus sum sunt talia; cum vero non possit esse ulla ratio universalis, semper manebit possibile innumera quæ tu non sis expertus esse diversa. Hinc jam patet inductionem per se nihil producere, ne certitudinem quidem moralem, sine adminiculo propositionum non ab inductione, sed ratione universali prudentium;

nam si essent et adminicula ab inductione, indigerent novis adminiculis, nec haberetur certitudo moralis in infinitum. Sed certitudo moralis ab inductione sperari plane non potest, additis quibuscunque adminiculis, et propositionem hanc, totum magis esse sua parte, sola inductione nunquam perfecte sciemus. Mox enim prodibit, qui negabit ob peculiarem quondam rationem in aliis nondum tentatis veram esse, quemadmodum ex facto sciimus Gregorium a Sancto Vincentio negasse totum esse majus sua parte, in angulis saltem contactus, alios in infinito; et Thomam Hobbes (at quem virum!) cœpisse dubitare de propositione illa geometrica a Pythagora demonstrata, et hecatombæ sacrificio digna habita; quod ego non sine stupore legi. This extract is not very much to the purpose of the text, but it may please some of those who take an interest in such speculations.

* Dissertation on Progress of Philosophy, p. 38.

unacknowledged opinions of his predecessors. The book is exceedingly scarce, which has been strangely ascribed to the efforts of Des Cartes to suppress it.* There is, however, a copy of the original edition in the British Museum, and it has been reprinted in Spain. It was an unhappy theft, if theft it were; for what Pereira maintained was precisely the most untenable proposition of the great French philosopher — the absence of sensation in brutes. Pereira argues against this with an extraordinary disregard of common phenomena, on the assumption of certain maxims which cannot be true, if they contradict inferences from our observation far more convincing than themselves. We find him give a curious reason for denying that we can infer the sensibility of brutes from their outward actions; namely, that this would prove too much, and lead us to believe them rational beings; instancing among other stories, true, or false, of apparent sagacity, the dog in pursuit of a hare, who, coming where two roads meet, if he traces no scent on the first, takes the other without trial.† Pereira is a rejecter of Aristotelian despotism; and observes that in matters of speculation and not of faith, no authority is to be respected.‡ Notwithstanding this assertion of freedom, he seems to be wholly enchained by the metaphysics of the schools; nor should I have thought the book worthy of notice, but for its scarcity and the circumstance above mentioned about Des Cartes.

23. These are, as far as I know, the only works deserving of commemoration in the history of speculative philosophy. A few might easily be inserted from the catalogues of libraries, or from biographical collections, as well as from the learned labours of Morhof, Brucker, Tennemann, and Buhle. It is also not to be doubted, that in treatises of a different character, theological, moral, or medical, very many passages, worthy of remembrance for their truth, their ingenuity, or originality, might be discovered, that bear upon the best

* Biogr. Univ. Brunet, Manuel du Libraire. Bayle has a long article on Pereira, but though he says the book had been shown to him, he wanted probably the opportunity to read much of it.

According to Brunet, several copies have been sold in France, some of them

at no great price. The later edition, of 1749, is of course cheaper.

† Fol. 18. This is continually told of dogs; but does any sensible sportsman confirm it by his own experience? I ask for information only.

‡ Fol. 4.

methods of reasoning, the philosophy of the human mind, the theory of natural religion, or the general system of the material world.

24. We should not, however, conclude this chapter without
Logic of
Ramus :
its success.
adverting to the dialectical method of Ramus, whom we left at the middle of the century, struggling against all the arms of orthodox logic in the university of Paris. The reign of Henry II. was more propitious to him than that of Francis. In 1551, through the patronage of the Cardinal of Lorraine, Ramus became royal professor of rhetoric and philosophy ; and his new system which, as has been mentioned, comprehended much that was important in the art of rhetoric, began to make numerous proselytes. Omer Talon, known for a treatise on eloquence, was among the most ardent of these ; and to him we owe our most authentic account of the contest of Ramus with the Sorbonne. The latter were not conciliated, of course, by the success of their adversary ; and Ramus having adhered to the Huguenot party in the civil feuds of France, it has been ascribed to the malignity of one of his philosophical opponents, that he perished in the massacre of St. Bartholomew. He had, however, already, by personally travelling and teaching in Germany, spread the knowledge of his system over that country. It was received in some of the German universities with great favour, notwithstanding the influence which Melanchthon's name retained, and which had been entirely thrown into the scale of Aristotle. The Ramists and Anti-Ramists contended in books of logic through the rest of this century, as well as afterwards ; but this was the principal period of Ramus's glory. In Italy he had few disciples ; but France, England, and still more Scotland and Germany, were full of them. Andrew Melville introduced the logic of Ramus at Glasgow. It was resisted for some time at St. Andrew's, but ultimately became popular in all the Scottish universities.* Scarce any eminent public school, says Brucker, can be named, in which the Ramists were not teachers. They encountered an equally zealous militia under the Aristotelian standard ; while some, with the spirit of compromise, which always takes possession of a few minds,

* M'Crie's *Life of Melville*, ii. 306.

though it is rarely very successful, endeavoured to unite the two methods, which in fact do not seem essentially exclusive of each other. It cannot be required of me to give an account of books so totally forgotten, and so uninteresting in their subjects as these dialectical treatises on either side. The importance of Ramus in philosophical history is not so much founded on his own deserts, as on the effect he produced in loosening the fetters of inveterate prejudice, and thus preparing the way, like many others of his generation, for those who were to be the restorers of genuine philosophy.*

* Brucker, v. 576. Buhle ii. 601.

CHAPTER IV.

HISTORY OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND
OF JURISPRUDENCE, FROM 1550 TO 1600.

SECT. I. — ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Soto — Hooker — Essays of Montaigne — Their Influence on the Public — Italian and English Moralists.

1. IT must naturally be supposed that by far the greater part of what was written on moral obligations in the sixteenth century will be found in the theological quarter of ancient libraries. The practice of auricular confession brought with it an entire science of casuistry, which had gradually been wrought into a complicated system. Many, once conspicuous writers in this province, belong to the present period ; but we shall defer the subject till we arrive at the next, when it had acquired a more prominent importance.

2. The first original work of any reputation in ethical philosophy since the revival of letters, and which, being apparently designed in great measure for the chair of the confessional, serves as a sort of link between the class of mere casuistry and the philosophical systems of morals which were to follow, is by Dominic Soto, a Spanish Dominican, who played an eminent part in the deliberations of the council of Trent, in opposition both to the papal court and to the theologians of the Scotist, or, as it was then reckoned by its adversaries, the Semi-Pelagian school. This folio volume, entitled *De Justitia et Jure*, was first published, according to the *Biographie Universelle*, at Antwerp, in 1568. It appears to be founded on the writings of Thomas Aquinas, the polar star of every true Dominican. Every question is

Soto De
Justitia.

discussed with that remarkable observation of distinctions, and that unrelenting desire both to comprehend and to distribute a subject, which is displayed in many of these forgotten folios, and ought to inspire us with reverence for the zealous energy of their authors, even when we find it impossible, as must generally be the case, to read so much as a few pages consecutively, or when we light upon trifling and insufficient arguments in the course of our casual glances over the volume.

3. Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity might seem more properly to fall under the head of theology; but the first book of this work being by much the best, ^{Hooker.} Hooker ought rather to be reckoned among those who have weighed the principles, and delineated the boundaries, of moral and political science. I have, on another occasion*, done full justice to the wisdom and eloquence of this earliest among the great writers of England, who, having drunk at the streams of ancient philosophy, has acquired from Plato and Tully somewhat of their redundancy and want of precision, with their comprehensiveness of observation and their dignity of soul. The reasonings of Hooker, though he bore in the ensuing century the surname of judicious, are not always safe or satisfactory, nor, perhaps, can they be reckoned wholly clear or consistent; his learning, though beyond that of most English writers in that age, is necessarily uncritical; and his fundamental principle, the mutability of ecclesiastical government, has as little pleased those for whom he wrote as those whom he repelled by its means.† But he stood out at

* Constitut. Hist. Engl. chap. iv.

† [The phrase, "fundamental principle," may appear too strong to those who have not paid much attention to the subject, especially when a man of so much ability as the last editor of the Ecclesiastical Polity has laboured to persuade his readers that Hooker maintained the divine right of episcopal government. By a fundamental principle, I mean a leading theorem which determines the character of a book, and gives it its typical form, as distinguished from others which may have the same main object in view. Thus, to take a very different instance, the main object of

Homer was to celebrate the prowess of the Greeks in the war of Troy; but the mode in which he presented this, the typical character of the Iliad, was the illustration of one memorable portion of that contest, the quarrel of Achilles with Agamemnon. What the wrath of Achilles was to Homer, that was the mutability of positive laws to Hooker; a leading idea, which gave its peculiar form to his work, and through which his ultimate end, the defence of the ecclesiastical constitution of his country, was to be effected. It may be inquired of those who think otherwise, why the first book of the Ecclesiastical Polity was written at all?

a vast height above his predecessors and contemporaries in the English church, and was, perhaps, the first of our writers who had any considerable acquaintance with the philosophers of Greece, not merely displayed in quotation, of which others may have sometimes set an example, but in a spirit of reflection and comprehensiveness which the study of antiquity alone could have infused. The absence of minute ramifications of argument, in which the schoolmen loved to spread out, distinguishes Hooker from the writers who had been trained in those arid dialectics, such as Soto or Suarez : but, as I have hinted, considering the depth and difficulty of several questions that he deals with in the first book of the *Polity*, we might wish for a little less of the expanded palm of rhetoric, and somewhat of more dialectical precision in the reasoning.*

Was it merely to display his reasoning or eloquence upon a subject far more appertaining to philosophy than to theology? Surely this would have been idle ostentation, especially in the very outset of his work. But those who read it can hardly fail to perceive, that it is the broad basis of what is to follow in the second and third books; that in laying down the distinction between natural and positive law, and affirming the former alone to be immutable, he prepares the way for denying the main position of his puritan antagonists, that all things contained in Scripture are of perpetual obligation. It is his doctrine, that where God has not declared a positive command to be perpetual, it may be dispensed with by lawful human authority; and in the third book he, in express words, asserts this of ecclesiastical government. Whether he is right or no, we do not here inquire; but those who prefer an honest avowal of truth to that small party interest, which is served by counting all names as on our side, cannot feel any hesitation about his opinion on this point. I repeat, that it may be called his fundamental principle.

I do not, however, deny that, in the seventh book of the *Ecclesiastical Polity*, written several years after the former, there are signs that Hooker had in some degree abandoned the broad principle of indifferency, and that he occasionally seems to contend for episcopal government as always best, though not always

indispensable. Whether this were owing to the natural effects of controversy, in rendering the mind tenacious of every point it has to maintain, or rather to the bolder course of defence which Saravia and Bancroft had latterly taught the advocates of the church to take, I do not determine. But, even in this book, we shall not find that he ever asserts in terms the perpetual obligation of episcopacy; nor does he, I believe, so much as allude to what is commonly called the apostolical succession, or transmission of spiritual power from one bishop to another; a question wholly distinct from that of mere ecclesiastical government, though perpetually confounded with it. — 1842.]

* It has been shown with irresistible proof by the last editor of Hooker, that the sixth book of the *Ecclesiastical Polity* has been lost; that which we read as such being, with the exception of a few paragraphs at the beginning, altogether a different production, though bearing marks of the same author. This is proved, not only by its want of relation to the general object of the work, and to the subject announced in the title of this very book, but by the remarkable fact, that a series of observations by two friends of Hooker on the sixth book are extant, and published in the last edition, which were obviously designed for a totally different treatise from that which has always passed for the sixth book of the *Ecclesiastical Polity*. This can only be explained by the confusion in which Hooker's ma-

4. Hooker, like most great moral writers both of antiquity and of modern ages, rests his positions on one solid basis, the eternal obligation of natural law. A His theory of natural law. small number had been inclined to maintain an arbitrary power of the Deity, even over the fundamental principles of right and wrong; but the sounder theologians seem to have held that, however the will of God may be the proper source of moral obligation in mankind, concerning which they were not more agreed then than they have been since, it was impossible for him to deviate from his immutable rectitude and holiness. They were unanimous also in asserting the capacity of the human faculties to discern right from wrong, little regarding what they deemed the prejudices or errors that had misled many nations, and more or less influenced the majority of mankind.

5. But there had never been wanting those who, struck by the diversity of moral judgments and behaviour Doubts felt by others. among men, and especially under circumstances of climate, manners, or religion, different from our own, had found it hard to perceive how reason could be an unerring arbiter, when there was so much discrepancy in what she professed to have determined. The relations of travellers, continually pressing upon the notice of Europe in the sixteenth century, and perhaps rather more exaggerated than at present, in describing barbarous tribes, afforded continual aliment to the suspicion. It was at least evident, without any thing that could be called unreasonable scepticism, that these diversities ought to be well explained and sifted before

nuscripts were left at his death, and upon which suspicions of interpolation have been founded. Such suspicions are not reasonable; and, notwithstanding the exaggerated language which has sometimes been used, I think it very questionable whether any more perfect manuscript was ever in existence. The reasoning in the seventh and eighth books appears as elaborate, the proofs as full, the grammatical structure as perfect, as in the earlier books; and the absence of those passages of eloquence, which we occasionally find in the former, cannot afford even a presumption that the latter were designed to

be written over again. The eighth book is manifestly incomplete, wanting some discussions which the author had announced; but this seems rather adverse to the hypothesis of a more elaborate copy. The more probable inference is, that Hooker was interrupted by death before he had completed his plan. It is possible also that the conclusion of the eighth book has been lost like the sixth. All the stories on this subject in the *Life of Hooker* by Walton, who seems to have been a man always too credulous of anecdote, are unsatisfactory to any one who exacts real proof.

we acquiesced in the pleasant conviction that we alone could be in the right.

6. The *Essays* of Montaigne, the first edition of which appeared at Bordeaux in 1580*, make in several respects an epoch in literature, less on account of their real importance, or the novel truths they contain, than of their influence upon the taste and the opinions of Europe. They are the first *provocatio ad populum*, the first appeal from the porch and the academy to the haunts of busy and of idle men, the first book that taught the unlearned reader to observe and reflect for himself on questions of moral philosophy. In an age when every topic of this nature was treated systematically and in a didactic form, he broke out without connexion of chapters, with all the digressions that levity and garrulous egotism could suggest, with a very delightful, but, at that time, most unusual rapidity of transition from seriousness to gaiety. It would be to anticipate much of what will demand attention in the ensuing century, were we to mention here the conspicuous writers who, more or less directly, and with more or less of close imitation, may be classed in the school of Montaigne; it embraces, in fact, a large proportion of French and English literature, and especially of that which has borrowed his title of *Essays*. No prose writer of the sixteenth century has been so generally read, nor probably has given so much delight. Whatever may be our estimate of Montaigne as a philosopher, a name which he was far from arrogating, there will be but one opinion of the felicity and brightness of his genius.

7. It is a striking proof of these qualities, that, in reading his *Essays*, we can hardly help believing him to have struck out all his thoughts by a spontaneous effort of his mind, and to have fallen afterwards upon his quotations and examples by happy accident. I have little doubt but that the process was different; and that, either by dint of memory, though he absolutely disclaims the possessing a good one, or by the usual method of common-placing, he had made his reading instrumental to excite his own ingenious and fearless understanding. His extent of learning was by

* This edition contains only the first and second books of the *Essays*; the third was published in that of Paris, 1588.

no means great for that age, but the whole of it was brought to bear on his object; and it is a proof of Montaigne's independence of mind that, while a vast mass of erudition was the only regular passport to fame, he read no authors but such as were most fitted to his own habits of thinking. Hence he displays an unity, a self-existence, which we seldom find so complete in other writers. His quotations, though they perhaps make more than one half of his *Essays*, seem parts of himself, and are like limbs of his own mind, which could not be separated without laceration. But over all is spread a charm of a fascinating simplicity, and an apparent abandonment of the whole man to the easy inspiration of genius, combined with a good-nature, though rather too epicurean and destitute of moral energy, which, for that very reason, made him a favourite with men of similar dispositions, for whom courts, and camps, and country mansions, were the proper soil.

8. Montaigne is superior to any of the ancients in liveliness, in that careless and rapid style, where one thought springs naturally, but not consecutively, from another, by analogical rather than deductive connexion; so that, while the reader seems to be following a train of arguments, he is imperceptibly hurried to a distance by some contingent association. This may be observed in half his *Essays*, the titles of which often give us little insight into their general scope. Thus the apology for Raymond de Sebonde is soon forgotten in the long defence of moral Pyrrhonism, which occupies the twelfth chapter of the second book. He sometimes makes a show of coming back from his excursions; but he has generally exhausted himself before he does so. This is what men love to practise (not advantageously for their severer studies) in their own thoughts; they love to follow the casual associations that lead them through pleasant labyrinths—as one riding along the high road is glad to deviate a little into the woods, though it may sometimes happen that he will lose his way, and find himself far remote from his inn. And such is the conversational style of lively and eloquent old men. We converse with Montaigne, or rather hear him talk; it is almost impossible to read his *Essays* without thinking that he speaks to us; we see his cheerful brow, his sparkling eye,

his negligent but gentlemanly demeanour : we picture him in his arm-chair, with his few books round the room, and Plutarch on the table.

9. The independence of his mind produces great part of the charm of his writing ; it redeems his vanity, without which it could not have been so fully displayed, or, perhaps, so powerfully felt. In an age of literary servitude, when every province into which reflection could wander was occupied by some despot ; when, to say nothing of theology, men found Aristotle, or Ulpian, or Hippocrates, at every turning to dictate their road, it was gratifying to fall in company with a simple gentleman who, with much more reading than generally belonged to his class, had the spirit to ask a reason for every rule.

10. Montaigne has borrowed much, besides his quotations, from the few ancient authors whom he loved to study. In one passage he even says that his book is wholly compiled from Plutarch and Seneca ; but this is evidently intended to throw the critics off their scent. " I purposely conceal the authors from whom I borrow," he says in another place, " to check the presumption of those who are apt to censure what they find in a modern. I am content that they should lash Seneca and Plutarch through my sides."* These were his two favourite authors ; and in order to judge of the originality of Montaigne in any passage, it may often be necessary to have a considerable acquaintance with their works. " When I write," he says, " I care not to have books about me ; but I can hardly be without a Plutarch."† He knew little Greek, but most editions at that time had a Latin translation : he needed not for Plutarch to go beyond his own language. Cicero he did not much admire, except the epistles to Atticus. He esteemed the moderns very slightly in comparison with antiquity, though praising Guicciardini and Philip de Comines. Dugald Stewart observes, that Montaigne cannot be suspected of affectation, and therefore must himself have believed what he says of the badness of his memory, forgetting, as he tells us, the names of the commonest things, and even of those he constantly saw. But his vanity led him to talk perpetually of himself ; and, as often happens to vain men, he

* l. ii. c. 32.

† l. ii. c. 10.

would rather talk of his own failings than of any foreign subject. He could not have had a very defective memory so far as it had been exercised, though he might fall into the common mistake of confounding his inattention to ordinary objects with weakness of the faculty.

11. Montaigne seldom defines or discriminates; his mind had great quickness, but little subtilty; his carelessness and impatience of labour rendered his views practically one-sided; for though he was sufficiently free from prejudice to place the objects of consideration in different lights, he wanted the power, or did not use the diligence, to make that comparative appreciation of facts which is necessary to distinguish the truth. He appears to most advantage in matters requiring good sense and calm observation, as in the education of children. The twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth chapters of the first book, which relate to this subject, are among the best in the collection. His excellent temper made him an enemy to the harshness and tyranny so frequent at that time in the management of children, as his clear understanding did to the pedantic methods of overloading and misdirecting their faculties. It required some courage to argue against the grammarians who had almost monopolised the admiration of the world. Of these men Montaigne observes, that though they have strong memories, their judgment is usually very shallow; making only an exception for Turnebus, who, though in his opinion the greatest scholar that had existed for a thousand years, had nothing of the pedant about him but his dress. In all the remarks of Montaigne on human character and manners, we find a liveliness, simplicity, and truth. They are such as his ordinary opportunities of observation, or his reading suggested; and though several writers have given proofs of deeper reflection or more watchful discernment, few are so well calculated to fall in with the apprehension of the general reader.

12. The scepticism of Montaigne, concerning which so much has been said, is not displayed in religion, for he was a steady Catholic, though his faith seems to have been rather that of acquiescence than conviction, nor in such subtilties of metaphysical Pyrrhonism as we find in Sanchez, which had no attraction for his careless nature. But he had read much

of Sextus Empiricus, and might perhaps have derived something from his favourite Plutarch. He had also been forcibly struck by the recent narratives of travellers, which he sometimes received with a credulity as to evidence, not rarely combined with theoretical scepticism, and which is too much the fault of his age to bring censure on an individual. It was then assumed that all travellers were trustworthy, and still more that none of the Greek and Roman authors have recorded falsehoods. Hence he was at a loss to discover a general rule of moral law, as an implanted instinct, or necessary deduction of common reason, in the varying usages and opinions of mankind. But his scepticism was less extravagant and unreasonable at that time than it would be now. Things then really doubtful have been proved, and positions, entrenched by authority which he dared not to scruple, have been overthrown *; truth, in retiring from her outposts, has become more unassailable in her citadel.

13. It may be deemed a symptom of wanting a thorough love of truth when a man overrates, as much as when he overlooks, the difficulties he deals with. Montaigne is perhaps not exempt from this failing. Though sincere and candid in his general temper, he is sometimes more ambitious of setting forth his own ingenuity than desirous to come to the bottom of his subject. Hence he is apt to run into the fallacy common to this class of writers, and which La Mothe le Vayer employed much more—that of confounding the variations of the customs of mankind in things morally indifferent with those which affect the principles of duty; and hence the serious writers on philosophy in the next age, Pascal, Arnauld, Malebranche, animadvert with much severity on Montaigne. They considered him, not perhaps unjustly, as an enemy to the candid and honest investigation of truth, both by his sceptical bias, and by the great indifference of his temperament; scarcely acknowledging so much as was due the service he had done by chasing away the servile pedantry of the schools, and preparing the road for closer reasoners than himself. But the very tone of their censures

* Montaigne's scepticism was rightly exercised on witchcraft and other supernatural stories; and he had probably some weight in discrediting those superstitions. See l. iii. c. 11.

is sufficient to prove the vast influence he had exerted over the world.

14. Montaigne is the earliest classical writer in the French language, the first whom a gentleman is ashamed not to have read. So long as an unaffected style and an appearance of the utmost simplicity and good nature shall charm, so long as the lovers of desultory and cheerful conversation shall be more numerous than those who prefer a lecture or a sermon, so long as reading is sought by the many as an amusement in idleness, or a resource in pain, so long will Montaigne be among the favourite authors of mankind. I know not whether the greatest blemish of his *Essays* has much impeded their popularity; they led the way to the indecency too characteristic of French literature, but in no writer on serious topics, except Bayle, more habitual than in Montaigne. It may be observed, that a larger portion of this quality distinguishes the third book, published after he had attained a reputation, than the two former. It is also more overspread by egotism; and it is not agreeable to perceive that the two leading faults of his disposition became more unrestrained and absorbing as he advanced in life.

15. The Italians have a few moral treatises of this period, but chiefly scarce and little read. The *Instituzioni Morali* of Alexander Piccolomini, the *Instituzioni di Tutta la Vita dell' Uomo Nato Nobile e in città Libera*, by the same author, the Latin treatise of Mazzoni de *Triplici Vita*, which, though we mention it here as partly ethical, seems to be rather an attempt to give a general survey of all science, are among the least obscure, though they have never been of much reputation in Europe.* But a more celebrated work, relating indeed to a minor department of ethics, the rules of polite and decorous behaviour, is the *Galateo* of Casa, bishop of Benevento, and an elegant writer of considerable reputation. This little treatise is not only accounted superior in style to most Italian prose, but serves

Writers on
morals in
Italy.

* For these books see Tiraboschi, Corniani, and Ginguéné. Nicéron, vol. xxiii., observes of Piccolomini, that he was the first who employed the Italian language in moral philosophy. This

must, however, be taken very strictly, for in a general sense of the word, we have seen earlier instances than his *Instituzioni Morali* in 1575.

to illustrate the manners of society in the middle of the sixteenth century. Some of the improprieties which he censures are such as we should hardly have expected to find in Italy, and almost remind us of a strange but graphic poem of one Dedekind, on the manners of Germany in the sixteenth century, called *Grobianus*. But his own precepts in other places, though hardly striking us as novel, are more refined, and relate to the essential principles of social intercourse, rather than to its conventional forms.* Casa wrote also a little book on the duties to be observed between friends of unequal ranks. The inferior, he advises, should never permit himself to jest upon his patron; but, if he is himself stung by any displeasing wit or sharp word, ought to receive it with a smiling countenance, and to answer so as to conceal his resentment. It is probable that this art was understood in an Italian palace without the help of books.

16. There was never a generation in England which, for worldly prudence and wise observation of mankind, stood higher than the subjects of Elizabeth. Rich in men of strong mind, that age had given them a discipline unknown to ourselves; the strictness of the Tudor government, the suspicious temper of the queen, the spirit not only of intolerance, but of inquisitiveness as to religious dissent, the uncertainties of the future, produced a caution rather foreign to the English character, accompanied by a closer attention to the workings of other men's minds, and their exterior signs. This, for similar reasons, had long distinguished the Italians; but it is chiefly displayed, perhaps, in their political writings. We find it, in a larger and more philosophical sense, near the end of Elizabeth's reign, when our literature made its first strong shoot, prompting the short condensed reflections of Burleigh and Raleigh, or saturating with moral observation the mighty soul of Shakspeare.

17. The first in time, and we may justly say, the first in excellence of English writings on moral prudence, are the *Essays* of Bacon. But these, as we now read them, though not very bulky, are greatly enlarged since

Bacon's
Essays.

* Casa inveighs against the punctilious and troublesome ceremonies, introduced, as he supposes, from Spain, making distinctions in the mode of addressing different ranks of nobility.

their first publication in 1597. They then were but ten in number :—entitled, 1. Of Studies ; 2. Of Discourse ; 3. Of Ceremonies and Respects ; 4. Of Followers and Friends ; 5. Of Suitors ; 6. Of Expence ; 7. Of Regiment of Health ; 8. Of Honour and Reputation ; 9. Of Faction ; 10. Of Negotiating. And even these few have been expanded in later editions to nearly double their extent. The rest were added chiefly in 1612, and the whole were enlarged in 1625. The pith, indeed, of these ten Essays will be found in the edition of 1597 ; the additions being merely to explain, correct, or illustrate. But, as a much greater number were incorporated with them in the next century, we shall say no more of Bacon's Essays for the present.

SECT. II.—ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Freedom of Writing on Government at this Time — Its Causes — Hottoman — Languet — La Boetie — Buchanan — Poynt — Rose — Mariana — The Jesuits — Botero and Paruta — Bodin — Analysis of his Republic.

18. THE present period, especially after 1570, is far more fruitful than the preceding in the annals of political science. It produced several works both of temporary and permanent importance. Before we come to Bodin, who is its most conspicuous ornament, it may be fit to mention some less considerable books, which, though belonging partly to the temporary class, have in several instances survived the occasion which drew them forth, and indicate a state of public opinion not unworthy of notice.

Number of
political
writers.

19. A constant progress towards absolute monarchy, sometimes silent, at other times attended with violence, had been observable in the principal kingdoms of Europe for the last hundred years. This had been brought about by various circumstances which belong to civil history ; but among others, by a more skilful management, and a more systematic attention to the maxims of state-craft, which had sometimes assumed a sort of scientific form, as in the Prince of Machiavel, but were more frequently inculcated

Oppression
of govern-
ments,

in current rules familiar to the counsellors of kings. The consequence had been not only many flagrant instances of violated public right, but in some countries, especially France, an habitual contempt for every moral as well as political restraint on the ruler's will. But oppression is always felt to be such, and the breach of known laws cannot be borne with-

and spirit
generated
by it.

out resentment, though it may without resistance; nor were there wanting several causes that tended to generate a spirit of indignation against the predominant despotism. Independent of those of a political nature, which varied according to the circumstances of kingdoms, there were three that belonged to the sixteenth century as a learned and reflecting age, which, if they did not all exercise a great influence over the multitude, were sufficient to affect the complexion of literature, and to indicate a somewhat novel state of opinion in the public mind.

20. I. From the Greek and Roman poets, orators, or historians, the scholar derived the principles, not only of equal justice, but of equal privileges; he learned to reverence free republics, to abhor tyranny, to sympathise with a Timoleon or a Brutus. A late English historian, who carried to a morbid excess his jealousy of democratic prejudices, fancied that these are perceptible in the versions of Greek authors by the learned of the sixteenth century, and that Xylander or Rhodomann gratified their spite against the sovereigns of their own time, by mistranslating their text, in order to throw odium on Philip or Alexander. This is probably unfounded; but it may still be true that men, who had imbibed notions, perhaps as indefinite as exaggerated, of the blessings of freedom in ancient Rome and Greece, would draw no advantageous contrast with the palpable outrages of arbitrary power before their eyes. We have seen, fifty years before, a striking proof of almost mutinous indignation in the Adages of Erasmus; and I have little doubt that further evidence of it might be gleaned from the letters and writings of the learned.

Derived
from classic
history.

21. II. In proportion as the antiquities of the existing European monarchies came to be studied, it could not but appear that the royal authority had outgrown many limitations that primitive usage or established

From their
own and the
Jewish.

law had imposed upon it; and the farther back these researches extended, the more they seemed, according to some inquirers, to favour a popular theory of constitutional polity. III. Neither of these considerations, which affected only the patient scholar, struck so powerfully on the public mind as the free spirit engendered by the Reformation, and especially the Judaizing turn of the early Protestants, those at least of the Calvinistic school, which sought for precedents and models in the Old Testament, and delighted to recount how the tribes of Israel had fallen away from Rehoboam, how the Maccabees had repelled the Syrian, how Eglon had been smitten by the dagger of Ehud. For many years the Protestants of France had made choice of the sword, when their alternative was the stake; and amidst defeat, treachery, and massacre, sustained an unequal combat with extraordinary heroism, and a constancy that only a persuasion of acting according to conscience could impart. That persuasion it was the business of their ministers and scholars to encourage by argument. Each of these three principles of liberty was asserted by means of the press in the short period between 1570 and 1580.

22. First in order of publication is the *Franco-Gallia* of Francis Hottoman, one of the most eminent lawyers of that age. This is chiefly a collection of passages from the early French historians, to prove the share of the people in government, and especially their right of electing the kings of the first two races. No one, in such inquiries, would now have recourse to the *Franco-Gallia*, which has certainly the defect of great partiality, and an unwarrantable extension of the author's hypothesis. But it is also true that Hottoman revealed some facts as to the ancient monarchy of France, which neither the later historians, flatterers of the court, nor the lawyers of the parliament of Paris, against whom he is prone to inveigh, had suffered to transpire.

23. An anonymous treatise, *Vindiciæ contra Tyrannos*, Auctore Stephano Junio Bruto Celta, 1579, commonly ascribed to Hubert Languet, the friend of Sir Philip Sidney, breathes the stern spirit of Judaical Huguenotism. Kings, that lay waste the church of God, and support idolatry, kings, that trample upon their subjects' privileges,

Franco-Gallia of Hottoman.

Vindiciæ of Languet.

may be deposed by the states of their kingdom, who indeed are bound in duty to do so, though it is not lawful for private men to take up arms without authority. As kings derive their pre-eminence from the will of the people, they may be considered as feudally vassals of their subjects, so far that they may forfeit their crown by felony against them. Though Languet speaks honourably of ancient tyrannicides, it seems as if he could not mean to justify assassination, since he refuses the right of resistance to private men.

24. Hottoman and Languet were both Protestants; and, the latter especially, may have been greatly influenced by the perilous fortunes of their religion. A short treatise, however, came out in 1578, written probably near thirty years before, by Stephen de la Boetie, best known to posterity by the ardent praises of his friend Montaigne, and an adherent to the church. This is called *Le Contr'Un, ou Discours de la Servitude Volontaire*. It well deserves its title. Roused by the flagitious tyranny of many contemporary rulers, and few were worse than Henry II., under whose reign it was probably written, La Boetie pours forth the vehement indignation of a youthful heart, full of the love of virtue and of the brilliant illusions which a superficial knowledge of ancient history creates, against the voluntary abjectness of mankind, who submit as slaves to one no wiser, no braver, no stronger than any of themselves. "He who so plays the master over you has but two eyes, has but two hands, has but one body, has nothing more than the least among the vast number who dwell in our cities; nothing has he better than you, save the advantage that you give him, that he may ruin you. Whence has he so many eyes to watch you, but that you give them to him? How has he so many hands to strike you, but that he employs your own? How does he come by the feet which trample on your cities, but by your means? How can he have any power over you, but what you give him? How could he venture to persecute you, if he had not an understanding with yourselves? What harm could he do you, if you were not receivers of the robber that plunders you, accomplices of the murderer who kills you, and traitors to your own selves? You, you sow the fruits of the earth, that he may waste them; you furnish

Contr'Un
of Boetie.

your houses, that he may pillage them; you rear your daughters, that they may glut his wantonness, and your sons, that he may lead them at the best to his wars, or that he may send them to execution, or make them the instruments of his concupiscence, the ministers of his revenge. You exhaust your bodies with labour, that he may revel in luxury, or wallow in base and vile pleasures; you weaken yourselves, that he may become more strong, and better able to hold you in check. And yet from so many indignities, that the beasts themselves, could they be conscious of them, would not endure, you may deliver yourselves, if you but make an effort, not to deliver yourselves, but to show the will to do it. Once resolve to be no longer slaves, and you are already free. I do not say that you should assail him, or shake his seat; merely support him no longer, and you will see that, like a great Colossus, whose basis has been removed from beneath him, he will fall by his own weight, and break to pieces.”*

25. These bursts of a noble patriotism, which no one who is in the least familiar with the history of that period will think inexcusable, are much unlike what we generally expect from the French writers. La Boetie, in fact, is almost a single instance of a thoroughly republican character till nearly the period of the Revolution. Montaigne, the staunchest supporter of church and state, excuses his friend, “the greatest man, in my opinion, of our age,” assuring us that he was always a loyal subject, though, if he had been permitted his own choice, “he would rather have been born at Venice than at Sarlat.” La Boetie died young, in 1561; and his Discourse was written some years before; he might have lived to perceive how much more easy it is to inveigh against the abuses of government, than to bring about any thing better by rebellion.

26. The three great sources of a free spirit in politics, admiration of antiquity, zeal for religion, and persuasion of positive right, which separately had animated La Boetie, Languet, and Hottoman, united their streams to produce, in another country, the treatise of

Buchanan,
De Jure
Regni.

* *Le Contr'Un* of La Boetie is published at the end of some editions of Montaigne.

George Buchanan (*De Jure Regni apud Scotos*), a scholar, a Protestant, and the subject of a very limited monarchy. This is a dialogue elegantly written, and designed, first, to show the origin of royal government from popular election; then, the right of putting tyrannical kings to death, according to Scripture, and the conditional allegiance due to the crown of Scotland, as proved by the coronation oath, which implies, that it is received in trust from the people. The following is a specimen of Buchanan's reasoning, which goes very materially farther than Languet had presumed to do: — "Is there, then," says one of the interlocutors, "a mutual compact between the king and the people? M. Thus it seems.—B. Does not he, who first violates the compact, and does any thing against his own stipulations, break his agreement? M. He does.—B. If, then, the bond which attached the king to the people is broken, all rights he derived from the agreement are forfeited? M. They are forfeited.—B. And he who was mutually bound becomes as free as before the agreement? M. He has the same rights and the same freedom as he had before.—B. But if a king should do things tending to the dissolution of human society, for the preservation of which he has been made, what name should we give him? M. We should call him a tyrant.—B. But a tyrant not only possesses no just authority over his people, but is their enemy? M. He is surely their enemy.—B. Is there not a just cause of war against an enemy who has inflicted heavy and intolerable injuries upon us? M. There is.—B. What is the nature of a war against the enemy of all mankind, that is, against a tyrant? M. None can be more just.—B. Is it not lawful in a war justly commenced, not only for the whole people, but for any single person to kill an enemy? M. It must be confessed.—B. What, then, shall we say of a tyrant, a public enemy, with whom all good men are in eternal warfare? may not any one of all mankind inflict on him every penalty of war? M. I observe that all nations have been of that opinion, for Theba is extolled for having killed her husband, and Timoleon for his brother's, and Cassius for his son's death."*

27. We may include among political treatises of this class some published by the English and Scottish exiles during the persecution of their religion by the two Maries. They are, indeed, prompted by circumstances, and in some instances have too much of a temporary character to deserve a place in literary history. I will, however, give an account of one, more theoretical than the rest, and characteristic of the bold spirit of these early Protestants, especially as it is almost wholly unknown except by name. This is in the titlepage, "A Short Treatise of Politique Power, and of the true obedience which subjects owe to kings and other civil governors, being an answer to seven questions: — '1. Whereof politique power groweth, wherefore it was ordained, and the right use and duty of the same? 2. Whether kings, princes, and other governors, have an absolute power and authority over their subjects? 3. Whether kings, princes, and other politique governors be subject to God's laws, or the positive laws of their countries? 4. In what things and how far subjects are bound to obey their princes and governors? 5. Whether all the subject's goods be the emperor's or king's own, and that they may lawfully take them for their own? 6. Whether it be lawful to depose an evil governor and kill a tyrant? 7. What confidence is to be given to princes and potentates?'" Poynt, on
Politique
Power.

28. The author of this treatise was John Poynt, or Ponnet, as it is spelled in the last edition, bishop of Winchester under Edward VI., and who had a considerable share in the Reformation.* It was first published in 1558, and reprinted in 1642, "to serve," says Strype, "the turn of those times." "This book," observes truly the same industrious person, "was not over favourable to princes." Poynt died very soon afterwards, so that we cannot determine whether he would have thought it expedient to speak as fiercely under the reign that was to come. The place of publication of the first edition I do not know, but I presume it was at Geneva or Frankfort. It is closely and vigorously written, deserving, in many parts, a high Its liberal
theory.

* Chalmers. Strype's Memorials.

place among the English prose of that age, though not entirely free from the usual fault—vulgar and ribaldrous invective. He determines all the questions stated in the title-page on principles adverse to royal power, contending, in the sixth chapter, that “the manifold and continual examples that have been, from time to time, of the deposing of kings and killing of tyrants, do most certainly confirm it to be most true, just, and consonant to God’s judgment. The history of kings in the Old Testament is full of it; and, as Cardinal Pole truly citeth, England lacketh not the practice and experience of the same; for they deprived King Edward II., because, without law, he killed the subjects, spoiled them of their goods, and wasted the treasures of the realm. And upon what just causes Richard II. was thrust out, and Henry IV. put in his place, I refer it to their own judgment. Denmark also now, in our days, did nobly the like act, when they deprived Christiern the tyrant, and committed him to perpetual prison.

29. “The reasons, arguments, and laws, that serve for the deposing and displacing of an evil governor will do as much for the proof that it is lawful to kill a tyrant, if they may be indifferently heard. As God hath ordained magistrates to hear and determine private men’s matters, and to punish their vices, so also willet he that the magistrates’ doings be called to account and reckoning, and their vices corrected and punished by the body of the whole congregation or commonwealth; as it is manifest by the memory of the ancient office of the High Constable of England, unto whose authority it pertained, not only to summon the king personally before the parliament, or other courts of judgment, to answer and receive according to justice, but also upon just occasion to commit him unto ward.* Kings, princes, and governors have their authority of the people, as all laws, usages, and policies, do declare and testify. For in some places and countries they have more and greater authority; in some places, less; and in some the people have not given this authority to any other, but retain and exercise it themselves. And is any man so unreason-

Argues for
tyrannicide.

* It is scarcely necessary to observe that this is an impudent falsehood.

able to deny that the whole may do as much as they have permitted one member to do, or those that have appointed an office upon trust have not authority upon just occasion (as the abuse of it) to take away what they gave? All laws do agree, that men may revoke their proxies and letters of attorney when it pleaseth them, much more when they see their proctors and attorneys abuse it.

30. "But now, to prove the latter part of this question affirmatively, that it is lawful to kill a tyrant, there is no man can deny, but that the Ethnics, albeit they had not the right and perfect true knowledge of God, were endued with the knowledge of the law of nature—for it is no private law to a few or certain people, but common to all—not written in books, but grafted in the hearts of men, not made by men, but ordained of God, which we have not learned, received, or read, but have taken, sucked, and drawn it out of nature, whereunto we are not taught, but made, not instructed, but seasoned*; and, as St. Paul saith, 'Man's conscience bearing witness of it,' " &c. He proceeds in a strain of some eloquence (and this last passage is not ill-translated from Cicero), to extol the ancient tyrannicides, accounting the first nobility to have been "those who had revenged, and delivered the oppressed people out of the hands of their governors. Of this kind of nobility was Hercules, Theseus, and such like."† It must be owned, the worthy bishop is a bold man in assertions of fact. Instances from the Old Testament, of course, follow, wherein Jezebel and Athalia are not forgotten, for the sake of our bloody queen.

31. If too much space has been allowed to so obscure a production, it must be excused on account of the illustration it gives to our civil and ecclesiastical history, though of little importance in literature. It is also well to exhibit an additional proof that the tenets of most men, however general and speculative they may appear, are espoused on account of the position of those who hold them, and the momentary consequences that they may produce. In a few years' time the Church of England, strong in the protection of that royalty which Poyntet thus

The tenets
of parties
swayed by
circum-
stances.

* Sic. The Latin in Cic. pro Mil. is *imbuti*.

† P. 49.

assailed in his own exile, enacted the celebrated homily against rebellion, which denounces every pretext of resistance to governors. It rarely happens that any parties, even the best and purest, will, in the strife to retain or recover their ascendancy, weaken themselves by a scrupulous examination of the reasoning or the testimony which is to serve their purpose. Those have lived and read to little advantage who have not discovered this.

32. It might appear that there was some peculiar association between these popular theories of resistance and the Protestant faith. Perhaps, in truth, they had a degree of natural connexion; but circumstances, more than general principles, affect the opinions of mankind. The rebellion of the League against Henry III., their determination not to acknowledge Henry IV., reversed the state of parties, and displayed, in an opposite quarter, the republican notions of Languet and Buchanan as fierce and as unlimited as any Protestants had maintained them. Henry of Bourbon could only rely upon his legitimate descent, upon the infeasible rights of inheritance. If France was to choose for herself, France demanded a Catholic king; all the topics of democracy were thrown into that scale; and, in fact, it is well known that Henry had no prospect whatever of success but by means of a conversion, which, though not bearing much semblance of sincerity, the nation thought fit to accept. But during that struggle of a few years we find, among other writings of less moment, one ascribed by some to Rose, bishop of Senlis, a strenuous partisan of the League, which may perhaps deserve to arrest our attention.*

33. This book, *De Justa Reipublicæ Christianæ in Reges Potestate*, published in 1590, must have been partly written

* The author calls himself *Rossæus*, and not, as has been asserted, bishop of Senlis. But Pits attributes this book to Rainolds (brother of the more celebrated Dr. John Rainolds), who is said to have called himself *Rossæus*. The *Biographie Universelle* (art. *Rose*) says this opinion has not gained ground; but it is certainly favoured by M. Barbier in the *Dictionnaire des Anonymes*, and some grounds for it are alleged. From internal evidence it seems rather the work of

a Frenchman than a foreigner; but I have not paid much attention to so unimportant a question. Jugler, in his *Historia Literaria*, c. 9., does not even name *Rose*. By a passage in Schelhorn, viii. 465., the book seems to have been sometimes ascribed to Genebrard. — [Herbert names Rainolds as the author, and says that it is supposed to have been printed at Edinburgh; but I cannot think this at all probable. — 1842.]

Similar
tenets among
the Leaguers.

before the death of Henry III. in the preceding year. He begins with the origin of human society, which he treats with some eloquence, and on the principle of an election of magistrates by the community, that they might live peaceably, and in enjoyment of their possessions. The different forms and limitations of government have sprung from the choice of the people, except where they have been imposed by conquest. He exhibits many instances of this variety : but there are two dangers, one of limiting too much the power of kings, and letting the populace change the dynasty at their pleasure ; the other, that of ascribing a sort of divinity to kings, and taking from the nation all the power of restraining them in whatever crimes they may commit. The Scottish Calvinists are an instance of the first error ; the modern advocates of the house of Valois of the other. The servile language of those who preach passive obedience has encouraged not only the worst Roman emperors, but such tyrants as Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Elizabeth of England.

Rose, on the
Authority of
Christian
States over
Kings.

34. The author goes, in the second chapter, more fully into a refutation of this doctrine, as contrary to the practice of ancient nations, who always deposed tyrants, to the principles of Christianity, and to the constitution of European communities, whose kings are admitted under an oath to keep the laws and to reign justly. The subject's oath of allegiance does not bind him, unless the king observe what is stipulated from him ; and this right of withdrawing obedience from wicked kings is at the bottom of all the public law of Europe. It is also sanctioned by the church. Still more has the nation a right to impose laws and limitations on kings, who have certainly no superiority to the law, so that they can transgress it at pleasure.

35. In the third chapter he inquires who is a tyrant ; and, after a long discussion comes to this result, that a tyrant is one who despoils his subjects of their possessions, or offends public decency by immoral life, but above all, who assails the Christian faith, and uses his authority to render his subjects heretical. All these characters are found in Henry of Valois. He then urges, in the two following chapters, that all Protestantism is worse than Paganism, inasmuch as it holds out

less inducement to a virtuous life, but that Calvinism is much the worst form of the Protestant heresy. The Huguenots, he proceeds to prove, are neither parts of the French church nor commonwealth. He infers, in the seventh chapter, that the king of Navarre, being a heretic of this description, is not fit to rule over Christians. The remainder of the book is designed to show that every king, being schismatic or heretical, may be deposed by the pope, of which he brings many examples; nor has any one deserved this sentence more than Henry of Navarre. It has always been held lawful that an heretical king should be warred upon by his own subjects and by all Christian sovereigns; and he maintains that a real tyrant, who, after being deposed by the wiser part of his subjects, attempts to preserve his power by force, may be put to death by any private person. He adds that Julian was probably killed by a Christian soldier, and quotes several fathers and ecclesiastical historians who justify and commend the act. He concludes by exhorting the nobility and other orders of France, since Henry is a relapsed heretic, who is not to be believed for any oaths he may make, to rally round their Catholic king, Charles of Bourbon.

36. The principles of Rose, if he were truly the author, both as to rebellion and tyrannicide, belonged naturally to those who took up arms against Henry III., and who applauded his assassin. They were adopted, and perhaps extended, by Boucher, a leaguer still more furious, if possible, than Rose himself, in a book published in 1589, *De Justa Henrici III. Abdicatione a Francorum Regno*. This book is written in the spirit of Languet, asserting the general right of the people to depose tyrants, rather than confining it to the case of heresy. The deposing power of the pope, consequently, does not come much into question. He was answered, as well as other writers of the same tenets, by a Scottish Catholic residing at Paris, William Barclay, father of the more celebrated author of the *Argenis*, in a treatise "*De Regno et Regali Potestate adversus Buchananum, Brutum, Boucherum et Reliquos Monarchomachos*," 1600. Barclay argues on the principles current in France, that the king has no superior in temporals; that the people are bound in all cases to obey him; that the

Treatise of
Boucher in
the same
spirit.

Answered
by Barclay.

laws owe their validity to his will. The settlement of France by the submission of the League on the one hand, and by the edict of Nantes on the other, naturally put a stop to the discussion of questions which, theoretical and universal as they might seem, would never have been brought forward but through the stimulating influence of immediate circumstances.

37. But while the war was yet raging, and the fate of the Catholic religion seemed to hang upon its success, many of the Jesuits had been strenuous advocates of the tyrannicidal doctrine; and the strong spirit of party attachment in that order renders it hardly uncandid to reckon among its general tenets whatever was taught by its most conspicuous members. The boldest and most celebrated assertion of these maxims was by Mariana, in a book, *De Rege et Regis Institutione*. The first edition of this remarkable book, and which is of considerable The Jesuits adopt these tenets.
Mariana, De Rege. scarcity, was published at Toledo in 1599, dedicated to Philip III., and sanctioned with more than an approbation, with a warm eulogy, by the censor, (one of the same order, it may be observed,) who by the king's authority had perused the manuscript. It is, however, not such as in an absolute monarchy we should expect to find countenance. Mariana, after inquiring what is the best form of government, and deciding for hereditary monarchy, but only on condition that the prince shall call the best citizens to his councils, and administer all affairs according to the advice of a senate, comes to show the difference between a king and a tyrant. His invectives against the latter prepare us for the sixth chapter, which is entitled, *Whether it be lawful to overthrow a tyrant?* He begins by a short sketch of the oppression of France under Henry III., which had provoked his assassination. Whether the act of James Clement, "the eternal glory of France, as most reckon him*," were in itself warrantable, he admits to be a controverted question, stating the arguments on both sides, but placing last those in favour of the murder, to which he evidently leans. All philosophers and theologians, he says,

* These words, *æternum Galliæ decus*, is very little other alteration; yet the are omitted in the subsequent editions, first alone is in request. but as far as I have compared them there

agree that an usurper may be put to death by any one. But in the case of a lawful king, governing to the great injury of the commonwealth or of religion (for we ought to endure his vices so long as they do not reach an intolerable height), he thinks that the states of the realm should admonish him, and on his neglect to reform his life, may take up arms, and put to death a prince whom they have declared to be a public enemy; and any private man may do the same. He concludes, therefore, that it is only a question of fact who is a tyrant, but not one of right, whether a tyrant may be killed. Nor does this maxim give a license to attempts on the lives of good princes; since it can never be applied till wise and experienced men have conspired with the public voice in declaring the prince's tyranny. "It is a wholesome thing," he proceeds, "that sovereigns should be convinced that, if they oppress the state, and become intolerable by their wickedness, their assassination will not only be lawful but glorious to the perpetrator."* This language, whatever indignation it might excite against Mariana and his order, is merely what we have seen in Buchanan.

38. Mariana discusses afterwards the question, whether the power of the king or of the commonwealth be the greater; and after intimating the danger of giving offence, and the difficulty of removing the blemishes which have become inveterate by time (with allusion, doubtless, to the change of the Spanish constitution under Charles and Philip), declares in strong terms for limiting the royal power by laws. In Spain, he asserts, the king cannot impose taxes against the will of the people. "He may use his influence, he may offer rewards, sometimes he may threaten, he may solicit with promises and bribes (we will not say whether he may do this rightly), but if they refuse he must give way; and it is the same with new laws, which require the sanction of the people. Nor could they preserve their right of deposing and putting to death a tyrant, if they had not retained the superior power to themselves when they delegated a part to the king. It may be the case in some nations, who have no public assem-

* Est salutaris cognitio, ut sit principibus persuasum, si rempublicam opprimerent, ea conditione vivere, ut non jure tantum sed cum laude et gloria perire possint. p. 77.

blies of the states, that of necessity the royal prerogative must compel obedience — a power too great, and approaching to tyranny — but we speak (says Mariana) not of barbarians, but of the monarchy which exists, and ought to exist among us, and of that form of polity which of itself is the best.” Whether any nation has a right to surrender its liberties to a king, he declines to inquire, observing only that it would act rashly in making such a surrender, and the king almost as much so in accepting it.

39. In the second book Mariana treats of the proper education of a prince; and in the third on the due administration of his government, inveighing vehemently against excessive taxation, and against debasement of the coin, which he thinks ought to be the last remedy in a public crisis. The whole work, even in its reprehensible exaggerations, breathes a spirit of liberty and regard to the common good. Nor does Mariana, though a Jesuit, lay any stress on the papal power to depose princes, which, I believe, he has never once intimated through the whole volume. It is absolutely on political principles that he reasons, unless we except that he considers impiety as one of the vices which constitute a tyrant.*

40. Neither of the conflicting parties in Great Britain had neglected the weapons of their contemporaries; the English Protestants under Mary, the Scots under Popular theories in England. her unfortunate namesake, the Jesuits and Catholic priests under Elizabeth, appealed to the natural rights of men, or to those of British citizens. Poyntet, Goodman, Knox, are of the first description; Allen and Persons of the second. Yet this was not done, by the latter at least, so boldly, and so much on broad principles, as it was on the Continent; and Persons in his celebrated Conference, under the name of Doleman, tried the different and rather inconsistent path of hereditary right. The throne of Elizabeth seemed to stand in need of a strongly monarchical sentiment in the nation. Yet we find that the popular origin of government, and the necessity of popular consent to its due

* Bayle, art. Mariana, notes G, H, and I, has expatiated upon this notable treatise, which did the Jesuits infinite mis-

chief, though they took pains to disclaim any participation in the doctrine.

exercise, are laid down by Hooker in the first and eighth books of the Ecclesiastical Polity, with a boldness not very usual in her reign, and, it must be owned, with a latitude of expression that leads us forward to the most unalloyed democracy. This theory of Hooker, which he endeavoured in some places to qualify, with little success or consistency, though it excited, perhaps, not much attention at the time, became the basis of Locke's more celebrated Essay on Government, and, through other stages, of the political creed which actuates at present, as a possessing spirit, the great mass of the civilised world.*

41. The bold and sometimes passionate writers, who possibly will be thought to have detained us too long, may be contrasted with another class more cool and prudent, who sought rather to make the most of what they found established in civil polity, than to amend or subvert it. The condition of France was such as to force men into thinking, where nature had given them the capacity of it. In some of the memoirs of the age, such as those of Castelnau or Tavannes, we find an habitual tendency to reflect, to observe the chain of causes, and to bring history to bear on the passing time. De Comines had set a precedent; and the fashion of studying his writings and those of Machiavel conspired with the force of circumstances to make a thoughtful generation. The political and military discourses of La Noue, being thrown into the form of dissertation, come more closely to our purpose than merely historical works. They are full of good sense, in a high moral tone, without pedantry or pretension, and throw much light on the first period of the civil wars. The earliest edition is referred by the Biographie Universelle to 1587, which I believe should be 1588; but the book seems to have been finished long before.

* Bilson, afterwards bishop of Winchester, in his "Difference between Christian Subjection and Unchristian Rebellion," published in 1585, argues against the Jesuits, that Christian subjects may not bear arms against their princes for any religious quarrel; but admits, "if a prince should go about to subject his kingdom to a foreign realm, or change the form of the commonwealth

from impy to tyranny, or neglect the laws established by common consent of prince and people, to execute his own pleasure, in these and other cases which might be named, if the nobles and commons join together to defend their ancient and accustomed liberty, regiment, and laws, they may not well be counted rebels." p. 520.

42. It would carry us beyond the due proportions of this chapter were I to seek out every book belonging to the class of political philosophy, and we are yet far from its termination. ^{Lipsius.} The *Politica* of Justus Lipsius deserve little regard; they are chiefly a digest of Aristotle, Tacitus, and other ancient writers. Charron has incorporated or abridged the greater part of this work in his own. In one passage Lipsius gave great and just offence to the best of the Protestant party, whom he was about to desert, by recommending the extirpation of heresy by fire and sword. A political writer of the Jesuit school was Giovanni ^{Botero.} Botero, whose long treatise, *Ragione di Stato*, 1589, while deserving of considerable praise for acuteness, has been extolled by Ginguéné, who had never read it, for some merits it is far from possessing.* The tolerant spirit, the maxims of good faith, the enlarged philosophy, which, on the credit of a Piedmontese panegyrist, he ascribes to Botero, will be sought in vain. This Jesuit justifies the massacre of St. Bartholomew and all other atrocities of that age; observing that the duke of Alba made a mistake in the public execution of Horn and Egmont, instead of getting rid of them privately.† Conservation is with him, as with Machiavel, the great end of government, which is to act so as neither to deserve nor permit opposition. The immediate punishment of the leaders of sedition, with as much silence and secrecy as possible, is the best remedy where the sovereign is sufficiently powerful. In cases of danger, it is necessary to conquer by giving way, and to wait for the cooling of men's tempers, and the disunion that will infallibly impair their force; least of all should he absent himself, like Henry III., from the scene of tumult, and thus give courage to the seditious, while he diminishes their respect for himself.

43. Botero had thought and observed much; he is, in extent of reading, second only to Bodin, and his views are sometimes luminous. The most remarkable passage that has occurred to me is on the sub-

His remarks
on popula-
tion.

* Vol. viii. p. 210.

† Poteva contentarsi di sbrigar-sene con dar morte quanto si può segreta-

mente fosse possibile. This is in another treatise by Botero, *Relazioni Universali de' Capitani Illustri*.

ject of population. No encouragement to matrimony, he observes, will increase the numbers of the people without providing also the means of subsistence, and without due care for breeding children up. If this be wanting, they either die prematurely, or grow up of little service to their country.* Why else, he asks, did the human race reach, three thousand years ago, as great a population as exists at present? Cities begin with a few inhabitants, increase to a certain point, but do not pass it, as we see at Rome, at Naples, and in other places. Even if all the monks and nuns were to marry, there would not, he thinks, be more people in the world than there are; two things being requisite for their increase—generation and education (or what we should perhaps rather call rearing), and if the multiplication of marriages may promote the one, it certainly hinders the other.† Botero must here have meant, though he does not fully express it, that the poverty attending upon improvident marriages is the great impediment to rearing their progeny.

44. Paolo Paruta, in his *Discorsi Politici*, Venice, 1599, is perhaps less vigorous and acute than Botero; yet he may be reckoned among judicious writers on general politics. The first book of these discourses relates to Roman, the second chiefly to modern history. His turn of thinking is independent and unprejudiced by the current tide of opinion, as when he declares against the conduct of Hannibal in invading Italy. Paruta generally states both sides of a political problem very fairly, as in one of the most remarkable of his discourses, where he puts the famous question on the usefulness of fortified towns. His final conclusion is favourable to them. He was a subject of Venice, and after holding considerable offices, was one of those historians employed by the Senate, whose writings form the series entitled *Istorici Veneziani*.

* Concio sia cosa ch  se bene senza il congiungimento dell' uomo e della donna non si pu  il genere umano moltiplicarsi, non dimeno la moltitudine di congiungimenti non   sola causa della moltiplicazione; si ricerca oltre di ci , la cura d' allevarli, e la commodit  di sustentarli; senza la quale o muojono innanzi tempo,

o riescono inutili, e di poco giovimento alla patria. lib. viii. p. 284.

† Ibid. Ricercandosi due cose per la propagazione de popoli, la generazione et l' educazione, 'se bene la moltitudine de matrimonj ajuta forte l' una, impedisce per  del sicuro l' altro.

45. John Bodin, author of several other less valuable works, acquired so distinguished a reputation by his *Republic*, published in French in 1577, and in Latin, ^{Bodin.} with many additions, by himself in 1586*, and has in fact so far outstripped the political writers of his own period, that I shall endeavour to do justice to his memory by something like an analysis of this treatise, which is far more known by name than generally read. Many have borne testimony to his extraordinary reach of learning and reflection. "I know of no political writer of the same period," says Stewart, "whose extensive, and various, and discriminating reading appear to me to have contributed more to facilitate and guide the researches of his successors, or whose references to ancient learning have been more frequently transcribed without acknowledgment."†

46. What is the object of political society? Bodin begins by inquiring. The greatest good, he answers, of every citizen, which is that of the whole state. And this he places in the exercise of the virtues proper to man, and in the knowledge of things natural, human, and divine. But as all have not agreed as to the chief good of a single man, nor whether the good of individuals be also that of the state, this has caused a variety of laws and customs according to the humours and passions of rulers. This first chapter is in a more metaphysical tone than we usually find in Bodin. He proceeds in the next to the rights of families (*jus familiare*), and to the distinction between a family and a commonwealth. A family is the right government of many

Analysis of
his treatise
called *The
Republic*.

* This treatise, in its first edition, made so great an impression, that when Bodin came to England in the service of the duke of Alençon, he found it explained by lecturers both in London and Cambridge, but not, as has sometimes been said, in the public schools of the university. This put him upon translating it into Latin himself, to render its fame more European. See Bayle, who has a good article on Bodin. I am much inclined to believe that the perusal of Bodin had a great effect in England. He is not perhaps very often quoted, and yet he is named with honour by the chief writers of the next age; but he furnished a store, both of arguments and of ex-

amples, which were not lost on the thoughtful minds of our countrymen.

Grotius, who is not very favourable to Bodin, though of necessity he often quotes the *Republic*, imputes to him an incorrectness as to facts, which in some cases raises a suspicion of ill-faith. *Epist. cceli.iii.* It would require a more close study of Bodin than I have made, to judge of the weight of this charge.

† *Dissertation on Progress of Philosophy*, p. 40. Stewart, however, thinks Bodin become so obscure that he makes an apology for the space he has allotted to the *Republic*, though not exceeding four pages. He was better known in the seventeenth century than at present.

persons under one head, as a commonwealth is that of many families.* Patriarchal authority he raises high, both marital and paternal, on each subject pouring out a vast stream of knowledge: nothing that sacred and profane history, the accounts of travellers, or the Roman lawyers could supply, ever escapes the comprehensive researches of Bodin.† He intimates his opinion in favour of the right of repudiation, one of the many proofs that he paid more regard to the Jewish than the Christian law‡, and vindicates the full extent of the paternal power in the Roman republic, deducing the decline of the empire from its relaxation.

Authority of
heads of
families.

47. The patriarchal government includes the relation of master to servant, and leads to the question whether slavery should be admitted into a well-constituted commonwealth. Bodin, discussing this with many arguments on both sides, seems to think that the Jewish law, with its limitations as to time of servitude, ought to prevail, since the divine rules were not laid down for the boundaries of Palestine, but being so wise, so salutary, and of such authority, ought to be preferred above the constitutions of men. Slavery, therefore, is not to be permanently established; but

Domestic
servitude.

§ Familia est plurium sub unius ac ejusdem patris familias imperium subditorum, earumque rerum quæ ipsius propria sunt, recta moderatio. He has an odd theory, that a family must consist of five persons; in which he seems to have been influenced by some notions of the jurists, that three families may constitute a republic, and that fifteen persons are also the minimum of a community.

† Cap. iii. 34. Bodin here protests against the stipulation sometimes made before marriage, that the wife shall not be in the power of the husband; "agreements so contrary to divine and human laws, that they cannot be endured, nor are they to be observed even when ratified by oath, since no oath in such circumstances can be binding."

‡ It has often been surmised that Bodin, though not a Jew by nativity, was such by conviction. This seems to be confirmed by his Republic, wherein he quotes the Old Testament continually, and with great deference, but sel-

dom or never the new. Several passages might be alleged in proof, but I have not noted them all down. In one place, lib. i. c. 6., he says, Paulus, Christianorum sæculi sui facile princeps, which is at least a singular mode of expression. In another he states the test of true religion so as to exclude all but the Mosaic. An unpublished work of Bodin, called the Heptaplomeris, is said to exist in many manuscripts, both in France and Germany; in which, after debating different religions in a series of dialogues, he gives the advantage to Deism or Judaism, for those who have seen it seem not to have determined which. No one has thought it worth while to print this production. Jugler, Hist. Literaria, p. 1740. Biogr. Univ. Nicéron, xvii. 264.

A posthumous work of Bodin, published in 1596, *Universæ Naturæ Theatrum*, has been called by some a disguised Pantheism. This did not appear, from what I have read of it, to be the case.

where it already exists, it will be expedient that emancipations should be gradual.*

48. These last are the rights of persons in a state of nature, to be regulated, but not created by the law.

“Before there was either city or citizen, or any form of a commonwealth amongst men (I make use in this place of Knolles’s very good translation), every master of a family was master in his own house, having power of life and death over his wife and children; but, after that force, violence, ambition, covetousness, and desire of revenge had armed one against another, the issues of wars and combats giving victory unto the one side, made the other to become unto them slaves; and amongst them that overcame he that was chosen chief and captain, under whose conduct and leading they had obtained the victory, kept them also in his power and command as his faithful and obedient servants, and the other as his slaves. Then that full and entire liberty, by nature given to every man to live as himself best pleased, was altogether taken from the vanquished, and in the vanquishers themselves in some measure also diminished in regard of the conqueror; for that now it concerned every man in private to yield his obedience unto his chief sovereign; and he that would not abate any thing of his liberty, to live under the laws and commandments of another, lost all. So the words of lord and servant, of prince and subject, before unknown to the world, were first brought into use. Yea reason, and the very light of nature, leadeth us to believe very force and violence to have given cause and beginning unto commonwealths.”†

49. Thus, therefore, the patriarchal simplicity of government was overthrown by conquest, of which Nimrod seems to have been the earliest instance; and now fathers of families, once sovereign, are become citizens. A citizen is a free man under the supreme government of another.‡ Those who enjoy more privileges than others are not citizens more than they. “It is the acknowledgment of the sovereign by his free subject, and the protection of the

Origin of
common-
wealths.

Privileges
of citizens.

* c. 5.

† c. 6.

homo, qui summa alterius potestate obligatur.

‡ Est civis nihil aliud quam liber

sovereign towards him that makes the citizen." This is one of the fundamental principles, it may be observed by us in passing, which distinguish a monarchical from a republican spirit in constitutional jurisprudence. Wherever mere subjection, or even mere nativity, are held to give a claim to citizenship, there is an abandonment of the republican principle. This, always reposing on a real or imaginary contract, distinguishes the nation, the successors of the first community, from alien settlers, and, above all, from those who are evidently of a different race. Length of time must, of course, ingraft many of foreign origin upon the native tree; but to throw open civil privileges at random to new-comers is to convert a people into a casual aggregation of men. In a monarchy the hereditary principle maintains an unity of the commonwealth; which may better permit, though not entirely without danger, an equality of privileges among all its subjects. Thus under Caracalla, but in a period in which we should not look for good precedents, the great name, as once it had been, of Roman citizen was extended, east and west, to all the provinces of the empire.

50. Bodin comes next to the relation between patron and client, and to those alliances among states which bear an analogy to it. But he is careful to distinguish patronage or protection from vassalage. Even in unequal alliances, the inferior is still sovereign; and, if this be not reserved, the alliance must become subjection.* Sovereignty, of which he treats in the following chapter, he defines a supreme and perpetual power, absolute and subject to no law.† A limited prince, except so far as the limitation is confined to the laws of nature, is not sovereign. A sovereign cannot bind his successor, nor can he be bound by his own laws, unless confirmed by oath; for we must not confound the laws and contracts of princes—the former depend upon his will, but the latter oblige his conscience. It is convenient to call parliaments or meetings of states-general for advice and consent, but the king is not bound by them; the contrary notion has done much harm. Even in England, where laws made in parliament cannot be repealed without

Nature of
sovereign
power.

* c. 7.

† *Majestas est summa in cives ac subditos legibusque soluta potestas.*

its consent, the king may reject any new one without regard to the desire of the nation.* And though no taxes are imposed in England without consent of parliament, this is the case also in other countries, if necessity does not prevent the meeting of the states. He concludes, that the English parliament may have a certain authority, but that the sovereignty and legislative power is solely in the king. Whoever legislates is sovereign, for this power includes all other. Whether a vassal or tributary prince is to be called sovereign, is a question that leads Bodin into a great quantity of feudal law and history; he determines it according to his own theory.†

51. The second book of the Republic treats of the different species of civil government. These, according to Bodin, are but three, no mixed form being possible, ^{Forms of government.} since sovereignty or the legislative power is indivisible. A democracy he defines to be a government where the majority of the citizens possess the sovereignty. Rome he holds to have been a democratic republic, in which, however, he is not exactly right; and he is certainly mistaken in his general theory, by arguing as if the separate definition of each of the three forms must be applicable after their combination.‡ In his chapter on despotic monarchy, he again denies that governments were founded on original ^{Despotism and monarchy.} contract. The power of one man, in the origin of political society, was absolute; and Aristotle was wrong in supposing a fabulous golden age, in which kings were chosen by suffrage.§ Despotism is distinguished from monarchy by the subjects being truly slaves, without a right over their properties; but as the despot may use them well, even this is not necessarily a tyranny.|| Monarchy, on the other hand, is the rule of one man according to the law of nature, who

* Hoc tamen singulare videri possit, quod, quæ leges populi rogatione ac principis jussu feruntur, non aliter quam populi comitiis abrogari possunt. Id enim Dellsus Anglorum in Gallia legatus mihi confirmavit; idem tamen confitetur legem probari aut respuì consuevisse contra populi voluntatem utcunque principi placuerit.

† c. 9. and 10.

‡ lib. ii. c. 1.

§ In the beginning of states, quo

societas hominum coalescere cœpit, ac reipublicæ forma quædam constitui, unius imperio ac dominatu omnia tenebantur. Fallit enim Aristoteles, qui aureum illud genus hominum fabulis poeticis quam reipsa illustrius, reges heroas suffragio creasse prodidit; cum omnibus persuasum sit ac perspicuum monarchiam omnium primam in Assyria fuisse constitutam Nimrodo principe, &c.

|| c. 2.

maintains the liberties and properties of others as much as his own.* As this definition does not imply any other restraint than the will of the prince imposes on himself, Bodin labours under the same difficulty as Montesquieu. Every English reader of the *Esprit des Loix* has been struck by the want of a precise distinction between despotism and monarchy. Tyranny differs, Bodin says, from despotism, merely by the personal character of the prince; but severity towards a seditious populace is not tyranny; and here he censures the lax government of Henry II. Tyrannicide he justifies in respect of an usurper who has no title except force, but not as to lawful princes, or such as have become so by prescription.†

52. An aristocracy he conceives always to exist where a smaller body of the citizens governs the greater.‡
Aristocracy. This definition, which has been adopted by some late writers, appears to lead to consequences hardly compatible with the common use of language. The electors of the House of Commons in England are not a majority of the people. Are they, therefore, an aristocratical body? The same is still more strongly the case in France, and in most representative governments of Europe. We might better say, that the distinguishing characteristic of an aristocracy is the enjoyment of privileges, which are not communicable to other citizens simply by any thing they can themselves do to obtain them. Thus no government would be properly aristocratical where a pecuniary qualification is alone sufficient to confer political power; nor did the ancients ever use the word in such a sense.

53. Sovereignty resides in the supreme legislative authority; but this requires the aid of other inferior and delegated ministers, to the consideration of which the third book of Bodin is directed. A senate he defines, “a lawful assembly of counsellors of state, to give advice to them who have the sovereignty in every commonwealth; we say, to give advice, that we may not ascribe any power of command to such a senate.” A council is necessary

* c. 3.

† c. 4.

esse judico, si minor pars civium ceteris

‡ Ego statum semper aristocraticum imperat. c. 1.

in a monarchy ; for much knowledge is generally mischievous in a king. It is rarely united with a good disposition, and with a moral discipline of mind. None of the emperors were so illiterate as Trajan, none more learned than Nero. The counsellors should not be too numerous, and he advises that they should retain their offices for life. It would be dangerous as well as ridiculous, to choose young men for such a post, even if they could have wisdom and experience, since neither older persons, nor those of their own age, would place confidence in them. He then expatiates, in his usual manner, upon all the councils that have existed in ancient or modern states.*

54. A magistrate is an officer of the sovereign, possessing public authority.† Bodin censures the usual definitions of magistracy, distinguishing from magistrates both those officers who possess no right of command, and such commissioners as have only a temporary delegation. In treating of the duty of magistrates towards the sovereign, he praises the rule of the law of France, that the judge is not to regard private letters of the king against the justice of a civil suit.‡ But after stating the doubt, whether this applies to matters affecting the public, he concludes that the judge must obey any direction he receives, unless contrary to the law of nature, in which case he is bound not to forfeit his integrity. It is however better, as far as we can, to obey all the commands of the sovereign, than to set a bad example of resistance to the people. This has probably a regard to the frequent opposition of the parliament of Paris, to what it deemed the unjust or illegal ordinances of the court. Several questions, discussed in these chapters on magistracy, are rather subtle and verbal ; and, in general, the argumentative part of Bodin is almost drowned in his erudition.

Duties of magistrates.

55. A state cannot subsist without colleges and corporations, for mutual affection and friendship is the necessary bond of human life. It is true that mischiefs have sprung from these institutions, and they are to be regulated by good laws ; but as a family is a community natural, so a college is a community civil, and a common-

Corporations.

* c. 1.

† c. 3.

‡ c. 4.

wealth is but a community governed by a sovereign power ; and thus the word community is common unto all three.* In this chapter we have a full discussion of the subject ; and, adverting to the Spanish Cortes and English House of Commons as a sort of colleges in the state, he praises them as useful institutions, observing, with somewhat more boldness than is ordinary to him, that in several provinces in France there had been assemblies of the states, which had been abolished by those who feared to see their own crimes and peculations brought to light.

56. In the last chapter of the third book, on the degrees and orders of citizens, Bodin seems to think that slaves, being subjects, ought to be reckoned parts of the state.† This is, as has been intimated, in conformity with his monarchical notions. He then enters upon the different modes of acquiring nobility, and inveighs against making wealth a passport to it ; discussing also the derogation to nobility by plebeian occupation. The division into three orders is useful in every form of government.

57. Perhaps the best chapter in the Republic of Bodin is the first in the fourth book, on the rise, progress, and stationary condition, revolutions, decline, and fall of states. A commonwealth is said to be changed when its form of polity is altered ; for its identity is not to be determined by the long standing of the city walls ; but when popular government becomes monarchy, or aristocracy is turned to democracy, the commonwealth is at an end. He thus uses the word *respublica* in the sense of polity or constitution, which is not, perhaps, strictly correct, though sanctioned by some degree of usage, and leaves his proposition a tautological truism. The extinction of states may be natural or violent, but in one way or the other it must happen ; since there is a determinate period to all things, and a natural season in which it seems desirable that they should come to an end. The best revolution is that which takes place by a voluntary cession of power.

58. As the forms of government are three, it follows that

* c. 7.

† Si mihi tabellæ ac jura suffragiorum in hac disputatione tribuantur, servos

æque ac liberos homines civitate donari cupiam. By this he may only mean that he would desire to emancipate them.

the possible revolutions from one to another are six. For anarchy is the extinction of a government, not a revolution in it. He proceeds to develop the causes of revolutions with great extent of historical learning and with judgment, if not with so much acuteness or so much vigour of style as Machiavel. Great misfortunes in war, he observes, have a tendency to change popular rule to aristocracy, and success has an opposite effect; the same seems applicable to all public adversity and prosperity. Democracy, however, more commonly ends in monarchy, as monarchy does in democracy, especially when it has become tyrannical; and such changes are usually accompanied by civil war or tumult. Nor can aristocracy, he thinks, be changed into democracy without violence, though the converse revolution sometimes happens quietly, as when the labouring classes and traders give up public affairs to look after their own; in this manner Venice, Lucca, Ragusa, and other cities have become aristocracies. The great danger for an aristocracy is, that some ambitious person, either of their own body or of the people, may arm the latter against them: and this is most likely to occur, when honours and magistracy are conferred on unworthy men, which affords the best topic to demagogues, especially where the plebeians are wholly excluded; which, though always grievous to them, is yet tolerable so long as power is intrusted to deserving persons; but when bad men are promoted, it becomes easy to excite the minds of the people against the nobility, above all, if there are already factions among the latter, a condition dangerous to all states, but mostly to an aristocracy. Revolutions are more frequent in small states, because a small number of citizens is easily split into parties; hence we shall find in one age more revolutions among the cities of Greece or Italy than have taken place during many in the kingdoms of France or Spain. He thinks the ostracism of dangerous citizens itself dangerous, and recommends rather to put them to death, or to render them friends. Monarchy, he observes, has this peculiar to it, that if the king be a prisoner, the constitution is not lost; whereas, if the seat of government in a republic be taken it is at an end, the subordinate cities never making resistance. It is evident that this can only be applicable to

the case, hitherto the more common one, of a republic, in which the capital city entirely predominates. "There is no kingdom which shall not, in continuance of time, be changed, and at length also be overthrown. But it is best for them who least feel their changes by little and little made, whether from evil to good, or from good to evil."

59. If this is the best, the next is the worst chapter in Bodin. It professes to inquire, whether the revolutions of states can be foreseen. Here he considers, whether the stars have such an influence on human affairs, that political changes can be foretold by their means, and declares entirely against it, with such expressions as would seem to indicate his disbelief in astrology. If it were true, he says, that the conditions of commonwealths depended on the heavenly bodies, there could be yet no certain prediction of them; since the astrologers lay down their observations with such inconsistency, that one will place the same star in direct course at the moment that another makes it retrograde. It is obvious that any one who could employ this argument must have perceived that it destroys the whole science of astrology. But, after giving instances of the blunders and contradictions of these pretended philosophers, he so far gives way as to admit that, if all the events from the beginning of the world could be duly compared with the planetary motions, some inferences might be deduced from them; and thus, giving up his better reason to the prejudices of his age, he acknowledges astrology as a theoretical truth. The hypothesis of Copernicus he mentions as too absurd to deserve refutation; since, being contrary to the tenets of all theologians and philosophers, and to common sense, it subverts the foundations of every science. We now plunge deeper into nonsense; Bodin proceeding to a long arithmetical disquisition, founded on a passage in Plato, ascribing the fall of states to want of proportion.*

60. The next chapter, on the danger of sudden revolutions in the entire government, asserts that even the most determined astrologers agree in denying that a wise man is subjugated by the starry influences, though they may govern those who are led by passion like

Astrological
fancies of
Bodin.

Danger of
sudden
changes.

wild beasts. Therefore a wise ruler may foresee revolutions and provide remedies. It is doubtful whether an established law ought to be changed, though not good in itself, lest it should bring others into contempt, especially such as affect the form of polity. These, if possible, should be held immutable; yet it is to be remembered, that laws are only made for the sake of the community, and public safety is the supreme law of laws. There is therefore no law so sacred that it may not be changed through necessity. But, as a general rule, whatever change is to be made should be effected gradually.*

61. It is a disputed question whether magistrates should be temporary or perpetual. Bodin thinks it essential that the council of state should be permanent, but high civil commands ought to be temporary.†

Judicial
power of
the sove-
reign.

It is in general important that magistrates shall accord in their opinions; yet there are circumstances in which their emulation or jealousy may be beneficial to a state.‡ Whether the sovereign ought to exercise judicial functions may seem, he says, no difficult question to those who are agreed that kings were established for the sake of doing justice. This, however, is not his theory of the origin of government; and after giving all the reasons that can be urged in favour of a monarch-judge, including as usual all historical precedents, he decides that it is inexpedient for the ruler to pronounce the law himself. His reasons are sufficiently bold, and grounded on an intimate knowledge of the vices of courts, which he does not hesitate to pour out.§

62. In treating of the part to be taken by the prince, or by a good citizen, in civil factions, after a long detail from history of conspiracies and seditions, he comes to disputes about religion, and contends against the permission of reasonings on matters of faith. What can be more impious, he says, than to suffer the eternal laws of God, which ought to be implanted in men's minds with the utmost certainty, to be called in question by probable reasonings? For there is nothing so demonstrable, which men will not undermine by argument. But the principles of religion do not depend on demonstrations and arguments, but

Toleration
of religions.

* c. 3.

† c. 4.

‡ c. 5.

§ c. 6.

on faith alone ; and whoever attempts to prove them by a train of reasoning, tends to subvert the foundations of the whole fabric. Bodin in this sophistry was undoubtedly insincere. He goes on, however, having purposely sacrificed this cock to Æsculapius, to contend that, if several religions exist in a state, the prince should avoid violence and persecution ; the natural tendency of man being to give his assent voluntarily, but never by force.*

63. The first chapter of the fifth book, on the adaptation of government to the varieties of race and climate, has excited more attention than most others, from its being supposed to have given rise to a theory of Montesquieu. In fact, however, the general principle is more ancient ; but no one had developed it so fully as Bodin. Of this he seems to be aware. No one, he says, has hitherto treated on this important subject, which should always be kept in mind, lest we establish institutions not suitable to the people, forgetting that the laws of nature will not bend to the fancy of man. He then investigates the peculiar characteristics of the northern, middle, and southern nations, as to physical and moral qualities. Some positions he has laid down erroneously ; but, on the whole, he shows a penetrating judgment and comprehensive generalisation of views. He concludes that bodily strength prevails towards the poles, mental power towards the tropics ; and that the nations lying between partake in a mixed ratio of both. This is not very just ; but he argues from the great armies that have come from the north, while arts and sciences have been derived from the south. There is certainly a considerable resemblance to Montesquieu in this chapter ; and like him, with better excuse, Bodin accumulates inaccurate stories. Force prevails most with northern nations, reason with the inhabitants of a temperate or middle climate, superstition with those of the south ; thus astrology, magic, and all mysterious sciences, have come from the Chaldeans and Egyptians. Mechanical arts and inventions, on the other hand, flourish best in northern countries, and the natives of the south hardly know how to imitate them, their genius being wholly speculative, nor have they so much industry, quickness

Influence
of climate
on govern-
ment.

in perceiving what is to be done, or worldly prudence. The stars appear to exert some influence over national peculiarities; but even in the same latitudes great variety of character is found, which arises from a mountainous or level soil, and from other physical circumstances. We learn by experience, that the inhabitants of hilly countries and the northern nations generally love freedom, but having less intellect than strength, submit readily to the wisest among them. Even winds are not without some effect on national character. But the barrenness or fertility of the soil is more important; the latter producing indolence and effeminacy, while one effect of a barren soil is to drive the people into cities, and to the exercise of handicrafts for the sake of commerce, as we see at Athens and Nuremberg, the former of which may be contrasted with Bœotia.

64. Bodin concludes, after a profusion of evidence drawn from the whole world, that it is necessary not only to consider the general character of the climate as affecting an entire region, but even the peculiarities of single districts, and to inquire what effects may be wrought on the dispositions of the inhabitants by the air, the water, the mountains and valleys, or prevalent winds, as well as those which depend on their religion, their customs, their education, their form of government; for whoever should conclude alike as to all who live in the same climate would be frequently deceived; since, in the same parallel of latitude, we may find remarkable differences even of countenance and complexion. This chapter abounds with proofs of the comprehension as well as patient research which distinguishes Bodin from every political writer who had preceded him.

65. In the second chapter, which inquires, how we may avoid the revolutions which an excessive inequality of possessions tends to produce, he inveighs against a partition of property, as inconsistent with civil society, and against an abolition of debts, because there can be no justice where contracts are not held inviolable; and observes, that it is absurd to expect a division of all possessions to bring about tranquillity. He objects also to any endeavour to limit the number of the citizens, except by colonisation. In deference to the authority of the Mosaic

Means of
obviating
inequality.

law, he is friendly to a limited right of primogeniture, but disapproves the power of testamentary dispositions, as tending to inequality, and the admission of women to equal shares in the inheritance, lest the same consequence should come through marriage. Usury he would absolutely abolish, to save the poorer classes from ruin.

66. Whether the property of condemned persons shall be confiscated is a problem, as to which, having given the arguments on both sides, he inclines to a middle course, that the criminal's own acquisitions should be forfeited, but what has descended from his ancestors should pass to his posterity. He speaks with great freedom against unjust prosecutions, and points out the dangers of the law of forfeiture.* In the next, being the fourth chapter of this book, he treats of rewards and punishments. All states depend on the due distribution of these; but, while many books are full of the latter, few have discussed the former, to which he here confines himself. Triumphs, statues, public thanks, offices of trust and command, are the most honourable; exemptions from service or tribute, privileges, and the like, the most beneficial. In a popular government, the former are more readily conceded than the latter; in a monarchy, the reverse. The Roman triumph gave a splendour to the republic itself. In modern times the sale of nobility, and of public offices, renders them no longer so honourable as they should be. He is here again very free-spoken as to the conduct of the French, and of other governments.†

67. The advantage of warlike habits to a nation, and the utility of fortresses, are then investigated. Some have objected to the latter, as injurious to the courage of the people, and of little service against an invader; and also, as furnishing opportunities to tyrants and usurpers, or occasionally to rebels. Bodin, however, inclines in their favour, especially as to those on the frontier, which may be granted as feudal benefices, but not in inheritance. The question of cultivating a military spirit in the people depends on the form of polity: in popular states it is necessary; in an aristocracy, unsafe. In monarchies, the position of the state with respect to its neighbours is to be considered.

Confiscations—
rewards.

Fortresses.

* c. 3.

† c. 4.

The capital city ought to be strong in a republic, because its occupation is apt to carry with it an entire change in the commonwealth. But a citadel is dangerous in such a state. It is better not to suffer castles, or strongholds of private men, as is the policy of England; unless when the custom is so established, that they cannot be dismantled without danger to the state.*

68. Treaties of peace and alliance come next under review. He points out with his usual prolixity the difference between equal and unequal compacts of this kind. Bodin contends strongly for the rigorous maintenance of good faith, and reprobates the civilians and canonists who induced the council of Constance to break their promise towards John Huss. No one yet, he exclaims, has been so consummately impudent, as to assert the right of violating a fair promise; but one alleges the deceit of the enemy; another, his own mistake; a third, the change of circumstances, which has rendered it impossible to keep his word; a fourth, the ruin of the state which it would entail. But no excuse, according to Bodin, can be sufficient, save the unlawfulness of the promise, or the impossibility of fulfilling it. The most difficult terms to keep are between princes and their subjects, which generally require the guarantee of other states. Faith, however, ought to be kept in such cases; and he censures, though under an erroneous impression of the fact, as a breach of engagement, the execution of the duke of York in the reign of Henry VI.; adding, that he prefers to select foreign instances, rather than those at home, which he would wish to be buried in everlasting oblivion. In this he probably alludes to the day of St. Bartholomew.†

69. The first chapter of the sixth book relates to a periodical census of property, which he recommends as too much neglected. The Roman censorship of manners he extols, and thinks it peculiarly required, when all domestic coercion is come to an end. But he would give no coercive jurisdiction to his censors, and plainly intimates his

* c. 5.

mestica recordor, quæ utinam sempiterna

† c. 6. *Externa libentius quam do-*

oblivione sepulta jacerent.

dislike to a similar authority in the church.* A more important disquisition follows on public revenues. These may be derived from seven sources : namely, national domains ; confiscation of enemies' property ; gifts of friendly powers ; tributes from dependent allies ; foreign trade carried on by the state ; tolls and customs on exports and imports ; or, lastly, taxes directly levied on the people. The first of these is the most secure and honourable ; and here we have abundance of ancient and modern learning, while of course the French principle of inalienability is brought forward. The second source of revenue is justified by the rights of war and practice of nations ; the third has sometimes occurred ; and the fourth is very frequent. It is dishonourable for a prince to be a merchant, and thus gain a revenue in the fifth mode, yet the kings of Portugal do not disdain this ; and the mischievous usage of selling offices in some other countries seems to fall under this head. The different taxes on merchandise, or, in our language, of customs and excise, come in the sixth place. Here Bodin advises to lower the import duties on articles with which the people cannot well dispense, but to lay them heavily on manufactured goods, that they may learn to practise these arts themselves.

70. The last species of revenue, obtained from direct taxation, is never to be chosen but from necessity ; and as taxes are apt to be kept up when the necessity is passed, it is better that the king should borrow money of subjects than impose taxes upon them. He then enters on the history of taxation in different countries, remarking it as peculiar to France, that the burthen is thrown on the people to the ease of the nobles and clergy, which is the case no where except with the French, among whom, as Cæsar truly wrote, nothing is more despised than the common people. Taxes on luxuries, which serve only to corrupt men, are the best of all ; those also are good which are imposed on proceedings at law, so as to restrain unnecessary litigation. Borrowing at interest, or by way of annuity, as they do at Venice, is ruinous. It seems, therefore, that Bodin recommends loans without interest, which must be compulsory. In the remainder of this chapter he treats of the best mode of

* lib. vi. c. 1.

expending the public revenue, and advises that royal grants should be closely examined, and, if excessive, be rescinded, at least after the death of the reigning king.*

71. Every adulteration of coin, to which Bodin proceeds, and every change in its value, is dangerous, as it affects the certainty of contracts, and renders every man's property insecure. The different modes of alloying coin are then explained according to practical metallurgy, and, assuming the constant ratio of gold to silver as twelve to one, he advises that coins of both metals should be of the same weight. The alloy should not be above one in twenty-four; and the same standard should be used for plate. Many curious facts in monetary history will be found collected in this chapter.†

72. Bodin next states fully, and with apparent fairness, the advantages and disadvantages both of democracy and aristocracy, and admitting that some evils belong to monarchy, contends that they are all much less than in the two other forms. It must be remembered, that he does not acknowledge the possibility of a mixed government; a singular error, which, of course, vitiates his reasonings in this chapter. But it contains many excellent observations on democratical violence and ignorance, which history had led him duly to appreciate.‡ The best form of polity he holds to be a monarchy by agnatic succession, such as, in contradiction to Hottoman, he maintains to have been always established in France, pointing out also the mischiefs that have ensued in other countries for want of a Salic law.§

73. In the concluding chapter of the work, Bodin, with too much parade of mathematical language, descants on what he calls arithmetical, geometrical, and harmonic proportions as applied to political regimen. As the substance of all this appears only to be, that laws ought sometimes to be made according to the circumstances and conditions of different ranks in society, sometimes to be absolutely equal, it will probably be thought by most rather incumbered by this philosophy, which, however, he borrowed from the ancients, and found conformable to the spirit of learned men

* c. 2.

† c. 3.

‡ c. 4.

§ c. 5.

in his own time. Several interesting questions in the theory of jurisprudence are incidentally discussed in this chapter, such as that of the due limits of judicial discretion.

74. It must appear, even from this imperfect analysis, in which much has been curtailed of its fair proportion, and many both curious and judicious observations omitted, that Bodin possessed a highly philosophical mind, united with the most ample stores of history and jurisprudence. No former writer on political philosophy had been either so comprehensive in his scheme, or so copious in his knowledge; none, perhaps, more original, more independent and fearless in his inquiries. Two names alone, indeed, could be compared with his—Aristotle and Machiavel. Without, however, pretending that Bodin was equal to the former in acuteness and sagacity, we may say that the experience of two thousand years, and the maxims of reason and justice, suggested or corrected by the Gospel and its ministers, by the philosophers of Greece and Rome, and by the civil law, gave him advantages, of which his judgment and industry fully enabled him to avail himself. Machiavel, again, has discussed so few, comparatively, of the important questions in political theory, and has seen many things so partially, according to the narrow experience of Italian republics, that, with all his superiority in genius, and still more in effective eloquence, we can hardly say that his Discourses on Livy are a more useful study than the Republic of Bodin.

75. It has been often alleged, as we have mentioned above, that Montesquieu owed something, and especially his theory of the influence of climate, to Bodin. But, though he had unquestionably read the Republic with that advantage which the most fertile minds derive from others, this ought not to detract in our eyes from his real originality. The Republic, and the Spirit of Laws bear, however, a more close comparison than any other political systems of celebrity. Bodin and Montesquieu are, in this province of political theory, the most philosophical of those who have read so deeply, the most learned of those who have thought so much. Both acute, ingenious, little respecting

Bodin compared with Aristotle and Machiavel.

and with Montesquieu.

authority in matters of opinion, but deferring to it in established power, and hence apt to praise the fountain of waters whose bitterness they exposed ; both in advance of their age, but one so much that his genius neither kindled a fire in the public mind, nor gained its own due praise, the other more fortunate in being the immediate herald of a generation which he stimulated, and which repaid him by its admiration ; both conversant with ancient and mediæval history, and with the Roman as well as national law ; both just, benevolent, and sensible of the great object of civil society, but displaying this with some variation according to their times ; both sometimes seduced by false analogies, but the one rather through respect to an erroneous philosophy, the other through personal thirst of praise and affectation of originality ; both aware that the basis of the philosophy of man is to be laid in the records of his past existence ; but the one prone to accumulate historical examples without sufficient discrimination, and to overwhelm, instead of convincing the reader by their redundancy, the other aiming at an induction from select experience, but hence appearing sometimes to reason generally from particular premises, or dazzling the student by a proof that does not satisfy his reason.*

* This account of Bodin's Republic will be found too long by many readers ; and I ought, perhaps, to apologise for it on the score that M. Lermnier, in his brilliant and agreeable Introduction à l'Histoire Générale du Droit, (Paris, 1829,) has pre-occupied the same ground. This, however, had escaped my recollection (though I was acquainted with the work of M. L.) when I made my own analysis, which has not been borrowed in a single line from his. The labours of M. Lermnier are not so commonly known in England as to render it un-

necessary to do justice to a great French writer of the sixteenth century.

As I have mentioned M. Lermnier, I would ask whether the following is a fair translation of the Latin of Bodin : —
Eo nos ipsa ratio deducit, imperia scilicet ac respublicas vi primum coaluisse, etiam si ab historia deseramus ; quamquam pleni sunt libri, plenæ leges, plena antiquitas. En établissant la théorie de l'origine des sociétés, il déclare qu'il y persiste, quand même les faits iraient à l'encontre. Hist. du Droit, p. 62. and 67.

SECT. III.—ON JURISPRUDENCE.

Golden Age of Jurisprudence — Cujacius — Other Civilians — Anti-Tribonianus of Hottoman — Law of Nations — Franciscus a Victoria — Balhazar Ayala — Albericus Gentilis.

76. THE latter part of the sixteenth century, denominated by Andrès the golden age of jurisprudence, produced the men who completed what Alciat and Augustinus had begun in the preceding generation, by elucidating and reducing to order the dark chaos which the Roman law, enveloped in its own obscurities and those of its earlier commentators, had presented to the student.

Golden age
of juris-
prudence.

The most distinguished of these, Cujacius, became professor at Bourges, the chief scene of his renown, and the principal seminary of the Roman law in France, about the year 1555. His works, of which many had been separately published, were collected in 1577, and they make an epoch in the annals of jurisprudence. This greatest of all civil lawyers pursued the track that Alciat had so successfully opened, avoiding all scholastic subtleties of interpretation, for which he substituted a general erudition that rendered the science at once more intelligible and more attractive. Though his works are voluminous, Cujacius has not the reputation of diffuseness; on the contrary, the art of lucid explanation with brevity is said to have been one of his great characteristics. Thus, in the *Paratitla* on the *Digest*, a little book which Hottoman, his rival and enemy, advised his own son to carry constantly about with him, we find a brief exposition, in very good Latin, of every title in order, but with little additional matter. And it is said that he thought nothing requisite for the *Institutes* but short clear notes, which his thorough admirers afterwards contrasted with the celebrated but rather verbose commentaries of Vinnius.

Cujacius.

77. Notwithstanding this conciseness, his works extend to a formidable length. For the civil law itself is, for the most part, very concisely written, and stretches to such an extent, that his indefatigable

Eulogies
bestowed
upon him.

diligence in illustrating every portion of it could not be satisfied within narrow bounds. "Had Cujacius been born sooner," in the words of the most elegant of his successors, "he would have sufficed instead of every other interpreter. For neither does he permit us to remain ignorant of any thing, nor to know any thing which he has not taught. He alone instructs us on every subject, and what he teaches is always his own. Hence, though the learned style of jurisprudence began with Alciat, we shall call it Cujacian."* "Though the writings of Cujacius are so voluminous," says Heineccius, "that scarce any one seems likely to read them all, it is almost peculiar to him, that the longer any of his books is, the more it is esteemed. Nothing in them is trivial, nothing such as might be found in any other; every thing so well chosen that the reader can feel no satiety; and the truth is seen of what he answered to his disciples, when they asked for more diffuse commentaries, that his lectures were for the ignorant, his writings for the learned."† A later writer, Gennari, has given a more fully elaborate character of this illustrious lawyer, who might seem to have united every excellence without a failing.‡ But without listening to the enemies whom his own eminence, or the polemical fierceness of some disputes in which he was engaged, created among the jurists of that age, it has since been observed, that in his writings may be detected certain inconsistencies, of which whole books have been invidiously compiled, and that he was too prone to abuse his acuteness by conjectural emendations of the text; a dangerous practice, as Bynkershoek truly remarks, when it may depend upon

* Gravina, *Origines Juris Civilis*, p. 219.

† Heineccii *Opera*, xiv. 203. He prefers the *Observationes atque Emendationes* of Cujacius to all his other works. These contain twenty-eight books, published, at intervals, from the year 1556. They were designed to extend to forty books.

‡ *Respublica Jurisconsultorum*, p. 237. *Intactum in jurisprudentia reliquit nihil, et quæ scribit, non tam ex aliis excerpta, quam a se inventa, sane fatentur omnes; ita omnia suo loco posita, non nimis protracta, quæ nauseam creant, non arcte ac*

jejune tractata, quæ explicationis paullo diffusioris pariunt desiderium. Candida perspicuitate brevis, elegans sub amabili simplicitate, caute eruditus, quantum patitur occasio, ubique docens, ne aliqua parte arguatur otiosus, tam nihil habet inane, nihil inconditum, nihil curtum, nihil claudicans, nihil redundans, amœnus in Observationibus, subtilis in Tractatibus, uber ac planus in Commentariis, generosus in refellendis objectis, accuratus in confingendis notis, in Paratitlis brevis ac succi plenus, rectus prudensque in Consultationibus.

a single particle whether the claim of Titius or of Marius shall prevail.*

78. Such was the renown of Cujacius that, in the public schools of Germany, when his name was mentioned, every one took off his hat.† The continual bickerings of his contemporaries, not only of the old Accursian school, among whom Albericus Gentilis was prominent in disparaging him, but of those who had been trained in the steps of Alciat like himself, did not affect this honest admiration of the general student.‡ But we must not consider Cujacius exactly in the light of what we now call a great lawyer. He rejected all modern forensic experience with scorn, declaring that he had misspent his youth in such studies. We have, indeed, fifty of his consultations which appear to be actual cases. But, in general, it is observed by Gravina, that both he and the greatest of his disciples “are but ministers of ancient jurisprudence, hardly deigning to notice the emergent questions of modern practice. Hence, while the elder jurists of the school of Bartolus, deficient as they are in expounding the Roman laws, yet apply them judiciously to new cases, these excellent interpreters hardly regard any thing modern, and leave to the others the whole honour of advising and deciding rightly.” Therefore he recommends that the student who has imbibed the elements of Roman jurisprudence in all their purity from the school of Cujacius, should not neglect the interpretations of Accursius in obscure passages; and, above all, should have recourse to Bartolus and his disciples for the arguments, authorities, and illustrations which ordinary forensic questions will require.§

79. At some distance below Cujacius, but in places of honour, we find among the great French interpreters of the civil law in this age, Duaren, as devoted to ancient learning as Cujacius, but differing from him by inculcating the necessity of forensic practice to form a perfect lawyer||; Govea, who, though a Portu-

Cujacius,
an inter-
preter of
law rather
than a
lawyer.

French law-
yers below
Cujacius;
Govea and
others.

* Heinecc. xiv. 209. Gennari, p. 199.

† Gennari, p. 246. Biogr. Univ.

‡ Heineccius, ibid. Gennari, p. 242.

§ Gravina, p. 222. 230.

|| Duarenus . . . sine forensis exercitationis præsidio nec satis percipi, nec recte commodeque doceri jus civile existimat. Gennari, p. 179.

guese, was always resident in France, whom some have set even above Cujacius for ability, and of whom it has been said that he is the only jurist who ought to have written more *; Brisson, a man of various learning, who became in the seditions of Paris an unfortunate victim of his own weak ambition; Balduin, a strenuous advocate for uniting the study of ancient history with that of law; Godefroi, whose *Corpus Juris Civilis* makes an epoch in jurisprudence, being the text-book universally received; and Connan, who is at least much quoted by the principal writers on the law of nature and nations. The boast of Germany was Gifanius.

80. These "ministers of ancient jurisprudence" seemed to have no other office than to display the excellencies of the old masters in their original purity. Opponents of the Roman law. Ulpian and Papinian were to them what Aristotle and Aquinas were to another class of worshippers. But the jurists of the age of Severus have come down to us through a compilation in that of Justinian; and Alciat himself had begun to discover the interpolations of Tribonian, and the corruption which, through ignorance or design, had penetrated the vast reservoir of the Pandects. Augustinus, Cujacius, and other French lawyers of the school of Bourges, followed in this track, and endeavoured not only to restore the text from errors introduced by the carelessness of transcribers, a necessary and arduous labour, but from such as had sprung out of the presumptuousness of the lawgiver himself, or of those whom he had employed. This excited a vehement opposition, led by some of the chief lawyers of France, jealous of the fame of Cujacius. But while they pretended to rescue the orthodox vulgate from the innovations of its great interpreter, another sect rose up, far bolder than either, which assailed the law itself. Of these the most determined were Faber and Hottoman.

81. Antony Faber, or Fabre, a lawyer of Savoy, who became president of the court of Chamberi in 1610, Faber of Savoy. acquired his reputation in the sixteenth century.

* Goveanus . . . vir, de quo uno desideretur, plura scripsisse, de cæteris vero, pauciora . . . quia felix ingenio, naturæ viribus tantum confideret,

ut diligentia laudem sibi non necessariam, minus etiam honorificam putare videatur. Gennari, p. 281.

He waged war against the whole body of commentators, and even treated the civil law itself as so mutilated and corrupt, so inapplicable to modern times, that it would be better to lay it altogether aside. Gennari says, that he would have been the greatest of lawyers, if he had not been too desirous to appear such *; his temerity and self-confidence diminished the effect of his ability. His mind was ardent and unappalled by difficulties; no one had more enlarged views of jurisprudence, but in his interpretations he was prone to make the laws rather what they ought to have been than what they were. His love of paradox is hardly a greater fault than the perpetual carping at his own master Cujacius, as if he thought the reform of jurisprudence should have been reserved for himself. †

82. But the most celebrated production of this party is the Anti-Tribonianus of Hottoman. This was written in 1567, and though not published in French till 1609, nor in the original till 1647, seems properly to belong to the sixteenth century. He begins by acknowledging the merit of the Romans in jurisprudence, but denies that the compilation of Justinian is to be confounded with the Roman law. He divides his inquiry into two questions: first, whether the study of these laws is useful in France; and, secondly, what are their deficiencies. These laws, he observes by the way, contain very little instruction about Roman history or antiquities, so that in books on those subjects we rarely find them cited. He then adverts to particular branches of the civil law, and shows that numberless doctrines are now obsolete, such as the state of servitude, the right of arrogation, the ceremonies of marriage, the peculiar law of guardianship, while for matters of daily occurrence they give us no assistance. He points out the useless distinctions between things *mancipi* and *non mancipi*, between the *dominium quiritarium* and *bonitarium*; the modes of acquiring property by mancipation, *cessio in jure*, *usucapio*, and the

* p. 97.

† Heineccius, p. 236. Fabre, says Ferrière, as quoted by Terrasson, Hist. de la Jurisprudence, est celui des juriscultes modernes qui a porté le plus loin les idées sur le droit. C'étoit un esprit vaste que ne se rebutoit par de

plus grandes difficultés. Mais on l'accuse avec raison d'avoir décidé un peu trop hardiment contre les opinions communes, et de s'être donné souvent trop de liberté de retrancher ou d'ajouter dans les lois. See, too, the article Favre, in Biographie Universelle.

like, the unprofitable doctrines about *fidei commissa* and the *jus accrescendi*. He dwells on the folly of keeping up the old forms of stipulation in contracts, and those of legal process, from which no one can depart a syllable without losing his suit. And on the whole he concludes, that not a twentieth part of the Roman law survives, and of that not one tenth can be of any utility. In the second part, Hottoman attacks Tribonian himself, for suppressing the genuine works of great lawyers, for barbarous language, for perpetually mutilating, transposing, and interpolating the passages which he inserts, so that no cohesion or consistency is to be found in these fragments of materials, nor is it possible to restore them. The evil has been increased by the herd of commentators and interpreters since the twelfth century; those who have lately appeared and applied more erudition rarely agreeing in their conjectural emendations of the text, which yet frequently varies in different manuscripts, so as to give rise to endless disputes. He ends by recommending that some jurisconsults and advocates should be called together, in order to compile a good code of laws; taking whatever is valuable in the Roman system, and adding whatever from other sources may seem worthy of reception, drawing them up in plain language, without too much subtilty, and attending chiefly to the principles of equity. He thinks that a year or two would suffice for the instruction of students in such a code of laws, which would be completed afterwards, as was the case at Rome, by forensic practice.

83. These opinions of Hottoman, so reasonable in themselves, as to the inapplicability of much of the Roman law to the actual state of society, were congenial to the prejudices of many lawyers in France. That law had in fact to struggle against a system already received, the feudal customs which had governed the greater part of the kingdom. And this party so much prevailed, that by the ordinance of Blois, in 1579, the university of Paris was forbidden to give lectures or degrees in civil law. This was not wholly regarded; but it was not till a century afterwards, that public lectures in that science were re-established in the university, on account of the uncertainty which the neglect of the civil law was alleged to have produced.

Civil law
not counte-
nanced in
France.

84. France now stood far pre-eminent in her lawyers.

Turamini. But Italy was not wanting in men once conspicuous, whom we cannot afford time to mention. One of them, Turamini, professor at Ferrara, though his name is not found in Tiraboschi, or even in Gravina, seems to have had a more luminous conception of the relation which should subsist between positive laws and those of nature, as well as of their distinctive provinces, than was common in the great jurists of that generation. His commentary on the title *De Legibus*, in the first book of the *Pandects*, gave him an opportunity for philosophical illustration. An account of his writings will be found in Corniani.*

Canon law. 85. The canon law, though by no means a province sterile in the quantity of its produce, has not deserved to arrest our attention. It was studied conjointly with that of Rome, from which it borrows many of its principles and rules of proceeding, though not servilely, nor without such variations as the independence of its tribunals and the different nature of its authorities might be expected to produce. Covarruvias and other Spaniards were the most eminent canonists; Spain was distinguished in this line of jurisprudence.

Law of nations. Its early state. 86. But it is of more importance to observe, that in this period we find a foundation laid for the great science of international law, the determining authority in questions of right between independent states. Whatever had been delivered in books on this subject, had rested too much on theological casuistry, or on the analogies of positive and local law, or on the loose practice of nations, and precedents rather of arms than of reason. The *fecial law*, or rights of ambassadors, was that which had been most respected. The customary code of Europe, in military and maritime questions, as well as in some others, to which no state could apply its particular jurisprudence with any hope of reciprocity, grew up by degrees to be administered, if not upon solid principles, yet with some uniformity. The civil jurists, as being conversant with a system more widely diffused, and of which the equity was more generally recognised than any other, took into their hands the adjudication of all

* Vol. vi. p. 197.

these cases. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the progress of international relations, and, we may add, the frequency of wars, though it did not at once create a common standard, showed how much it was required. War itself, it was perceived, even for the advantage of the belligerents, had its rules; an enemy had his rights; the study of ancient history furnished precedents of magnanimity and justice, which put the more recent examples of Christendom to shame; the spirit of the Gospel could not be wholly suppressed, at least in theory; the strictness of casuistry was applied to the duties of sovereigns; and perhaps the scandal given by the writings of Machiavel was not without its influence in dictating a nobler tone to the morality of international law.

87. Before we come to works strictly belonging to this kind of jurisprudence, one may be mentioned which connects it with theological casuistry. The *Relectiones Theologicæ* of Francis a Victoria, a professor in Salamanca, and one on whom Nicolas Antonio and many other Spanish writers bestow the highest eulogy, as the restorer of theological studies in their country, is a book of remarkable scarcity, though it has been published at least in four editions. Grotius has been supposed to have made use of it in his own great work; but some of those who since his time have mentioned Victoria's writings on this subject lament that they are not to be met with. Dupin, however, has given a short account of the *Relectiones*; and there are at least two copies in England—one in the Bodleian Library, and another in that of Dr. Williams in Redcross Street. The edition I have used is of Venice, 1626, being probably the latest; it was published first at Lyons in 1557, at Salamanca in 1565, and again at Lyons in 1587, but had become scarce before its republication at Venice.* It consists of thirteen *relectiones*, as Victoria calls them, or dissertations on different subjects,

* This is said on the authority of the Venetian edition. But Nicolas Antonio mentions an edition at Ingoldstadt in 1580, and another at Antwerp in 1604. He is silent about those of 1587 and 1626. He also says that the *Relectiones* are twelve in number. Perhaps

he had never seen the book, but he does not advert to its scarcity. Morhof, who calls it *Prælectiones*, names the two editions of Lyons, and those of Ingoldstadt and Antwerp. Brunet, Watts, and the *Biographie Universelle* do not mention Victoria at all.

passed it with liberty to dissent. It was in the mode in which he treats them. The title settles the rights and the limits of the king's power and the laws important.

Of the title to settle the *Indians' Civil*. In this he settles government and monarchy from divine institution and shows that as the majority of a state may choose a king whom the minority are bound to obey so the majority of Christians may bind the minority by the choice of an universal monarch. In the chapter concerning the Indians he strongly asserts the natural right of those nations to dominion over their own property and to sovereignty. Refuting the argument to the contrary founded in their minority or race. He treats this question methodically in a scholastic manner giving the reasonings on both sides. He denies that the emperor, or the pope, is lord of the whole world or that the pope has any power over the barbarian Indians or other nations. The right of sovereignty in the king of Spain over these people he rests on such grounds as he can find: namely, the refusal of permission to trade which he holds to be a just cause of war, and the injuries made to him by sales among the native people. In the sixth relection on the right of war, he goes over most of the leading questions discussed afterwards by Albericus Gentilis and Grotius. His dissertation is exceedingly condensed, comprising sixty sections in twenty-eight pages; wherein he treats of the general right of war, the difference between public war and reprisal, the just and unjust causes of war, its proper ends, the right of subjects to examine its grounds, and many more of a similar kind. He determines that a war cannot be just on both sides, except through ignorance; and also that subjects ought not to serve their prince in a war which they reckon unjust. Grotius has adopted both these tenets. The whole relection, as well as that on the Indians, displays an intrepid spirit of justice and humanity, which seems to have been rather a general characteristic of the Spanish theologians. Dominic Soto, always inflexibly on the side of right, had already sustained by his authority the noble enthusiasm of Las Casas.

89). But the first book, so far as I am aware, that systematically reduced the practice of nations in the conduct of

war to legitimate rules, is a treatise by Balthazar Ayala, judge-advocate (as we use the word) to the Spanish army in the Netherlands, under the prince of Parma, to whom it is dedicated. The dedication bears date 1581, and the first edition is said to have appeared the next year. I have only seen that of 1597, and I apprehend every edition to be very scarce. For this reason, and because it is the opening of a great subject, I shall give the titles of his chapters in a note.* It will appear, that the

Ayala on
the rights
of war.

* Balth. Ayalæ, J. C. et exercitus regii apud Belgas supremi juridici, de jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari, libri tres. Antw. 1597. 12mo. pp. 405.

Lib. i.

- c. 1. De Ratione Belli Indicendi, Aliisque Cæremoniis Bellicis.
2. De Bello Justo.
3. De Duello, sive Singulari Certamine.
4. De Pignationibus, quas vulgo Represalias vocant.
5. De Bello Captis et Jure Postliminii.
6. De Fide Hosti Servanda.
7. De Fœderibus et Induciis.
8. De Insiidiis et Fraude Hostili.
9. De Jure Legatorum.

Lib. ii.

- c. 1. De Officiis Bellicis.
2. De Imperatore vel Duce Exercitus.
3. Unum non Plures Exercitui Præfici debere.
4. Utrum Lenitate et Benevolentia, an Severitate et Sævitia, plus proficiet Imperator.
5. Temporum Rationem præcipue in Bello Habendam.
6. Contentiosas et Lentas de Rebus Bellicis Deliberationes admodum Noxias esse.
7. Dum Res sunt Integræ ne minimum quidem Regi vel Republicæ de Majestate sua Concedendum esse; et errare eos qui Arrogantiam Hostium Modestia et Patientia vinci posse existimant.
8. An præstet Bellum Domi excipere, an vero in Hostilem Agrum inferre.
9. An præstet Initio Prælii Magno Clamore et Concitato Cursu in Hostes pergere, an vero Loco manere.

Lib. ii.

- c. 10. Non esse Consilii invicem In-fensos Civilibus Disensionibus Hostes Sola Discordia Fretum invadere.
11. Necessitatem Pugnandi Magno Studio Imponendam esse Militibus et Hostibus Remittendam.
12. In Victoria potissimum de Pace Cogitandum.
13. Devictis Hostibus qua potissimum Ratione Perpetua Pace Quietæ obtineri possint [sic].

Lib. iii.

- c. 1. De Disciplina Militari.
2. De Officio Legati et Aliorum qui Militibus præsunt.
3. De Metatoribus sive Mensoribus.
4. De Militibus, et qui Militare possunt.
5. De Sacramento Militari.
6. De Missione.
7. De Privilegiis Militum.
8. De Judiciis Militaribus.
9. De Pœnis Militum.
10. De Contumacibus et Ducum Dicto non Parentibus.
11. De Emansoribus.
12. De Desertoribus.
13. De Transfugis et Proditoribus.
14. De Seditiosis.
15. De iis qui in Acie Loco cedunt aut Victi Se dedunt.
16. De iis qui Arma alienant vel amittunt.
17. De iis qui Excubias deserunt vel minus recte agunt.
18. De eo qui Arcem vel Oppidum cujus Præsidio impositus est, amittit vel Hostibus dedit.
19. De Furtis et Aliis Delictis Militaribus.
20. De Præmiis Militum.

second book of Ayala, relates more to politics and to strategy than to international jurisprudence; and that in the third he treats entirely of what we call martial law. But in the first he aspires to lay down great principles of public ethics; and Grotius, who refers to Ayala with commendation, is surely mistaken in saying that he has not touched the grounds of justice and injustice in war.* His second chapter is on this subject, in thirty-four pages; and though he neither sifts the matter so exactly, nor limits the right of hostility so much as Grotius, he deserves the praise of laying down the general principle without subtilty or chicanery. Ayala positively denies, with Victoria, the right of levying war against infidels, even by authority of the pope, on the mere ground of their religion; for their infidelity does not deprive them of their right of dominion; nor was that sovereignty over the earth given originally to the faithful alone, but to every reasonable creature. And this, he says, has been shown by Covarruvias to be the sentiment of the majority of doctors.† Ayala deals abundantly in examples from ancient history, and in authorities from the jurists.

90. We find next in order of chronology a treatise by Albericus Gentilis, *De Legationibus*, published in 1583. Gentilis was an Italian protestant who, through the Earl of Leicester, obtained the chair of civil law at Oxford in 1582. His writings on Roman jurisprudence are numerous, but not very highly esteemed. This work, on the Law of Embassy, is dedicated to Sir Philip Sidney, the patron of so many distinguished strangers. The first book contains an explanation of the different kinds of embassies, and of the ceremonies anciently connected with them. His aim, as he professes, is to elevate the importance and sanctity of ambassadors, by showing the practice of former times. In the second book he enters more on their peculiar rights. The envoys of rebels and pirates are not

Albericus
Gentilis on
Embassies.

* *Causas unde bellum justum aut injustum dicitur Ayala non tetigit.* De Jure B. and P. Prolegom. § 38.

† *Bellum adversus infideles ex eo solum quod infideles sunt, ne quidem auctoritate imperatoris vel summi pontificis indicii potest; infidelitas enim non*

privat infideles dominio quod habent jure gentium; nam non fidelibus tantum rerum dominia, sed omni rationabili creaturæ data sunt. . . . Et hæc sententia plerisque probatur, ut ostendit Covarruvias.

protected. But difference of religion does not take away the right of sending ambassadors. He thinks that civil suits against public ministers may be brought before the ordinary tribunals. On the delicate problem as to the criminal jurisdiction of these tribunals over ambassadors conspiring against the life of the sovereign, Gentilis holds, that they can only be sent out of the country, as the Spanish ambassador was by Elizabeth. The civil law, he maintains, is no conclusive authority in the case of ambassadors, who depend on that of nations, which in many respects is different from the other. The second book is the most interesting, for the third chiefly relates to the qualifications required in a good ambassador. His instances are more frequently taken from ancient than modern history.

91. A more remarkable work by Albericus Gentilis is his treatise, *De Jure Belli*, first published at Lyons, 1589. Grotius acknowledges his obligations to Gentilis, as well as to Ayala, but in a greater degree to the former. And that this comparatively obscure writer was of some use to the eminent founder, as he has been deemed, of international jurisprudence, were it only for mapping his subject, will be evident from the titles of his chapters, which run almost parallel to those of the first and third book of Grotius.* They embrace, as the reader will

His treatise
on the Rights
of War.

* Lib. i.

- c. 1. De Jure Gentium Bellico.
2. Belli Definitio.
3. Principes Bellum gerunt.
4. Latrones Bellum non gerunt.
5. Bella juste geruntur.
6. Bellum juste geri utrinque.
7. De Caussis Bellorum.
8. De Caussis Divinis Belli Faciendi.
9. An Bellum Justum sit pro Religione.
10. Si Princeps Religionem Bello apud suos juste tuetur.
11. An Subditi bellent contra Principem ex Causa Religionis.
12. Utrum sint Causæ Naturales Belli Faciendi.
13. De Necessaria Defensione.
14. De Utili Defensione.
15. De Honesta Defensione.

Lib. i.

- c. 16. De Subditi Alienis contra Dominum Defendendis.
17. Qui Bellum necessarie inferunt.
18. Qui utiliter Bellum inferunt.
19. De Naturalibus Caussis Belli inferendi.
20. De Humanis Caussis Belli inferendi.
21. De Malefactis Privatorum.
22. De Vetustis Caussis non Excitandis.
23. De Regnorum Eversionibus.
24. Si in Posteris movetur Bellum.
25. De Honesta Causa Belli inferendi.

Lib. ii.

- c. 1. De Bello Indicendo.
2. Si quando Bellum non indicitur.
3. De Dolo et Stratagematis.
4. De Dolo Verborum.

perceive, the whole field of public faith, and of the rights both of war and victory. But I doubt whether the obligation has been so extensive as has sometimes been insinuated. Grotius does not, as far as I have compared them, borrow many quotations from Gentilis, though he cannot but sometimes allege the same historical examples. It will also be found in almost every chapter, that he goes deeper into the subject, reasons much more from ethical principles, relies less on the authority of precedent, and is in fact a philosopher where the other is a compiler.

92. Much that bears on the subject of international law may probably be latent in the writings of the jurists, Baldus, Covarruvias, Vasquez, especially the two latter, who seem to have combined the science of casuistry with that of the civil law. Gentilis, and even Grotius, refer much to them; and the former, who is no great philosopher, appears to have borrowed from that source some of his general principles. It is honourable to these men, as we have already seen in Soto, Victoria, and Ayala, that they strenuously defended the maxims of political justice.

Lib. ii.

- c. 5. De Mendaciis.
6. De Veneficiis.
7. De Armis et Mentitis Armis.
8. De Scævola, Juditha, et Similibus.
9. De Zopiro et Aliis Transfugis.
10. De Pactis Ducum.
11. De Pactis Militum.
12. De Induciis.
13. Quando contra Inducias fiat.
14. De Salvo Conductu.
15. De Permutationibus et Liberationibus.
16. De Captivis, et non necandis.
17. De His qui se Hosti tradunt.
18. In Deditis, et Captos sæviri.
19. De Obsidibus.
20. De Supplicibus.
21. De Pueris et Fœminis.
22. De Agricolis, Mercatoribus, Peregrinis, Aliis Similibus.
23. De Vastitate et Incendiis.
24. De Cæsis sepieliendis.

Lib. iii.

- c. 1. De Belli Fine et Pace.
2. De Ultione Victoris.
3. De Sumptibus et Damnis Belli.
4. Tributis et Agris multari Victos.

Lib. iii.

- c. 5. Victoris Acquisitio Universalis.
6. Victos Ornamentis Spoliari.
7. Urbes diripi, dirui.
8. De Ducibus Hostium Captis.
9. De Servis.
10. De Statu Mutando.
11. De Religionis Aliarumque Rerum Mutatione.
12. Si Utile cum Honesto Pugnet.
13. De Pace Futura Constituenda.
14. De Jure Conveniendi.
15. De Quibus cavetur in Fœderibus et in Duello.
16. De Legibus et Libertate.
17. De Agris et Postliminio.
18. De Amicitia et Societate.
19. Si Fœdus recte contrahitur cum Diversæ Religionis Hominibus.
20. De Armis et Classibus.
21. De Arcibus et Præidiis.
22. Si Successores Fœderatorum tenentur.
23. De Ratihabitione, Privatis, Piratis, Exulibus, Adhærentibus.
24. Quando Fœdus violatur.

CHAPTER V.

HISTORY OF POETRY FROM 1550 TO 1600.

SECT. I.—ON ITALIAN POETRY.

Character of the Italian Poets of this Age — Some of the best enumerated — Bernardino Rota — Gaspara Stampa — Bernardo Tasso — Gierusalemme Liberata of Torquato Tasso.

1. THE school of Petrarch, restored by Bembo, was prevalent in Italy at the beginning of this period. It would demand the use of a library, formed peculiarly for this purpose, as well as a great expenditure of time, to read the original volumes which this immensely numerous class of poets, the Italians of the sixteenth century, filled with their sonnets. In the lists of Crescimbeni, they reach the number of 661. We must, therefore, judge of them chiefly through selections, which, though they may not always have done justice to every poet, cannot but present to us an adequate picture of the general style of poetry. The majority are feeble copyists of Petrarch. Even in most of those who have been preferred to the rest, an affected intensity of passion, a monotonous repetition of customary metaphors, of hyperboles reduced to commonplaces by familiarity, of mythological allusions, pedantic without novelty, cannot be denied incessantly to recur. But, in observing how much they generally want of that which is essentially the best, we might be in danger of forgetting that there is a praise due to selection of words, to harmony of sound, and to skill in overcoming metrical impediments, which it is for natives alone to award. The authority of Italian critics should, therefore, be respected, though not without keeping in mind both their national prejudice, and

General
character of
Italian poets
in this age.

Their usual
faults.

that which the habit of admiring a very artificial style must always generate.

2. It is perhaps hardly fair to read a number of these compositions in succession. Every sonnet has its own unity, and is not, it might be pleaded, to be charged with tediousness or monotony, because the same structure of verse, or even the same general sentiment, may recur in an equally independent production. Even collectively taken, the minor Italian poetry of the sixteenth century may be deemed a great repertory of beautiful language, of sentiments and images, that none but minds finely tuned by nature produce, and that will ever be dear to congenial readers, presented to us with exquisite felicity and grace, and sometimes with an original and impressive vigour. The sweetness of the Italian versification goes far towards their charm; but are poets forbidden to avail themselves of this felicity of their native tongue, or do we invidiously detract, as we might on the same ground, from the praise of Theocritus and Bion?

3. "The poets of this age," says one of their best critics, "had, in general, a just taste, wrote with elegance, employed deep, noble, and natural sentiments, and filled their compositions with well-chosen ornaments. There may be observed, however, some difference between the authors who lived before the middle of the century and those who followed them. The former were more attentive to imitate Petrarch, and, unequal to reach the fertility and imagination of this great master, seemed rather dry, with the exception, always, of Casa and Costanzo, whom, in their style of composition, I greatly admire. The later writers, in order to gain more applause, deviated in some measure from the spirit of Petrarch, seeking ingenious thoughts, florid conceits, splendid ornaments, of which they became so fond, that they fell sometimes into the vicious extreme of saying too much."*

4. Casa and Costanzo, whom Muratori seems to place in the earlier part of the century, belong, by the date of publication at least, to this latter period. The former was the first to quit the style of Petrarch, which

* Muratori, della Perfetta Poesia, i. 22.

Bembo had rendered so popular. Its smoothness evidently wanted vigour, and it was the aim of Casa to inspire a more masculine tone into the sonnet, at the expense of a harsher versification. He occasionally ventured to carry on the sense without pause from the first to the second tercet; an innovation praised by many, but which, at that time, few attempted to imitate, though in later ages it has become common, not much perhaps to the advantage of the sonnet. The poetry of Casa speaks less to the imagination, the heart, or the ear, than to the understanding.*

5. Angelo di Costanzo, a Neapolitan, and author of a well-known history of his country, is highly extolled by Crescimbeni and Muratori; perhaps no Of Costanzo. one of these lyric poets of the sixteenth century is so much in favour with the critics. Costanzo is so regular in his versification, and so strict in adhering to the unity of subject, that the Society of Arcadians, when, towards the close of the seventeenth century, they endeavoured to rescue Italian poetry from the school of Marini, selected him as the best model of imitation. He is ingenious, but perhaps a little too refined; and by no means free from that coldly hyperbolic tone in addressing his mistress, which most of these sonnetteers assume. Costanzo is not to me, in general, a pleasing writer; though sometimes he is very beautiful, as in the sonnet on Virgil, "Quella cetra gentil," justly praised by Muratori, and which will be found in most collections; remarkable, among higher merits, for being contained in a single sentence. Another, on the same subject, "Cigni felici," is still better. The poetry of Camillo Pellegrini much resembles that of Costanzo.† The sonnets of Baldi, especially a series on the ruins and antiquities of Rome, Baldi. appear to me deserving of a high place among those

* Casa . . . per poco deviando dalla dolcezza del Petrarca, a un novello stile diede principio, col quale le sue rime compose, intendendo sopra il tutto alla gravità; per conseguir la quale, si valse specialmente del carattere aspro, e de' raggrati periodi e rotondi, insino a condurre uno stesso sentimento d' uno in altro quadernario, e d' uno in altro tercetto; cosa in prima da alcuno non più tentata; perlochè somma lode ritrasse de

chiunque coltivò in questi tempi la toscana poesia. Ma perchè si fatto stile era proprio, e adattato all' ingegno del suo inventore, molto difficile riuscì il seguirlo. Crescimbeni, *Della Volgar Poesia*, ii. 410. See also Ginguéné, ix. 329. Tiraboschi, x. 22. Casa is generally, to my apprehension, very harsh and prosaic.

† Crescimbeni, vol. iv. p. 25.

of the age. They may be read among his poems ; but few have found their way into the collections by Gobbi and Rubbi, which are not made with the best taste. Caro, says Crescim-

beni, is less rough than Casa, and more original than Bembo. Salfi extols the felicity of his style, and the harmony of his versification ; while he owns that his thoughts are often forced and obscure.*

6. Among the canzoni of this period, one by Celio Magno on the Deity stands in the eyes of foreigners, and I believe of many Italians, prominent above the rest. It is certainly a noble ode.† Rubbi, editor of the *Parnaso Italiano*, says that he would call Celio the greatest lyric poet of his age, if he did not dread the clamour of the Petrarchists. The poetry of Celio Magno, more than one hundred pages extracted from which will be found in the thirty-second volume of that collection, is not in general amatory, and displays much of that sonorous rhythm and copious expression which afterwards made Chiabrera and Guidi famous. Some of his odes, like those of Pindar, seem to have been written for pay, and have somewhat of that frigid exaggeration which such conditions produce. Crescimbeni thinks that Tansillo, in the ode, has no rival but Petrarch.‡ The poetry in general of Tansillo, especially *La Balia*, which contains good advice to mothers about nursing their infants very prosaically delivered, seems deficient in spirit.§

7. The amatory sonnets of this age, forming the greater number, are very frequently cold and affected. This might possibly be ascribed in some measure to the state of manners in Italy, where, with abundant

Coldness of
the amatory
sonnets.

* Crescimbeni, ii. 429. Ginguéné (continuation par Salfi), ix. 12. Caro's sonnets on Castelvetro, written during their quarrel, are full of furious abuse with no wit. They have the ridiculous particularity that the last line of each is repeated so as to begin the next.

† This will be found in the *Compendi-menti Lirici* of Mathias ; a collection good on the whole, yet not perhaps the best that might have been made ; nor had the editor at that time so extensive an acquaintance with Italian poetry as he afterwards acquired. Crescimbeni reckons

Celio the last of the good age in poetry ; he died in 1612. He praises also Scipio Gaetano (not the painter of that name) whose poems were published, but posthumously, in the same year.

‡ Della *Volgar Poesia*, ii. 436.

§ Roscoe republished *La Balia*, which was very little worth while : the following is an average specimen : —

Questo degenerar, ch' ognor si vede,
Sendo voi caste, donne mie, vi dico,
Che d' altro che dal latte non procede.
I' altrui latte oscurar fa 'l pregio antico
Degli avi illustri e adulterar le razze,
E s' infetta talor sangue pudico.

licentiousness, there was still much of jealousy, and public sentiment applauded alike the successful lover and the vindictive husband. A respect for the honour of families, if not for virtue, would impose on the poet who felt or assumed a passion for any distinguished lady, the conditions of Tasso's *Olindo*, to desire much, to hope for little, and to ask nothing. It is also at least very doubtful, whether much of the amorous sorrow of the sonnetteers were not purely ideal.

8. Lines and phrases from Petrarch are as studiously introduced as we find those of classical writers in modern Latin poetry. It cannot be said that this is unpleasing; and to the Italians, who knew every passage of their favourite poet, it must have seemed at once a grateful homage of respect, and an ingenious artifice to bespeak attention. They might well look up to him as their master, but could not hope that even a foreigner would ever mistake the hand through a single sonnet. He is to his disciples, especially those towards the latter part of the century, as Guido is to Franceschini or Elisabetta Serena; an effeminate and mannered touch enfeebles the beauty which still lingers round the pencil of the imitator. If they produce any effect upon us beyond sweetness of sound and delicacy of expression, it is from some natural feeling, some real sorrow, or from some occasional originality of thought, in which they cease for a moment to pace the banks of their favourite *Sorga*. It would be easy to point out not a few sonnets of this higher character, among those especially of Francesco Coppetta, of Claudio Tolomei, of Ludovico Paterno, or of Bernardo Tasso.

Studied
imitation of
Petrarch.

9. A school of poets, that has little vigour of sentiment, falls readily into description, as painters of history or portrait that want expression of character endeavour to please by their landscape. The Italians, especially in this part of the sixteenth century, are profuse in the song of birds, the murmur of waters, the shade of woods; and, as these images are always delightful, they shed a charm over much of their poetry, which only the critical reader, who knows its secret, is apt to resist, and that to his own loss of gratification. The pastoral character, which it became customary to assume, gives much opportunity for these secondary, yet very seducing beauties of style. They belong to the de-

Their fond-
ness for
description.

cline of the art, and have something of the voluptuous charm of evening. Unfortunately they generally presage a dull twilight, or a thick darkness of creative poetry. The Greeks had much of this in the Ptolemaic age, and again in that of the first Byzantine emperors. It is conspicuous in Tansillo, Paterno, and both the Tassos.

10. The Italian critics, Crescimbeni, Muratori, and Quadrio, have given minute attention to the beauties of particular sonnets culled from the vast stores of the sixteenth century. But as the development of the thought, the management of the four constituent clauses of the sonnet, especially the last, the propriety of every line, for nothing digressive or merely ornamental should be admitted, constitute in their eyes the chief merit of these short compositions, they extol some which in our eyes are not so pleasing, as what a less regular taste might select. Without presuming to rely on my own judgment, defective both as that of a foreigner, and of one not so extensively acquainted with the minor poetry of this age, I will mention two writers, well known, indeed, but less prominent in the critical treatises than some others, as possessing a more natural sensibility and a greater truth of sorrow than most of their contemporaries—Bernardino Rota and Gaspara Stampa.

11. Bernardino Rota, a Neapolitan of ancient lineage and considerable wealth, left poems in Latin as well as Italian; and among the latter his eclogues are highly praised by his editor. But he is chiefly known by a series of sonnets intermixed with canzoni, upon a single subject, Portia Capece, his wife, whom, "what is unusual among our Tuscan poets (says his editor), he loved with an exclusive affection." But be it understood, lest the reader should be discouraged, that the poetry addressed to Portia Capece is all written before their marriage, or after her death. The earlier division of the series, "Rime in Vita," seems not to rise much above the level of amorous poetry. He wooed, was delayed, complained, and won—the natural history of an equal and reasonable love. Sixteen years intervened of that tranquil bliss which contents the heart without moving it, and seldom affords much to the poet in which the reader can find interest. Her death in 1559 gave rise to poetical

sorrows, as real, and certainly full as rational, as those of Petrarch, to whom some of his contemporaries gave him the second place; rather probably from the similarity of their subject, than from the graces of his language. Rota is by no means free from conceits, and uses sometimes affected and unpleasing expressions, as *mia dolce guerra*, speaking of his wife, even after her death; but his images are often striking*; and, above all, he resembles Petrarch, with whatever inferiority, in combining the ideality of a poetical mind with the naturalness of real grief. It has never again been given to man, nor will it probably be given, to dip his pen in those streams of ethereal purity which have made the name of Laura immortal; but a sonnet of Rota may be not disadvantageously compared with one of Milton, which we justly admire for its general feeling, though it begins in pedantry and ends in conceit.† For my own part, I would much rather read again the collection of Rota's sonnets than those of Costanzo.

* Muratori blames a line of Rota as too bold, and containing a false thought.

Feano i begl' occhi a se medesmi giorno.

It seems to me not beyond the limits of poetry, nor more hyperbolic than many others which have been much admired. It is, at least, *Petrarchesque* in a high degree.

† This sonnet is in Mathias, iii. 256. That of Milton will be remembered by most readers.

In lieto e pien di riverenza aspetto,
Con veste di color bianco e vermiglio,
Di doppia luce serenato il ciglio,
Mi viene in sonno il mio dolce diletto.
Io me l' inchino, e con cortese affetto
Seco ragiono e seco mi consiglio.
Com' abbia a governarmi in quest' esiglio,
E piango intanto, e la risposta aspetto.
Ella m' ascolta fiso, e dice cose
Veramente celesti, ed io l' apprendo,
E serbo ancor nella memoria ascose.
Mi lascia al fine e parte, e va spargendo
Per l' aria nel partir viole e rose;
Io le porgo la man; poi mi reprendo.

In one of Rota's sonnets we have the thought of Pope's epitaph on Gay:—

Questo cor, questa mente e questo petto
Sia 'l tuo sepolcro, e non la tomba o 'l sasso;
Ch' io t' apparecchio qui doglioso e lasso;
Non si deve a te, donna, altro ricetto.

He proceeds very beautifully:—

Ricca sia la memoria e l' intelletto,
Del ben per cui tutt' altro a dietro io lasso;

E mentre questo mar di pianto passo,
Vadammi sempre innanzi il caro oggetto.
Alma gentil, dove bitar solei
Donna e reina, in terren fascio avvolta,
Ivi regnar celeste immortal dei.
Vantisi pur la morte averti tolta
Al mondo, a me non già; ch' a pensier miei
Una sempre sarai viva e sepolta.

The poems of Rota are separately published in two volumes. Naples, 1726. They contain a mixture of Latin. Whether Milton intentionally borrowed the sonnet on his wife's death,

"Methought I saw my last espoused saint,"

from that above quoted, I cannot pretend to say; certainly his resemblances to the Italian poets often seem more than accidental. Thus two lines in an indifferent writer, Girolamo Preti (Mathias, iii. 329.) are exactly like one of the sublimest flights in the *Paradise Lost*.

Tu per soffrir della cui luce i ral
Si fan con l' ale i serafim un velo.

Dark with excessive light thy skirts appear:
Yet dazzle Heaven, that brightest seraphim
Approach not, but with both wings veil their eyes.

[But it has been suggested to me that both poets must have alluded to Isaiah, vi. 2. Thus, too, the language of the Jewish liturgies represents the seraphim as veiling their eyes with wings in the presence of God.—1842.]

12. The sorrows of Gaspara Stampa were of a different kind, but not less genuine than those of Rota. She was a lady of the Paduan territory, living near the small river Anaso, from which she adopted the poetical name of Anasilla. This stream bathes the foot of certain lofty hills, from which a distinguished family, the counts of Collalto, took their appellation. The representative of this house, himself a poet as well as soldier, and, if we believe his fond admirer, endowed with every virtue except constancy, was loved by Gaspara with enthusiastic passion. Unhappily she learned only by sad experience the want of generosity too common to man, and sacrificing, not the honour, but the pride of her sex, by submissive affection, and finally by querulous importunity, she estranged a heart never so susceptible as her own. Her sonnets, which seem arranged nearly in order, begin with the delirium of sanguine love; they are extravagant effusions of admiration, mingled with joy and hope; but soon the sense of Collalto's coldness glides in and overpowers her bliss.* After three years' expectation of seeing his promise of marriage fulfilled, and when he had already caused alarm by his indifference, she was compelled to endure the pangs of absence by his entering the service of France. This does not seem to have been of long continuance; but his letters were infrequent, and her complaints, always vented in a sonnet, become more fretful. He returned, and Anasilla exults with tenderness, yet still timid in the midst of her joy.

Gaspara
Stampa.
Her love
for Collalto

Oserò io, con queste fide braccia,
Cingerli il caro collo, ed accostare
La mia tremante alla sua viva faccia ?

But jealousy, not groundless, soon intruded, and we find her doubly miserable. Collalto became more harsh, avowed his indifference, forbade her to importune him with her complaints, and in a few months espoused another woman. It is said by the historians of Italian literature, that the broken heart of Gaspara sunk very soon under

is ill re-
quited.

* In an early sonnet she already calls Collalto, "*il Signor, ch' in amo, e ch' in pavento*;" an expression descriptive

enough of the state in which poor Gaspara seems to have lived several years.

these accumulated sorrows into the grave.* And such, no doubt, is what my readers expect, and (at least the gentler of them) wish to find. But inexorable truth, to whom I am the sworn vassal, compels me to say that the poems of the lady herself contain unequivocal proofs that she avenged herself better on Collalto—by falling in love again. We find the acknowledgment of another incipient ^{Her second love.} passion, which speedily comes to maturity; and, while declaring that her present flame is much stronger than the last, she dismisses her faithless lover with the handsome compliment, that it was her destiny always to fix her affections on a noble object. The name of her second choice does not appear in her poems; nor has any one hitherto, it would seem, made the very easy discovery of his existence. It is true that she died young; “but not of love.”†

13. The style of Gaspara Stampa is clear, simple, graceful; the Italian critics find something to censure in the versification. In purity of taste, I ^{Style of Gaspara Stampa.} should incline to set her above Bernardino Rota, though she has less vigour of imagination. Corniani has applied to her the well-known lines of Horace upon Sappho.‡ But the fires of guilt and shame, that glow along the strings of the Æolian lyre, ill resemble the pure sorrows of the tender Anasilla. Her passion for Collalto, ardent and undisguised, was ever virtuous; the sense of gentle birth, though

* She anticipated her epitaph, on this hypothesis of a broken heart, which did not occur.

Per amar molto, ed esser poco amata
Visse e morì infelice; ed or qui giace
La più fedel amanto che sia stata.
Pregale, viator, riposo e pace,
Ed impara da lei sì mal trattata
A non seguire un cor crudo e fugace.

† It is impossible to dispute the evidence of Gaspara herself in several sonnets, so that Corniani, and all the rest, must have read her very inattentively. What can we say to these lines?

Perchè mi par vedere a certi segni
Ch' ordisci (Amor) nuovi lacci e nuove faci,
E di ritrarre al giogo tuo t'ingegni.

And afterwards more fully:

Qual darai fine, Amor, alle mie pene,
Se dal cinere estinto d' un ardore
Rinasce l' altro, tua mercè, maggiore,
E sì vivace a consumar mi viene?
Qual nelle più felici e calde arene

Nel nido acceso sol di vario odore
D' una fenice estinta esce poi fuore
Un verme, che fenice altra diviene.

In questo io debbo à tuoi cortesi strali
Che sempre è degno, ed onorato oggetto
Quello, onde mi ferisci, onde m' assali.
Ed ora è tale, e tanto, e sì perfetto,
Ha tante doti alla bellezza eguali,
Ch' ardor per lui m' è sommo alto diletto.

‡ . . . spirat adhuc amor
Vivuntque commissi calores
Æoliæ fidibus puellæ.

Corniani, v. 212., and Salfi in *Gin-guéné*, ix. 406., have done some justice to the poetry of Gaspara Stampa, though by no means more than it deserves. Bouterwek, ii. 150., observes only, *viel Poesie zeigt sich nicht in diesen Sonnetten*; which, I humbly conceive, shows, that either he had not read them, or was an indifferent judge; and from his general taste I prefer the former hypothesis.

so inferior to his, as perhaps to make a proud man fear disparagement, sustained her against dishonourable submission.

E ben ver, che 'l desio, con che amo voi,
E tutto d' onestà pieno, e d' amore ; *
Perchè altrimenti non convien tra noi. †

But not less in elevation of genius than in dignity of character, she is very far inferior to Vittoria Colonna, or even to Veronica Gambara, a poetess, who, without equalling Vittoria, had much of her nobleness and purity. We pity the Gasparas; we should worship, if we could find them, the Vittorias.

14. Among the longer poems which Italy produced in this period two may be selected. The Art of Navigation, *La Nautica*, published by Bernardino Baldi in 1590, is a didactic poem in blank verse, too minute sometimes and prosaic in its details, like most of that class, but neither low, nor turgid, nor obscure, as many others have been. The descriptions, though never very animated, are sometimes poetical and pleasing. Baldi is diffuse; and this conspires with the triteness of his matter to render the poem somewhat uninteresting. He by no means wants the power to adorn his subject, but does not always trouble himself to exert it, and is tame where he might be spirited. Few poems bear more evident marks that their substance had been previously written down in prose.

15. Bernardo Tasso, whose memory has almost been effaced with the majority of mankind by the splendour of his son, was not only the most conspicuous poet of the age wherein he lived, but was placed by its critics, in some points of view, above Ariosto himself. His minor poetry is of considerable merit. ‡ But that to which he

*Amadigi of
Bernardo
Tasso.*

* Sic. leg. onore?

† I quote these lines on the authority of Corniani, v. 215. But I must own that they do not appear in the two editions of the *Rime della Gaspara Stampa* which I have searched. I must also add that, willing as I am to believe all things in favour of a lady's honour, there is one very awkward sonnet among those of poor Gaspara, upon which it is by no means easy to put such a construction as we should wish.

‡ "The character of his lyric poetry is a sweetness and abundance of expressions and images, by which he becomes more flowing and full (*più morbido e più pastoso*, metaphors not translatable by single English words) than his contemporaries of the school of Petrarch." Corniani, v. 127.

A sonnet of Bernardo Tasso, so much admired at the time, that almost every one, it is said, of a refined taste had it by heart, will be found in Panizzi's edition

owed most of his reputation is an heroic romance on the story of Amadis, written about 1540, and first published in 1566. L'Amadigi is of prodigious length, containing 100 cantos, and about 57,000 lines. The praise of facility, in the best sense, is fully due to Bernardo. His narration is fluent, rapid, and clear; his style not in general feeble or low, though I am not aware that many brilliant passages will be found. He followed Ariosto in his tone of relating the story: his lines perpetually remind us of the Orlando; and I believe it would appear on close examination that much has been borrowed with slight change. My own acquaintance, however, with the Amadigi is not sufficient to warrant more than a general judgment. Ginguéné, who rates this poem very highly, praises the skill with which the disposition of the original romance has been altered and its canvass enriched by new insertions, the beauty of the images and sentiments, the variety of the descriptions, the sweetness, though not always free from languor, of the style, and finally recommends its perusal to all lovers of romantic poetry, and to all who would appreciate that of Italy.* It is evident, however, that the choice of a subject become frivolous in the eyes of mankind, not less than the extreme length of Bernardo Tasso's poem, must render it almost impossible to follow this advice.

16. The satires of Bentivoglio, it is agreed, fall short of those by Ariosto, though some have placed them above those of Alamanni.† But all these are satires on the regular model, assuming at least a half-serious tone. A style more congenial to the Italians was that of burlesque poetry, sometimes poignantly satirical, but as destitute of any grave aim, as it was light and familiar, even to

Satirical and
burlesque
poetry;
Aretin.

of the Orlando Innamorato, vol. i. p. 376., with a translation by a lady well known for the skill with which she has transferred the grace and feeling of Petrarch into our language. The sonnet, which begins, *Poiché la parte men perfetta e bella*, is not found in Gobbi or Mathias. It is distinguished from the common crowd of Italian sonnets in the sixteenth century by a novelty, truth, and delicacy of sentiment, which is comparatively rare in them.

* Vol. v. p. 61—108. Bouterwek,

(vol. ii. 159.), speaks much less favourably of the Amadigi, and, as far as I can judge, in too disparaging a tone. Corniani, a great admirer of Bernardo, owns that his *morbidezza* and fertility have rendered him too frequently diffuse and flowery. See also Panizzi, p. 393., who observes that the Amadigi wants interest, but praises its imaginative descriptions as well as its delicacy and softness.

† Ginguéné, ix. 198. Biogr. Univ. Tiraboschi, x. 66.

popular vulgarity, in its expression, though capable of grace in the midst of its gaiety, and worthy to employ the best masters of Tuscan language.* But it was disgraced by some of its cultivators, and by none more than Peter Aretin. The character of this profligate and impudent person is well known; it appears extraordinary that, in an age so little scrupulous as to political or private revenge, some great princes, who had never spared a worthy adversary, thought it not unbecoming to purchase the silence of an odious libeller, who called himself their scourge. In a literary sense, the writings of Aretin are unequal; the serious are for the most part reckoned wearisome and prosaic; in his satires a poignancy and spirit, it is said, frequently breaks out; and though his popularity, like that of most satirists, was chiefly founded on the ill-nature of mankind, he gratified this with a neatness and point of expression, which those who cared nothing for the satire might admire.†

17. Among the writers of satirical, burlesque, or licentious poetry, after Aretin, the most remarkable are Firenzuola, Casa, (one of whose compositions passed so much all bounds as to have excluded him from the purple, and has become the subject of a sort of literary controversy, to which I can only allude,)‡ Franco, and Grazzini, surnamed Il Lasca. I must refer to the regular historians of Italian literature for accounts of these, as well as for the styles of poetry called *macaronica* and *pedantesca*, which appear wholly contemptible, and the attempts to introduce Latin metres, a folly with which every nation has been inoculated in its turn.§ Claudio Tolomei, and

Other burlesque writers.

Attempts at Latin metres.

* A canzon by Coppetta on his cat, in the twenty-seventh volume of the *Parnaso Italiano*, is rather amusing.

† Bouterwek, ii. 207. His authority does not seem sufficient; and Ginguéné, ix. 212., gives a worse character of the style of Aretin. But Muratori (*Della Perfetta Poesia*, ii. 284.) extols one of his sonnets as deserving a very high place in Italian poetry.

‡ A more innocent and diverting capitolo of Casa turns on the ill luck of being named John.

S' lo avessi manco quindici o venti' anni,
Messer Gandolfo, io mi sbatterezzerel,

Per non aver mai più nome Giovanni.
Perch' io non posso andar pe' fatti miei,
Nè partirmi di qui per ir al presso
Ch' io nol senta chiamar da cinque e sei.

He ends by lamenting that no alteration mends the name.

Mutalo, o sminuiscell, se tu sai,
O Nanni, o Gianni, o Giannino, o Giannozzo,
Come più tu lo tocchi, peggio fai,
Che gli è cattivo intero, e peggior mozzo.

§ Macaronic verse was invented by one Folengo, in the first part of the century. This worthy had written an epic poem, which he thought superior to the *Æneid*. A friend, to whom he showed the manuscript, paid him the compli-

Angelo Costanzo himself, by writing sapphics and hexameters, did more honour to so strange a pedantry than it deserved.

18. The translation of the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid by Anguillara seems to have acquired the highest name with the critics * ; but that of the *Æneid* by Caro is certainly the best known in Europe. It is not, however, very faithful, though written in blank verse, which leaves a translator no good excuse for deviating from his original ; the style is diffuse, and, upon the whole, it is better that those who read it should not remember Virgil. Many more Italian poets ought, possibly, to be commemorated ; but we must hasten forward to the greatest of them all.

19. The life of Tasso is excluded from these pages by the rule I have adopted ; but I cannot suppose any reader to be ignorant of one of the most interesting and affecting stories that literary biography presents. It was in the first stages of a morbid melancholy, almost of intellectual derangement, that the *Gierusalemme Liberata* was finished ; it was during a confinement, harsh in all its circumstances, though perhaps necessary, that it was given to the world. Several portions had been clandestinely published, in consequence of the author's inability to protect his rights ; and even the first complete edition, in 1581, seems to have been without his previous consent. In the later editions of the same year he is said to have been consulted ; but his disorder was then at a height, from which it afterwards receded, leaving his genius undiminished, and his reason somewhat more sound, though always unsteady. Tasso died at Rome in 1595, already the object of the world's enthusiastic admiration, rather than of its kindness and sympathy.

20. The *Jerusalem* is the great epic poem, in the strict sense, of modern times. It was justly observed by Voltaire, that in the choice of his subject Tasso is superior to Homer. Whatever interest tradition might have attached among the Greeks to the wrath of Achilles and the death of Hector, was slight to those genuine recol-

Poetical
translations.

Torquato
Tasso.

The Jeru-
salem ex-
cellent in
choice of
subject.

ment, as he thought, of saying that he had equalled Virgil. Folengo, in a rage, threw his poem into the fire, and sat down for the rest of his life to write

Macaronics. *Journal des Savans*, Dec. 1831.

* Salfi (continuation de Ginguené), x. 180. Corniani, vi. 113.

lections which were associated with the first crusade. It was not the theme of a single people, but of Europe ; not a fluctuating tradition, but certain history ; yet history so far remote from the poet's time, as to adapt itself to his purpose with almost the flexibility of fable. Nor could the subject have been chosen so well in another age or country ; it was still the holy war, and the sympathies of his readers were easily excited for religious chivalry ; but, in Italy, this was no longer an absorbing sentiment ; and the stern tone of bigotry, which perhaps might still have been required from a Castilian poet, would have been dissonant amidst the soft notes that charmed the court of Ferrara.

21. In the variety of occurrences, the change of scenes and images, and of the trains of sentiment connected with them in the reader's mind, we cannot place the *Iliad* on a level with the *Jerusalem*. And again, by the manifest unity of subject, and by the continuance of the crusading army before the walls of Jerusalem, the poem of Tasso has a coherence and singleness, which is comparatively wanting to that of Virgil. Every circumstance is in its place ; we expect the victory of the Christians, but acknowledge the probability and adequacy of the events that delay it. The episodes, properly so to be called, are few and short ; for the expedition of those who recall Rinaldo from the arms of Armida, though occupying too large a portion of the poem, unlike the fifth and sixth, or even the second and third books of the *Æneid*, is an indispensable link in the chain of its narrative.

22. In the delineation of character, at once natural, distinct, and original, Tasso must give way to Homer, perhaps to some other epic and romantic poets. There are some indications of the age in which he wrote, some want of that truth to nature, by which the poet, like the painter, must give reality to the conceptions of his fancy. Yet here also the sweetness and nobleness of his mind and his fine sense of moral beauty are displayed. The female warrior had been an old invention ; and few, except Homer, had missed the opportunity of diversifying their battles with such a character. But it is of difficult management ; we know not how to draw the line between the savage virago,

Superior to
Homer and
Virgil in
some points.

Its cha-
racters.

from whom the imagination revolts, and the gentler fair one, whose feats in arms are ridiculously incongruous to her person and disposition. Virgil first threw a romantic charm over his Camilla; but he did not render her the object of love. In modern poetry, this seemed the necessary compliment to every lady; but we hardly envy Rogero the possession of Bradamante, or Arthegal that of Britomart. Tasso alone, with little sacrifice of poetical probability, has made his readers sympathise with the enthusiastic devotion of Tancred for Clorinda. She is so bright an ideality, so heroic, and yet, by the enchantment of verse, so lovely, that no one follows her through the combat without delight, or reads her death without sorrow. And how beautiful is the contrast of this character with the tender and modest Erminia! The heroes, as has been hinted, are drawn with less power. Godfrey is a noble example of calm and faultless virtue, but we find little distinctive character in Rinaldo. Tancred has seemed to some rather too much enfeebled by his passion, yet this may be justly considered as part of the moral of the poem.

23. The Jerusalem is read with pleasure in almost every canto. No poem, perhaps, if we except the *Æneid*,
Excellence
of its style.
has so few weak or tedious pages; the worst passages are the speeches, which are too diffuse. The native melancholy of Tasso tinges all his poem; we meet with no lighter strain, no comic sally, no effort to relieve for an instant the tone of seriousness that pervades every stanza. But it is probable, that some become wearied by this uniformity which his metre serves to augment. The *ottava rima* has its inconveniences; even its intricacy, when once mastered, renders it more monotonous, and the recurrence of marked rhymes, the breaking of the sense into equal divisions, while they communicate to it a regularity that secures the humblest verse from sinking to the level of prose, deprive it of that variety which the hexameter most eminently possesses. Ariosto lessened this effect by the rapid flow of his language, and perhaps by its negligence and inequality; in Tasso, who is more sustained at a high pitch of elaborate expression than any great poet except Virgil, and in whom a prosaic or feeble stanza will rarely be found, the uniformity of cadence may

conspire with the lusciousness of style to produce a sense of satiety in the reader. This is said rather to account for the injustice, as it seems to me, with which some speak of Tasso, than to express my own sentiments ; for there are few poems of great length which I so little wish to lay aside as the *Jerusalem*.

24. The diction of Tasso excites perpetual admiration ; it is rarely turgid or harsh ; and though more figurative than that of Ariosto, it is so much less than that of most of our own or the ancient poets, that it appears simple in our eyes. Virgil, to whom we most readily compare him, is far superior in energy, but not in grace. Yet his grace is often too artificial, and the marks of the file are too evident in the exquisiteness of his language. Lines of superior beauty occur in almost every stanza ; pages after pages may be found, in which, not pretending to weigh the style in the scales of the Florentine academy, I do not perceive one feeble verse or improper expression.

25. The conceits so often censured in Tasso, though they bespeak the false taste that had begun to prevail, do not seem quite so numerous as his critics have been apt to insinuate ; but we find sometimes a trivial or affected phrase, or, according to the usage of the times, an idle allusion to mythology, when the verse or stanza requires to be filled up. A striking instance may be given from the admirable passage where Tancred discovers Clorinda in the warrior on whom he has just inflicted a mortal blow —

La vide, e la conobbe ; e restò senza
E moto e senso —

The effect is here complete, and here he would have desired to stop. But the necessity of the verse induced him to finish it with feebleness and affectation. *Ahi vista ! Ahi conoscenza !* Such difficult metres as the ottava rima demand these sacrifices too frequently. Ariosto has innumerable lines of necessity.

26. It is easy to censure the faults of this admirable poem. The supernatural machinery is perhaps somewhat in excess ; yet this had been characteristic of the romantic school of poetry, which had moulded the

Some faults
in it.

Defects of
the poem.

taste of Europe, and is seldom displeasing to the reader. A still more unequivocal blemish is the disproportionate influence of love upon the heroic crusaders, giving a tinge of effeminacy to the whole poem, and exciting something like contempt in the austere critics, who have no standard of excellence in epic song but what the ancients have erected for us. But while we must acknowledge that Tasso has indulged too far the inspirations of his own temperament, it may be candid to ask ourselves, whether a subject so grave, and by necessity so full of carnage, did not require many of the softer touches which he has given it. His battles are as spirited and picturesque as those of Ariosto, and perhaps more so than those of Virgil; but to the taste of our times he has a little too much of promiscuous slaughter. The *Iliad* had here set an unfortunate precedent, which epic poets thought themselves bound to copy. If Erminia and Armida had not been introduced, the classical critic might have censured less in the Jerusalem; but it would have been far less also the delight of mankind.

27. Whatever may be the laws of criticism, every poet will best obey the dictates of his own genius. The skill and imagination of Tasso made him equal to descriptions of war; but his heart was formed for that sort of pensive voluptuousness which most distinguishes his poetry, and which is very unlike the coarser sensuality of Ariosto. He lingers around the gardens of Armida, as though he had been himself her thrall. The Florentine critics vehemently attacked her final reconciliation with Rinaldo in the twentieth canto, and the renewal of their loves; for the reader is left with no other expectation. Nor was their censure unjust; since it is a sacrifice of what should be the predominant sentiment in the conclusion of the poem. But Tasso seems to have become fond of Armida, and could not endure to leave in sorrow and despair the creature of his ethereal fancy, whom he had made so fair and so winning. It is probable that the majority of readers are pleased with this passage, but it can never escape the condemnation of severe judges.

It indicates
the peculiar
genius of
Tasso.

28. Tasso, doubtless, bears a considerable resemblance to Virgil. But, independently of the vast advantages which

the Latin language possesses in majesty and vigour, and which render exact comparison difficult as well as unfair, it may be said that Virgil displays more justness of taste, a more extensive observation, and, if we may speak thus in the absence of so much poetry which he may have imitated, a more genuine originality. Tasso did not possess much of the self-springing invention which we find in a few great poets, and which, in this higher sense, I cannot concede to Ariosto; he not only borrows freely, and perhaps studiously, from the ancients, but introduces frequent lines from earlier Italian poets, and especially from Petrarch. He has also some favourite turns of phrase, which serve to give a certain mannerism to his stanzas.

29. The Jerusalem was no sooner published than it was weighed against the Orlando Furioso, and neither to Ariosto; Italy nor Europe have yet agreed which scale inclines. It is indeed one of those critical problems, that admit of no certain solution, whether we look to the suffrage of those who feel acutely and justly, or to the general sense of mankind. We cannot determine one poet to be superior to the other, without assuming premises which no one is bound to grant. Those who read for a stimulating variety of circumstances, and the enlivening of a leisure hour, must prefer Ariosto; and he is probably, on this account, a poet of more universal popularity. It might be said, perhaps by some that he is more a favourite of men, and Tasso of women. And yet, in Italy, the sympathy with tender and graceful poetry is so general, that the Jerusalem has hardly been less in favour with the people than its livelier rival; and its fine stanzas may still be heard by moonlight from the lips of a gondolier, floating along the calm bosom of the Giudecca.*

* The following passages may perhaps be naturally compared, both as being celebrated, and as descriptive of sound. Ariosto has, however, much the advantage; and I do not think the lines in the Jerusalem, though very famous, are altogether what I should select as a specimen of Tasso.

Aspri concetti, orribile armonia
D' alte querele, d' ululi, e di strida
Della misera gente, che peria
Nel fondo per cagion della sua guida,

Istranamente concordar s' uolia
Col fiero suon della fiamma omicida.
Driand. Fur. c. 14.

Chiama gli abitator dell' ombre eterne
Il rauco suon della tartarea tromba;
Tremar le spaziose altre caverne.
E l' aer cieco a quel rumor rimbomba.
Nè sì stridendo mal dalle superne
Regioni del cielo il folgor piomba;
Nè sì scossa gl'immai trema la terra
Quando i vapori in sen gravida serra.
Gierus. Lib. c. 4.

In the latter of these stanzas there is rather too studied an effort at imitative

30. Ariosto must be placed much more below Homer than Tasso falls short of Virgil. The Orlando has not the impetuosity of the Iliad; each is prodigiously rapid, but Homer has more momentum by his weight; the one is a hunter, the other a war-horse. The finest stanzas in Ariosto are fully equal to any in Tasso, but the latter has by no means so many feeble lines. Yet his language, though never affectedly obscure, is not so pellucid, and has a certain refinement which makes us sometimes pause to perceive the meaning. Whoever reads Ariosto slowly, will probably be offended by his negligence; whoever reads Tasso quickly, will lose something of the elaborate finish of his style.

31. It is not easy to find a counterpart among painters for Ariosto. His brilliancy and fertile invention might remind us of Tintoret; but he is more natural, and less solicitous of effect. If indeed poetical diction to the Bolognese painters. be the correlative of colouring in our comparison of the arts, none of the Venetian school can represent the simplicity and averseness to ornament of language which belong to the Orlando Furioso; and it would be impossible, for other reasons, to look for a parallel in a Roman or Tuscan pencil. But with Tasso the case is different; and though it would be an affected expression to call him the founder of the Bolognese school, it is evident that he had a great influence on its chief painters, who came but a little after him. They imbued themselves with the spirit of a poem so congenial to their age, and so much admired in it. No one, I think, can consider their works without perceiving both the analogy of the place each hold in their respective arts, and the traces of a feeling, caught directly from Tasso as their prototype and model. We recognise his spirit in the sylvan shades and voluptuous forms of Albano and Domenichino, in the pure beauty that radiates from the ideal heads of Guido, in the skilful composition, exact design, and noble expression of the Caracci. Yet the school of Bologna seems to furnish no

sound; the lines are grand and nobly expressed, but they do not hurry along the reader like those of Ariosto. In his there is little attempt at vocal imitation, yet we seem to hear the cries of the suffering, and the crackling of the flames.

parallel to the enchanting grace and diffused harmony of Tasso ; and we must, in this respect, look back to Correggio as his representative.

SECT. II.—ON SPANISH POETRY.

Louis de Leon — Herrera — Ercilla — Camoens — Spanish Ballads.

32. THE reigns of Charles and his son have long been reckoned the golden age of Spanish poetry ; and if the art of verse was not cultivated in the latter period by any quite so successful as Garcilasso and Mendoza, who belonged to the earlier part of the century, the vast number of names that have been collected by diligent inquiry show, at least, a national taste which deserves some attention. The means of exhibiting a full account of even the most select names in this crowd are not readily at hand. In Spain itself, the poets of the age of Philip II., like those who lived under his great enemy in England, were, with very few exceptions, little regarded till after the middle of the eighteenth century. The *Parnaso Español* of Sedano, the first volumes of which were published in 1768, made them better known ; but Bouterwek observes, that it would have been easy to make a superior collection, as we do not find several poems of the chief writers, with which the editor seems to have fancied the public to be sufficiently acquainted. An imperfect knowledge of the language, and a cursory view of these volumes, must disable me from speaking confidently of Castilian poetry ; so far as I feel myself competent to judge, the specimens chosen by Bouterwek do no injustice to the compilation.*

* "The merit of Spanish poems," says a critic equally candid and well-informed, "independently of those intended for representation, consists chiefly in smoothness of versification and purity of language, and in facility rather than strength of imagination." Lord Holland's *Lope de Vega*, vol. i. p. 107. He had previously observed that these poets were

generally voluminous : "it was not uncommon even for the nobility of Philip IV.'s time (later of course than the period we are considering) to converse for some minutes in extemporaneous poetry ; and in carelessness of metre, as well as in common-place images, the verses of that time often remind us of the *improvisatori* of Italy." p. 106.

33. The best lyric poet of Spain in the opinion of many, with whom I venture to concur, was Fra Luis Ponce de Leon, born in 1527, and whose poems were probably written not very long after the middle of the century. Luis de Leon. The greater part are translations, but his original productions are chiefly religious, and full of that soft mysticism which allies itself so well to the emotions of a poetical mind. One of his odes, *De la Vida del Cielo*, which will be found entire in Bouterwek, is an exquisite piece of lyric poetry, which, in its peculiar line of devout aspiration, has perhaps never been excelled.* But the warmth of his piety was tempered by a classical taste, which he had matured by the habitual imitation of Horace. “At an early age,” says Bouterwek, “he became intimately acquainted with the odes of Horace, and the elegance and purity of style which distinguish those compositions made a deep impression on his imagination. Classical simplicity and dignity were the models constantly present to his creative fancy. He, however, appropriated to himself the character of Horace’s poetry too naturally ever to incur the danger of servile imitation. He discarded the prolix style of the canzone, and imitated the brevity of the strophes of Horace in romantic measures of syllables and rhymes: more just feeling for the imitation of the ancients was never evinced by any modern poet. His odes have, however, a character totally different from those of Horace, though the sententious air which marks the style of both authors imparts to them a deceptive resemblance. The religious austerity of Luis de Leon’s life was not to be reconciled with the epicurism of the Latin poet; but notwithstanding this very different disposition of the mind, it is not surprising that they should have adopted the same form of poetic expression, for each possessed a fine imagination, subordinate to the control of a sound understanding. Which of the two is the superior poet, in the most extended sense of the word, it would be difficult to determine, as each formed his style by free imitation, and neither overstepped the boundaries of a certain sphere of practical observation. Horace’s odes exhibit a superior style of art; and, from the relationship between the thoughts and images, possess a degree of attraction which is

* p. 248.

wanting in those of Luis de Leon; but, on the other hand, the latter are the more rich in that natural kind of poetry, which may be regarded as the overflowing of a pure soul, elevated to the loftiest regions of moral and religious idealism."* Among the fruits of these Horatian studies of Luis de Leon, we must place an admirable ode suggested by the prophecy of Nereus, wherein the genius of the Tagus, rising from its waters to Rodrigo, the last of the Gothic kings, as he lay encircled in the arms of Cava, denounces the ruin which their guilty loves were to entail upon Spain.†

34. Next to Luis de Leon in merit, and perhaps above him in European renown, we find Herrera, surnamed the divine. He died in 1578; and his poems seem to have been first collectively published in 1582. He was an innovator in poetical language, whose boldness was sustained by popularity, though it may have diminished his fame. "Herrera was a poet," says Bouterwek, "of powerful talent, and one who evinced undaunted resolution in pursuing the new path which he had struck out for himself. The novel style, however, which he wished to introduce into Spanish poetry, was not the result of a spontaneous essay, flowing from immediate inspiration, but was theoretically constructed on artificial principles. Thus, amidst traits of real beauty, his poetry every where presents marks of affectation. The great fault of his language is too much singularity; and his expression, where it ought to be elevated, is merely far-fetched."‡ Velasquez observes that, notwithstanding the genius and spirit of Herrera, his extreme care to polish his versification has rendered it sometimes unpleasant to those who require harmony and ease. §

35. Of these defects in the style of Herrera I cannot judge; his odes appear to possess a lyric elevation and richness of phrase, derived in some measure from the study of Pindar, or still more, perhaps, of the Old Testament, and worthy of comparison with Chiabrera. Those on the battle

* p. 243.

† This ode I first knew many years since by a translation in the poems of Russell, which are too little remembered, except by a few good judges. It has been surmised by some Spanish critics to have suggested the famous vision of the

Spirit of the Cape to Camoens; but the resemblance is not sufficient, and the dates rather incompatible.

‡ p. 229.

§ Geschichte der Spanischen Dichtkunst, p. 207.

of Lepanto are most celebrated ; they pour forth a torrent of resounding song, in those rich tones which the Castilian language so abundantly supplies. I cannot so thoroughly admire the ode addressed to Sleep, which Bouterwek as well as Sedano extol. The images are in themselves pleasing and appropriate, the lines steal with a graceful flow on the ear ; but we should desire to find something more raised above the common-places of poetry.

36. The poets of this age belong generally, more or less, to the Italian school. Many of them were also translators from Latin. In their odes, epistles, and sonnets, the resemblance of style, as well as that of the languages, make us sometimes almost believe that we are reading the Italian instead of the Spanish Parnaso. There seem, however, to be some shades of difference even in those who trod the same path. The Castilian amatory verse is more hyperbolic, more full of extravagant metaphors, but less subtle, less prone to ingenious trifling, less blemished by verbal conceits than the Italian. Such at least is what has struck me in the slight acquaintance I have with the former. The Spanish poets are also more redundant in descriptions of nature, and more sensible to her beauties. I dare not assert that they have less grace and less power of exciting emotion ; it may be my misfortune to have fallen rarely on passages that might repel my suspicion.

General tone
of Castilian
poetry.

37. It is at least evident that the imitation of Italy, propagated by Boscan and his followers, was not the indigenous style of Castile. And of this some of her most distinguished poets were always sensible. In the *Diana* of Montemayor, a romance which, as such, we shall have to mention hereafter, the poetry, largely interspersed, bears partly the character of the new, partly that of the old or native school. The latter is esteemed superior. Castillejo endeavoured to restore the gay rhythm of the redondilla, and turned into ridicule the imitators of Petrarch. Bouterwek speaks rather slightly of his general poetic powers ; though some of his canciones have a considerable share of elegance. His genius, playful and witty, rather than elegant, seemed not ill-fitted to revive the popular poetry.*

Castillejo.

But those who claimed the praise of superior talents did not cease to cultivate the polished style of Italy. The most conspicuous, perhaps, before the end of the century, were Gil Polo, Espinel, Lope de Vega, Barahona de Soto, and Figueroa.* Several other names, not without extracts, will be found in Bouterwek.

38. Voltaire, in his early and very defective essay on epic poetry, made known to Europe the *Araucana* of Araucana of Ercilla. Ercilla, which has ever since enjoyed a certain share of reputation, though condemned by many critics as tedious and prosaic. Bouterwek depreciates it in rather more sweeping a manner than seems consistent with the admissions he afterwards makes.† A talent for lively description and for painting situations, a natural and correct diction, which he ascribes to Ercilla, if they do not constitute a claim to a high rank among poets, are at least as much as many have possessed. An English writer of good taste has placed him in a triumvirate with Homer and Ariosto for power of narration.‡ Raynouard observes, that Ercilla has taken Ariosto as his model, especially in the opening of his cantos. But the long digressions and episodes of the *Araucana*, which the poet has not had the art to connect with his subject, render it fatiguing. The first edition, in 1569, contains but fifteen books; the second part was published in 1578; the whole together in 1590. §

39. The *Araucana* is so far from standing alone in this class of poetry, that not less than twenty-five epic poems appeared in Spain within little more than half a century. These will be found enumerated, and, as far as possible, described and characterised, in Velasquez's *History of Spanish Poetry*, which I always quote in

* Lord Holland has given a fuller account of the poetry of Lope de Vega than either Bouterwek or Velasquez and Dieze; and the extracts in his "Lives of Lope de Vega and Guillen de Castro" will not, I believe, be found in the *Parnaso Español*, which is contrived on a happy plan of excluding what is best. *Las Lagrimas de Angelica*, by Barahona de Soto, Lord H. says, "has always been esteemed one of the best poems in the Spanish language," vol. i. p. 33. Bouterwek says

he has never met with the book. It is praised by Cervantes in *Don Quixote*.

The translation of Tasso's *Aminta*, by Jauregui, has been preferred by Menage as well as Cervantes to the original. But there is no extraordinary merit in turning Italian into Spanish, even with some improvement of the diction.

† p. 407.

‡ *Pursuits of Literature*.

§ *Journal des Savans*, Sept. 1824.

the German translation with the valuable notes of Dieze.* Bouterwek mentions but a part of the number, and a few of them may be conjectured by the titles not to be properly epic. It is denied by these writers, that Ercilla excelled all his contemporaries in heroic song. I find, however, a different sentence in a Spanish poet of that age, who names him as superior to the rest.†

40. But in Portugal there had arisen a poet, in comparison of whose glory that of Ercilla is as nothing. The name of Camoens has truly an European reputation, but the *Lusiad* is written in a language not generally familiar. From Portuguese critics it would be unreasonable to demand want of prejudice in favour of a poet so illustrious, and of a poem so peculiarly national. The *Æneid* reflects the glory of Rome as from a mirror; the *Lusiad* is directly and exclusively what its name, "The Portuguese" (*Os Lusíadas*), denotes, the praise of the Lusitanian people. Their past history chimes in, by means of episodes, with the great event of Gama's voyage to India. The faults of Camoens, in the management of his fable and the choice of machinery, are sufficiently obvious; it is, nevertheless, the first successful attempt in modern Europe to construct an epic poem on the ancient model; for the *Gierusalemme Liberata*, though incomparably superior, was not written or published so soon. In consequence, perhaps, of this epic form, which, even when imperfectly delineated, long obtained, from the general veneration for antiquity, a greater respect at the hands of critics than perhaps it deserved, the celebrity of Camoens has always been considerable. In point of fame he ranks among the poets of the south immediately after the first names of Italy; nor is the distinctive character that belongs

Camoens.

Defects of
the *Lusiad*;

* p. 376—407. Bouterwek, p. 413.

† Oye el estilo grave, el blando acento,
Y altos concetos del varón famoso
Que en el heroico verso fue el primero
Que honró a su patria, y aun quizá el pos-
terero.

Del fuerte Arauco el pecho altivo espanta
Don Alonso de Ercilla con el mano,
Con ella lo derriba y lo levanta,
Vence y honra venciendo al Araucano;
Calla sus hechos, los agenos canta,
Con tal estilo que eclipsó al Toscano:
Virtud que el cielo para sí reserva
Que en el furor de Marte esté Minerva.

La Casa de la Memoria, por Vicente Espinel, in *Parnaso Español*, viii. 352.

Antonio, near the end of the seventeenth century, extols Ercilla very highly, but intimates that some did not relish his simple perspicuity. Ad hunc usque diem ab iis omnibus avidissime legitur, qui facile dicendi genus atque perspicuum admittere vim suam et nervos, nativæque sublimitate quadam attolli posse, cothurnatunquæ ire non ignorant.

to the poetry of the southern languages any where more fully perceived than in the *Lusiad*. In a general estimate of its merits it must appear rather feeble and prosaic; the geographical and historical details are insipid and tedious; a skilful use of poetical artifice is never exhibited; we are little detained to admire an ornamented diction, or glowing thoughts, or brilliant imagery; a certain negligence disappoints us in the most beautiful passages; and it is not till a second perusal, that their sweetness has time to glide into the heart. The celebrated stanzas on Inez De Castro are a proof of this.

41. These deficiencies, as a taste formed in the English school, or in that of classical antiquity, is apt to account them, are greatly compensated, and doubtless far more to a native than they can be to us, by a freedom from all that offends, for he is never turgid nor affected, nor obscure, by a perfect ease and transparency of narration, by scenes and descriptions, possessing a certain charm of colouring, and perhaps not less pleasing from the apparent negligence of the pencil, by a style kept up at a level just above common language, by a mellifluous versification, and, above all, by a kind of soft languor which tones, as it were, the whole poem, and brings perpetually home to our minds the poetical character and interesting fortunes of its author. As the mirror of a heart so full of love, courage, generosity, and patriotism, as that of Camoens, the *Lusiad* can never fail to please us, whatever place we may assign to it in the records of poetical genius.*

42. The *Lusiad* is best known in England by the translation of Mickle, who has been thought to have done something more than justice to his author, both by the unmeasured eulogies he bestows upon him, and by the more substantial service of excelling the original in his unfaithful delineation. The style of Mickle is certainly more poetical, according to our standard, than that of Ca-

* "In every language," says Mr. Southey, probably, in the *Quarterly Review*, xxvii. 38., "there is a magic of words as untranslatable as the Sesame in the Arabian tale — you may retain the meaning, but if the words be changed the spell is lost. The magic has its effect

only upon those to whom the language is as familiar as their mother-tongue, hardly indeed upon any but those to whom it is really such. Camoens possesses it in perfection, it is his peculiar excellence."

moens, that is, more figurative and emphatic ; but it seems to me replenished with common-place phrases, and wanting in the facility and sweetness of the original ; in which it is well known that he has interpolated a great deal without a pretence.*

43. The most celebrated passage in the *Lusiad* is that wherein the Spirit of the Cape, rising in the midst of his stormy seas, threatens the daring adventurer that violates their unploughed waters. In order to judge fairly of this conception, we should endeavour to forget all that has been written in imitation of it. Nothing has become more common-place in poetry than one of its highest flights, supernatural personification ; and, as children draw notable monsters when they cannot come near the human form, so every poetaster, who knows not how to describe one object in nature, is quite at home with a goblin. Considered by itself, the idea is impressive and even sublime. Nor am I aware of any evidence to impeach its originality, in the only sense which originality of poetical invention can bear ; it is a combination which strikes us with the force of novelty, and which we cannot instantly resolve into any constituent elements. The prophecy of Nereus, to which we have lately alluded, is much removed in grandeur and appropriateness of circumstance from this passage of Camoens, though it may contain the germ of his conception. It is, however, one that seems much above the genius of its author. Mild, graceful, melancholy, he has never given in any other place signs of such vigorous imagination. And when we read these lines on the Spirit of the Cape, it is impossible not to perceive that, like Frankenstein, he is unable to deal with the monster he has created. The formidable Adamastor is rendered mean by particularity of description, descending even to yellow teeth. The speech put into his mouth is feeble and prolix ; and it is a serious objection to the whole, that the awful vision answers no purpose but that of ornament, and is impotent against the success and glory of the navigators. A spirit of whatever

Celebrated
passage in
the *Lusiad*.

* Several specimens of Mickle's infidelities ever taken in this way, are mentioned in translation, which exceed all mentioned in the Quarterly Review.

dimensions, that can neither overwhelm a ship, nor even raise a tempest, is incomparably less terrible than a real hurricane.

44. Camoens is still, in his shorter poems, esteemed the chief of Portuguese poets in this age, and possibly in every other; his countrymen deem him their model, and judge of later verse by comparison with his. In every kind of composition then used in Portugal he has left proofs of excellence. "Most of his sonnets," says Bouterwek, "have love for their theme, and they are of very unequal merit; some are full of Petrarchic tenderness and grace, and moulded with classical correctness, others are impetuous and romantic, or disfigured by false learning, or full of tedious pictures of the conflicts of passion with reason. Upon the whole, however, no Portuguese poet has so correctly seized the character of the sonnet as Camoens. Without apparent effort, merely by the ingenious contrast of the first eight with the last six lines, he knew how to make these little effusions convey a poetic unity of ideas and impressions, after the model of the best Italian sonnets, in so natural a manner, that the first lines or quartets of the sonnet excite a soft expectation, which is harmoniously fulfilled by the tercets or last six lines."* The same writer praises several other of the miscellaneous compositions of Camoens.

45. But, though no Portuguese of the sixteenth century has come near to this illustrious poet, Ferreira endeavoured with much good sense, if not with great elevation, to emulate the didactic tone of Horace, both in lyric poems and epistles, of which the latter have been most esteemed.† The classical school formed by Ferreira produced other poets in the sixteenth century; but it seems to have been little in unison with the national character. The reader will find as full an account of these as, if he is unacquainted with the Portuguese language, he is likely to desire, in the author on whom I have chiefly relied.

46. The Spanish ballads or romances are of very different ages. Some of them, as has been observed in another place, belong to the fifteenth century; and there seems sufficient ground for referring a small number

Minor
poems of
Camoens.

Ferreira.

Spanish
ballads.

* Hist. of Portuguese Literature, p. 187.

† Id. p. 111.

to even an earlier date. But by far the greater portion is of the reign of Philip II., or even that of his successor. The Moorish romances, in general, and all those on the Cid, are reckoned by Spanish critics among the most modern. Those published by Depping and Duran have rarely an air of the raciness and simplicity which usually distinguish the poetry of the people, and seem to have been written by poets of Valladolid or Madrid, the contemporaries of Cervantes, with a good deal of elegance, though not much vigour. The Moors of romance, the chivalrous gentlemen of Granada, were displayed by these Castilian poets in attractive colours*; and much more did the traditions of their own heroes, especially of the Cid, the bravest and most noble-minded of them all, furnish materials for their popular songs. Their character, it is observed by the latest editor, is unlike that of the older romances of chivalry, which had been preserved orally, as he conceives, down to the middle of the sixteenth century, when they were inserted in the *Cancionero de Romances* at Antwerp, 1555.† I have been

* Bouterwek, Sismondi, and others, have quoted a romance, beginning *Tanta Zayda y Adalifa*, as the effusion of an orthodox zeal, which had taken offence at these encomiums on infidels. Whoever reads this little poem, which may be found in Depping's collection, will see that it is written more as a humorous ridicule on contemporary poets than a serious reproof. It is much more lively than the answer, which these modern critics also quote. Both these poems are of the end of the sixteenth century. Neither Bouterwek nor Sismondi have kept in mind the recent date of the Moorish ballads.

† Duran in the preface to his *Romancero* of 1832. These Spanish collections of songs and ballads, called *Cancioneros* and *Romanceros*, are very scarce, and there is some uncertainty among bibliographers as to their editions. According to Duran, this of Antwerp contains many romances unpublished before, and far older than those of the fifteenth century, collected in the *Cancionero General* of 1516. It does not appear, perhaps, that the number which can be referred with probability to a period anterior to 1400 is considerable, but they are very interesting. Among these are

Los Fronterizos, or songs which the Castilians used in their incursions on the Moorish frontier. These were preserved orally, like other popular poetry. We find in these early pieces, he says, some traces of the Arabian style, rather in the melancholy of its tone than in any splendour of imagery, giving as an instance some lines quoted by Sismondi, beginning, "*Fonte frida, fonte frida, Fonte frida y con amor*," which are evidently very ancient. Sismondi says (*Littérature du Midi*, iii. 240.) that it is difficult to explain the charm of this little poem, but "by the tone of truth, and the absence of all object;" and Bouterwek calls it very nonsensical. It seems to me that some real story is shadowed in it under images in themselves of very little meaning, which may account for the tone of truth and pathos it breathes.

The older romances are usually in alternate verses of eight and seven syllables, and the rhymes are *consonant*, or real rhymes. The *assonance* is, however, older than Lord Holland supposes, who says, (*Life of Lope de Vega*, vol. ii. p. 12.) that it was not introduced till the end of the sixteenth century. It occurs in several that Duran reckons ancient.

The romance of the *Conde Alarcos* is

informed that an earlier edition, printed in Spain, has lately been discovered. In these there is a certain prolixity and hardness of style, a want of connexion, a habit of repeating verses or entire passages from others. They have nothing of the marvellous, nor borrow any thing from Arabian sources. In some others of the more ancient poetry, there are traces of the oriental manner, and a peculiar tone of wild melancholy. The little poems scattered through the prose romance, entitled, *Las Guerras de Granada*, are rarely, as I should conceive, older than the reign of Philip II. These Spanish ballads are known to our public, but generally with inconceivable advantage, by the very fine and animated translations of Mr. Lockhart.*

SECT. III.—ON FRENCH AND GERMAN POETRY.

French Poetry — Ronsard — His Followers — German Poetry.

47. THIS was an age of verse in France; and perhaps in no subsequent period do we find so long a catalogue of her poets. Goujet has recorded not merely the names, but the lives, in some measure, of nearly two hundred, whose works were published in this half century. Of this number scarcely more than five or six are much remembered in their own country. It is possible, indeed, that the fastidiousness of French critics, or their idolatry of the age of Louis XIV., and of that of Voltaire, may have led to a little injustice in their estimate of these early versifiers. Our own prejudices are apt of late to take an opposite direction.

probably of the fifteenth century. This is written in octosyllable consonant rhymes, without division of strophes. The Moorish ballads, with a very few exceptions, belong to the reigns of Philip II. and Philip III., and those of the Cid, about which so much interest has been taken, are the latest, and among the least valuable of all. All these are, I be-

lieve, written on the principle of *assonances*.

An admirable romance on a bull-fight, in Mr. Lockhart's volume, is faintly to be traced in one introduced in *Las Guerras de Granada*; but I have since found it much more at length in another collection. It is still, however, far less poetical than the English imitation.

48. A change in the character of French poetry, about the commencement of this period, is referrible to the general revolution of literature. The allegorical personifications which, from the era of the Roman de la Rose, had been the common field of verse, became far less usual, and gave place to an inundation of mythology and classical allusion. The *Désir* and *Reine d'Amour* of the older school became Cupid with his arrows and Venus with her doves; the theological and cardinal virtues, which had gained so many victories over *Sensualité* and *Faux Semblant*, vanished themselves from a poetry which had generally enlisted itself under the enemy's banner. This cutting off of an old resource rendered it necessary to explore other mines. All antiquity was ransacked for analogies; and where the images were not wearisomely common-place, they were absurdly far-fetched. This revolution was certainly not instantaneous; but it followed the rapid steps of philological learning, which had been nothing at the accession of Francis I., and was every thing at his death.* In his court, and in that of his son, if business or gallantry rendered learning impracticable, it was at least the mode to affect an esteem for it. Many names in the list of French poets are conspicuous for high rank, and a greater number are among the famous scholars of the age. These, accustomed to writing in Latin, sometimes in verse, and yielding a superstitious homage to the mighty dead of antiquity, thought that they ennobled their native language by destroying her idiomatic purity.

49. The prevalence, however, of this pedantry was chiefly owing to one poet, of great though short-lived renown, Pierre Ronsard. He was the first of seven contemporaries in song under Henry II., then denominated

Change in
the tone of
French
poetry.

Ronsard.

* [Sainte-Beuve, in his learned *Tableau de la Poésie Française au seizième siècle*, Paris, 1828, speaks of this revolution in taste, which substituted a classical school for that of the middle ages, kept up as it had been by Marot and his contemporaries, as almost sudden: — Tout enfin semble promettre à Marot une postérité d'admiration encore plus que de rivaux, et à la poésie un perfectionnement paisible et continu, lorsqu'à l'improviste la génération nouvelle réclame contre une admiration jusque là

unanime, et, le détachant brusquement du passé, déclare qu'il est temps de s'ouvrir par d'autres voies un avenir de gloire. *L'Illustration de la Langue Française*, par Joachim Dubellay, est comme le manifeste de cette insurrection soudaine, qu'on peut dater de 1549. The extracts which he proceeds to give from this work of Dubellay prove that it was at least intended to recommend the cultivation of style in the native language through a careful study of classical models. — 1847].

the French Pleiad ; the others were Jodelle, Bellay, Baif, Thyard, Dorat, and Belleau. Ronsard, well acquainted with the ancient languages, and full of the most presumptuous vanity, fancied that he was born to mould the speech of his fathers into new forms more adequate to his genius.

Je fis des nouveaux mots,
J'en condamnai les vieux.*

His style, therefore, is as barbarous, if the continual adoption of Latin and Greek derivatives renders a modern language barbarous, as his allusions are pedantic. They are more ridiculously such in his amatory sonnets ; in his odes these faults are rather less intolerable, and there is a spirit and grandeur which show him to have possessed a poetical mind.† The popularity of Ronsard was extensive ; and, though he sometimes complained of the neglect of the great, he wanted not the approbation of those whom poets are most ambitious to please. Charles IX. addressed some lines to Ronsard, which are really elegant, and at least do more honour to that prince than any thing else recorded of him ; and the verses of this poet are said to have lightened the weary hours of Mary Stuart's imprisonment. On his death in 1586 a funeral service was performed in Paris with the best music that the king could command ; it was attended by the Cardinal de Bourbon and an immense concourse ; eulogies in prose and verse were recited in the university ; and in those anxious moments, when the crown of France was almost in its agony, there was leisure to lament that Ronsard had been withdrawn. How differently attended was the grave of Spenser !‡

50. Ronsard was capable of conceiving strongly, and bringing his conceptions in clear and forcible, though seldom in pure or well-chosen language, before the mind. The poem, entitled *Promesse*, which will be found in Auguis's *Recueil des Anciens Poëtes*, is a proof of this, and excels what little besides I have read of this poet.§ Bouterwek, whose criticism on Ronsard appears fair and just, and who gives him, and those who belonged to his school, credit for

* Goujet, *Bibliothèque Française*, xii.
199.

† *Id.* 216.

‡ *Id.* 207.

§ *Vol. iv. p. 135*

perceiving the necessity of elevating the tone of French verse above the creeping manner of the allegorical rhymers, observes that, even in his errors, we discover a spirit striving upwards, disdaining what is trivial, and restless in the pursuit of excellence.* But such a spirit may produce very bad and tasteless poetry. La Harpe, who admits Ronsard's occasional beauties and his poetic fire, is repelled by his scheme of versification, full of *enjambemens*, as disgusting to a correct French ear as they are, in a moderate use, pleasing to our own. After the appearance of Malherbe, the poetry of Ronsard fell into contempt, and the pure correctness of Louis XIV.'s age was not likely to endure his barbarous innovations and false taste.† Balzac not long afterwards turns his pedantry into ridicule, and, admitting the abundance of the stream, adds that it was turbid.‡ In later times more justice has been done to the spirit and imagination of this poet, without repealing the sentence against his style.§

51. The remaining stars of the Pleiad, except perhaps Bellay, sometimes called the French Ovid, and whose "Regrets," or lamentations for his absence from France during a residence at Rome, are almost as querulous, if not quite so reasonable, as those of his prototype on the Ister||, seem scarce worthy of particular notice; for Jodelle, the founder of the stage in France, has

Other French poets.

* Geschichte der Poesie, v. 214.

† Goujet, 245. Malherbe scratched out about half from his copy of Ronsard, giving his reasons in the margin. Racan one day looking over this, asked whether he approved what he had not effaced. Not a bit more, replied Malherbe, than the rest.

‡ Encore aujourd'hui il est admiré par les trois quarts du parlement de Paris, et généralement par les autres parlemens de France. L'université et les Jésuites tiennent encore son part contre la cour, et contre l'académie. . . . Ce n'est pas un poëte bien entier, c'est le commencement et la matière d'un poëte. On voit, dans ses œuvres, des parties naissantes, et à demi animées, d'un corps qui se forme et qui se fait, mais qui n'a garde d'estre achevé. C'est une grande source, il faut l'avouer; mais c'est une source troublée et boueuse; une source, où non seulement il y a moins d'eau qu'à de limon, mais

où l'ordure empêche de couler l'eau. Œuvres de Balzac, i. 670. and Goujet, ubi supra.

§ La Harpe. Biogr. Univ.

[M. Sainte-Beuve has devoted a whole volume to a selection from Ronsard, Paris, 1828, to whom, without undue praise, he has restored a more honourable place than Malherbe and those who took their tone from him had assigned him. The extracts are chiefly from his lighter poetry, in which the pedantry of his more pompous style does not much appear. Though with little invention, and indeed a large proportion of these selections is taken from Latin or Greek poets, Ronsard is often more happy in expression, and more spirited, as well as gay, in sentiment, than we should expect to find after reading his laboured poems.—1847.]

|| Goujet, xiii. 128. Auguis.

deserved much less credit as a poet, and fell into the fashionable absurdity of making French out of Greek. Raynouard bestows some eulogy on Baif.* Those who came afterwards were sometimes imitators of Ronsard, and, like most imitators of a faulty manner, far more pedantic and far-fetched than himself. An unintelligible refinement, which every nation in Europe seems in succession to have admitted into its poetry, has consigned much then written in France to oblivion. As large a proportion of the French verse in this period seems to be amatory as of the Italian; and the Italian style is sometimes followed. But a simpler and more lively turn of language, though without the naïveté of Marot, often distinguishes these compositions. These pass the bounds of decency not seldom; a privilege which seems in Italy to have been reserved for certain Fescennine metres, and is not indulged to the solemnity of the sonnet or canzone. The Italian language is ill-adapted to the epigram, in which the French succeed so well.†

52. A few may be selected from the numerous versifiers under the sons of Henry II. Amadis Janyn, the
 Du Bartas. pupil of Ronsard, was reckoned by his contemporaries almost a rival, and is more natural, less inflated and emphatic than his master.‡ This praise is by no means due to a more celebrated poet, Du Bartas. His numerous productions, unlike those of his contemporaries, turn mostly upon sacred history; but his poem on the Creation, called *La Semaine*, is that which obtained most reputation, and by which alone he is now known. The translation by Silvester has rendered it in some measure familiar to the readers of our old poetry; and attempts have been made, not without success, to show that Milton had been diligent in picking jewels from this mass of bad taste and bad writing. Du Bartas, in his style, was a disciple of Ronsard; he affects words derived from the ancient languages, or, if founded on

* "Baif is one of the poets who, in my opinion, have happily contributed by their example to fix the rules of our versification." *Journal des Savans*, Feb. 1825.

† Goujet devotes three volumes, the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth, of his

Bibliothèque Française to the poets of these fifty years. Bouterwek and La Harpe have touched only on a very few names. In the *Recueil des Anciens Poëtes*, the extracts from them occupy about a volume and a half.

‡ Goujet, xiii. 229. *Biog. Univ.*

analogy, yet without precedent, and has as little naturalness or dignity in his images as purity in his idiom. But his imagination, though extravagant, is vigorous and original.*

53. Pibrac, a magistrate of great integrity, obtained an extraordinary reputation by his quatrains; a series of moral tetrastichs in the style of Theognis. These first appeared in 1574, fifty in number, and were augmented to 126 in later editions. They were continually republished in the seventeenth century, and translated into many European and even oriental languages. It cannot be wonderful that, in the change of taste and manners, they have ceased to be read.† An imitation of the sixth satire of Horace, by Nicolas Rapin, printed in the collection of Auguis, is good and in very pure style.‡ Philippe Desportes, somewhat later, chose a better school than that of Ronsard; he rejected its pedantry and affectation, and by the study of Tibullus, as well as by his natural genius, gave a tenderness and grace to the poetry of love which those pompous versifiers had never sought. He has been esteemed the precursor of a better era; and his versification is rather less lawless§, according to La Harpe, than that of his predecessors.

54. The rules of metre became gradually established. Few writers of this period neglect the alternation of masculine and feminine rhymes||; but the open vowel will be found in several of the earlier. Du Bartas almost affects the *enjambement*, or continuation of the sense beyond the couplet; and even Desportes does not avoid it. Their metres are various; the Alexandrine, if so we may call it, or verse of twelve syllables, was occasionally adopted by Ronsard, and in time displaced the old verse of ten syl-

Pibrac;
Desportes.

French
metre and
versification.

* Goujet, xiii. 304. The *Semaine of Du Bartas* was printed thirty times within six years, and translated into Latin, Italian, German, and Spanish, as well as English. Id. 312., on the authority of La Croix du Maine.

Du Bartas, according to a French writer of the next century, used methods of exciting his imagination which I recommend to the attention of young poets. L'on dit en France, que Du Bartas auparavant que de faire cette belle description de cheval ou il a si bien rencontré, s'enfermoit quelquefois dans une cham-

bre, et se mettant à quatre pattes, souffloit, hennissoit, gambadoit, tiroit des ruades, alloit l'amble, le trot, le galop, à courbette, et tâchoit par toutes sortes de moyens à bien contrefaire le cheval. Naudé, *Considérations sur les Coups d'Estat*, p. 47.

† Goujet, xii. 266. *Biogr. Univ.*

‡ *Recueil des Poètes*, v. 361.

§ Goujet, xiv. 63. La Harpe. *Au-
guis*, v. 343—377.

|| Grevin, about 1558, is an exception, *Goujet*, xii. 159.

lables, which became appropriated to the lighter style. The sonnets, as far as I have observed, are regular; and this form, which had been very little known in France, after being introduced by Jodelle and Ronsard, became one of the most popular modes of composition.* Several attempts were made to naturalise the Latin metres; but this pedantic innovation could not long have success. Specimens of it may be found in Pasquier.†

55. It may be said, perhaps, of French poetry in general, but at least in this period, that it deviates less from a certain standard than any other. It is not often low, as may be imputed to the earlier writers, because a peculiar style, removed from common speech, and supposed to be classical, was a condition of satisfying the critics; it is not often obscure, at least in syntax, as the Italian sonnet is apt to be, because the genius of the language and the habits of society demanded perspicuity. But it seldom delights us by a natural sentiment or unaffected grace of diction, because both one and the other were fettered by conventional rules. The monotony of amorous song is more wearisome, if that be possible, than among the Italians.

56. The characteristics of German verse impressed upon it by the meister-singers still remained, though the songs of those fraternities seem to have ceased. It was chiefly didactic or religious, often satirical, and employing the veil of apologue. Luther, Hans Sachs, and other more obscure names, are counted among the fabulists; but

General
character of
French
poetry.

German
poetry.

* Bouterwek, v. 212.

† Recherches de la France, l. vii. c. 11. Baif has passed for the inventor of this foolish art in France, which was more common there than in England. But Prosper Marchand ascribes a translation of the Iliad and Odyssey into regular French hexameters to one Mousset, of whom nothing is known; on no better authority, however, than a vague passage of D'Aubigné, who "remembered to have seen such a book sixty years ago." Though Mousset may be imaginary, he furnishes an article to Marchand, who brings together a good deal of learning as to the latinized French metres of the sixteenth century. Dictionnaire Historique.

Passerat, Ronsard, Nicolas Rapin, and Pasquier, tried their hands in this style. Rapin improved upon it by rhyming in Sapphics. The following stanzas are from his ode on the death of Ronsard: —

Vous que les ruisseaux d'Hélicon fréquentes,
Vous que les jardins solitaires hantes,
Et le fonds des bois, curieux de choisir
L'ombre et le loisir.

Qui vivant bien loin de la fange et du bruit,
Et de ces grandeurs que le peuple poursuit,
Estimez les vers que la muse après vous
Trempe de miel doux.

Notre grand Ronsard, de ce monde sorti,
Les efforts derniers de la Parque a senti;
Ses saveurs n'ont pu le garantir enân
Contre le destin, &c. &c.

PASQUIER, *ubi supra*.

the most successful was Burcard Waldis, whose fables, partly from Æsop, partly original, were first published in 1548. The *Froschmauser* of Rollenhagen, in 1545, is in a similar style of political and moral apologue with some liveliness of description. Fischart is another of the moral satirists, but extravagant in style and humour, resembling Rabelais, of whose romance he gave a free translation. One of his poems, *Die Gluckhafte Schiff*, is praised by Bouterwek for beautiful descriptions and happy inventions; but in general he seems to be the Skelton of Germany. Many German ballads belong to this period, partly taken from the old tales of chivalry: in these the style is humble, with no poetry except that of invention, which is not their own; yet they are true-hearted and unaffected, and better than what the next age produced.*

SECT. IV. — ON ENGLISH POETRY.

Paradise of Dainty Devices — *Sackville* — *Gascoyne* — *Spenser's Shepherd's Kalender* — *Improvement in Poetry* — *England's Helicon* — *Sidney* — *Shakespeare's Poems* — *Poets near the close of the Century* — *Translations* — *Scots and English Ballads* — *Spenser's Faery Queen*.

57. THE poems of Wyatt and Surrey with several more, first appeared in 1557, and were published in a little book, entitled *Tottel's Miscellanies*. But as both of these belonged to the reign of Henry VIII. their poetry has come already under our review. It is probable that Lord Vaux's short pieces, which are next to those of Surrey and Wyatt in merit, were written before the middle of the century. Some of these are published in *Tottel*, and others in a scarce collection; the first edition of which was in 1576, quaintly named, *The Paradise of Dainty Devices*. The poems in this volume, as in that of *Tottel*, are not co-eval with its publication; it has been supposed to represent the age of Mary, full as much as that of Elizabeth, and one of the chief contributors, if not framers of the collection,

*Paradise of
Dainty
Devices.*

* Bouterwek, vol. ix. Heinsius, vol. iv.

Richard Edwards, died in 1566. Thirteen poems are by Lord Vaux, who certainly did not survive the reign of Mary.

58. We are indebted to Sir Egerton Brydges for the republication, in his *British Bibliographer*, of the *Paradise of Dainty Devices*, of which, though there had been eight editions, it is said that not above six copies existed.* The poems are almost all short, and by more nearly thirty than twenty different authors. "They do not, it must be admitted," says their editor, "belong to the higher classes; they are of the moral and didactic kind. In their subject there is too little variety, as they deal very generally in the common-places of ethics, such as the fickleness and caprices of love, the falsehood and instability of friendship, and the vanity of all human pleasures. But many of these are often expressed with a vigour which would do credit to any era. . . . If my partiality does not mislead me, there is in most of these short pieces some of that indescribable attraction which springs from the colouring of the heart. The charm of imagery is wanting, but the precepts inculcated seem to flow from the feelings of an overloaded bosom." Edwards he considers, probably with justice, as the best of the contributors, and Lord Vaux the next. We should be inclined to give as high a place to William Hunnis, were his productions all equal to one little poem†; but too often he falls into trivial morality and a ridiculous excess of alliteration. The amorous poetry is the best in this *Paradise*; it is not imaginative or very graceful, or exempt from the false taste of antithetical conceits, but sometimes natural and pleasing; the serious pieces are in general very heavy, yet there is a dignity and strength in some of the devotional strains. They display the religious earnestness of that age with a kind of austere philosophy in their views of life.

* Beloe's *Anecdotes of Literature*, vol. v.

† This song is printed in Campbell's *Specimens of English Poets*, vol. i. p. 117. It begins,

"When first mine eyes did view and mark."

The little poem of Edwards, called *Amantium Iræ*, has often been reprinted in modern collections, and is reckoned by

Brydges one of the most beautiful in the language. But hardly any light poem of this early period is superior to some lines addressed to Isabella Markham by Sir John Harrington, bearing the date of 1564. If these are genuine, and I know not how to dispute it, they are as polished as any written at the close of the queen's reign. These are not in the *Paradise of Dainty Devices*.

Whatever indeed be the subject, a tone of sadness reigns through this misnamed Paradise of Daintiness, as it does through all the English poetry of this particular age. It seems as if the confluence of the poetic melancholy of the Petrarchists with the reflective seriousness of the Reformation overpowered the lighter sentiments of the soul; and some have imagined, I know not how justly, that the persecutions of Mary's reign contributed to this effect.

59. But at the close of that dark period, while bigotry might be expected to render the human heart torpid, and the English nation seemed too fully absorbed in religious and political discontent to take much relish in literary amusements, one man shone out for an instant in the higher walks of poetry. This was Thomas Sackville, many years afterwards Lord Buckhurst, and high treasurer of England, thus withdrawn from the haunts of the muses to a long and honourable career of active life. The *Mirroure of Magistrates*, published in 1559, is a collection of stories by different authors, on the plan of Boccaccio's prose work, *De Casibus virorum illustrium*, recounting the misfortunes and reverses of men eminent in English history. It was designed to form a series of dramatic soliloquies united in one interlude.* Sackville, who seems to have planned the scheme, wrote an Induction, or prologue, and also one of the stories, that of the first Duke of Buckingham. The Induction displays best his poetical genius; it is, like much earlier poetry, a representation of allegorical personages, but with a fertility of imagination, vividness of description, and strength of language, which not only leave his predecessors far behind, but may fairly be compared with some of the most poetical passages in Spenser. Sackville's Induction forms a link which unites the school of Chaucer and Lydgate to the Faery Queen. It would certainly be vain to look in Chaucer, wherever Chaucer is original, for the grand creations of Sackville's fancy, yet we should never find any one who would rate Sackville above Chaucer. The strength of an eagle is not to

Sackville's
Induction.

* Warton, iv. 40. A copious account of the *Mirroure for Magistrates* occupies the forty-eighth and three following sections of the *History of Poetry*, p. 33—105. In this Warton has introduced

rather a long analysis of the *Inferno* of Dante, which he seems to have thought little known to the English public, as in that age, I believe, was the case.

be measured only by the height of his place, but by the time that he continues on the wing. Sackville's Induction consists of a few hundred lines ; and even in these there is a monotony of gloom and sorrow, which prevents us from wishing it to be longer. It is truly styled by Campbell a landscape on which the sun never shines. Chaucer is various, flexible, and observant of all things in outward nature, or in the heart of man. But Sackville is far above the frigid elegance of Surrey ; and, in the first days of Elizabeth's reign, is the herald of that splendour in which it was to close.

60. English poetry was not speedily animated by the example of Sackville. His genius stands absolutely alone in the age to which as a poet he belongs. Not that there was any deficiency in the number of versifiers ; the muses were honoured by the frequency, if not by the dignity, of their worshippers. A different sentence will be found in some books ; and it has become common to elevate the Elizabethan age in one indiscriminating panegyric. For wise counsellors, indeed, and acute politicians, we could not perhaps extol one part of that famous reign at the expense of another. Cecil and Bacon, Walsingham, Smith, and Sadler, belong to the earlier days of the queen. But in a literary point of view, the contrast is great between the first and second moiety of her four-and-forty years. We have seen this already in other subjects than poetry ; and in that we may appeal to such parts of the *Mirroure of Magistrates* as are not written by Sackville, to the writings of Churchyard, or to those of Gouge and Turberville. These writers scarcely venture to leave the ground, or wander in the fields of fancy. They even abstain from the ordinary commonplaces of verse, as if afraid that the reader should distrust or misinterpret their images. The first who deserves to be

mentioned as an exception is George Gascoyne, whose *Steel Glass*, published in 1576, is the earliest instance of English satire, and has strength and sense enough to deserve respect. Chalmers has praised it highly. "There is a vein of sly sarcasm in this piece which appears to me to be original ; and his intimate knowledge of mankind enabled him to give a more curious picture of the dress, manners, amusements, and follies of the times, than we meet with in

*Inferiority of
poets in early
years of
Elizabeth.*

Gascoyne.

almost any other author. His *Steel Glass* is among the first specimens of blank verse in our language." This blank verse, however, is but indifferently constructed. Gascoyne's long poem, called the *Fruits of War*, is in the doggerel style of his age; and the general commendations of Chalmers on this poet seem rather hyperbolical. But his minor poems, especially one called *The Arraignment of a Lover*, have much spirit and gaiety*; and we may leave him a respectable place among the Elizabethan versifiers.

61. An epoch was made, if we may draw an inference from the language of contemporaries, by the publication of Spenser's *Shepherd's Kalendar* in 1579.† His primary idea, that of adapting a pastoral to every month of the year, was pleasing and original, though he has frequently neglected to observe the season, even when it was most abundant in appropriate imagery. But his *Kalendar* is, in another respect, original, at least when compared with the pastoral writings of that age. This species of composition had become so much the favourite of courts, that no language was thought to suit it but that of courtiers, which, with all its false beauties of thought and expression, was transferred to the mouths of shepherds. A striking instance of this had lately been shown in the *Aminta*; and it was a proof of Spenser's judgment, as well as genius, that he struck out a new line of pastoral, far more natural, and therefore more pleasing, so far as imitation of nature is the source of poetical pleasure, instead of vying, in our more harsh and uncultivated language, with the consummate elegance of Tasso. It must be admitted, however, that he fell too much into the opposite extreme, and gave a Doric rudeness to his dialogue, which is a little repulsive to our taste. The dialect of Theocritus is musical to our ears, and free from vulgarity; praises which we cannot bestow on the uncouth provincial rusticity of Spenser. He has been less justly censured on another account, for intermingling allusions to the political history and religious differences of his own times; and an

Spenser's
Shepherd's
Kalendar.

* Ellis's *Specimens*. Campbell's *Specimens*, ii. 146.

† The *Shepherd's Kalendar* was printed anonymously. It is ascribed to Sidney by Whetstone in a monody on

his death, in 1586. But Webbe, in his *Discourse on English Poesie*, published the same year, mentions Spenser by name.

ingenious critic has asserted that the description of the grand and beautiful objects of nature, with well-selected scenes of rural life, real but not coarse, constitute the only proper materials of pastoral poetry. These limitations, however, seem little conformable to the practice of poets or the taste of mankind; and if Spenser has erred in the allegorical part of his pastorals, he has done so in company with most of those who have tuned the shepherd's pipe. Several of Virgil's *Eclogues*, and certainly the best, have a meaning beyond the simple songs of the hamlet; and it was notorious that the Portuguese and Spanish pastoral romances, so popular in Spenser's age, teemed with delineations of real character, and sometimes were the mirrors of real story. In fact, mere pastoral must soon become insipid, unless it borrows something from active life or elevated philosophy. The most interesting parts of the *Shepherd's Kalendar* are of this description; for Spenser has not displayed the powers of his own imagination, so strongly as we might expect, in pictures of natural scenery. This poem has spirit and beauty in many passages; but is not much read in the present day, nor does it seem to be approved by modern critics. It was otherwise formerly. Webbe, in his *Discourse of English Poetry*, 1586, calls Spenser "the rightest English poet he ever read," and thinks he would have surpassed Theocritus and Virgil, "if the coarseness of our speech had been no greater impediment to him, than their pure native tongues were to them." And Drayton says, "Master Edmund Spenser had done enough for the immortality of his name, had he only given us his *Shepherd's Kalendar*, a masterpiece, if any."*

62. Sir Philip Sidney, in his *Defence of Poesie*, which may have been written at any time between 1581 and his death in 1586, laments that "poesy thus embraced in all other places, should only find in our time a bad welcome in England;" and, after praising Sackville, Surrey, and Spenser for the *Shepherd's Kalendar*, does not "remember to have seen many more that have poetical sinews in them. For proof whereof, let but most of the verses be put into prose, and then ask the meaning, and it will be found that one verse did but beget another,

Sidney's
character of
contempo-
rary poets.

* Preface to Drayton's *Pastorals*.

without ordering at the first what should be at the last ; which becomes a confused mass of words, with a tinkling sound of rhyme, barely accompanied with reason. Truly many of such writings as come under the banner of irresistible love, if I were a mistress, would never persuade me they were in love ; so coldly they apply fiery speeches as men that had rather read lovers' writings, and so caught up certain swelling phrases, than that in truth they feel those passions."

63. It cannot be denied that some of these blemishes are by no means unusual in the writers of the Elizabethan age, as in truth they are found also in much other poetry of many countries. But a change seems to have come over the spirit of English poetry soon after 1580. Sidney, Raleigh, Lodge, Breton, Marlowe, Greene, Watson, are the chief contributors to a collection called *England's Helicon*, published in 1600, and comprising many of the fugitive pieces of the last twenty years. Davison's *Poetical Rhapsody*, in 1602*, is a miscellany of the same class. A few other collections are known to have existed, but are still more scarce than these. *England's Helicon*, by far the most important, has been reprinted in the same volume of the *British Bibliographer* as the *Paradise of Dainty Devices*. In this juxtaposition the difference of their tone is very perceptible. Love occupies by far the chief portion of the later miscellany ; and love no longer pining and melancholy, but sportive and boastful. Every one is familiar with the beautiful song of Marlowe, "Come live with me and be my love ;" and with the hardly less beautiful answer ascribed to Raleigh. Lodge has ten pieces in this collection, and Breton eight. These are generally full of beauty, grace, and simplicity ; and while in reading the productions of Edwards and his coadjutors every sort of allowance is to be made, and we can only praise a little at intervals, these lyrics, twenty or thirty years later, are among the best in our language. The conventional tone is that of pastoral ; and thus, if they have less of the depth sometimes

Improve-
ment soon
after this
time.

* [It was much enlarged in 1608 and been reprinted by Sir Harris Nicolas in 1826.—1847.]

shown in serious poetry, they have less also of obscurity and false refinement.*

64. We may easily perceive in the literature of the later period of the queen, what our biographical knowledge confirms, that much of the austerity characteristic of her earlier years had vanished away. Relaxation of moral austerity. The course of time, the progress of vanity, the prevalent dislike, above all, of the Puritans, avowed enemies of gaiety, concurred to this change. The most distinguished courtiers, Raleigh, Essex, Blount, and we must add Sidney, were men of brilliant virtues, but not without license of morals; while many of the wits and poets, such as Nash, Greene, Peele, Marlowe, were notoriously of very dissolute lives.

65. The graver strains, however, of religion and philosophy were still heard in verse. Serious poetry. The Soul's Errand, printed anonymously in Davison's Rhapsody, and ascribed by Ellis, probably without reason, to Silvester, is characterised by strength, condensation, and simplicity.† And we might rank in a respectable place among these English poets, though I think he has been lately overrated, one whom the jealous law too prematurely deprived of life, Robert Southwell, executed as a seminary priest in 1591, under one of those persecuting statutes which even the traitorous restlessness of the English Jesuits cannot excuse. Southwell's poetry wears a deep tinge of gloom, which seems to presage a catastrophe too usual to have been unexpected.

* Ellis, in the second volume of his *Specimens of English Poets*, has taken largely from this collection. It must be owned that his good taste in selection gives a higher notion of the poetry of this age than, on the whole, it would be found to deserve; yet there is so much of excellence in England's Helicon, that he has been compelled to omit many pieces of great merit.

† Campbell reckons this, and I think justly, among the best pieces of the Elizabethan age. Brydges gives it to Raleigh without evidence, and we may add, without probability. It is found in manuscripts, according to Mr. Campbell, of the date of 1593. Such poems as this could only be written by a man who

had seen and thought much; while the ordinary Latin and Italian verses of this age might be written by any one who had a knack of imitation and a good ear. [It was published in the second edition of Davison, 1608, with the title, *The Lie*. In Silvester's works it bears the present title. Its publication therein would of course be presumptive evidence that he was the author, were it not weakened, as Sir Harris Nicolas observes, by the circumstance that it is also published among the poems of the Earl of Pembroke. If it is really found, as Campbell tells us, in a manuscript of 1593, Pembroke's claim must be out of the question.—1847.]

It is, as may be supposed, almost wholly religious; the shorter pieces are the best.*

66. *Astrophel and Stella*, a series of amatory poems by Sir Philip Sidney, though written nearly ten years before, was published in 1591. These songs and sonnets recount the loves of Sidney and Lady Rich, sister of Lord Essex; and it is rather a singular circumstance that, in her own and her husband's lifetime, this ardent courtship of a married woman should have been deemed fit for publication. Sidney's passion seems indeed to have been unsuccessful, but far enough from being platonic.† *Astrophel and Stella* is too much disfigured by conceits, but is in some places very beautiful; and it is strange that Chalmers, who reprinted Turberville and Warner, should have left Sidney out of his collection of British poets. A poem by the writer just mentioned, Warner, with the quaint title, *Albion's England*, 1586, has at least the equivocal merit of great length. It is rather legendary than historical; some passages are pleasing, but it is not a work of genius, and the style, though natural, seldom rises above that of prose.

Poetry of Sidney.

67. Spenser's *Epithalamium* on his own marriage, written perhaps in 1594, is of a far higher mood than any thing we have named. It is a strain redolent of a bridegroom's joy, and of a poet's fancy. The English language seems to expand itself with a copiousness unknown before, while he pours forth the varied imagery of this splendid little poem. I do not know any other nuptial song, ancient or modern, of equal beauty. It is an intoxication of ecstasy, ardent, noble, and pure. But it pleased not Heaven that these day-dreams of genius and virtue should be undisturbed.

Epithalamium of Spenser.

* I am not aware that Southwell has gained any thing by a republication of his entire poems in 1817. Headley and Ellis had culled the best specimens. St. Peter's Complaint, the longest of his poems, is wordy and tedious; and in reading the volume I found scarce any thing of merit which I had not seen before.

† Godwin having several years since made some observations on Sidney's

amour with Lady Rich, a circumstance which such biographers as Dr. Zouch take good care to suppress, a gentleman who published an edition of Sidney's Defence of Poetry, thought fit to indulge in recriminating attacks on Godwin himself. It is singular that men of sense and education should persist in fancying that such arguments are likely to convince any dispassionate reader.

68. Shakspeare's *Venus and Adonis* appears to have been published in 1593, and his *Rape of Lucrece* the following year. The redundance of blossoms in these juvenile effusions of his unbounded fertility obstructs the reader's attention, and sometimes almost leads us to give him credit for less reflection and sentiment than he will be found to display. The style is flowing, and, in general, more perspicuous than the Elizabethan poets are wont to be. But I am not sure that they would betray themselves for the works of Shakspeare, had they been anonymously published.

69. In the last decad of this century several new poets came forward. Samuel Daniel is one of these. His *Complaint of Rosamond*, and probably many of his minor poems, belong to this period; and it was also that of his greatest popularity. On the death of Spenser, in 1598, he was thought worthy to succeed him as poet-laureate; and some of his contemporaries ranked him in the second place; an eminence due rather to the purity of his language than to its vigour.* Michael Drayton, who first tried his shepherd's pipe with some success in the usual style, published his *Barons' Wars* in 1598. They relate to the last years of Edward II., and conclude with the execution of Mortimer under his son. This poem, therefore, seems to possess a sufficient unity, and, tried by rules of criticism, might be thought not far removed from the class of epic — a dignity, however, to which it has never pretended. But in its conduct Drayton follows history very closely, and we are kept too much in mind of a common chronicle. Though not very pleasing, however, in its general effect, this poem, *The Barons' Wars*, contains several passages of considerable beauty, which men of greater renown, especially Milton, who availed himself largely of all the poetry of the preceding age, have been willing to imitate.

70. A more remarkable poem is that of Sir John Davies, afterwards chief-justice of Ireland, entitled, *Nosce Teipsum*, published in 1599, usually, though rather inaccurately, called, *On the Immortality of the Soul*.

* British Bibliographer, vol. ii. Headley remarks that Daniel was spoken of by contemporary critics as the polisher and purifier of the English language.

Perhaps no language can produce a poem, extending to so great a length, of more condensation of thought, or in which fewer languid verses will be found. Yet, according to some definitions, the *Nosce Teipsum* is wholly unpoetical, inasmuch as it shows no passion and little fancy. If it reaches the heart at all, it is through the reason. But since strong argument in terse and correct style fails not to give us pleasure in prose, it seems strange that it should lose its effect when it gains the aid of regular metre to gratify the ear and assist the memory. Lines there are in Davies which far outweigh much of the descriptive and imaginative poetry of the last two centuries, whether we estimate them by the pleasure they impart to us, or by the intellectual vigour they display. Experience has shown that the faculties peculiarly deemed poetical are frequently exhibited in a considerable degree, but very few have been able to preserve a perspicuous brevity without stiffness or pedantry (allowance made for the subject and the times), in metaphysical reasoning, so successfully as Sir John Davies.

71. Hall's Satires are tolerably known, partly on account of the subsequent celebrity of the author in a very different province, and partly from a notion, to which he gave birth by announcing the claim, that he was the first English satirist. In a general sense of satire, we have seen that he had been anticipated by Gascoyne; but Hall has more of the direct Juvenalian invective, which he may have reckoned essential to that species of poetry. They are deserving of regard in themselves. Warton has made many extracts from Hall's Satires; he praises in them "a classical precision, to which English poetry had yet rarely attained;" and calls the versification "equally energetic and elegant."* The former epithet may be admitted; but elegance is hardly compatible with what Warton owns to be the chief fault of Hall, "his obscurity, arising from a remote phraseology, constrained combinations, unfamiliar allusions, elliptical apostrophes, and abruptness of expression." Hall is in fact not only so harsh and rugged, that he cannot be read with much pleasure, but so obscure in very many places that he cannot be understood at all, his lines frequently bearing no

Satires of
Hall,
Marston,
and Donne.

* Hist. of English Poetry, iv. 383.

visible connexion in sense or grammar with their neighbours. The stream is powerful, but turbid and often choked.* Marston and Donne may be added to Hall in this style of poetry, as belonging to the sixteenth century, though the satires of the latter were not published till long afterwards. With as much obscurity as Hall, he has a still more inharmonious versification, and not nearly equal vigour.

72. The roughness of these satirical poets was perhaps studiously affected ; for it was not much in unison with the general tone of the age. It requires a good deal of care to avoid entirely the combinations of consonants that clog our language ; nor have Drayton or Spenser always escaped this embarrassment. But in the lighter poetry of the queen's last years, a remarkable sweetness of modulation has always been recognised. This has sometimes been attributed to the general fondness for music. It is at least certain, that some of our old madrigals are as beautiful in language as they are in melody. Several collections were published in the reign of Elizabeth.† And it is evident that the regard to the capacity of his verse for marriage with music, that was before the poet's mind, would not only polish his metre, but give it grace and sentiment, while it banished also the pedantry, the antithesis, the prolixity, which had disfigured the earlier lyric poems. Their measures became more various : though the quatrain, alternating by eight and six syllables, was still very popular, we find the trochaic verse of seven, sometimes ending with a double rhyme, usual towards the end of the queen's reign. Many of these occur in England's Helicon, and in the poems of Sidney.

Modulation
of
English
verse.

73. The translations of ancient poets by Phaier, Golding, Stanyhurst, and several more, do not challenge our attention ; most of them, in fact, being very wretched performances.‡ Marlowe, a more celebrated name,

Translation
of Homer by
Chapman ;

* Hall's Satires are praised by Campbell, as well as Warton, full as much, in my opinion, as they deserve. Warton has compared Marston with Hall, and concludes that the latter is more "elegant, exact, and elaborate." More so than his rival he may by possibility be esteemed ; but these three epithets cannot be pre-

dictated of his satires in any but a relative sense.

† Morley's Musical Airs, 1594, and another collection in 1597, contain some pretty songs. British Bibliographer, i. 342. A few of these madrigals will also be found in Mr. Campbell's Specimens.

‡ Warton, chap. liv., has gone very laboriously into this subject.

did not, as has commonly been said, translate the poem of Hero and Leander ascribed to Musæus, but expanded it into what he calls six Sestiads on the same subject; a paraphrase, in every sense of the epithet, of the most licentious kind. This he left incomplete, and it was finished by Chapman.* But the most remarkable productions of this kind are the *Iliad* of Chapman, and the *Jerusalem* of Fairfax, both printed in 1600; the former, however, containing in that edition but fifteen books, to which the rest was subsequently added. Pope, after censuring the haste, negligence, and fustian language of Chapman, observes, "that which is to be allowed him, and which very much contributed to cover his defects, is a free daring spirit that animates his translation, which is something like what one might imagine Homer himself would have written before he arrived at years of discretion." He might have added, that Chapman's translation, with all its defects, is often exceedingly Homeric; a praise which Pope himself seldom attained. Chapman deals abundantly in compound epithets, some of which have retained their place; his verse is rhymed, of fourteen syllables, which corresponds to the hexameter better than the decasyllable couplet; he is often uncouth, often unmusical, and often low; but the spirited and rapid flow of his metre makes him respectable to lovers of poetry. Waller, it is said, could not read him without transport. It must be added, that he is an unfaithful translator, and interpolated much, besides the general redundancy of his style.†

74. Fairfax's *Tasso* has been more praised, and is better known. Campbell has called it, in rather strong terms, "one of the glories of Elizabeth's reign." Tasso,
Fairfax.

It is not the first version of the *Jerusalem*, one very literal and prosaic having been made by Carew in 1594.‡ That of Fairfax, if it does not represent the grace of its original, and

* Marlowe's poem is republished in the *Restituta* of Sir Egerton Brydges. It is singular that Warton should have taken it for a translation of Musæus.

† Warton, iv. 269. *Retrospective Review*, vol. iii. See also a very good comparison of the different translations of Homer, in *Blackwood's Magazine* for 1831 and 1832, where Chapman comes in for his due.

‡ In the third volume of the *Retrospective Review*, these translations are compared, and it is shown that Carew is far more literal than Fairfax, who has taken great liberties with his original. Extracts from Carew will also be found in the *British Bibliographer*, i. 30. They are miserably bad. [Carew translated only the first five books of *Tasso*. — [1847.]

deviates also too much from its sense, is by no means deficient in spirit and vigour. It has been considered as one of the earliest works, in which the obsolete English, which had not been laid aside in the days of Sackville, and which Spenser affected to preserve, gave way to a style not much differing, at least in point of single words and phrases, from that of the present age. But this praise is equally due to Daniel, to Drayton, and to others of the later Elizabethan poets. The translation of Ariosto by Sir John Harrington, in 1591, is much inferior.

75. An injudicious endeavour to substitute the Latin metres for those congenial to our language met with no more success than it deserved; unless it may be called success, that Sidney, and even Spenser, were for a moment seduced into approbation of it. Gabriel Harvey, best now remembered as the latter's friend, recommended the adoption of hexameters in some letters which passed between them, and Spenser appears to have concurred. Webbe, a few years afterwards, a writer of little taste or ear for poetry, supported the same scheme, but may be said to have avenged the wrong of English verse upon our great poet, by travestying the Shepherd's Kalendar into Sapphics.* Campion, in 1602, still harps upon this foolish pedantry; many instances of which may be found during the Elizabethan period. It is well-known that in German the practice has been in some measure successful, through the example of a distinguished poet, and through translations from the ancients in measures closely corresponding with their own. In this there is doubtless the advantage of presenting a truer mirror of the original. But as most imitations of Latin measures, in German or English, begin by violating their first principle, which assigns an invariable value in time to the syllables of every word, and produce a chaos of false quantities, it seems as if they could only disgust any one acquainted with classical versification. In the early English hexameters of the period before us, we sometimes perceive an

Employment
of ancient
measures.

* Webbe's success was not inviting to the Latinists. Thus in the second Eclogue of Virgil, for the beautiful lines —

At mecum raucis, tua dum vestigia lustris,
Sole sub ardenti resonant arbusta cicadis,

we have this delectable hexametric version: —

But by the scorched bank-sides I' thy footsteps
still I go plodding:
Hedge-rows hot do resound with grasshops
mournfully squeaking.

intention to arrange long and short syllables according to the analogies of the Latin tongue. But this would soon be found impracticable in our own, which, abounding in harsh terminations, cannot long observe the law of position.

76. It was said by Ellis, that nearly one hundred names of poets belonging to the reign of Elizabeth might be enumerated, besides many that have left no memorial except their songs. This however was but a moderate computation. Drake has made a list of more than two hundred, some few of whom, perhaps, do not strictly belong to the Elizabethan period.* But many of these are only known by short pieces in such miscellaneous collections as have been mentioned. Yet in the entire bulk of poetry, England could not, perhaps, bear comparison with Spain or France, to say nothing of Italy. She had come, in fact, much later to cultivate poetry as a general accomplishment. And, consequently, we find much less of the mechanism of style, than in the contemporaneous verse of other languages. The English sonnetteers deal less in customary epithets and conventional modes of expression. Every thought was to be worked out in new terms, since the scanty precedents of early versifiers did not supply them. This was evidently the cause of many blemishes in the Elizabethan poetry; of much that was false in taste, much that was either too harsh and extravagant, or too humble, and of more that was so obscure as to defy all interpretation. But it saved also that monotonous equability that often wearies us in more polished poetry. There is more pleasure, more sense of sympathy with another mind, in the perusal even of Gascoyne or Edwards, than in that of many French and Italian versifiers whom their contemporaries extolled. This is all that we can justly say in their favour; for any comparison of the Elizabethan poetry, save Spenser's alone, with that of the nineteenth century would show an extravagant predilection for the mere name or dress of antiquity.

77. It would be a great omission to neglect in any review of the Elizabethan poetry, that extensive, though anonymous class, the Scots and English ballads.

●
Number of
poets in this
age.

Scots and
English ballads.

* Shakspeare and his Times, i. 674. Even this catalogue is probably incomplete; it includes, of course, translators.

The very earliest of these have been adverted to in our account of the fifteenth century. They became much more numerous in the present. The age of many may be determined by historical or other allusions; and from these, availing ourselves of similarity of style, we may fix, with some probability, the date of such as furnish no distinct evidence. This however is precarious, because the language has often been modernised, and passing for some time by oral tradition, they are frequently not exempt from marks of interpolation. But, upon the whole, the reigns of Mary and James VI., from the middle to the close of the sixteenth century, must be reckoned the golden age of the Scottish ballad; and there are many of the corresponding period in England.

78. There can be, I conceive, no question as to the superiority of Scotland in her ballads. Those of an historic or legendary character, especially the former, are ardently poetical; the nameless minstrel is often inspired with an Homeric power of rapid narration, bold description, lively or pathetic touches of sentiment. They are familiar to us through several publications, but chiefly through the *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*, by one whose genius these indigenous lays had first excited, and whose own writings, when the whole civilised world did homage to his name, never ceased to bear the indelible impress of the associations that had thus been generated. The English ballads of the northern border, or perhaps, of the northern counties, come near in their general character and cast of manners to the Scottish, but, as far as I have seen, with a manifest inferiority. Those again which belong to the south, and bear no trace either of the rude manners, or of the wild superstitions which the bards of *Etrick* and *Cheviot* display, fall generally into a creeping style, which has exposed the common ballad to contempt. They are sometimes, nevertheless, not devoid of elegance, and often pathetic. The best are known through *Percy's Reliques of Ancient Poetry*; a collection singularly heterogeneous, and very unequal in merit, but from the publication of which, in 1765, some of high name have dated the revival of a genuine feeling for true poetry in the public mind.

79. We have reserved to the last the chief boast of this period, the Faery Queen. Spenser, as is well known, composed the greater part of his poem in Ireland, The Faery Queen. on the banks of his favourite Mulla. The first three books were published in 1590; the last three did not appear till 1596. It is a perfectly improbable supposition, that the remaining part, or six books required for the completion of his design, have been lost. The short interval before the death of this great poet was filled up by calamities sufficient to wither the fertility of any mind.

80. The first book of the Faery Queen is a complete poem, and far from requiring any continuation, is rather injured by the useless re-appearance of its hero in the second. Superiority of the first book. It is generally admitted to be the finest of the six. In no other is the allegory so clearly conceived by the poet, or so steadily preserved, yet with a disguise so delicate, that no one is offended by that servile setting forth of a moral meaning we frequently meet with in allegorical poems; and the reader has the gratification which good writing in works of fiction always produces, that of exercising his own ingenuity without perplexing it. That the red-cross knight designates the militant Christian, whom Una, the true church, loves, whom Duessa, the type of popery, seduces, who is reduced almost to despair, but rescued by the intervention of Una, and the assistance of Faith, Hope, and Charity, is what no one feels any difficulty in acknowledging, but what every one may easily read the poem without perceiving or remembering. In an allegory conducted with such propriety, and concealed or revealed with so much art, there can surely be nothing to repel our taste; and those who read the first book of the Faery Queen without pleasure, must seek (what others perhaps will be at no loss to discover for them) a different cause for their insensibility, than the tediousness or insipidity of allegorical poetry. Every canto of this book teems with the choicest beauties of imagination; he came to it in the freshness of his genius, which shines throughout with an uniformity it does not always afterwards maintain, unsullied as yet by flattery, unobstructed by pedantry, and unquenched by languor.

81. In the following books, we have much less allegory ; for the personification of abstract qualities, though The succeeding books. often confounded with it, does not properly belong to that class of composition : it requires a covert sense beneath an apparent fable, such as the first book contains. But of this I do not discover many proofs in the second or third, the legends of Temperance and Chastity ; they are contrived to exhibit these virtues and their opposite vices, but with little that is not obvious upon the surface. In the fourth and sixth books, there is still less ; but a different species of allegory, the historical, which the commentators have, with more or less success, endeavoured to trace in other portions of the poem, breaks out unequivocally in the legend of Justice, which occupies the fifth. The friend and patron of Spenser, Sir Arthur Grey, Lord Deputy of Ireland, is evidently portrayed in Arthegal ; and the latter cantos of this book represent, not always with great felicity, much of the foreign and domestic history of the times. It is sufficiently intimated by the poet himself, that his Gloriana, or Faery Queen, is the type of Elizabeth ; and he has given her another representative in the fair huntress Belphebe. Spenser's adulation of her beauty (at some fifty or sixty years of age) may be extenuated, we can say no more, by the practice of wise and great men, and by his natural tendency to clothe the objects of his admiration in the hues of fancy ; but its exaggeration leaves the servility of the Italians far behind.

82. It has been justly observed by a living writer of the most ardent and enthusiastic genius, whose eloquence is as the rush of mighty waters, and has left it for Spenser's sense of beauty, others almost as invidious to praise in terms of less rapture, as to censure what he has borne along in the stream of unhesitating eulogy, that "no poet has ever had a more exquisite sense of the beautiful than Spenser."* In Virgil and Tasso this was not less powerful ; but even they, even the latter himself, do not hang with such a tenderness of delight, with such a forgetful delay, over the fair creations of their fancy. Spenser is not averse to images that jar on

* I allude here to a very brilliant series of papers on the Faery Queen, published in Blackwood's Magazine, during the years 1834 and 1835. [They are universally ascribed to Professor Wilson.—1842.]

the mind by exciting horror or disgust, and sometimes his touches are rather too strong ; but it is on love and beauty, on holiness and virtue, that he reposes with all the sympathy of his soul. The slowly sliding motion of his stanza, "with many a bout of linked sweetness long drawn out," beautifully corresponds to the dreamy enchantment of his description, when Una, or Belphebe, or Florimel, or Amoret, are present to his mind. In this varied delineation of female perfectness, no earlier poet had equalled him ; nor, excepting Shakspeare, has he had, perhaps, any later rival.

83. Spenser is naturally compared with Ariosto. "Fierce wars and faithful loves did moralise the song" of both poets. But in the constitution of their minds, compared to Ariosto. in the character of their poetry, they were almost the reverse of each other. The Italian is gay, rapid, ardent ; his pictures shift like the hues of heaven ; even while diffuse, he seems to leave in an instant what he touches, and is prolix by the number, not the duration, of his images. Spenser is habitually serious ; his slow stanza seems to suit the temper of his genius ; he loves to dwell on the sweetness and beauty which his fancy portrays. The ideal of chivalry, rather derived from its didactic theory, than from the precedents of romance, is always before him ; his morality is pure and even stern, with nothing of the libertine tone of Ariosto. He worked with far worse tools than the bard of Ferrara, with a language not quite formed, and into which he rather injudiciously poured an unnecessary archaism, while the style of his contemporaries was undergoing a rapid change in the opposite direction. His stanza of nine lines is particularly inconvenient and languid in narration, where the Italian octave is sprightly and vigorous ; though even this becomes ultimately monotonous by its regularity, a fault from which only the ancient hexameter and our blank verse are exempt.

84. Spenser may be justly said to excel Ariosto in originality of invention, in force and variety of character, in strength and vividness of conception, in depth of reflection, in fertility of imagination, and above all, in that exclusively poetical cast of feeling, which discerns in every thing what common minds do not perceive. In the construction and

arrangement of their fable neither deserve much praise ; but the siege of Paris gives the Orlando Furioso, spite of its perpetual shiftings of the scene, rather more unity in the reader's apprehension than belongs to the Faery Queen. Spenser is, no doubt, decidedly inferior in ease and liveliness of narration, as well as clearness and felicity of language. But, upon thus comparing the two poets, we have little reason to blush for our countryman. Yet the fame of Ariosto is spread through Europe, while Spenser is almost unknown out of England ; and even in this age, when much of our literature is so widely diffused, I have not observed proofs of much acquaintance with him on the Continent.

85. The language of Spenser, like that of Shakspeare, is an instrument manufactured for the sake of the work it was to perform. No other poet had written like either, though both have had their imitators. It is rather apparently obsolete by his partiality to certain disused forms, such as the *y* before the participle, than from any close resemblance to the diction of Chaucer or Lydgate.* The enfeebling expletives *do* and *did*, though certainly very common in our early writers, had never been employed with such an unfortunate predilection as by Spenser. Their everlasting recurrence is among the great blemishes of his style. His versification is in many passages beautifully harmonious ; but he has frequently permitted himself, whether for the sake of variety or from some other cause, to baulk the ear in the conclusion of a stanza.†

86. The inferiority of the last three books to the former is surely very manifest. His muse gives gradual signs of weariness ; the imagery becomes less vivid, the vein of poetical description less rich, the digres-

Style of
Spenser.

* "Spenser," says Ben Jonson, "in affecting the ancients writ no language ; yet I would have him read for his matter, but as Virgil read Ennius." This is rather in the sarcastic tone attributed to Jonson.

† Coleridge, who had a very strong perception of the beauty of Spenser's poetry, has observed his alternate alliteration, "which when well used is a great secret in melody ; as '*sad* to see her sorrowful constraint ;'—'on the grass her dainty limbs *did* lay.'" But I can hardly

agree with him when he proceeds to say, "it never strikes any unwarned ear as artificial, or other than the result of the necessary movement of the verse." The artifice seems often very obvious. I do not also quite understand, or, if I do, cannot acquiesce in what follows, that "Spenser's descriptions are not in the true sense of the word picturesque, but are composed of a wondrous series of images, as in our dreams." Coleridge's *Remarks*, vol. i. p. 93.

sions more frequent and verbose. It is true that the fourth book is full of beautiful inventions, and contains much admirable poetry ; yet even here we perceive a comparative deficiency in the quantity of excelling passages, which becomes far more apparent as we proceed, and the last book falls very short of the interest which the earlier part of the Faery Queen had excited. There is, perhaps, less reason than some have imagined, to regret that Spenser did not complete his original design. The Faery Queen is already in the class of longest poems. A double length, especially if, as we may well suspect, the succeeding parts would have been inferior, might have deterred many readers from the perusal of what we now possess. It is felt already in Spenser, as it is perhaps even in Ariosto, when we read much of either, that tales of knights and ladies, giants and salvage men, end in a satiety which no poetical excellence can overcome. Ariosto, sensible of this intrinsic defect in the epic romance, has enlivened it by great variety of incidents, and by much that carries us away from the peculiar tone of chivalrous manners. The world he lives in is before his eyes, and to please it is his aim. He plays with his characters as with puppets that amuse the spectator and himself. In Spenser, nothing is more remarkable than the steadiness of his apparent faith in the deeds of knighthood. He had little turn for sportiveness ; and in attempting it, as in the unfortunate instance of Malbecco, and a few shorter passages, we find him dull as well as coarse. It is in the ideal world of pure and noble virtues that his spirit, wounded by neglect, and weary of trouble, loved to refresh itself without reasoning or mockery ; he forgets the reader, and cares little for his taste, while he can indulge the dream of his own delighted fancy. It may be here also observed, that the elevated and religious morality of Spenser's poem would secure it, in the eyes of every man of just taste, from the ridicule which the mere romances of knight-errantry must incur, and against which Ariosto evidently guarded himself by the gay tone of his narration. The Orlando Furioso and the Faery Queen are each in the spirit of its age ; but the one was for Italy in the days of Leo, the other for England under Elizabeth, before, though but just before, the severity of the Reformation had been softened

away. The lay of Britomart, in twelve cantos, in praise of chastity, would have been received with a smile at the court of Ferrara, which would have had almost as little sympathy with the justice of Arthegal.

87. The allegories of Spenser have been frequently censured. One of their greatest offences, perhaps, is that they gave birth to some tedious and uninteresting poetry of the same kind. There is usually something repulsive in the application of an abstract or general name to a person, in which, though with some want of regard, as I have intimated above, to the proper meaning of the word, we are apt to think that allegorical fiction consists. The French and English poets of the middle ages had far too much of this; and it is to be regretted, that Spenser did not give other appellations to his Care and Despair, as he has done to Duessa and Talus. In fact, Orgoglio is but a giant, Humiltà a porter, Obedience a servant. The names, when English, suggest something that perplexes us; but the beings exhibited are mere persons of the drama, men and women, whose office or character is designated by their appellation.

88. The general style of the Faery Queen is not exempt from several defects, besides those of obsolescence and redundancy. Spenser seems to have been sometimes deficient in one attribute of a great poet, the continual reference to the truth of nature, so that his fictions should be always such as might exist on the given conditions. This arises in great measure from copying his predecessors too much in description, not suffering his own good sense to correct their deviations from truth. Thus, in the beautiful description of Una, where she first is introduced to us, riding

Upon a lowly ass more white than snow;
Herself much whiter.

This absurdity may have been suggested by Ovid's *Brachia Sithonia candidiora nive*; but the image in this line is not brought so distinctly before the mind as to be hideous as well as untrue; it is merely a hyperbolical parallel.* A

* Vincent Bourne, in his translation of William and Margaret, has one of the most elegant lines he ever wrote: —

Candidior nivibus, frigidiorque manus.
 But this is said of a ghost.

similar objection lies to the stanza enumerating as many kinds of trees as the poet could call to mind, in the description of a forest, —

The sailing pine, the cedar proud and tall,
The vine-prop elm, the poplar never dry,
The builder oak, sole king of forests all,
The aspine good for staves, the cypress funeral, —

with thirteen more in the next stanza. Every one knows that a natural forest never contains such a variety of species ; nor indeed could such a medley as Spenser, treading in the steps of Ovid, has brought together from all soils and climates, exist long if planted by the hands of man. Thus, also, in the last canto of the second book, we have a celebrated stanza, and certainly a very beautiful one, if this defect did not attach to it ; where winds, waves, birds, voices, and musical instruments are supposed to conspire in one harmony. A good writer has observed upon this, that “ to a person listening to a concert of voices and instruments, the interruption of singing birds, winds, and waterfalls, would be little better than the torment of Hogarth’s enraged musician.”* But perhaps the enchantment of the Bower of Bliss, where this is feigned to have occurred, may in some degree justify Spenser in this instance, by taking it out of the common course of nature. The stanza is translated from Tasso, whom our own poet has followed with close footsteps in these cantos of the second book of the Faery Queen — cantos often in themselves beautiful, but which are rendered stiff by a literal adherence to the original, and fall very short of its ethereal grace and sweetness. It would be unjust not to relieve these strictures, by observing that very numerous passages might be brought from the Faery Queen of admirable truth in painting, and of indisputable originality. The cave of Despair, the hovel of Corceca, the incantation of Amoret, are but a few among those that will occur to the reader of Spenser.

89. The admiration of this great poem was unanimous and enthusiastic. No academy had been trained to carp at his genius with minute cavilling ; no recent popularity, no traditional fame (for Chaucer was

Admiration
of the Faery
Queen.

* Twining’s Translation of Aristotle’s Poetics, p. 14.

rather venerated than much in the hands of the reader) interfered with the immediate recognition of his supremacy. The Faery Queen became at once the delight of every accomplished gentleman, the model of every poet, the solace of every scholar. In the course of the next century, by the extinction of habits derived from chivalry, and the change both of taste and language, which came on with the civil wars and the restoration, Spenser lost something of his attraction, and much more of his influence over literature; yet, in the most phlegmatic temper of the general reader, he seems to have been one of our most popular writers. Time, however, has gradually wrought its work; and, notwithstanding the more imaginative cast of poetry in the present century, it may be well doubted whether the Faery Queen is as much read or as highly esteemed as in the days of Anne. It is not perhaps very difficult to account for this: those who seek the delight that mere fiction presents to the mind (and they are the great majority of readers) have been supplied to the utmost limit of their craving, by stores accommodated to every temper, and far more stimulant than the legends of Faeryland. But we must not fear to assert, with the best judges of this and of former ages, that Spenser is still the third name in the poetical literature of our country, and that he has not been surpassed, except by Dante, in any other.*

90. If we place Tasso and Spenser apart, the English poetry of Elizabeth's reign will certainly not enter into competition with that of the corresponding period in Italy. It would require not only much national prejudice but a want of genuine *æsthetic*

General
parallel of
Italian and
English
poetry.

* Mr. Campbell has given a character of Spenser, not so enthusiastic as that to which I have alluded, but so discriminating, and, in general, sound, that I shall take the liberty of extracting it from his *Specimens of the British Poets*, i. 125. "His command of imagery is wide, easy, and luxuriant. He threw the soul of harmony into our verse, and made it more warmly, tenderly, and magnificently descriptive than it ever was before, or, with a few exceptions, than it has ever been since. It must certainly be owned that in description he exhibits nothing of the brief strokes and robust power which characterise the very greatest poets; but we shall nowhere find

more airy and expansive images of visionary things, a sweeter tone of sentiment, or a finer flush in the colours of language, than in this Rubens of English poetry. His fancy teems exuberantly in minuteness of circumstance, like a fertile soil sending bloom and verdure through the utmost extremities of the foliage which it nourishes. On a comprehensive view of the whole work, we certainly miss the charm of strength, symmetry, and rapid, or interesting progress; for though the plan which the poet designed is not completed, it is easy to see that no additional cantos could have rendered it less perplexed."

discernment to put them on a level. But it may still be said that our own muses had their charms ; and even that, at the end of the century, there was a better promise for the future than beyond the Alps. We might compare the poetry of one nation to a beauty of the court, with noble and regular features, a slender form, and grace in all her steps, but wanting a genuine simplicity of countenance, and with somewhat of sickliness in the delicacy of her complexion, that seems to indicate the passing away of the first season of youth ; while that of the other would rather suggest a country maiden, newly mingling with polished society, not of perfect lineaments, but attracting beholders by the spirit, variety, and intelligence of her expression, and rapidly wearing off the traces of rusticity, which are still sometimes visible in her demeanour.

SECT. V.—ON LATIN POETRY.

In Italy — Germany — France — Great Britain.

91. THE cultivation of poetry in modern languages did not as yet thin the ranks of Latin versifiers. They are, on the contrary, more numerous in this period than before. Italy, indeed, ceased to produce men equal to those who had flourished in the age of Leo and Clement. Some of considerable merit will be found in the great collection, “*Carmina Illustrium Poetarum*” (Florentiæ, 1719); one too, which, rigorously excluding all voluptuous poetry, makes some sacrifice of genius to scrupulous morality. The brothers Amaltei are perhaps the best of the later period. It is not always easy, at least without more pains than I have taken, to determine the chronology of these poems, which are printed in the alphabetical order of the authors’ names. But a considerable number must be later than the middle of the century. It cannot be denied that most of these poets employ trivial images, and do not much vary their forms of expression. They often please, but rarely make an impression on the memory. They are generally, I think, harmonious ; and perhaps metrical faults, though not uncommon, are less

Decline of
Latin poetry
in Italy ;

so than among the Cisalpine Latinists. There appears, on the whole, an evident decline since the preceding age.

92. This was tolerably well compensated in other parts of Europe. One of the most celebrated authors is a native of Germany, Lotichius, whose poems were first published in 1551, and with much amendment in 1561. They are written in a strain of luscious elegance, not rising far above the customary level of Ovidian poetry, and certainly not often falling below it. The versification is remarkably harmonious and flowing, but with a mannerism not sufficiently diversified; the first foot of each verse is generally a dactyle, which adds to the grace, but, so continually repeated, somewhat impairs the strength.* Lotichius is, however, a very elegant and classical versifier; and perhaps equal in elegy to Joannes Secundus, or any Cisalpine writer of the sixteenth century.† One of his elegies, on the siege of Magdeburg, gave rise to a strange notion—that he predicted, by a sort of divine enthusiasm, the calamities of that city in 1631. Bayle has spun a long note out of this fancy of some Germans.‡ But those who take the trouble, which these critics seem to have spared themselves, of attending to the poem itself, will perceive that the author concludes it with prognostics of peace instead of capture. It was evidently written on the siege of Magdeburg by Maurice in 1550. George Sabinus, son-in-law of Melancthon, ranks second in reputation to Lotichius among the Latin poets of Germany during this period.

93. But France and Holland, especially the former, became the more favoured haunts of the Latin muse. A collection in three volumes by Gruter, under the fictitious name of Ranusius Gherus, *Deliciæ Poetarum Gallorum*, published in 1609, contains the principal writers of the former country, some entire, some in selection.

* [It is not worth while to turn again to Lotichius; but the first foot in elegiac metre ought to be generally a dactyle, though there may be a possible excess. In Ovid's *Epistles*, the first foot is a dactyle in four cases out of five, especially in the pentameter. In the second book, *De Arte Amandi*, out of 746 lines, only 105 begin with a spondee. In the fourth of the *Fasti*, out of the first 400 lines, only 65 to 335.—1847.]

† Baillet calls him the best poet of Germany after Eobanus Hessus.

‡ Morhof, l. i. c. 19. Bayle, art. Lotichius, note G. This seems to have been agitated after the publication of Bayle; for I find in the catalogue of the British Museum a disquisition, by one Krusike, *Utrum Petrus Lotichius secundam obsidionem urbis Magdeburgensis prædixerit*; published as late as 1708.

In these volumes there are about 100,000 lines; in the *Deliciæ Poetarum Belgarum*, a similar publication by Gruter, I find about as many; his third collection, *Deliciæ Poetarum Italorum*, seems not so long, but I have not seen more than one volume. These poets are disposed alphabetically; few, comparatively speaking, of the Italians seem to belong to the latter half of the century, but very much the larger proportion of the French and Dutch. A fourth collection, *Deliciæ Poetarum Germanorum*, I have never seen. All these bear the fictitious name of Gherus. According to a list in Baillet, the number of Italian poets selected by Gruter is 203; of French, 108; of Dutch or Belgic, 129; of German, 211.

94. Among the French poets, Beza, who bears in Gruter's collection the name of Adeodatus Seba, deserves high praise, though some of his early pieces are rather licentious.* Bellay is also an amatory poet; in the opinion of Baillet he has not succeeded so well in Latin as in French. The poems of Muretus are perhaps superior. Joseph Scaliger seemed to me to write Latin verse tolerably well, but he is not rated highly by Baillet and the authors whom he quotes.† The epigrams of Henry Stephens are remarkably prosaic and heavy. Passerat is very elegant; his lines breathe a classical spirit, and are full of those fragments of antiquity with which Latin poetry ought always to be inlaid, but in sense they are rather feeble.‡ The epistles, on the

Characters
of some
Gallo-Latin
poets.

* Baillet, n. 1366, thinks Beza an excellent Latin poet. The *Juvenilia* first appeared in 1548. The later editions omitted several poems.

† *Jugemens des Savans*, n. 1295. One of Scaliger's poems celebrates that immortal flea, which, on a great festival at Poitiers, having appeared on the bosom of a learned, and doubtless beautiful, young lady, Mademoiselle des Roches, was the theme of all the wits and scholars of the age. Some of their lines, and those of Joe Scaliger among the number, seem designed, by the freedom they take with the fair pucelle, to beat the intruder himself in impudence. See *Œuvres de Pasquier*, ii. 950.

‡ Among the epigrams of Passerat I have found one which Amaltheus seems

to have shortened and improved, retaining the idea, in his famous lines on Acon and Leonilla. I do not know whether this has been observed.

*Cætera formosi, dextro est orbatus ocello
Frater, et est lævo lumine capta soror.
Frontibus adversis ambo si jungitis ora,
Bina quidem facies, vultus at unus erit.
Sed tu, Carle, tuum lumen trans mitte sorori,
Continuo ut vestrâ fiat uterque Deus.
Plena hæc fulgebit fraterna luce Diana.
Hujus frater eris tu quoque, cæcus Amor.*

This is very good, and Passerat ought to have credit for the invention; but the other is better. Though most know the lines by heart, I will insert them here:—

*Lumine Acon dextro, capta est Leonilla sinistro,
Et potis est forma vincere uterque Deos.
Blande puer, lumen quod habes, concede sorori,
Sic tu cæcus Amor, sic erit illa Venus.*

[I now believe, on the authority of a

contrary, of the Chancellor de l'Hospital, in an easy Horatian versification, are more interesting than such insipid effusions, whether of flattery or feigned passion, as the majority of modern Latinists present. They are unequal, and fall too often into a creeping style: but sometimes we find a spirit and nervousness of strength and sentiment worthy of his name; and though keeping in general to the level of Horatian satire, he rises at intervals to a higher pitch, and wants not the skill of descriptive poetry.

95. The best of Latin poets whom France could boast was Sammarthanus (Sainte Marthe), known also, but less favourably, in his own language. They are more classically elegant than any others which met my eye in Gruter's collection; and this, I believe, is the general suffrage of critics.* Few didactic poems, probably, are superior to his *Pædotrophia*, on the nurture of children; it is not a little better, which indeed is no high praise, than the *Balia* of Tansillo on the same subject.† We may place Sammarthanus, therefore, at the head of the list; and not far from the bottom of it I should class Bonnefons, or Bonifonius, a French writer of Latin verse in the very worst taste, whom it would not be worth while to mention, but for a certain degree of reputation he has acquired. He might almost be suspected of designing to turn into ridicule the effeminacy which some Italians had introduced into amorous poetry. Bonifonius has closely imitated Secundus, but is much inferior to him in every thing but his faults. The Latinity is full of gross and obvious errors.‡

friend, that this epigram, published in 1576, preceded that of Passerat.—1842.]

* Baillet, n. 1401. Some did not scruple to set him above the best Italians, and one went so far as to say that Virgil would have been envious of the *Pædotrophia*.

† The following lines are a specimen of the *Pædotrophia*, taken much at random:—

*Ipsæ etiam Alpibus villosæ in caubibus ursæ,
Ipsæ etiam tigres, et quicquid ubique ferarum est,
Debita servandis concedunt ubera natis.
Tu, quam mihi animo natura benigna creavit,
Exuperes fertitate feras? nec te tua tangant
Pignora, nec querulos puerilli e gutture planctus,
Nec lacrymas miseræ, opemque injusta recuses,
Quam præstare tuum est, et quæ te pendet ab
Cujus onus teneris hærebit dulce lacertis [unâ.
Infelix puer, et molli se pectore sternet?
Quicquid quis primi capitabit gaudia risûs
Et primas voces et blæssæ murmura lingue?*

*Tunc fruenda alii potes illa relinquere demens,
Tantique esse putas teretis servare papillæ
Integrum decus, et juvenilem in pectore Sorens?*
l. lib. i. (Gruter, lib. 285.)

‡ The following lines are not an unfair specimen of Bonifonius:—

*Nympha bellula, nympha mollicella,
Cujus in roseis latent labellis
Mææ deliciæ, mææ salutes, &c.
Salvete aureolæ mææ puellæ
Crines aureolique crispulique,
Salvete et mihi vos puellæ ocelli,
Ocelli improbuli protervulique;
Salvete et Veneris paræ papillis
Papillæ teretesque turgidæque;
Salvete semula purpure labella;
Tota denique Pancharilla salve.
Nunc te possideo, alma Pancharilla,
Turturilla mea et columbilla.*

Bonifonius has been thought worthy of several editions, and has met with more favourable judges than myself.

96. The *Deliciæ Poetarum Belgarum* appeared to me, on rather a cursory inspection, inferior to the French. Belgic poets. Secundus outshines his successors. Those of the younger Dousa, whose premature death was lamented by all the learned, struck me as next in merit. Dominic Baudius is harmonious and elegant, but with little originality or vigour. These poets are loose and negligent in versification, ending too often a pentameter with a polysyllable, and with feeble effect; they have also little idea of several common rules of Latin composition.

97. The Scots, in consequence of receiving, very frequently, a continental education, cultivated Latin poetry with ardour. It was the favourite amusement of Andrew Scots poets; Buchanan. Melville, who is sometimes a mere scribbler, at others tolerably classical and spirited. His poem on the Creation, in *Deliciæ Poetarum Scotorum*, is very respectable. One by Hercules Rollock, on the marriage of Anne of Denmark, is better, and equal, a few names withdrawn, to any of the contemporaneous poetry of France. The *Epistolæ Heroidum* of Alexander Bodius or Boyd are also good. But the most distinguished among the Latin poets of Europe in this age was George Buchanan, of whom Joseph Scaliger and several other critics have spoken in such unqualified terms, that they seem to place him even above the Italians at the beginning of the sixteenth century.* If such were their meaning, I should crave the liberty of hesitating. The best poem of Buchanan, in my judgment, is that on the Sphere, than which few philosophical subjects could afford better opportunities for ornamental digression. He is not, perhaps, in hexameters inferior to Vida, and certainly far superior to Palearius. In this poem Buchanan descants on the absurdity of the Pythagorean system, which supposes the motion of the earth. Many good passages occur in his elegies, though we may not reckon him equal in this metre to several of the Italians. His celebrated

* *Buchananus unus est in tota Europa omnes post se relinquens in Latina poesi. Scaligerana Prima.*

Henry Stephens, says Maittaire, was the first who placed Buchanan at the head of all the poets of his age, and all France, Italy, and Germany, have since subscribed to the same opinion, and con-

ferred that title upon him. *Vitæ Stephanorum*, ii. 258. I must confess that Sainte Marthe appears to me not inferior to Buchanan. The latter is very unequal: if we frequently meet with a few lines of great elegance, they are compensated by others of a different description.

translation of the Psalms I must also presume to think overpraised* ; it is difficult, perhaps, to find one, except the 137th, with which he has taken particular pains, that can be called truly elegant or classical Latin poetry. Buchanan is now and then incorrect in the quantity of syllables, as indeed is common with his contemporaries.

98. England was far from strong, since she is not to claim Buchanan, in the Latin poetry of this age. A poem in ten books, *De Republica Instauranda*, by Sir Thomas Chaloner, published in 1579, has not, perhaps, received so much attention as it deserves, though the author is more judicious than imaginative, and does not preserve a very good rhythm. It may be compared with the *Zodiacus Vitæ* of Palingenius, rather than any other Latin poem I recollect, to which, however, it is certainly inferior. Some lines relating to the English constitution, which, though the title leads us to expect more, forms only the subject of the last book, the rest relating chiefly to private life, will serve as a specimen of Chaloner's powers†, and also display the principles of our government as an experienced statesman understood them. The *Anglorum Prælia*, by Ockland, which was directed by an order of the Privy Council to be read exclusively in schools, is an hexameter poem, versified from the chronicles, in a tame strain, not exceedingly bad, but still farther from good. I recollect no other Latin verse of the queen's reign worthy of notice.

* Baillet thinks it impossible that those who wish for what is solid as well as what is agreeable in poetry, can prefer any other Latin verse of Buchanan to his Psalms. *Jugemens des Savans*, n. 1328. But Baillet and several others exclude much poetry of Buchanan on account of its reflecting on popery. Baillet and Blount produce abundant testimonies to the excellence of Buchanan's verses. Le Clerc calls his translation of the Psalms incomparable. *Bibl. Choisie*, viii. 127., and prefers it much to that by Beza, which I am not prepared to question. He extols also all his other poetry, except his tragedies and the poem of the Sphere, which I have praised above the rest. So different are the humours of critics ! But as I have fairly quoted those who do not quite agree with myself, and by both number and reputation ought to weigh

more with the reader, he has no right to complain that I mislead his taste.

† Nempe tribus simul ordinibus jus esse sacratas
Condendi leges patrio pro more vetustas
Longo usu sic docta tulit, modus iste rogandi
Haud secus ac basis hanc nostram sic constitui
tuit rem.

Ut si inconsultis reliquis pars ulla superbo
Imperio quicquam statuat, seu tollat, ad omnes
Quod spectat, posthac quo nomine lesa vocetur
Publica res nobis, nihil amplius ipse laboro.

Plebs primum reges statuit ; jus hoc quoque
nostrum est

Cunctorum, ut regi faveant popularia vota ;
(Si quid id est, quod plebs responderi rite rogata)
Nam neque ab invitis potuit vis unica multis
Extorquere datos concordæ munere facies ;
Quin populus reges in publica commoda quon-
Egregios certa sub conditione paravit, [dam
Non reges populum ; namque his antiquior
ille est.

Nec cupiens nova jura ferat, seu condita tollat,
Non prius ordinibus regni de more vocatis,
Ut procerum populi que rato stant ordine vota,
Omnibus et positum scilicet conjuncta voluntas.
De Rep. Inst. l. 10.

CHAPTER VI.

HISTORY OF DRAMATIC LITERATURE FROM 1550 TO 1600.

Italian Tragedy and Comedy — Pastoral Drama — Spanish Drama — Lope de Vega — French Dramatists — Early English Drama — Second Era; of Marlowe and his Contemporaries — Shakspeare — Character of several of his Plays written within this Period.

1. MANY Italian tragedies are extant, belonging to these fifty years, though not very generally known, nor can I speak of them except through Ginguéné and ^{Italian} Walker, the latter of whom has given a few extracts. The Marianna and Dilone of Lodovico Dolce, the Œdipus of Anguillara, the Merope of Torelli, the Semiramis of Manfredi, are necessarily bounded, in the conduct of their fable, by what was received as truth. But others, as Cinthio had done, preferred to invent their story, in deviation from the practice of antiquity. The Hadriana of Groto, the Acripanda of Decio da Orto, and the Torrismond of Tasso, are of this kind. In all these we find considerable beauties of language, a florid and poetic tone, but declamatory and not well adapted to the rapidity of action, in which we seem to perceive the germ of that change from common speech to recitative, which, fixing the attention of the hearer on the person of the actor rather than on his relation to the scene, destroyed in great measure the character of dramatic representation. The Italian tragedies are deeply imbued with horror; murder and cruelty, with all attending circumstances of disgust, and every pollution of crime, besides a profuse employment of spectral agency, seem the chief weapons of the poet's armoury to subdue the spectator. Even the gentleness of Tasso could not resist the contagion in his Torrismond. These tragedies still retain the chorus at the termination of every act. C the Italian comedies little can be added to what has been said before; no comic writer of this period is comparable

reputation to Machiavel, Ariosto, or even Aretin.* They are rather less licentious ; and, in fact, the profligacy of Italian manners began, in consequence, probably, of a better example in the prelates of the church, to put on some regard for exterior decency in the latter part of the century.

2. These regular plays, though possibly deserving of more attention than they have obtained, are by no means the most important portion of the dramatic literature of Italy in this age. A very different style of composition has, through two distinguished poets, contributed to spread the fame of Italian poetry, and the language itself, through Europe. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were abundantly productive of pastoral verse ; a style pleasing to those who are not severe in admitting its conventional fictions. The pastoral dialogue had not much difficulty in expanding to the pastoral drama. In the Sicilian gossips of Theocritus, and in some other ancient eclogues, new interlocutors supervene, which is the first germ of a regular action. Pastorals of this kind had been written, and possibly represented, in Spain, such as the Mingo Rebulgo, in the middle of the fifteenth century.† Ginguéné has traced the progress of similar representations, becoming more and more dramatic, in Italy.‡ But it is admitted that the honour of giving the first example of a true pastoral fable to the theatre was due to Agostino Beccari of Ferrara. This piece, named *Il Sacrificio*, was acted at that court in 1554. Its priority in a line which was to become famous appears to be its chief merit. In this, as in earlier and more simple attempts at pastoral dialogue, the chorusses were set to music.§

3. This pleasing, though rather effeminate, species of poetry was carried, more than twenty years afterwards, one or two unimportant imitations of Beccari having intervened, to a point of excellence, which perhaps it has never surpassed, in the *Aminta* of Tasso. Its admirable author was then living at the court of Ferrara, yielding up his heart to those seductive illusions of finding happiness in the favour of the great, and even in ambitious and ill-assorted love, which his sounder judgment already saw through, the

Aminta of
Tasso.

* Ginguéné, vol. vi.
† Bouterwek's Spanish Literature, i. 129.

‡ vi. 327. et post.
§ Id. vi. 332.

Aminta bearing witness to both states of mind. In the character of Tirsi he has drawn himself, and seems once (though with the proud consciousness of genius) to hint at that eccentric melancholy, which soon increased so fatally for his peace.

Ne già cose scrivea degne di riso,
Se ben cose facea degne di riso.

The language of all the interlocutors in the *Aminta* is alike, nor is the satyr less elegant or recondite than the learned shepherds. It is in general too diffuse and florid, too uniform and elaborate, for passion; especially if considered dramatically, in reference to the story and the speakers. But it is to be read as what it is, a beautiful poem; the delicacy and gracefulness of many passages rendering them exponents of the hearer's or reader's feelings, though they may not convey much sympathy with the proper subject. The death of Aminta, however, falsely reported to Sylvia, leads to a truly pathetic scene. It is to be observed that Tasso was more formed by classical poetry, and more frequently an imitator of it, than any earlier Italian. The beauties of the *Aminta* are in great measure due to Theocritus, Virgil, Ovid, Anacreon, and Moschus.

4. The success of Tasso's *Aminta* produced the *Pastor Fido* of Guarini, himself long in the service of the duke of Ferrara, where he had become acquainted with Tasso; though in consequence of some dissatisfaction at that court, he sought the patronage of the duke of Savoy. The *Pastor Fido* was first represented at Turin in 1585, but seems not to have been printed for some years afterwards. It was received with general applause; but the obvious resemblance to Tasso's pastoral drama could not fail to excite a contention between their respective advocates, which long survived the mortal life of the two poets. Tasso, it has been said, on reading the *Pastor Fido*, was content to observe that, if his rival had not read the *Aminta*, he would not have excelled it. If his modesty induced him to say no more than this, very few would be induced to dispute his claim; the characters, the sentiments are evidently imitated; and in one celebrated instance a whole chorus is parodied with the pre-

servation of every rhyme.* But it is far more questionable whether the palm of superior merit, independent of originality, should be awarded to the later poet. More elegance and purity of taste belong to the *Aminta*, more animation and variety to the *Pastor Fido*. The advantage in point of morality, which some have ascribed to Tasso, is not very perceptible; Guarini may transgress rather more in some passages, but the tone of the *Aminta*, in strange opposition to the pure and pious life of its author, breathes nothing but the avowed laxity of an Italian court. The *Pastor Fido* may be considered, in a much greater degree than the *Aminta*, a prototype of the Italian opera; not that it was spoken in recitative; but the short and rapid expressions of passion, the broken dialogue, the frequent changes of personages and incidents, keep the effect of representation and of musical accompaniment continually before the reader's imagination. Any one who glances over a few scenes of the *Pastor Fido* will, I think, perceive that it is the very style which Metastasio, and inferior coadjutors of musical expression, have rendered familiar to our ears.

5. The great invention, which though chiefly connected with the history of music and of society, was by no means without influence upon literature, the melo-drame, usually called the Italian opera, belongs to the very last years of this century. Italy, long conspicuous for such musical science and skill as the middle ages possessed, had fallen, in the first part of the sixteenth century, very short of some other countries, and especially of the Netherlands, from which the courts of Europe, and even of the Italian princes, borrowed their performers and their instructors. But a revolution in church music, which had become particularly dry and pedantic, was brought about by the genius of Palestrina about 1560; and the art, in all its departments, was cultivated with an increased zeal for all the rest of the century.† In the splendour that environed the houses of

* This is that beginning, *O bella età dell' oro*.

† Ranke, with the musical sentiment of a German, ascribes a wonderful influence in the revival of religion after the middle of the century to the compositions of Palestrina. Church music had be-

come so pedantic and technical that the council of Trent had some doubts whether it should be retained. Pius IV. appointed a commission to examine this question, who could arrive at no decision. The artists said it was impossible to achieve what the church required, a

Medici and Este, in the pageants they loved to exhibit, music, carried to a higher perfection by foreign artists, and by the natives who came forward to emulate them, became, of indispensable importance; it had already been adapted to dramatic representation in chorusses; interludes and pieces written for scenic display were now given with a perpetual accompaniment, partly to the songs, partly to the dance and pantomime which intervened between them.* Finally, Ottavio Rinuccini, a poet of considerable genius, but who is said to have known little of musical science, by meditating on what is found in ancient writers on the accompaniment to their dramatic dialogue, struck out the idea of recitative. This he first tried in the pastoral of *Dafne*, represented privately in 1594; and its success led him to the composition of what he entitled a tragedy for music, on the story of *Eurydice*. This was represented at the festival on the marriage of Mary of Medicis in 1600. "The most astonishing effects," says Ginguéné, "that the theatrical music of the greatest masters has produced, in the perfection of the science, are not comparable to those of this representation, which exhibited to Italy the creation of a new art."† It is, however, a different question whether this immense enhancement of the powers of music, and consequently of its popularity, has been favourable to the development of poetical genius in this species of composition; and in general it may be said that, if music has, on some occasions, been a serviceable handmaid, and even a judicious mistress, to poetry, she has been apt to prove but a tyrannical mistress. In the melodrame, Corniani well observes, poetry became her vassal, and has been ruled with a despotic sway.

6. The struggle that seemed arduous in the earlier part of this century between the classical and national schools of dramatic poetry in Spain proved of no long duration. The latter became soon decisively superior;

The national taste revives in the Spanish drama.

coincidence of expression between the words and the music. Palestrina appeared at this time, and composed the mass of *Marcellus*, which settled the dispute for ever. Other works by himself and his disciples followed, which elevated sacred music to the highest importance among the accessories of religious worship. *Die Päpste*, vol. i. p. 498. But

a large proportion of the performers, I apprehend, were Germans, especially in theatrical music.

* Ginguéné, vol. vi., has traced the history of the melodrame with much pains.

† P. 474. Corniani, vii. 31., speaks highly of the poetical abilities of Rinuccini. See also Galluzzi, *Storia del Gran Ducato*, v. 547.

and before the end of the present period, that kingdom was in possession of a peculiar and extensive literature, which has attracted the notice of Europe, and has enriched both the French theatre and our own. The spirit of the Spanish drama is far different from that which animated the Italian writers; there is not much of Machiavel in their comedy, and still less of Cinthio in their tragedy. They abandoned the Greek chorus, which still fettered their contemporaries, and even the division into five acts, which later poets, in other countries, have not ventured to renounce. They gave more complication to the fable, sought more unexpected changes of circumstance, were not solicitous in tragedy to avoid colloquial language or familiar incidents, showed a preference to the tragi-comic intermixture of light with serious matter, and cultivated grace in poetical diction more than vigour. The religious mysteries, once common in other parts of Europe, were devoutly kept up in Spain; and under the name of Autos Sacramentales, make no inconsiderable portion of the writings of their chief dramatists.*

7. Andrès, favourable as he is to his country, is far from enthusiastic in his praises of the Spanish theatre. Its exuberance has been its ruin; no one, he justly remarks, can read some thousand plays in the hope of finding a few that are tolerable. Andrès, however, is not exempt from a strong prejudice in favour of the French stage. He admits the ease and harmony of the Spanish versification, the purity of the style, the abundance of the thoughts, and the ingenious complexity of the incidents. This is peculiarly the merit of the Spanish comedy, as its great defect, in his opinion, is the want of truth and delicacy in the delineation of the passions, and of power to produce a vivid impression on the reader. The best work, he concludes rather singularly, of the comic poets of Spain has been the French theatre.†

8. The most renowned of these is Lope de Vega, so many of whose dramas appeared within the present century, ^{Lope de Vega:} that although, like Shakspeare, he is equally to be claimed by the next, we may place his name, once for all, in this period. Lope de Vega is called by Cervantes a prodigy of nature; and such he may justly be reckoned; not that we

* Bouterwek.

† Vol. v. p. 138.

can ascribe to him a sublime genius, or a mind abounding with fine original thought, but his fertility of invention and readiness of versifying are beyond competition. It was said foolishly, if meant as praise, of Shakspeare, and we may be sure untruly, that he never blotted a line. This may almost be presumed of Vega. "He required," says Bouterwek, "no more than four-and-twenty hours to write a versified drama of three acts in redondillas, interspersed with sonnets, tercets, and octaves, and from beginning to end abounding in intrigues, prodigies, or interesting situations. This astonishing facility enabled him to supply the Spanish theatre with upwards of 2000 original dramas, of which not more than 300 have been preserved by printing. In general the theatrical manager carried away what he wrote before he had even time to revise it; and immediately a fresh applicant would arrive to prevail on him to commence a new piece. He sometimes wrote a play in the short space of three or four hours." . . . "Arithmetical calculations have been employed in order to arrive at a just estimate of Lope de Vega's facility in poetic composition. According to his own testimony, he wrote on an average five sheets a day; it has therefore been computed that the number of sheets which he composed during his life must have amounted to 133,225; and that, allowing for the deduction of a small portion of prose, Lope de Vega must have written upwards of 21,300,000 verses. Nature would have overstepped her bounds and have produced the miraculous, had Lope de Vega, along with this rapidity of invention and composition, attained perfection in any department of literature." *

9. This peculiar gift of rapid composition will appear more extraordinary when we attend to the nature of Lope's ^{his extraordinary} versification, very unlike the irregular lines of our old drama, which it is not perhaps difficult for one well practised to write or utter extemporaneously. "The most singular circumstance attending his verse," says Lord Holland, "is the frequency and difficulty of the tasks which he imposes

* P. 361. 363. Montalvan, Lope's friend, says, that he wrote 1800 plays and 400 autos. In a poem of his own, written in 1609, he claims 483 plays, and he continued afterwards to write for the stage. Those that remain and have been collected in twenty-five volumes are about 300.

on himself. At every step we meet with acrostics, echoes, and compositions of that perverted and laborious kind, from attempting which another author would be deterred by the trouble of the undertaking, if not by the little real merit attending the achievement. They require no genius, but they exact much time; which one should think that such a voluminous poet could little afford to waste. But Lope made a parade of his power over the vocabulary: he was not contented with displaying the various order in which he could dispose the syllables and marshal the rhymes of his language; but he also prided himself upon the celerity with which he brought them to go through the most whimsical but the most difficult evolutions. He seems to have been partial to difficulties for the gratification of surmounting them." This trifling ambition is usual among second-rate poets, especially in a degraded state of public taste; but it may be questionable whether Lope de Vega ever performed feats of skill more surprising in this way than some of the Italian *improvisatori*, who have been said to carry on at the same time three independent sonnets, uttering, in their unpremeditated strains, a line of each in separate succession. There is reason to believe, that their extemporaneous poetry is as good as any thing in Lope de Vega.

10. The immense popularity of this poet, not limited, ^{his popularity;} among the people itself, to his own age, bespeaks some attention from criticism. "The Spaniards who affect fine taste in modern times," says Schlegel, "speak with indifference of their old national poets; but the people retain a lively attachment to them, and their productions are received on the stage, at Madrid, or at Mexico, with passionate enthusiasm." It is true that foreign critics have not in general pronounced a very favourable judgment of Lope de Vega. But a writer of such prodigious fecundity is ill appreciated by single plays; the whole character of his composition manifests that he wrote for the stage, and for the stage of his own country, rather than for the closet of a foreigner. His writings are divided into spiritual plays, heroic and historical comedies, most of them taken from the annals and traditions of Spain, and, lastly, comedies of real life, or, as they were called, "of the cloak and sword" (*capa y espada*), a name

answering to the *comædia togata* of the Roman stage. These have been somewhat better known than the rest, and have, in several instances, found their way to our own theatre, by suggesting plots and incidents to our older writers. The historian of Spanish literature, to whom I am so much indebted, has given a character of these comedies, in which the English reader will perhaps recognise much that might be said also of Beaumont and Fletcher.

11. "Lope de Vega's comedies de Capa y Espada, or those which may properly be denominated his dramas of intrigue, though wanting in the delineation of character, are romantic pictures of manners, drawn from real life. They present, in their peculiar style, no less interest with respect to situations than his heroic comedies, and the same irregularity in the composition of the scenes. The language, too, is alternately elegant and vulgar, sometimes highly poetic, and sometimes, though versified, reduced to the level of the dullest prose. Lope de Vega seems scarcely to have bestowed a thought on maintaining probability in the succession of the different scenes; ingenious complication is with him the essential point in the interest of his situations. Intrigues are twisted and entwined together, until the poet, in order to bring his piece to a conclusion, without ceremony cuts the knots he cannot untie, and then he usually brings as many couples together as he can by any possible contrivance match. He has scattered through his pieces occasional reflections and maxims of prudence; but any genuine morality, which might be conveyed through the stage, is wanting, for its introduction would have been inconsistent with that poetic freedom on which the dramatic interest of the Spanish comedy is founded. His aim was to paint what he observed, not what he would have approved, in the manners of the fashionable world of his age; but he leaves it to the spectator to draw his own inferences."*

12. An analysis of one of these comedies from real life is given by Bouterwek, and another by Lord Holland. The very few that I have read appear lively and diversified, not unpleasing in the perusal, but exciting little interest, and rapidly forgotten. Among the heroic pieces

character of
his comedies.

Tragedy of
Don Sancho
Ortiz.

* Bouterwek, p. 375.

of Lope de Vega a high place appears due to the *Estrella de Sevilla*, published with alterations by Triquero, under the name of Don Sancho Ortiz.* It resembles the *Cid* in its subject. The king, Sancho the Brave, having fallen in love with Estrella, sister of Don Bustos Tabera, and being foiled by her virtue†, and by the vigilance of her brother, who had drawn his sword upon him, as in disguise he was attempting to penetrate into her apartment, resolves to have him murdered, and persuades Don Sancho Ortiz, a soldier full of courage and loyalty, by describing the attempt made on his person, to undertake the death of one whose name is contained in a paper he gives him. Sancho is the accepted lover of Estrella, and is on that day to espouse her with her brother's consent. He reads the paper, and after a conflict which is meant to be pathetic, but in our eyes is merely ridiculous, determines, as might be supposed, to keep his word to his sovereign. The shortest course is to contrive a quarrel with Bustos, which produces a duel, wherein the latter is killed. The second act commences with a pleasing scene of Estrella's innocent delight in her prospect of happiness; but the body of her brother is now brought in, and the murderer, who had made no attempt to conceal himself, soon appears in custody. His examination, before the judges, who endeavour in vain to extort one word from him in his defence, occupies part of the third act. The king, anxious to save his life, but still more so to screen his own honour, requires only a pretext to pardon the offence. But the noble Castilian disdains to save himself by falsehood, and merely repeats that he had not slain his friend without cause, and that the action was atrocious but not criminal.

Dice que fue atrocidad,
Pero que no delito.

13. In this embarrassment Estrella appears, demanding, not the execution of justice on her brother's murderer, but that

* In Lord Holland's *Life of Lope de Vega*, a more complete analysis than what I have offered is taken from the original play. I have followed the *rifacimento* of Triquero, which is substantially the same.

† Lope de Vega has borrowed for

Estrella the well-known answer of a lady to a king of France, told with several variations of names, and possibly true of none.

Soy (she says)
Para esposa vuestra poco,
Para dama vuestra mucho.

he should be delivered up to her. The king, with his usual feebleness, consents to this request, observing that he knows by experience it is no new thing for her to be cruel. She is, however, no sooner departed with the royal order, than the wretched prince repents, and determines to release Sancho, making compensation to Estrella by marrying her to a rich hombre of Castile. The lady meantime reaches the prison, and in an interview with her unfortunate lover, offers him his liberty, which by the king's concession is in her power. He is not to be outdone in generous sentiments, and steadily declares his resolution to be executed. In the fifth act this heroic emulation is reported by one who had overheard it to the king. All the people of this city, he replies, are heroes, and outstrip nature herself by the greatness of their souls. The judges now enter, and with sorrow report their sentence that Sancho must suffer death. But the king is at length roused, and publicly acknowledges that the death of Bustos had been perpetrated by his command. The president of the tribunal remarks that, as the king had given the order, there must doubtless have been good cause. Nothing seems to remain but the union of the lovers. Here, however, the high Castilian principle once more displays itself. Estrella refuses to be united to one she tenderly loves, but who has brought such a calamity into her family; and Sancho himself, willingly releasing her engagement, admits that their marriage under such circumstances would be a perpetual torment. The lady therefore chooses, what is always at hand in Catholic fiction, the dignified retirement of a nunnery, and the lover departs to dissipate his regrets in the Moorish war.

14. Notwithstanding all in the plan and conduct of this piece, which neither our own state of manners nor the laws of any sound criticism can tolerate, it is very conceivable that to the factitious taste of a Spanish audience in the age of Lope de Vega it would have appeared excellent. The character of Estrella is truly noble, and much superior in interest to that of Chimène. Her resentment is more genuine, and free from that hypocrisy which, at least in my judgment, renders the other almost odious and contemptible. Instead of imploring the condemnation of him she loves, it is as her own prisoner that she demands Sancho Ortiz, and

this for the generous purpose of setting him at liberty. But the great superiority of the Spanish play is at the close. Chimène accepts the hand stained with her father's blood, while Estrella sacrifices her own wishes to a sentiment which the manners of Spain, and, we may add, the laws of natural decency required.

15. The spiritual plays of Lope de Vega abound with as many incongruous and absurd circumstances as the His spiritual plays. mysteries of our forefathers. The Inquisition was politic enough to tolerate, though probably the sternness of Castilian orthodoxy could not approve, these strange representations, which, after all, had the advantage of keeping the people in mind of the devil, and of the efficacy of holy water in chasing him away. But the regular theatre, according to Lord Holland, has always been forbidden in Spain by the church, nor do the kings frequent it.

16. Two tragedies by Bermudez, both on the story of Numancia of Cervantes. Ines de Castro, are written on the ancient model, with a chorus, and much simplicity of fable. They are, it is said, in a few scenes impressive and pathetic, but interrupted by passages of flat and tedious monotony.* Cervantes was the author of many dramatic pieces, some of which are so indifferent as to have been taken for intentional satires upon the bad taste of his times, so much of it do they display. One or two, however, of his comedies have obtained some praise from Schlegel and Bouterwek. But his tragedy of Numancia stands apart from his other dramas, and, as I conceive, from any thing on the Spanish stage. It is probably one of his earlier works, but was published for the first time in 1784. It is a drama of extraordinary power, and may justify the opinion of Bouterwek, that, in different circumstances, the author of Don Quixote might have been the Æschylus of Spain. If terror and pity are the inspiring powers of tragedy, few have been for the time more under their influence than Cervantes in his Numancia. The story of that devoted city, its long resistance to Rome, its exploits of victorious heroism, that foiled repeatedly the consular legions, are known to every one. Cervantes has opened his tragedy at the moment when Scipio Æmilianus, enclosing

* Bouterwek, 296.

the city with a broad trench, determines to secure its reduction by famine. The siege lasted five months, when the Numantines, exhausted by hunger, but resolute never to yield, setting fire to a pile of their household goods, after slaying their women and children, cast themselves into the flame. Every circumstance that can enhance horror, the complaints of famished children, the desperation of mothers, the sinister omens of rejected sacrifice, the appalling incantations that re-animate a recent corpse to disclose the secrets of its prison-house, are accumulated with progressive force in this tremendous drama. The love-scenes of Morando and Lira, two young persons whose marriage had been frustrated by the public calamity, though some incline to censure them, contain nothing beyond poetical truth, and add, in my opinion, to its pathos, while they somewhat relieve its severity.

17. Few, probably, would desire to read the *Numancia* a second time. But it ought to be remembered that the historical truth of this tragedy, though, as in the *Ugolino* of Dante, it augments the painfulness of the impression, is the legitimate apology of the author. Scenes of agony, and images of unspeakable sorrow, when idly accumulated by an inventor at his ease, as in many of our own older tragedies, and in much of modern fiction, give offence to a reader of just taste, from their needlessly trespassing upon his sensibility. But in that which excites an abhorrence of cruelty and oppression, or which, as the *Numancia*, commemorates ancestral fortitude, there is a moral power, for the sake of which the sufferings of sympathy must not be flinched from.

18. The *Numancia* is divided into four jornadas or acts, each containing changes of scene, as on our own stage. The metre, by a most extraordinary choice, is the regular octave stanza, ill-adapted as that is to the drama, intermixed with the favourite redondilla. The diction, though sometimes what would seem tame and diffuse to us, who are accustomed to a bolder and more figurative strain in tragedy than the southern nations require, rises often with the subject to nervous and impressive poetry. There are, however, a few sacrifices to the times. In a finely-imagined *proso-popeia*, where Spain, crowned with towers, appears on the scene to ask the Duero what hope there could be for Nu-

mancia, the river-god, rising with his tributary streams around him, after bidding her despair of the city, goes into a tedious consolation, in which the triumphs of Charles and Philip are specifically, and with as much tameness as adulation, brought forward as her future recompense. A much worse passage occurs in the fourth act, where Lira, her brother lying dead of famine, and her lover of his wounds before her, implores death from a soldier who passes over the stage. He replies that some other hand must perform that office; he was born only to adore her.* This frigid and absurd line, in such a play by such a poet, is an almost incredible proof of the mischief which the Provençal writers, with their hyperbolical gallantry, had done to European poetry. But it is just to observe that this is the only faulty passage, and that the language of the two lovers is simple, tender, and pathetic. The material accompaniments of representation on the Spanish theatre seem to have been full as defective as on our own. The Numancia is printed with stage directions, almost sufficient to provoke a smile in the midst of its withering horrors.

19. The mysteries which had delighted the Parisians for a century and a half were suddenly forbidden by the parliament as indecent and profane in 1548.

French
theatre;
Jodelle.

Four years only elapsed before they were replaced, though not on the same stage, by a different style of representation. Whatever obscure attempts at a regular dramatic composition may have been traced in France at an earlier period, Jodelle was acknowledged by his contemporaries to be the true father of their theatre. His tragedy of Cléopâtre, and his comedy of La Rencontre, were both represented for the first time before Henry II. in 1552. Another comedy, Eugene, and a tragedy on the story of Dido, were published about the same time. Pasquier, who tells us this, was himself a witness of the representation of the two former.† The Cléopâtre, ac-

* Otra mano, otro hierro ha de acabaros,
Que yo solo nació por adoraros.

† Cette comédie, et la Cléopâtre furent représentées devant le roi Henri à Paris en l'Hostel de Rheims, avec un grand applaudissement de toute la compagnie; et depuis encore au collège de Boncourt, où

toutes les fenestres estoient tapissées d'une infinité de personnages d'honneur, et la cour si pleine d'escoliers que les portes du collège en regorgeoient. Je le dis comme celuy qui y estois présent, avec le grand Tornebus en une mesme chambre. Et les entreparleurs estoient tous

according to Fontenelle, is very simple, without action or stage effect, full of long speeches, and with a chorus at the end of every act. The style is often low and ludicrous, which did not prevent this tragedy, the first-fruits of a theatre which was to produce Racine, from being received with vast applause. There is, in reality, amidst these raptures that frequently attend an infant literature, something of an undefined presage of the future, which should hinder us from thinking them quite ridiculous. The comedy of Eugene is in verse, and, in the judgment of Fontenelle, much superior to the tragedies of Jodelle. It has more action, a dialogue better conceived, and some traits of humour and nature. This play, however, is very immoral and licentious; and it may be remarked that some of its satire falls on the vices of the clergy.*

20. The Agamemnon of Toutain, published in 1557, is taken from Seneca, and several other pieces about the same time, or soon afterwards, seem also to be translations.† The Jules César of Grevin was represented in 1560.‡ It contains a few lines that La Harpe has extracted, as not without animation. But the first tragedian that deserves much notice after Jodelle was Robert Garnier, whose eight tragedies were collectively printed in 1580. They are chiefly taken from mythology or ancient history, and are evidently framed according to a standard of taste which has ever since prevailed on the French stage. But they retain some characteristics of the classical drama which were soon afterwards laid aside; the chorus is heard between every act, and a great portion of the events is related by messengers. Garnier makes little change in the stories he

Garnier.

hommes de nom. Car même Remy Belleau et Jean de la Peruse jouoient les principaux roullets. Suard tells us that the whole troop of performers, the Confrères de la Passion, whose mysteries had been interdicted, availed themselves of an exclusive privilege granted to them by Charles VI. in 1400, to prevent the representation of the Cléopâtre by public actors. Jodelle was therefore forced to have it performed by his friends. See *Recherches de la France*, l. vii. c. 6. Fontenelle, *Hist. du Théâtre François*, (in *Œuvres de Font.* edit. 1776,) vol. iii. p. 52. Beauchamps, *Recherches sur les*

Théâtres de France. Suard, *Mélanges de Littérature*, vol. iv. p. 59. The last writer, in what he calls *Coup-d'Œil sur l'Histoire de l'Ancien Théâtre François* (in the same volume), has given an amusing and instructive sketch of the French drama down to Corneille.

* Fontenelle, p. 61.

† Beauchamps. Suard.

‡ Suard, p. 73. La Harpe, *Cours de Littérature*. Grevin also wrote comedies which were very licentious, as those of the 16th century generally were in France and Italy, and were not in England, or, I believe, in Spain.

found in Seneca or Euripides ; nor had love yet been thought essential to tragedy. Though his speeches are immeasurably long, and overlaid with pompous epithets, though they have often much the air of bad imitations of Seneca's manner, from whom probably, if any one should give himself the pains to make the comparison, some would be found to have been freely translated, we must acknowledge that in many of his couplets the reader perceives a more genuine tone of tragedy, and the germ of that artificial style which reached its perfection in far greater men than Garnier. In almost every line there is some fault, either against taste or the present rules of verse ; yet there are many which a good poet would only have had to amend and polish. The account of Polyxena's death in *La Troade* is very well translated from the *Hecuba*. But his best tragedy seems to be *Les Juives*, which is wholly his own, and displays no inconsiderable powers of poetical description. In this I am confirmed by Fontenelle, who says that this tragedy has many noble and touching passages ; wherein he has been aided by taking much from Scripture, the natural sublimity of which cannot fail to produce an effect.* We find, however, in *Les Juives* a good deal of that propensity to exhibit cruelty, by which the Italian and English theatres were at that time distinguished. Pasquier says, that every one gave the prize to Garnier above all who had preceded him, and after enumerating his eight plays, expresses his opinion that they would be admired by posterity.†

21. We may consider the comedies of Larivey, published in 1579, as making a sort of epoch in the French drama. This writer, of whom little is known, but that he was a native of Champagne, prefers a claim to be the

* P. 71. Suard, who dwells much longer on Garnier than either Fontenelle or La Harpe have done, observes, as I think, with justice: Les ouvrages de Garnier meritent de faire époque dans l'histoire du théâtre, non par la beauté de ses plans; il n'en faut chercher de bons dans aucune des tragédies du seizième siècle; mais les sentimens qu'il exprime sont nobles, son style a souvent de l'élevation sans enflure et beaucoup de sensibilité; sa versification est facile et souvent harmonieuse. C'est lui qui a fixé

d'une manière invariable la succession alternative des rimes masculines et féminines. Enfin c'est le premier des tragiques Français dont le lecture pût être utile à ceux qui voudraient suivre la même carrière; on a même prétendu que son *Hyppolite* avait beaucoup aidé Racine dans la composition de *Phèdre*. Mais s'il l'a aidé, c'est comme l'*Hyppolite* de Sénèque, dont celui de Garnier n'est qu'une imitation, p. 81.

† Ibid.

first who chose subjects for comedy from real life in France (forgetting in this those of Jodelle), and the first who wrote original dramas in prose. His comedies are six in number, to which three were added in a subsequent edition, which is very rare.* These six are *Le Laquais*, *La Veuve*, *Les Esprits*, *Le Morfondu*, *Les Jaloux*, and *Les Ecoliers*. Some of them are partly borrowed from Plautus and Terence; and in general they belong to that school, presenting the usual characters of the Roman stage, with no great attempt at originality. But the dialogue is conducted with spirit; and in many scenes, especially in the play called *Le Laquais*, which, though the most free in all respects, appears to me the most comic and amusing, would remind any reader of the minor pieces of Molière, being conceived, though not entirely executed, with the same humour. All these comedies of Larivey are highly licentious both in their incidents and language. It is supposed in the *Biographie Universelle* that Molière and Regnard borrowed some ideas from Larivey; but both the instances alleged will be found in Plautus.

22. No regular theatre was yet established in France. These plays of Garnier, Larivey, and others of that class, were represented either in colleges or in private houses. But the *Confrères de la Passion*, and another company, the *Enfans de Sans Souci*, whom they admitted into a participation of their privilege, used to act gross and stupid farces, which few respectable persons witnessed. After some unsuccessful attempts, two companies of regular actors appeared near the close of the century; one, in 1598, having purchased the exclusive right of the *Confrères de la Passion*, laid the foundations of the *Comédie Française*, so celebrated and so permanent; the other, in 1600, established by its permission a second theatre in the Marais. But the pieces they represented were still of a very low class.†

23. England at the commencement of this period could

* The first edition itself, I conceive, is not very common; for few writers within my knowledge have mentioned Larivey. Fontenelle, I think, could not have read his plays, or he would have given him a place in his brief sketch of the early French stage, as the father of

comedy in prose. La Harpe was too superficial to know any thing about him. Beauchamps, vol. ii. p. 68., acknowledges his pretensions, and he has a niche in the *Biographie Universelle*. Suard has also done him some justice.

† Suard.

boast of little besides the Scripture mysteries, already losing ground, but which have been traced down ^{English stage.} to the close of the century, and the more popular moral plays, which furnished abundant opportunities for satire on the times, for ludicrous humour, and for attacks on the old or the new religion. The latter, however, were kept in some restraint by the Tudor government. These moralities gradually drew nearer to regular comedies, and sometimes had nothing but an abstract name given to an individual, by which they could be even apparently distinguished from such. We have already mentioned Ralph Royster Doyster, written by Udal in the reign of Henry VIII., as the earliest English comedy in a proper sense, so far as our negative evidence warrants such a position. Mr. Collier has recovered four acts of another, called *Misogonus*, which he refers to the beginning of Elizabeth's reign.* It is, like the former, a picture of London life. A more celebrated piece is ^{Gammar Gurton's Needle.} *Gammar Gurton's Needle*, commonly ascribed to John Still, afterwards bishop of Bath and Wells.

No edition is known before 1575, but it seems to have been represented in Christ's College at Cambridge, not far from the year 1565.† It is impossible for any thing to be meaner in subject and characters than this strange farce; but the author had some vein of humour, and writing neither for fame nor money, but to make light-hearted boys laugh, and to laugh with them, and that with as little grossness as the story would admit, is not to be judged with severe criticism. He comes, however, below Udal, and perhaps below the writer of *Misogonus*. The *Supposes* of George Gascoyne, acted at Gray's Inn in 1566, is but a translation in prose from the *Suppositi* of Ariosto. It seems to have been published in the same year.‡

* Hist. of Dramatic Poetry, ii. 464.

† Mr. Collier agrees with Malone in assigning this date, but it is merely conjectural, as one rather earlier might be chosen with equal probability. Still is said in the biographies to have been born in 1543; but this date seems to be too low. He became Margaret's professor of divinity in 1570. *Gammar Gurton's Needle* must have been written

while the protestant establishment, if it existed, was very recent, for the parson is evidently a papist.

‡ Warton, iv. 304. Collier, iii. 6. The original had been first published in prose, 1525, and from this Gascoyne took his translation, adopting some of the changes Ariosto had introduced when he turned it into verse; but he has inserted little of his own. Ib

24. But the progress of literature soon excited in one person an emulation of the ancient drama. Sackville has the honour of having led the way. His ^{Gorboduc of Sackville.} tragedy of Gorboduc was represented at Whitehall before Elizabeth in 1562.* It is written in what was thought the classical style, like the Italian tragedies of the same age, but more inartificial and unimpassioned. The speeches are long and sententious; the action, though sufficiently full of incident, passes chiefly in narration; a chorus, but in the same blank-verse measure as the rest, divides the acts; the unity of place seems to be preserved, but that of time is manifestly transgressed. The story of Gorboduc, which is borrowed from our fabulous British legends, is as full of slaughter as was then required for dramatic purposes; but the characters are clearly drawn and consistently sustained; the political maxims grave and profound; the language not glowing or passionate, but vigorous; and upon the whole it is evidently the work of a powerful mind, though in a less poetical mood than was displayed in the Induction to the Mirror of Magistrates. Sackville, it has been said, had the assistance of Norton in this tragedy; but Warton has decided against this supposition from internal evidence.†

25. The regular form adopted in Gorboduc, though not wholly without imitators, seems to have had little success with the public.‡ An action passing visibly on the stage, instead of a frigid narrative, a copious intermixture of comic buffoonery with the gravest story, were requisites with which no English audience would dispense. Thus Edwards treated the story of Damon and Pythias, which, though according to the notions of those

* The 18th of January, 1561, to which date its representation is referred by Mr. Collier, seems to be 1562, according to the modern style; and this tallies best with what is said in the edition of 1571, that it had been played about nine years before. See Warton, iv. 179.

† Hist. of Engl. Poetry, iv. 194. Mr. Collier supports the claim of Norton to the first three acts, which would much reduce Sackville's glory, ii. 481. I incline to Warton's opinion, grounded upon

the identity of style, and the superiority of the whole tragedy to any thing we can certainly ascribe to Norton, a coadjutor of Sternhold in the old version of the Psalms, and a contributor to the Mirror of Magistrates.

‡ The Jocasta of Gascoyne, translated with considerable freedom, in adding, omitting, and transposing, from the Phœnissæ of Euripides, was represented at Gray's Inn in 1566. Warton, iv. 196. Collier, iii. 7. Gascoyne had the assistance of two obscure poets in this play.

times, it was too bloodless to be called a tragedy at all, belonged to the elevated class of dramatic compositions.* Several other subjects were taken from ancient history; this indeed became an usual source of the fable; but if we may judge from those few that have survived, they were all constructed on the model which the mysteries had accustomed our ancestors to admire.

26. The office of Master of the Revels, in whose province it lay to regulate, among other amusements of the court, the dramatic shows of various kinds, was established in 1546. The inns of court vied with the royal palace in these representations, and Elizabeth sometimes honoured the former with her presence. On her visits to the universities, a play was a constant part of the entertainment. Fifty-two names, though nothing more, of dramas acted at court under the superintendence of the Master of the Revels, between 1568 and 1580, are preserved.† In 1574 a patent was granted to the Earl of Leicester's servants to act plays in any part of England, and in 1576 they erected the first public theatre in Blackfriars. It will be understood, that the servants of the Earl of Leicester were a company under his protection; as we apply the word, Her Majesty's Servants, at this day, to the performers of Drury Lane.‡

27. As we come down towards 1580, a few more plays are extant. Among these may be mentioned the Promos and Cassandra of Whetstone, on the subject which Shakspeare, not without some retrospect to his predecessor, so much improved in Measure for Measure.§

* Collier, iii. 2.

† Collier, i. 193. et post, iii. 24. Of these fifty-two plays eighteen were upon classical subjects, historical or fabulous, twenty-one taken from modern history or romance, seven may by their titles, which is a very fallible criterion, be comedies or farces from real life, and six may, by the same test, be moralities. It is possible, as Mr. C. observes, that some of these plays, though no longer extant in their integrity, may have formed the foundation of others; and the titles of a few in the list countenance this supposition.

‡ See Mr. Collier's excellent History of Dramatic Poetry to the Time of

Shakspeare, vol. i., which having superseded the earlier works of Langbaine, Reid, and Hawkins, so far as this period is concerned, it is superfluous to quote them.

§ Promos and Cassandra is one of the Six Old Plays reprinted by Stevens. Shakspeare found in it not only the main story of Measure for Measure, which was far from new, and which he felicitously altered, by preserving the chastity of Isabella, but several of the minor circumstances and names, unless even these are to be found in the novels, from which all the dramatists ultimately derived their plot.

But in these early dramas there is hardly any thing to praise ; or, if they please us at all, it is only by the broad humour of their comic scenes. There seems little reason, therefore, for regretting the loss of so many productions, which no one contemporary has thought worthy of commendation. Sir Philip Sidney, writing about 1583, treats our English stage with great disdain. His censures, indeed, fall chiefly on the neglect of the classical unities, and on the intermixture of kings with clowns.* It is amusing to reflect, that this contemptuous reprehension of the English theatre (and he had spoken in as disparaging terms of our general poetry) came from the pen of Sidney, when Shakspeare had just arrived at manhood. Had he not been so prematurely cut off, what would have been the transports of that noble spirit, which the ballad of Chevy Chase could "stir as with the sound of a trumpet," in reading the Faery Queen or Othello!

28. A better era commenced not long after, nearly coincident with the rapid development of genius in other departments of poetry. Several young men of talent appeared, Marlowe, Peele, Greene, Lily, Lodge, Marlowe and his contemporaries. Kyd, Nash, the precursors of Shakspeare, and real founders, as they may in some respects be called, of the English drama. Sackville's Gorboduc is in blank verse, though of bad and monotonous construction ; but his first followers wrote, as far as we know, either in rhyme or in prose.† In the tragedy of Tamburlaine, referred by Mr. Collier to 1586, Tamburlaine. and the production wholly or principally of Marlowe‡, a better kind of blank verse is first employed ; the lines are interwoven, the occasional hemistich and redundant syllables break the monotony of the measure, and give more of a

* "Our tragedies and comedies, not without cause, are cried out against, observing rules neither of honest civility nor skillful poetry;" and proceeds to ridicule their inconsistencies and disregard to time and place. Defence of Poesy.

† It may be a slight exception to this, that some portions of the second part of Whetstone's Promos and Cassandra are in blank verse. This play is said never to have been represented. Collier, iii. 64.

‡ Nash has been thought the author of Tamburlaine by Malone, and his inflated style, in pieces known to be his,

may give some countenance to this hypothesis. It is mentioned, however, as "Marlowe's Tamburlaine" in the contemporary diary of Henslow, a manager or proprietor of a theatre, which is preserved at Dulwich College. Marlowe and Nash are allowed to have written "Dido Queen of Carthage," in conjunction. Mr. Collier has produced a body of evidence to show that Tamburlaine was written, at least principally, by the former, which leaves no room, as it seems, for further doubt. Vol. iii. p. 113.

colloquial spirit to the dialogue. Tamburlaine was ridiculed on account of its inflated style. The bombast, however, which is not so excessive as has been alleged, was thought appropriate to such oriental tyrants. This play has more spirit and poetry than any which, upon clear grounds, can be shown to have preceded it. We find also more action on the stage, a shorter and more dramatic dialogue, a more figurative style, with a far more varied and skilful versification.*

Blank verse
of Marlowe.

If Marlowe did not re-establish blank verse, which is difficult to prove, he gave it at least a variety of cadence, and an easy adaptation of the rhythm to the sense, by which it instantly became in his hands the finest instrument that the tragic poet has ever employed for his purpose, less restricted than that of the Italians, and falling occasionally almost into numerous prose, lines of fourteen syllables being very common in all our old dramatists, but regular and harmonious at other times as the most accurate ear could require.

29. The savage character of Tamburlaine, and the want of all interest as to every other, render this tragedy a failure in comparison with those which speedily followed from the pen of Christopher Marlowe. The first two acts of the Jew of Malta are more vigorously conceived, both as to character and circumstance, than any other Elizabethan play, except those of Shakspeare; and perhaps we may think that Barabas, though not the prototype of Shylock, a praise of which he is unworthy, may have suggested some few ideas to the inventor. But the latter acts, as is usual with our old dramatists, are a tissue of uninteresting crimes and slaughter.† Faustus is better known; it contains nothing, perhaps, so dramatic as the first part of the Jew of Malta; yet the occasional glimpses of repentance and struggles of alarmed conscience in the chief character are finely brought in. It is full of poetical beauties; but an

Marlowe's
Jew of Malta,

and Faustus.

* Shakspeare having turned into ridicule a passage or two in Tamburlaine, the critics have concluded it to be a model of bad tragedy. Mr. Collier, iii. 115—126., has elaborately vindicated its dramatic merits, though sufficiently aware of its faults.

† "*Blood*," says a late witty writer, "is made as light of in some of these old

dramas as *money* in a modern sentimental comedy; and as *this* is given away till it reminds us that it is nothing but counters, so *that* is spilt till it affects us no more than its representative, the paint of the property-man in the theatre." Lamb's Specimens of Early Dramatic Poets, i. 19.

intermixture of buffoonery weakens the effect, and leaves it on the whole rather a sketch by a great genius than a finished performance. There is an awful melancholy about Marlowe's Mephistopheles, perhaps more impressive than the malignant mirth of that fiend in the renowned work of Goethe. But the fair form of Margaret is wanting; and Marlowe has hardly earned the credit of having breathed a few casual inspirations into a greater mind than his own.*

30. Marlowe's *Life of Edward II.* which was entered on the books of the Stationers' Company in 1593, has been deemed by some the earliest specimen of the historical play founded upon English chronicles. Whether this be true or not, and probably it is not, it is certainly by far the best after those of Shakspeare.† And it seems probable that the old plays of the *Contention of Lancaster and York*, and the *True Tragedy of Richard Duke of York*, which Shakspeare remodelled in the second and third parts of *Henry VI.*, were in great part by Marlowe, though Greene seems to put in for some share in their composition.‡ These plays claim certainly a very low

His Edward II.

Plays whence Henry VI. was taken.

* The German story of Faust is said to have been published for the first time in 1587. It was rapidly translated into most languages of Europe. We need hardly name the absurd supposition, that Faust, the great printer, was intended.

† Collier observes, that "the character of Richard II. in Shakspeare seems modelled in no slight degree upon that of Edward II." But I am reluctant to admit that Shakspeare modelled his characters by those of others; and it is natural to ask whether there were not an extraordinary likeness in the dispositions as well as fortunes of the two kings.

‡ These old plays were reprinted by Stevens in 1766. Malone, on a laborious comparison of them with the second and third parts of *Henry VI.*, has ascertained that 1771 lines in the latter plays were taken from the former unaltered, 2373 altered by Shakspeare, while 1899 were altogether his own. It remains to inquire, who are to claim the credit of these other plays, so great a portion of which has passed with the world for the genuine work of Shakspeare. The solution seems to be given, as well as we can expect, in a passage often quoted from Robert Greene's *Groat's Worth of Wit*,

published not long before his death in September, 1592. "Yes," says he, addressing himself to some one who has been conjectured to be Peele, but more probably Marlowe, "trust them (the players) not, for there is an upstart crow, beautified with our feathers, that, with his tyger's heart wrapped in a player's hide, supposes he is as well able to bombast out a blank verse as the best of you; and being an absolute Johannes factotum, is, in his own conceit, the only *Shakescene* in a country." An allusion is here manifest to the "tyger's heart, wrapt in a woman's hide," which Shakspeare borrowed from the old play, *The Contention of the Houses*, and which is here introduced to hint the particular subject of plagiarism that prompts the complaint of Greene. The bitterness he displays must lead us to suspect that he had been one himself of those who were thus preyed upon. But the greater part of the plays in question is in the judgment, I conceive, of all competent critics, far above the powers either of Greene or Peele, and exhibits a much greater share of the spirited versification, called by Jonson the "mighty line," of Christopher Marlowe. Malone, upon

rank among those of Shakspeare: his original portion is not inconsiderable; but it is fair to observe, that some of the passages most popular, such as the death of Cardinal Beaufort, and the last speech of the Duke of York, seem not to be by his hand.

31. No one could think of disputing the superiority of

Peele. Marlowe to all his contemporaries of this early school of the English drama. He was killed in a tavern fray in 1593. There is more room for difference of tastes as to the second place. Mr. Campbell has bestowed high praises upon Peele. "His *David and Bethsabe* is the earliest fountain of pathos and harmony that can be traced in our dramatic poetry. His fancy is rich and his feeling tender; and his conceptions of dramatic character have no inconsiderable mixture of solid veracity and ideal beauty. There is no such sweetness of versification and imagery to be found in our blank verse anterior to Shakspeare."* I must concur with Mr. Collier in thinking these compliments excessive. Peele has some command of imagery, but in every other quality it seems to me that he has scarce any claim to honour; and I doubt if there are three lines together in any of his plays that could be mistaken for Shakspeare's. His *Edward I.* is a gross tissue of absurdity, with some facility of language, but nothing truly good. It has also the fault of grossly violating historic truth, in a hideous misrepresentation of the virtuous Eleanor of Castile; probably from the base motive of rendering the Spanish nation odious to the vulgar. This play, which is founded on a ballad equally false, is referred to the year 1593. The versification of Peele is much inferior to that of Marlowe; and though sometimes poetical, he seems rarely dramatic.

32. A third writer for the stage in this period is Robert

second thoughts, gave both these plays to Marlowe, having, in his dissertation on the three parts of *Henry VI.*, assigned one to Greene, the other to Peele. None of the three parts have any resemblance to the manner of Peele.

* *Specimens of English Poetry*, i. 140. Hawkins says of three lines in Peele's *David and Bethsabe*, that they contain a metaphor worthy of *Æschylus*:—

At him the thunder shall discharge his bolt;
And his fair spouse with bright and fiery wings
Sit ever burning on his hateful bones.

It may be rather *Æschylean*, yet I cannot much admire it. Peele seldom attempts such flights. "His genius was not boldly original; but he had an elegance of fancy, a gracefulness of expression, and a melody of versification which, in the earlier part of his career, was scarcely approached." Collier, iii. 191.

Greene, whose "Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay" may probably be placed about the year 1590. This comedy, though savouring a little of the old school, contains Greene. easy and spirited versification, superior to Peele, and though not so energetic as that of Marlowe, reminding us perhaps more frequently of Shakspeare.* Greene succeeds pretty well in that florid and gay style, a little redundant in images, which Shakspeare frequently gives to his princes and courtiers, and which renders some unimpassioned scenes in his historic plays effective and brilliant. There is great talent shown, though upon a very strange canvass, in Greene's "Looking Glass for London and England." His angry allusion to Shakspeare's plagiarism is best explained by supposing that he was himself concerned in the two old plays which had been converted into the second and third parts of Henry VI.† In default of a more probable claimant, I have sometimes been inclined to assign the first part of Henry VI. to Greene. But those who are far more conversant with the style of our dramatists do not suggest this; and we are evidently ignorant of many names, which might have ranked not discreditably by the side of these tragedians. The first part, however, of Henry VI. is, in some passages, not unworthy of Shakspeare's earlier days, nor, in my judgment, unlike his style; nor in fact do I know any one of his contemporaries who could have written the scene in the Temple Garden.

* "Greene in facility of expression and in the flow of his blank verse is not to be placed below his contemporary Peele. His usual fault, more discoverable in his plays than in his poems, is an absence of simplicity; but his pedantic classical references, frequently without either taste or discretion, he had in common with the other scribbling scholars of the time. It was Shakspeare's good fortune to be in a great degree without the knowledge, and therefore, if on no other account, without the defect." Collier, iii. 153. Tieck gives him credit for "a happy talent, a clear spirit, and a lively imagination, which characterise all his writings." Collier, iii. 148.

† Mr. Collier says, iii. 146., Greene may possibly have had a hand in the

True History of Richard Duke of York. But why possibly? when he claims it, if not in express words, yet so as to leave no doubt of his meaning. See the note in p. 377.

In a poem written on Greene in 1594, are these lines:—

Green is the pleasing object of an eye;
 Greene pleased the eyes of all that look'd upon him;
 Green is the ground of every painter's die;
 Greene gave the ground to all that wrote upon him:
 Nay, more, the men that so eclipsed his fame,
 Furlow'd his plumes, can they deny the same?

This seems an allusion to Greene's own metaphor, and must be taken for a covert attack on Shakspeare, who had by this time pretty well eclipsed the fame of Greene.

The light touches of his pencil have ever been still more inimitable, if possible, than its more elaborate strokes.*

33. We can hardly afford time to dwell on several other writers anterior to Shakspeare. Kyd, whom Mr. Collier places, as a writer of blank verse, next to Marlowe†, Lodge‡, Lily, Nash, Hughes, and a few more, have all some degree of merit. Nor do the anonymous tragedies, some of which were formerly ascribed to Shakspeare, and which even Schlegel, with less acuteness of criticism than is usual with him, has deemed genuine, always want a forcible delineation of passion, and a vigorous strain of verse, though not kept up for many lines. Among these are specimens of the domestic species of tragic drama, drawn probably from real occurrences, such as *Arden of Feversham* and the *Yorkshire Tragedy*, the former of which, especially, has very considerable merit. Its author, I believe, has not been conjectured; but it may be referred to the last decad of the century.§ Another play of the same kind, A

* "These three gifted men," (Peele, Greene, and Marlowe,) says their late editor, Mr. Dyce (Peele's Works, preface, xxxv.), "though they often present to us pictures that in design and colouring outrage the truth of nature, are the earliest of our tragic writers who exhibit any just delineation of the workings of passion; and their language, though now swelling into bombast, and now sinking into meanness, is generally rich with poetry, while their versification, though somewhat monotonous, is almost always flowing and harmonious. They as much excel their immediate predecessors as they are themselves excelled by Shakspeare." Not quite as much.

† Collier, iii. 207. Kyd is author of *Jeronymo*, and of the "*Spanish Tragedy*," a continuation of the same story. Shakspeare has selected some of their absurdities for ridicule, and has left an abundant harvest for the reader. Parts of the *Spanish Tragedy*, Mr. C. thinks, "are in the highest degree pathetic and interesting." This perhaps may be admitted, but Kyd is not, upon the whole, a pleasing dramatist.

‡ Lodge, one of the best poets of the age, was concerned, jointly with Greene, in the *Looking Glass for London*. In

this strange performance the prophet Hosea is brought to Nineveh, and the dramatis personæ, as far as they are serious, belong to that city; but all the farcical part relates to London. Of Lodge, Mr. C. says, that he is "second to Kyd in vigour and boldness of conception, but as a drawer of character, so essential a part of dramatic poetry, he unquestionably has the advantage." iii. 214.

§ The murder of *Arden of Feversham* occurred under Edward VI., but the play was published in 1592. The impression made by the story must have been deep, to produce a tragedy so long afterwards. It is said by Mr. Collier, that Professor Tieck has inclined to think *Arden of Feversham* a genuine work of Shakspeare. I cannot but venture to suspect that, if this distinguished critic were a native, he would discern such differences of style, as render this hypothesis improbable. The speeches in *Arden of Feversham* have spirit and feeling, but there is none of that wit, that fertility of analogical imagery, which the worst plays of Shakspeare display. The language is also more plain and perspicuous than we ever find in him, especially on a subject so full of passion. Mr. Collier discerns the hand of Shak-

Woman killed with Kindness, bears the date of 1600, and is the earliest production of a fertile dramatist, Thomas Heywood. The language is not much raised <sup>Heywood's
Woman
killed with
Kindness.</sup> above that of comedy, but we can hardly rank a tale of guilt, sorrow, and death, in that dramatic category. It may be read with interest and approbation at this day, being quite free from extravagance either in manner or language, the besetting sin of our earlier dramatists, and equally so from buffoonery. The subject resembles that of Kotzebue's drama, *The Stranger*, but is managed with a nobler tone of morality. It is true that Mrs. Frankfort's immediate surrender to her seducer, like that of Beaumelé in the *Fatal Dowry*, makes her contemptible; but this, though it might possibly have originated in the necessity created by the narrow limits of theatrical time, has the good effect of preventing that sympathy with her guilt which is reserved for her penitence.

34. Of William Shakspeare*, whom, through the mouths of those whom he has inspired to body forth the <sup>William
Shakspeare.</sup> modifications of his immense mind, we seem to know better than any human writer, it may be truly said that we scarcely know any thing. We see him, so far as we do see him, not in himself, but in a reflex image from the objectivity in which he was manifested; he is Falstaff, and Mercutio, and Malvolio, and Jaques, and Portia, and Imogen, and Lear, and Othello; but to us he is scarcely a determined person, a substantial reality of past time, the man Shakspeare. The two greatest names in poetry are to

speare in the Yorkshire Tragedy, and thinks that "there are some speeches which could scarcely have proceeded from any other pen." Collier, iii. 51. It was printed with his name in 1608; but this, which would be thought good evidence in most cases, must not be held sufficient. It is impossible to explain the grounds of internal persuasion in these nice questions of æsthetic criticism; but I cannot perceive the hand of Shakspeare in any of the anonymous tragedies.

* Though I shall not innovate in a work of this kind, not particularly relating to Shakspeare, I must observe, that

Sir Frederic Madden has offered very specious reasons (in the *Archæologia*, vol. xxvi.) for believing that the poet and his family spelt their name *Shakspere*, and that there are, at least, no exceptions in his own autographs, as has commonly been supposed. A copy of Florio's translation of Montaigne, a book which he had certainly read (see Malone's note on *Tempest*, act ii. scene i.), has been lately discovered with the name *W. Shakspere* clearly written in it, and there seems no reason to doubt that it is a genuine signature. This book has, very properly, been placed in the British Museum, among the choice *κεκμηλία* of that repository.

us little more than names. If we are not yet come to question his unity, as we do that of "the blind old man of Scio's rocky isle," an improvement in critical acuteness doubtless reserved for a distant posterity, we as little feel the power of identifying the young man who came up from Stratford, was afterwards an indifferent player in a London theatre, and retired to his native place in middle life, with the author of *Macbeth* and *Lear*, as we can give a distinct historic personality to Homer. All that insatiable curiosity and unwearied diligence have hitherto detected about Shakspeare serves rather to disappoint and perplex us, than to furnish the slightest illustration of his character. It is not the register of his baptism, or the draft of his will, or the orthography of his name that we seek. No letter of his writing, no record of his conversation, no character of him drawn with any fulness by a contemporary has been produced.*

35. It is generally supposed that he settled in London about 1587, being then twenty-three years old. For some time afterwards we cannot trace him distinctly. His first writings for the stage. *Venus and Adonis*, published in 1593, he describes in his dedication to Lord Southampton, as "the first heir of his invention." It is however certain that it must have been written some years before, unless we take these words in a peculiar sense, for Greene, in his *Groat's Worth of Wit*, 1592, alludes, as we have seen, to Shakspeare as already known among dramatic authors. It appears by this passage, that he had converted the two plays on the wars of York and Lancaster into what we read as the second and third parts of *Henry VI*. What share he may have had in similar repairs of the many plays then represented cannot be determined. It is generally believed that he had much to do with the

* [I am not much inclined to qualify this paragraph in consequence of the petty circumstances relating to Shakspeare which have been lately brought to light, and which rather confirm than otherwise what I have said. But I laud the labours of Mr. Collier, Mr. Hunter, and other collectors of such crumbs; though I am not sure that we should not venerate Shakspeare as much if they had left him undisturbed in his obscurity.

To be told that he played a trick to a brother player in a licentious amour, or that he died of a drunken frolic, as a stupid vicar of Stratford recounts (long after the time) in his diary, does not exactly inform us of the man who wrote *Lear*. If there was a Shakspeare of earth, as I suspect, there was also one of heaven; and it is of him that we desire to know something.—1842.]

tragedy of *Pericles*, which is now printed among his works, and which external testimony, though we should not rely too much on that as to Shakspeare, has assigned to him; but the play is full of evident marks of an inferior hand.* Its date is unknown; Drake supposes it to have been his earliest work, rather from its inferiority than on any other ground. *Titus Andronicus* is now by common consent denied to be, in any sense, a production of Shakspeare; very few passages, I should think not one, resemble his manner.†

36. The *Comedy of Errors* may be presumed by an allusion it contains to have been written before the submission of Paris to Henry IV. in 1594, which nearly put an end to the civil war.‡ It is founded on a very popular subject. This furnishes two extant comedies of Plautus, a translation from one of which, the *Menæchmi*, was represented in Italy earlier than any other play. It had been already, as Mr. Collier thinks, brought upon the stage in England; and another play, later than the *Comedy of Errors*, has been reprinted by Stevens. Shakspeare himself was so well pleased with the idea that he has returned to it in *Twelfth Night*. Notwithstanding the opportunity which these mistakes of identity furnish for ludicrous situations and for carrying on a complex plot, they are not very well adapted to dramatic effect, not only from the manifest difficulty of finding performers quite alike, but because, were this overcome, the audience must be in as great embarrassment as the represented characters themselves. In the *Comedy of Errors* there are only a few passages of a poetical vein, yet such perhaps as no other living dramatist could have written; but the story is well invented and well managed; the confusion of persons does not cease to amuse;

*Comedy of
Errors.*

* Malone, in a dissertation on the tragedy of *Pericles*, maintained that it was altogether an early work of Shakspeare. Stevens contended that it was a production of some older poet, improved by him; and Malone had the candour to own that he had been wrong. The opinion of Stevens is now general. Drake gives the last three acts, and part of the former, to Shakspeare; but I can hardly think his share is by any means so large.

† Notwithstanding this internal evi-

dence, Mercs, so early as 1598, enumerates *Titus Andronicus* among the plays of Shakspeare, and mentions no other but what is genuine. Drake, ii. 287. But, in criticism of all kinds, we must acquire a dogged habit of resisting testimony, when *res ipsa per se vociferatur* to the contrary.

‡ Act iii. scene 2. Some have judged the play from this passage to be written as early as 1591, but on precarious grounds.

the dialogue is easy and gay beyond what had been hitherto heard on the stage ; there is little buffoonery in the wit, and no absurdity in the circumstances.

37. The Two Gentlemen of Verona ranks above the Comedy of Errors, though still in the third class of Shakspeare's plays. It was probably the first English comedy in which characters are drawn from social life, at once ideal and true ; the cavaliers of Verona and their lady-loves are graceful personages, with no transgression of the probabilities of nature ; but they are not exactly the real men and women of the same rank in England. The imagination of Shakspeare must have been guided by some familiarity with romances before it struck out this comedy. It contains some very poetical lines. Though these two plays could not give the slightest suspicion of the depth of thought which Lear and Macbeth were to display, it was already evident that the names of Greene, and even Marlowe, would be eclipsed without any necessity for purloining their plumes.

38. Love's Labour Lost is generally placed, I believe, at the bottom of the list. There is indeed little interest in the fable, if we can say that there is any fable at all ; but there are beautiful coruscations of fancy, more original conception of character than in the Comedy of Errors, more lively humour than in the Gentlemen of Verona, more symptoms of Shakspeare's future powers as a comic writer than in either. Much that is here but imperfectly developed came forth again in his later plays, especially in As you Like It, and Much Ado about Nothing. The

Taming of the Shrew is the only play, except Henry VI., in which Shakspeare has been very largely a borrower. The best parts are certainly his, but it must be confessed, that several passages, for which we give him credit, and which are very amusing, belong to his unknown predecessor. The original play, reprinted by Stevens, was published in 1594.* I do not find so much genius in the

* Mr. Collier thinks that Shakspeare had nothing to do with any of the scenes where Katherine and Petruchio are not introduced. The underplot resembles,

he says, the style of Haughton, author of a comedy called Englishmen for my Money, iii. 78.

Taming of the Shrew as in *Love's Labour Lost*; but, as an entire play, it is much more complete.

39. The beautiful play of *Midsummer Night's Dream* is placed by Malone as early as 1592; its superiority to those we have already mentioned affords some Midsummer Night's Dream. presumption that it was written after them. But it evidently belongs to the earlier period of Shakspeare's genius; poetical, as we account it, more than dramatic; yet rather so, because the indescribable profusion of imaginative poetry in this play overpowers our senses till we can hardly observe any thing else, than from any deficiency of dramatic excellence. For in reality the structure of the fable, consisting as it does of three if not four actions, very distinct in their subjects and personages, yet wrought into each other without effort or confusion, displays the skill, or rather instinctive felicity, of Shakspeare, as much as in any play he has written. No preceding dramatist had attempted to fabricate a complex plot; for low comic scenes, interspersed with a serious action upon which they have no influence, do not merit notice. The *Menæchmi* of Plautus had been imitated by others as well as by Shakspeare; but we speak here of original invention.

40. The *Midsummer Night's Dream* is, I believe, altogether original in one of the most beautiful concep- Its ma- chinery. tions that ever visited the mind of a poet, the fairy machinery. A few before him had dealt in a vulgar and clumsy manner with popular superstitions; but the sportive, beneficent, invisible population of the air and earth, long since established in the creed of childhood, and of those simple as children, had never for a moment been blended with "human mortals" among the personages of the drama. *Lily's Maid's Metamorphosis* is probably later than this play of Shakspeare, and was not published till 1600.* It is unnecessary to observe that the fairies of Spenser, as he has dealt with them, are wholly of a different race.

41. The language of *Midsummer Night's Dream* is equally novel with the machinery. It sparkles in perpetual Its language. brightness with all the hues of the rainbow; yet there is nothing overcharged or affectedly ornamented. Per-

* Collier, iii. 185. Lily had, however, brought fairies, without making them speak, into some of his earlier plays. Ibid.

haps no play of Shakspeare has fewer blemishes, or is from beginning to end in so perfect keeping ; none in which so few lines could be erased, or so few expressions blamed. His own peculiar idiom, the dress of his mind, which began to be discernible in the *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, is more frequently manifested in the present play. The expression is seldom obscure, but it is never in poetry, and hardly in prose, the expression of other dramatists, and far less of the people. And here, without reviving the debated question of Shakspeare's learning, I must venture to think, that he possessed rather more acquaintance with the Latin language than many believe. The phrases, unintelligible and improper, except in the sense of their primitive roots, which occur so copiously in his plays, seem to be unaccountable on the supposition of absolute ignorance. In the *Midsummer Night's Dream*, these are much less frequent than in his later dramas. But here we find several instances. Thus, "things base and vile, holding no *quantity*," for value ; rivers, that "have overborn their *continents*," the *continente ripa* of Horace ; "*compact* of imagination ;" "something of great *constancy*," for consistency ; "sweet Pyramus *translated* there ;" "the law of Athens, which by no means we may *extenuate*." I have considerable doubts whether any of these expressions would be found in the contemporary prose of Elizabeth's reign, which was less overrun by pedantry than that of her successor ; but, could authority be produced for Latinisms so forced, it is still not very likely that one, who did not understand their proper meaning, would have introduced them into poetry. It would be a weak answer that we do not detect in Shakspeare any imitations of the Latin poets. His knowledge of the language may have been chiefly derived, like that of schoolboys, from the dictionary, and insufficient for the thorough appreciation of their beauties. But, if we should believe him well acquainted with Virgil or Ovid, it would be by no means surprising that his learning does not display itself in imitation. Shakspeare seems now and then to have a tinge on his imagination from former passages ; but he never designedly imitates, though, as we have seen, he has sometimes adopted. The streams of invention flowed too fast from his own mind to leave him time to accommodate

the words of a foreign language to our own. He knew that to create would be easier, and pleasanter, and better.*

42. The tragedy of *Romeo and Juliet* is referred by Malone to the year 1596. Were I to judge by internal evidence, I should be inclined to date this play before ^{*Romeo and Juliet.*} the *Midsummer Night's Dream*; the great frequency of rhymes, the comparative absence of Latinisms, the want of that thoughtful philosophy, which, when it had once germinated in Shakspeare's mind, never ceased to display itself, and several of the faults that juvenility may best explain and excuse, would justify this inference.

43. In one of the Italian novels to which Shakspeare had frequently recourse for his fable, he had the good ^{*Its plot.*} fortune to meet with this simple and pathetic subject. What he found he has arranged with great skill. The incidents in *Romeo and Juliet* are rapid, various, unintermitting in interest, sufficiently probable, and tending to the catastrophe. The most regular dramatist has hardly excelled one writing for an infant and barbarian stage. It is certain that the observation of the unity of time, which we find in this tragedy, unfashionable as the name of unity has become in our criticism, gives an intenseness of interest to the story, which is often diluted and dispersed in a dramatic history. No play of Shakspeare is more frequently represented, or honoured with more tears.

44. If from this praise of the fable we pass to other considerations, it will be more necessary to modify our eulogies. It has been said above of the *Midsummer Night's Dream*, that none of Shakspeare's plays ^{*Its beauties and blemishes.*} have fewer blemishes. We can by no means repeat this commendation of *Romeo and Juliet*. It may be said rather that few, if any, are more open to reasonable censure; and

* The celebrated essay by Farmer on the learning of Shakspeare, put an end to such notions as we find in Warburton and many of the older commentators, that he had imitated Sophocles, and I know not how many Greek authors. Those indeed who agree with what I have said in a former chapter as to the state of learning under Elizabeth will not think

it probable that Shakspeare could have acquired any knowledge of Greek. It was not a part of such education as he received. The case of Latin is different: we know that he was at a grammar school, and could hardly have spent two or three years there without bringing away a certain portion of the language.

we are almost equally struck by its excellencies and its defects.

45. Madame de Stael has truly remarked, that in *Romeo and Juliet* we have, more than in any other tragedy, the mere passion of love; love, in all its vernal promise, full of hope and innocence, ardent beyond all restraint of reason, but tender as it is warm. The contrast between this impetuosity of delirious joy, in which the youthful lovers are first displayed, and the horrors of the last scene, throws a charm of deep melancholy over the whole. Once alone each of them, in these earlier moments, is touched by a presaging fear; it passes quickly away from them, but is not lost on the reader. To him there is a sound of despair in the wild effusions of their hope, and the madness of grief is mingled with the intoxication of their joy. And hence it is that, notwithstanding its many blemishes, we all read and witness this tragedy with delight. It is a symbolic mirror of the fearful realities of life, where "the course of true love" has so often "not run smooth," and moments of as fond illusion as beguiled the lovers of Verona have been exchanged, perhaps as rapidly, not indeed for the dagger and the bowl, but for the many-headed sorrows and sufferings of humanity.

46. The character of *Romeo* is one of excessive tenderness. His first passion for Rosaline, which no vulgar poet would have brought forward, serves to display a constitutional susceptibility. There is indeed so much of this in his deportment and language, that we might be in some danger of mistaking it for effeminacy, if the loss of his friend had not aroused his courage. It seems to have been necessary to keep down a little the other characters, that they might not overpower the principal one; and though we can by no means agree with Dryden, that if Shakspeare had not killed Mercutio, Mercutio would have killed him, there might have been some danger of his killing *Romeo*. His brilliant vivacity shows the softness of the other a little to a disadvantage. *Juliet* is a child, whose intoxication in loving and being loved whirls away the little reason she may have possessed. It is however impossible, in my opinion, to place her among the great female characters of Shakspeare's creation.

The characters.

47. Of the language of this tragedy what shall we say? It contains passages that every one remembers, that ^{The lan-} are among the nobler efforts of Shakspeare's poetry, ^{guage.} and many short and beautiful touches of his proverbial sweetness. Yet, on the other hand, the faults are in prodigious number. The conceits, the phrases that jar on the mind's ear, if I may use such an expression, and interfere with the very emotion the poet would excite, occur at least in the first three acts without intermission. It seems to have formed part of his conception of this youthful and ardent pair, that they should talk irrationally. The extravagance of their fancy, however, not only forgets reason, but wastes itself in frigid metaphors and incongruous conceptions; the tone of Romeo is that of the most bombastic common-place of gallantry, and the young lady differs only in being one degree more mad. The voice of virgin love has been counterfeited by the authors of many fictions: I know none who have thought the style of Juliet would represent it. Nor is this confined to the happier moments of their intercourse. False thoughts and misplaced phrases deform the whole of the third act. It may be added that, if not dramatic propriety, at least the interest of the character, is affected by some of Juliet's allusions. She seems indeed to have profited by the lessons and language of her venerable guardian; and those who adopt the edifying principle of deducing a moral from all they read, may suppose that Shakspeare intended covertly to warn parents against the contaminating influence of such domestics. These censures apply chiefly to the first three acts; as the shadows deepen over the scene, the language assumes a tone more proportionate to the interest; many speeches are exquisitely beautiful; yet the tendency to quibbles is never wholly eradicated.

48. The plays we have hitherto mentioned, to which one or two more might be added, belong to the earlier class, or, as we might say, to his first manner. In ^{Second} the second period of his dramatic life, we should ^{period of} place his historical plays, and such others as were written ^{Shakspeare.} before the end of the century or perhaps before the death of Elizabeth. The Merchant of Venice, As You Like It, and Much Ado about Nothing, are among these. The versifica-

tion in these is more studied, the pauses more artificially disposed, the rhymes, though not quite abandoned, become less frequent, the language is more vigorous and elevated, the principal characters are more strongly marked, more distinctly conceived, and framed on a deeper insight into mankind. Nothing in the earlier plays can be compared, in this respect, with the two Richards, or Shylock, or Falstaff, or *Hotspur*.

49. Many attempts had been made to dramatise the English chronicles, but with the single exception of The historical plays. Marlowe's *Edward II.*, so unsuccessfully, that Shakspeare may be considered as almost an original occupant of the field. He followed historical truth with considerable exactness; and, in some of his plays, as in that of *Richard II.*, and generally in *Richard III.* and *Henry VIII.*, admitted no imaginary personages, nor any scenes of amusement. The historical plays have had a great effect on Shakspeare's popularity. They have identified him with English feelings in English hearts, and are very frequently read more in childhood, and consequently better remembered than some of his superior dramas. And these dramatic chronicles borrowed surprising liveliness and probability from the national character and form of government. A prince, and a courtier, and a slave, are the stuff on which the historic dramatist would have to work in some countries; but every class of freemen, in the just subordination, without which neither human society, nor the stage, which should be its mirror, can be more than a chaos of huddled units, lay open to the selection of Shakspeare. What he invented is as truly English, as truly historical, in the large sense of moral history, as what he read.

50. Merchant of Venice. The *Merchant of Venice* is generally esteemed the best of Shakspeare's comedies. This excellent play is referred to the year 1597.* In the management

* Meres, in his *Palladis Tamia*, or *Wit's Treasury*, 1598, has a passage of some value in determining the age of Shakspeare's plays, both by what it contains, and by what it omits. "As Plautus and Seneca are accounted the best for comedy and tragedy among the

Latins, so Shakspeare among the English is the most excellent in both kinds for the stage; for comedy witness his *Gentlemen of Verona*, his *Errors*, his *Love's Labour Lost*, his *Love's Labour Won* [the original appellation of *All's Well that Ends Well*], his *Midsummer*

of the plot, which is sufficiently complex without the slightest confusion or incoherence, I do not conceive that it has been surpassed in the annals of any theatre. Yet there are those who still affect to speak of Shakspeare as a barbarian ; and others who, giving what they think due credit to his genius, deny him all judgment and dramatic taste. A comparison of his works with those of his contemporaries, and it is surely to them that we should look, will prove that his judgment is by no means the least of his rare qualities. This is not so remarkable in the mere construction of his fable, though the present comedy is absolutely perfect in that point of view, and several others are excellently managed, as in the general keeping of the characters, and the choice of incidents. If Shakspeare is sometimes extravagant, the Marstons and Middletons are seldom otherwise. The variety of characters in the Merchant of Venice, and the powerful delineation of those upon whom the interest chiefly depends, the effectiveness of many scenes in representation, the copiousness of the wit, and the beauty of the language, it would be superfluous to extol ; nor is it our office to repeat a tale so often told as the praise of Shakspeare. In the language there is the commencement of a metaphysical obscurity which soon became characteristic ; but it is perhaps less observable than in any later play.

51. The sweet and sportive temper of Shakspeare, though it never deserted him, gave way to advancing years, and to the mastering force of serious thought. What he read we know but very imperfectly ; yet, in the last years of this century, when five-and-thirty summers had ripened his genius, it seems that he must have transfused much of the wisdom of past ages into his own all-combining mind. In several of the historical plays, in the Merchant of Venice, and especially in *As You Like It*, the philosophic eye, As You Like It. turned inward on the mysteries of human nature, is more and more characteristic ; and we might apply to the last comedy the bold figure that Coleridge has less appropriately employed as to the early poems, that “ the creative power and the intellectual energy wrestle as in a war-embrace.” In

Night's Dream, and his Merchant of *Titus Andronicus*, and his *Romeo and Venice*; for tragedy, his *Richard II.*, his *Juliet*.⁷ *Drake*, ii. 2:7.
Richard III., *Henry IV.*, *King John*,

no other play, at least, do we find the bright imagination and fascinating grace of Shakspeare's youth so mingled with the thoughtfulness of his maturer age. This play is referred with reasonable probability to the year 1600. Few comedies of Shakspeare are more generally pleasing, and its manifold improbabilities do not much affect us in perusal. The brave, injured Orlando, the sprightly but modest Rosalind, the faithful Adam, the reflecting Jaques, the serene and magnanimous Duke, interest us by turns, though the play is not so well managed as to condense our sympathy, and direct it to the conclusion.

52. The comic scenes of Shakspeare had generally been drawn from novels, and laid in foreign lands. But Jonson's *Every Man in his Humour*. several of our earliest plays, as has been partly seen, delineate the prevailing manners of English life. None had acquired a reputation which endured beyond their own time till Ben Jonson in 1596 produced, at the age of twenty-two, his first comedy, *Every Man in his Humour*; an extraordinary monument of early genius, in what is seldom the possession of youth, a clear and unerring description of human character, various, and not extravagant beyond the necessities of the stage. He had learned the principles of comedy, no doubt, from Plautus and Terence; for they were not to be derived from the moderns at home or abroad; but he could not draw from them the application of living passions and manners; and it would be no less unfair, as Gifford has justly observed, to make Bobadil a copy of Thraso, than to deny the dramatic originality of Kiteley.

53. *Every Man in his Humour* is perhaps the earliest of European domestic comedies that deserves to be remembered; for even the *Mandragola* of Machiavel shrinks to a mere farce in comparison.* A much greater master of comic powers than

* This would not have been approved by a modern literary historian. Quelle était, avant que Molière parût et même de son temps, la comédie moderne comparable à la *Calandria*, à la *Mandragore*, aux meilleures pièces de l'*Arioste*, à celles de l'*Aretin*, du *Cecchi*, du *Lasca*, du *Bentivoglio*, de *Francesco D'Ambra*, et de tant d'autres? Ginguéné, vi. 316. This comes of deciding

before we know any thing of the facts. Ginguéné might possibly be able to read English, but certainly had no sort of acquaintance with the English theatre. I should have no hesitation in replying that we could produce at least forty comedies, before the age of Molière, superior to the best of those he has mentioned, and perhaps three times that number as good as the worst.

Jonson was indeed his contemporary, and, as he perhaps fancied, his rival; but, for some reason, Shakspeare had never yet drawn his story from the domestic life of his countrymen. Jonson avoided the common defect of the Italian and Spanish theatre, the sacrifice of all other dramatic objects to one only, a rapid and amusing succession of incidents: his plot is slight and of no great complexity; but his excellence is to be found in the variety of his characters, and in their individuality very clearly defined with little extravagance.

CHAPTER VII.

HISTORY OF POLITE LITERATURE IN PROSE
FROM 1550 TO 1600.

SECT. I.

Style of best Italian Writers — Those of France — England.

1. I AM not aware that we can make any great distinction in the character of the Italian writers of this and the preceding period, though they are more numerous in the present. Some of these have been already mentioned on account of their subjects. In point of style, to which we now chiefly confine ourselves, Casa is esteemed among the best.* The *Galateo* is certainly diffuse, but not so languid as some contemporary works; nor do we find in it, I think, so many of the inversions which are common blemishes in the writings of this age. The prose of Tasso is placed by Corniani almost on a level with his poetry for beauty of diction. "We find in it," he says, "dignity, rhythm, elegance, and purity without affectation, and perspicuity without vulgarity. He is never trifling or verbose, like his contemporaries of that century; but endeavours to fill every part of his discourses with meaning."† These praises may be just, but there is a tediousness in the moral essays of Tasso, which, like many other productions of that class, assert what the reader has never seen denied, and distinguish what he is in no danger of confounding.

* Corniani, v. 174. Parini called the *Galateo*, *Capo d'opera di nostra lingua*.

† Corniani, vi. 240.

2. Few Italian writers, it is said by the editors of the voluminous Milan collection, have united equally with Firenzuola the most simple naïveté to a delicate sweetness, that diffuses itself over the heart of the reader. His dialogue on the Beauty of Women is reckoned one of the best of his works. It is diffuse, but seems to deserve the praise bestowed upon its language. His translation of the Golden Ass of Apuleius is read with more pleasure than the original. The usual style of Italian prose in this, accounted by some its best age, is elaborate, ornate, yet not to excess, with a rhythmical structure apparently much studied, very rhetorical, and for the most part trivial, as we should now think, in its matter. The style of Machiavel, to which, perhaps, the reader's attention was not sufficiently called while we were concerned with his political philosophy, is eminent for simplicity, strength, and clearness. It would not be too much to place him at the head of the prose writers of Italy. But very few had the good taste to emulate so admirable a model. "They were apt to presume, says Corniani, that the spirit of good writing consisted in the artificial employment of rhetorical figures. They hoped to fertilise a soil barren of argument by such resources. They believed that they should become eloquent by accumulating words upon words, and phrases upon phrases, hunting on every side for metaphors, and exaggerating the most trifling theme by frigid hyperboles."*

Firenzuola.
Character
of Italian
prose.

3. A treatise on Painting, by Raffaello Borghino, published in 1584, called *Il Riposo*, is highly praised for its style by the Milan editors; but it is difficult for a foreigner to judge so correctly of these delicacies of language, as he may of the general merits of composition. They took infinite pains with their letters, great numbers of which have been collected. Those of Annibal Caro are among the best known†; but Pietro Aretino,

Italian
letter-
writers.

* Corniani, vi. 52.

† It is of no relevancy to the history of literature, but in one of Caro's letters to Bernardo Tasso, about 1544, he censures the innovation of using the third person in addressing a correspondent. Tutto questo secolo (dice Monsignor de

la Casa) è adulate; ognuno che scrive dà de le signorie; ognuno, a chi si scrive, le vuole; e non pure i grandi, ma i mezzani e i plebei quasi aspirano a questi gran nomi, e si tengono anco per affronto, se non gli hanno, e d' errore son notati quelli, che non gli danno. Cosa, che a

Paolo Manuzio, and Bonfadio are also celebrated for their style. The appearance of labour and affectation is still less pleasing in epistolary correspondence than in writings more evidently designed for the public eye; and there will be found abundance of it in these Italian writers, especially in addressing their superiors. Cicero was a model perpetually before their eyes, and whose faults they did not perceive. Yet perhaps the Italian writings of this period, with their flowing grace, are more agreeable than the sententious antitheses of the Spaniards. Both are artificial, but the efforts of the one are bestowed on diction and cadence, those of the other display a constant strain to be emphatic and profound. What Cicero was to Italy, Seneca became to Spain.

4. An exception to the general character of diffuseness is found in the well-known translation of Tacitus by Davanzati's Tacitus. Davanzati. This, it has often been said, he has accomplished in fewer words than the original. No one, for the most part, inquires into the truth of what is confidently said, even where it is obviously impossible. But whoever knows the Latin and Italian languages must know that a translation of Tacitus into Italian cannot be made in fewer words. It will be found, as might be expected, that Davanzati has succeeded by leaving out as much as was required to compensate the difference that articles and auxiliary verbs made against him. His translation is also censured by Corniani *, as full of obsolete terms and Florentine vulgarisms.

5. We can place under no better head than the present that lighter literature which, without taking the form of romance, endeavours to amuse the reader by fanciful invention and gay remark. The Italians have much of this; but it is beyond our province to enumerate productions of no great merit or renown. Jordano Bruno's

me pare stranissima e stomachosa, che habbiamo a parlar con uno, come se fosse un altro, e tutta via in astratto, quasi con la idea di colui, con chi si parla, non con la persona sua propria. Pure l' abuso è già fatto, ed è generale. &c., lib. i. p. 122. (edit. 1581.) I have found the third person used as early as a letter

of Paolo Manuzio to Castelvetro in 1543; but where there was any intimacy with an equal rank, it is not much employed; nor is it always found in that age in letters to men of very high rank from their inferiors.

* vi. 58.

celebrated *Spaccio della Bestia Trionfante* is one of this class. Another of Bruno's light pieces is entitled, *La Cabala del Cavallo Pegaseo, con l' Aggiunta de l' Asino Cilienico*. This has more profaneness in it than the *Spaccio della Bestia*. The latter, as is well-known, was dedicated to Sir Philip Sidney; as was also another little piece, *Gli Eroici Furori*. In this he has a sonnet addressed to the English ladies; "Dell' Inghilterra o Vaghe Ninfe e Belle;" but ending, of course, with a compliment, somewhat at the expense of these beauties, to "l' unica Diana, Qual' è trà voi quel, che trà gl' astri il sole." It had been well for Bruno if he had kept himself under the protection of Diana. The "chaste beams of that watery moon" were less scorching than the fires of the Inquisition.

6. The French generally date the beginning of an easy and natural style in their own language from the publication of James Amyot's translation of Plutarch in 1559. Some earlier writers, however, French writers.
Amyot. have been mentioned in another place, and perhaps some might have been added. The French style of the sixteenth century is for the most part diffuse, endless in its periods, and consequently negligent of grammar; but it was even then lively and unaffected, especially in narration, the memoirs of that age being still read with pleasure. Amyot, according to some, knew Greek but indifferently, and was perhaps on that account a better model of his own language; but if he did not always render the meaning of Plutarch, he has made Plutarch's reputation, and that, in some measure, of those who have taken Plutarch for their guide. It is well known how popular, more perhaps than any other ancient, this historian and moralist has been in France; but it is through Amyot that he has been read. The style of his translator, abounding with the native idiom, and yet enriching the language not at that time quite copious enough for its high vocation in literature, with many words which usage and authority have recognised, has always been regarded with admiration, and by some, in the prevalence of a less natural taste, with regret. It is in French prose what that of Marot is in poetry, and suggests, not an uncultivated simplicity, but the natural grace of a young person, secure of appear-

ing to advantage, but not at bottom indifferent to doing so. This *naïveté*, a word which, as we have neither naturalised in orthography nor translated it, I must adopt, has ever since been the charm of good writing in France. It is, above all, the characteristic of one who may justly be called the disciple of Amyot, and who extols him above all other writers in the language — Montaigne. The fascination of Montaigne's manner is acknowledged by all who read him; and with a worse style, or one less individually adapted to his character, he would never have been the favourite of the world.*

7. In the essays of Montaigne a few passages occur of striking, though simple eloquence. But it must be admitted that the familiar idiomatic tone of Amyot was better fitted to please than to awe, to soothe the mind than to excite it, to charm away the cares of the moment than to impart a durable emotion. It was also so remote from the grand style which the writings of Cicero and the precepts of rhetoric had taught the learned world to admire, that we cannot wonder to find some who sought to model their French by a different standard. The only one of these, so far as I am aware, that falls within the sixteenth century is Du Vair, a man not less distinguished in public life than in literature, having twice held the seals of France under Louis XIII. "He composed," says a modern writer, "many works, in which he endeavoured to be eloquent; but he fell into the error, at that time so common, of too much wishing to Latinise our mother-tongue. He has been charged with fabricating words, such as *sponsion*, *cogitation*, *contumélie*, *dilucidité*, *contemnement* †," &c. Notwithstanding these instances of bad taste which, when collected, seem more monstrous than as they are dispersed in his writings, Du Vair is not devoid of a flowing eloquence, which, whether perfectly congenial to the spirit of the language or not, has never wanted its imitators and admirers, and those very successful and brilliant, in French literature.‡

* See the articles on Amyot in Baillet, iv. 428. Bayle. La Harpe. Biogr. Universelle. Préface aux Œuvres de Pascal, par Neufchâteau.

† Neufchâteau, in Préface à Pascal, p. 181. Bouterwek, v. 326., praises Du

Vair, but he does not seem a favourite with his compatriot critics.

‡ Du Vair's *Essay de la Constance et Consolations ès Malheurs Publicques*, of which the first edition is in 1594, furnishes some eloquent declamation in a

It was of course the manner of the bar and of the pulpit, after the pulpit laid aside its buffoonery, far more than that of Amyot and Montaigne.

8. It is not in my power to communicate much information as to the minor literature of France. One book may be named as being familiarly known, the *Satire Menippée*. ^{Satire Menippée.} The first edition bears the date of 1593, but is said not to have appeared till 1594, containing some allusions to events of that year. It is a ridicule on the proceedings of the League, who were then masters of Paris, and has commonly been ascribed to Leroy, canon of Rouen, though Passerat, Pithou, Rapin, and others, are said to have had some share in it. This book is historically curious, but I do not perceive that it displays any remarkable degree of humour or invention. The truth appears so much throughout, that it cannot be ranked among works of fiction.*

9. In the scanty and obscure productions of the English press under Edward and Mary, or in the early years of Elizabeth, we should search, I conceive, in vain ^{English writers.} for any elegance or eloquence in writing. Yet there is an increasing expertness and fluency; and the language insensibly rejecting obsolete forms, the manner of our writers is less uncouth, and their sense more pointed and perspicuous than before. Wilson's *Art of Rhetorique* is at least a proof that

style unlike that of Amyot. Repassez en votre memorie l'histoire de toute l'antiquité; et quand vous trouverez un magistrat qui aura eu grand credit envers un peuple, ou auprès d'un prince, et qui se sera voulu comporter vertueusement, dites hardiment: Je gage que cestui-ci a été banni, que cestui-ci a été tué, qui cestui-ci a été empoisonné. A Athènes, Aristides, Themistoclès, et Phocion; à Rome, infinis desquels je laisse les noms Pour n'emplir le papier, me contentant de Camille, Scipion, et Ciceron pour l'antiquité, de Papinien pour les temps des empereurs Romains, et de Boece sous les Gots. Mais pourquoi le prenons-nous si haut? Qui avons-nous vu de notre siècle tenir les sceaux de France, qui n'ait été mis en cette charge, pour en être déjeté avec contumélie? Celui qui auroit vu M. le Chancelier Olivier, ou M. le Chancelier de l'Hospital, partir de

la cour pour se retirer en leurs maisons, n'auroit jamais envié de tels honneurs, ni de tels charges. Imaginez vous ces braves et vénérables vieillards, esquels reluisoient toutes sortes de vertus, et esquels entre une infinité de grandes parties vous n'eussiez sçu que choisir, remplis d'érudition, consommez ès affaires, amateurs de leur patrie, vraiment dignes de telles charges, si le siècle eust été digne d'eux. Après avoir longuement et fidèlement servis la patrie, on leur dresse des querelles d'Allemands, et de fausses accusations pour les bannir des affaires, ou plutôt pour en priver les affaires; comme un navire agité de la conduite de si sages et experts pilotes, afin de le faire plus aisément briser. p. 76. (edit. 1604.)

* Biog. Univ. art. Leroy. Vigneul-Marville, i. 197.

some knew the merits of a good style, if they did not yet bring their rules to bear on their own language. In Wilson's own manner there is nothing remarkable. The first book

which can be worth naming at all, is Ascham's

Ascham.

Schoolmaster, published in 1570, and probably written some years before. Ascham is plain and strong in his style, but without grace or warmth; his sentences have no harmony of structure. He stands, however, as far as I have seen, above all other writers in the first half of the queen's reign. The best of these, like Reginald Scot, express their meaning well, but with no attempt at a rhythmical structure or figurative language; they are not bad writers, because their solid sense is aptly conveyed to the mind; but they are not good, because they have little selection of words, and give no pleasure by means of style. Puttenham is perhaps the first who wrote a well-measured prose; in his *Art of English Poesie*, published in 1586, he is elaborate, studious of elevated and chosen expression, and rather diffuse, in the manner of the Italians of the sixteenth century, who affected that fulness of style, and whom he probably meant to imitate. But in these later years of the queen, when almost every one was eager to be distinguished for sharp wit or ready learning, the want of good models of writing in our own language gave rise to some perversion of the public taste. Thoughts and words began to be valued, not as they were just and natural, but as they were removed from common apprehension, and most exclusively the original property of those who employed them. This in poetry showed itself in affected conceits, and in prose led to the pedantry of recondite mythological allusion, and of a Latinised phraseology.

10. The most remarkable specimen of this class is the

Euphues of Lilly, a book of little value, but which

Euphues
of Lilly.

deserves notice on account of the influence it is recorded to have had upon the court of Elizabeth; an influence also over the public taste, which is manifested in the literature of the age.* It is divided into two parts, having separate titles; the first, "Euphues, the Anatomy of Wit;"

* [Euphues, Mr. Collier thinks, was the second edition. Watts refers the published early in 1579; Malone had a first edition to 1580. — 1842.]
copy of that year, which he took to be

the second, "Euphues and his England." This is a very dull story of a young Athenian, whom the author places at Naples in the first part, and brings to England in the second; it is full of dry common-places. The style which obtained celebrity is antithetical and sententious to affectation; a perpetual effort with no adequate success rendering the book equally disagreeable and ridiculous, though it might not be difficult to find passages rather more happy and ingenious than the rest. The following specimen is taken at random, and though sufficiently characteristic, is perhaps rather unfavourable to Lilly, as a little more affected and empty than usual.

11. "The sharpest north-east wind, my good Euphues, doth never last three days, tempests have but a short time, and the more violent the thunder is, the less permanent it is. In the like manner it falleth out with jars and carplings of friends, which, begun in a moment, are ended in a moment. Necessary it is that among friends there should be some thwarting, but to continue in anger not convenient: the camel first troubleth the water before he drink; the frankincense is burned before it smell; friends are tried before they be trusted, lest, shining like the carbuncle as though they had fire, they be found, being touched, to be without fire. Friendship should be like the wine, which Homer much commending calleth Maroneum, whereof one pint being mingled with five quarts of water, yet it keepeth his old strength and virtue, not to be qualified by any discourtesie. Where salt doth grow, nothing else can breed; where friendship is built, no offence can harbour. Then, Euphues, let the falling out of friends be the renewing of affection, that in this we may resemble the bones of the lion, which, lying still and not moved, begin to rot, but being stricken one against another, break out like fire, and wax green."

12. "The lords and gentlemen in that court (of Elizabeth) are also an example," he says in a subsequent passage, "for all others to follow, true types of nobility, the only stay and staff of honour, brave courtiers, stout soldiers, apt to revel in peace and ride in war. In fight fierce, not dreading death; in friendship firm, not breaking promise; courteous to all that deserve well, cruel to none that deserve ill. Their

adversaries they trust not—that sheweth their wisdom; their enemies they fear not—that argueth their courage. They are not apt to proffer injuries, not fit to take any; loth to pick quarrels, but longing to revenge them.” Lilly pays great compliments to the ladies for beauty and modesty, and overloads Elizabeth with panegyric. “Touching the beauty of this prince, her countenance, her majesty, her personage, I cannot think that it may be sufficiently commended, when it cannot be too much marvelled at; so that I am constrained to say, as Praxiteles did when he began to paint Venus and her son, who doubted whether the world could afford colours good enough for two such fair faces, and I whether my tongue can yield words to blaze that beauty, the perfection whereof none can imagine; which, seeing it is so, I must do like those that want a clear sight, who being not able to discern the sun in the sky, are enforced to behold it in the water.”

13. It generally happens that a style devoid of simplicity, when first adopted, becomes the object of admiration Its popularity. for its imagined ingenuity and difficulty; and that of Euphuës was well adapted to a pedantic generation who valued nothing higher than far-fetched allusions and sententious precepts. All the ladies of the time, we are told, were Lilly’s scholars; “she who spoke not Euphuism being as little regarded at court as if she could not speak French.” “His invention,” says one of his editors, who seems well worthy of him, “was so curiously strung, that Elizabeth’s court held his notes in admiration.”* Shakspeare has ridiculed this style in *Love’s Labour Lost*, and Jonson in *Every Man out of his Humour*; but, as will be seen on comparing the extracts I have given above with the language of *Holofernes* and *Fastidious Brisk*, a little in the tone of caricature, which Sir Walter Scott has heightened in one of his novels, till it bears no great resemblance to the real Euphuës. I am not sure that Shakspeare has never caught the Euphuistic style, when he did not intend to make it ridiculous, especially in some speeches of Hamlet.

14. The first good prose writer, in any positive sense of the word, is Sir Philip Sidney. The *Arcadia* appeared in 1590. It has been said of the author of

Sidney’s
Arcadia.

* In *Biogr. Britannica*, art. Lilly.

this famous romance, to which, as such, we shall have soon to revert, that "we may regard the whole literary character of that age as in some sort derived and descended from him, and his work as the fountain from which all the vigorous shoots of that period drew something of their verdure and strength. It was indeed the *Arcadia* which first taught to the contemporary writers that inimitable interweaving and contexture of words, that bold and unshackled use and application of them, that art of giving to language, appropriated to objects the most common and trivial, a kind of acquired and adventitious loftiness, and to diction in itself noble and elevated a sort of superadded dignity, that power of ennobling the sentiments by the language, and the language by the sentiments, which so often excites our admiration in perusing the writers of the age of Elizabeth." * This panegyric appears a good deal too strongly expressed, and perhaps the *Arcadia* had not this great influence over the writers of the latter years of Elizabeth, whose *age* is, in the passage quoted, rather too indefinitely mentioned. We are sometimes apt to mistake an improvement springing from the general condition of the public mind for imitation of the one writer who has first displayed the effects of it. Sidney is, as I have said, our earliest good writer; but if the *Arcadia* had never been published, I cannot believe that Hooker or Bacon would have written worse.

15. Sidney's Defence of Poesie, as has been surmised by his last editor, was probably written about 1581. His Defence of Poesie. I should incline to place it later than the *Arcadia*; † and he may perhaps allude to himself where he says, "some have mingled matters heroical and pastoral." This treatise is elegantly composed, with perhaps too artificial a construction of sentences; the sense is good, but the expression is very diffuse, which gives it too much the air of a declamation. The great praise of Sidney in this treatise is, that he has shown the capacity of the English language for spirit, variety, gracious idiom, and masculine firmness. It is worth notice that under the word *poesy* he includes such works as his own

* Retrospective Review, vol. ii. p. 42. was written in 1580, and the Defence of

† [Zouch, quoted in Nicolas's edition of Poesie in 1582.—1847.]
of Davison's Rhapsody, says the *Arcadia*

Arcadia, or in short any fiction. "It is not rhyming and versing that maketh poesy; one may be a poet without versing, and a versifier without poetry."

16. But the finest, as well as the most philosophical, writer of the Elizabethan period is Hooker. The first book of the Ecclesiastical Polity is at this day one of the masterpieces of English eloquence. His periods, indeed, are generally much too long and too intricate, but portions of them are often beautifully rhythmical; his language is rich in English idiom without vulgarity, and in words of a Latin source without pedantry; he is more uniformly solemn than the usage of later times permits, or even than writers of that time, such as Bacon, conversant with mankind as well as books, would have reckoned necessary; but the example of ancient orators and philosophers upon themes so grave as those which he discusses may justify the serious dignity from which he does not depart. Hooker is perhaps the first of such in England who adorned his prose with the images of poetry; but this he has done more judiciously and with more moderation than others of great name; and we must be bigots in Attic severity, before we can object to some of his grand figures of speech. We may praise him also for avoiding the superfluous luxury of quotation, a rock on which the writers of the succeeding age were so frequently wrecked.

17. It must be owned, however, by every one not absolutely blinded by a love of scarce books, that the prose literature of the queen's reign, taken generally, is but very mean. The pedantic Euphuism of Lilly overspreads the productions which aspire to the praise of politeness; while the common style of most pieces of circumstance, like those of Martin Mar-prelate and his answerers (for there is little to choose in this respect between parties), or of such efforts at wit and satire as came from Greene, Nash, and other worthies of our early stage, is low, and, with few exceptions, very stupid ribaldry. Many of these have a certain utility in the illustration of Shakspeare and of ancient manners, which is neither to be overlooked in our contempt for such trash, nor to be mistaken for intrinsic merit. If it is alleged that I have not read enough of the Elizabethan literature to censure it, I must reply that, ad-

Character of
Elizabethan
writers.

mitting my slender acquaintance with the numberless little books that some years since used to be sold at vast prices, I may still draw an inference from the inability of their admirers, or at least purchasers, to produce any tolerable specimens. Let the labours of Sir Egerton Brydges, the British Bibliographer, the *Censura Literaria*, the *Restituta*, collections so copious, and formed with so much industry, speak for the prose of the queen's reign. I would again repeat that good sense in plain language was not always wanting upon serious subjects; it is to polite writing alone that we now refer.* Spenser's dialogue upon the State of Ireland, the Brief Con-
 ceit of English Policy, and several other tracts, are written as such treatises should be written, but they are not to be counted in the list of eloquent or elegant compositions.

SECT. II.—ON CRITICISM.

State of Criticism in Italy — Scaliger — Castelvetro — Salviati — In other Countries — England.

18. IN the earlier periods with which we have been conversant, criticism had been the humble handmaid of the ancient writers, content to explain, or sometimes ^{State of criticism.} aspiring to restore, but seldom presuming to censure their text, or even to justify the superstitious admiration that modern scholars felt for it. There is, however, a different and far higher criticism, which excites and guides the taste for truth and beauty in works of imagination; a criticism to which even the great masters of language are responsible,

* It is not probable that Brydges, a man of considerable taste and judgment, whatever some other pioneers in the same track may have been, would fail to select the best portions of the authors he has so carefully perused. And yet I would almost defy any one to produce five passages in prose from his numerous volumes, so far as the sixteenth century

is concerned, which have any other merit than that of illustrating some matter of fact, or of amusing by their oddity. I have only noted, in traversing that long desert, two sermons by one Edward Dering, preached before the queen (British Bibliographer, i. 260. and 560.), which show considerably more vigour than was usual in the style of that age.

and from which they expect their reward. But of the many who have sat in this tribunal, a small minority have been recognised as rightful arbiters of the palms they pretend to confer, and an appeal to the public voice has as often sent away the judges in dishonour as confirmed their decision.

19. It is a proof at least of the talents and courage which distinguished Julius Cæsar Scaliger, that he, first of all the moderns, (or, if there are exceptions, they must be partial and inconsiderable,) undertook to reduce the whole art of verse into system, illustrating and confirming every part by a profusion of poetical literature. His *Poetics* form an octavo of about 900 pages, closely printed. We can give but a slight sketch of so extensive a work. In the first book he treats of the different species of poems; in the second, of different metres; the third is more miscellaneous, but relates chiefly to figures and turns of phrase; the fourth proceeds with the same subject, but these two are very comprehensive. In the fifth we come to apply these principles to criticism; and here we find a comparison of various poets one with another, especially of Homer with Virgil. The sixth book is a general criticism on all Latin poets, ancient and modern. The seventh is a kind of supplement to the rest, and seems to contain all the miscellaneous matter that he found himself to have omitted, together with some questions purposely reserved, as he tells us, on account of their difficulty. His comparison of Homer with Virgil is

very elaborate, extending to every simile or other passage, wherein a resemblance or imitation can be observed, as well as to the general management of their epic poems. In this comparison he gives an invariable preference to Virgil, and declares that the difference between these poets is as great as between a lady of rank and the awkward wife of a citizen. Musæus he conceives to be far superior to Homer, according to the testimony of antiquity; and the poem of Hero and Leander, which it does not occur to him to suspect, is the only one in Greek that can be named in competition with Virgil, as he shows by comparison of the said poem with the very inferior effusions of Homer. If Musæus had written on the same subject as Homer,

Scaliger's
Poetics.

His prefer-
ence of
Virgil to
Homer.

Scaliger does not doubt but that he would have left the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* far behind.*

20. These opinions will not raise Scaliger's taste very greatly in our eyes. But it is not perhaps surprising that an Italian, accustomed to the polished effeminacy of modern verse, both in his language and in Latin, should be delighted with the poem of Hero and Leander, which has the sort of charm that belongs to the statues of Bacchus, and soothes the ear with voluptuous harmony, while it gratifies the mind with elegant and pleasing imagery. It is not, however, to be taken for granted that Scaliger is always mistaken in his judgments on particular passages in these greatest of poets. The superiority of the Homeric poems is rather incontestable in their general effect, and in the vigorous originality of his verse, than in the selection of circumstance, sentiment, or expression. It would be a sort of prejudice almost as tasteless as that of Scaliger, to refuse the praise of real poetic superiority to many passages of Virgil, even as compared with the *Iliad*, and far more with the *Odyssey*. If the similes of the older poet are more picturesque and animated, those of his imitator are more appropriate and parallel to the subject. It would be rather whimsical to deny this to be a principal merit in a comparison. Scaliger sacrifices Theocritus as much as Homer at the altar of Virgil, and of course Apollonius has little chance with so partial a judge. Horace and Ovid, at least the latter, are also held by Scaliger superior to the Greeks whenever they come into competition.

21. In the fourth chapter of the sixth book, Scaliger cri-

* Quod si Musæus ea, quæ Homerus scripsit, scripsisset, longè melius eum scripturum fuisse judicamus.

The following is a specimen of Scaliger's style of criticism, chosen rather for its shortness than any other cause:—

Ex vicesimo tertio *Iliadis* transtulit versus illos in comparationem;

μάστιγι δ' αὖν ἔλαυν' παρτιμαδίη· αἱ δὲ αἰ ἴσταν
ἰφίο' ἀκρίσθην ἔμψα περισσῶντι πιλυβοῖ.

ἰσχυρολογία multa; at in nostro animata oratio;

Non tam præcípites bijugo certamine campum
Corripuere, ruuntque effusi carcere currus, &c.

Cum virtutibus horum carminum non est conferenda jejuna illa humilitas; au-

dent præferre tamen grammatici temerarii. Principio, nihil infelicius quam μάστιγι αἰὲν ἔλαυνεν. Nam continuatio et equorum diminuit opinionem, et contemptum facit verberum. Frequentibus intervallis stimuli plus proficiunt. Quod vero admirantur Græculi, pessimum est. ἰφίο' ἀκρίσθην. Extento namque, et, ut milites loquantur, clauso cursu non subsillente opus est. Quare divinus vir, undantia lora; hoc enim pro flagro, et præcípites, et corripuere campum; idque in præterito, ad celeritatem. Et ruunt, quasi in diversa, adeo celeres sunt. Illa vero supra omnem Homerum, proni in verbera pendent. l. v. c. 3.

ticises the modern Latin poets, beginning with Marullus ;

His critique
on modern
Latin poets.

for what is somewhat remarkable, he says that he had been unable to see the Latin poems of Petrarch. He rates Marullus low, though he dwells at length on his poetry, and thinks no better of Augurellus. The continuation of the *Æneid* by Maphæus he highly praises ; Augerianus not at all ; Mantuan has some genius, but no skill ; and Scaliger is indignant that some ignorant schoolmasters should teach from him rather than from Virgil. Of Dolet he speaks with great severity ; his unhappy fate does not atone for the badness of his verses in the eyes of so stern a critic ; “ the fire did not purify him, but rather he polluted the fire.” Palingenius, though too diffuse, he accounts a good poet, and Cotta as an imitator of Catullus. Palearius aims rather to be philosophical than poetical. Castiglione is excellent ; Bembo wants vigour, and sometimes elegance ; he is too fond, as many others are, of trivial words. Of Politian Scaliger does not speak highly ; he rather resembles Statius, has no grace, and is careless of harmony. Vida is reckoned, he says, by most the first poet of our time ; he dwells, therefore, long on the *Ars Poetica*, and extols it highly, though not without copious censure. Of Vida’s other poems the *Bombyx* is the best. Pontanus is admirable for every thing, if he had known where to stop. To Sannazarius and Fracastorius he assigns the highest praise of universal merit, but places the last at the head of the whole band.

22. The Italian language, like those of Greece and Rome, had been hitherto almost exclusively treated by grammarians, the superior criticism having little place even in the writings of Bembo. But soon after the middle of the century, the academies established in many cities, dedicating much time to their native language, began to point out beauties, and to animadvert on defects beyond the province of grammar. The enthusiastic admiration of Petrarch poured itself forth in tedious commentaries upon every word of every sonnet ; one of which, illustrated with the heavy prolixity of that age, would sometimes be the theme of a volume. Some philosophical or theological pedants spiritualised his meaning, as had been attempted before ; the absurd paradox of denying the real existence of Laura is a

Critical influence of the academies.

known specimen of their refinements. Many wrote on the subject of his love for her; and a few denied its Platonic purity, which however the academy of Ferrara thought fit to decree. One of the heretics, by name Cresci, ventured also to maintain that she was married; but this probable hypothesis had not many followers.*

23. Meantime a multitude of new versifiers, chiefly close copyists of the style of Petrarch, lay open to the malice of their competitors, and the strictness of these self-chosen judges of song. A critical controversy that sprang up about 1558 between two men of letters, very prominent in their age, Annibal Caro and Ludovico Castelvetro, is celebrated in the annals of Italian literature. The former had published a canzone in praise of the king of France, beginning —

Dispute of
Caro and
Castelvetro.

Venite all' ombra de' gran gigli d' oro.

Castelvetro made some sharp animadversions on this ode, which seems really to deserve a good deal of censure, being in bad taste, turgid, and foolish. Caro replied with the bitterness natural to a wounded poet. In this there might be nothing unpardonable, and even his abusive language might be extenuated at least by many precedents in literary story; but it is imputed to Caro that he excited the Inquisition against his suspected adversary. Castelvetro had been of the celebrated academy of Modena, whose alleged inclination to Protestantism had proved, several years before, the cause of its dissolution, and of the persecution which some of its members suffered. Castelvetro, though he had avoided censure at that time, was now denounced about 1560, when the persecution was hottest, to the Inquisition at Rome. He obeyed its summons, but soon found it prudent to make his escape, and reached Chiavenna in the Grison dominions. He lived several years afterwards in safe quarters, but seems never to have made an open profession of the reformed faith.†

24. Castelvetro himself is one of the most considerable among the Italian critics; but his taste is often lost in subtilty,

* Crescimbeni, Storia della Volgar Poesia, ii. 295—309. Crescimbeni, ii. 431. Tiraboschi, x. 31. Ginguéné, vii. 365. Corniani, vi. 61.

† Muratori, Vita del Castelvetro, 1727.

and his fastidious temper seems to have sought nothing so much as occasion for censure. His greatest work is a commentary upon the Poetics of Aristotle; and it may justly claim respect, not only as the earliest exposition of the theory of criticism, but for its acuteness, erudition, and independence of reasoning, which disclaims the Stagirite as a master, though the diffuseness usual in that age, and the microscopic subtilty of the writer's mind may render its perusal tedious. Twining, one of the best critics on the Poetics, has said, in speaking of the commentaries of Castelvetro and of a later Italian, Beni, that "their prolixity, their scholastic and trifling subtilty, their useless tediousness of logical analysis, their microscopic detection of difficulties invisible to the naked eye of common sense, and their waste of confutation upon objections made only by themselves, and made on purpose to be confuted—all this, it must be owned, is disgusting and repulsive. It may sufficiently release a commentator from the duty of reading their works throughout, but not from that of examining and consulting them; for in both these writers, but more especially in Beni, there are many remarks equally acute and solid; many difficulties will be seen clearly stated, and sometimes successfully removed; many things usefully illustrated and clearly explained; and if their freedom of censure is now and then disgraced by a little disposition to cavil, this becomes almost a virtue when compared with the servile and implicit admiration of Dacier."*

25. Castelvetro in his censorious humour did not spare the greatest shades that repose in the laurel groves of Parnassus, nor even those whom national pride had elevated to a level with them. Homer is less blamed than any other; but frequent shafts are levelled at Virgil, and not always unjustly, if poetry of real genius could ever bear the extremity of critical rigour, in which a monotonous and frigid mediocrity has generally found refuge.† In

Castelvetro
on Aristotle's
Poetics.

Severity of
Castelvetro's
criticism.

* Twining's Aristotle's Poetics, preface, p. 13.

† One of his censures falls on the minute particularity of the prophecy of Anchises in the sixth Æneid; peccando Virgilio nella convenevolezza della pro-

fetia, la quale non suole condescendere a nomi proprj, ne a cose tanto chiare e particolari, ma, tacendo i nomi, suole manifestare le persone, e le loro azioni con figure di parlare alquanto oscure, si come si vede nelle profetie della scrittura

Dante he finds fault with the pedantry that has filled his poem with terms of science, unintelligible and unpleasing to ignorant men, for whom poems are chiefly designed.* Ariosto he charges with plagiarism, laying unnecessary stress on his borrowing some stories, as that of Zerbino, from older books; and even objects to his introduction of false names of kings, since we may as well invent new mountains and rivers, as violate the known truths of history.† This punctilious cavil is very characteristic of Castelvetro. Yet he sometimes reaches a strain of philosophical analysis, and can by no means be placed in the ranks of criticism below La Harpe, to whom, by his attention to verbal minuteness, as well as by the acrimony and self-confidence of his character, he may in some measure be compared.

26. The Ercolano of Varchi, a series of dialogues, belongs to the inferior but more numerous class of ^{Ercolano of Varchi.} critical writings, and after some general observations on speech and language as common to men, turns to the favourite theme of his contemporaries, their native idiom. He is one who with Bembo contends that the language should not be called Italian, or even Tuscan, but Florentine, though admitting, what might be expected, that few agree to this except the natives of the city. Varchi had written on the side of Caro against Castelvetro, and though upon the whole he does not speak of the latter in the Ercolano with incivility, cannot restrain his wrath at an assertion of the stern critic of Modena, that there were as famous writers in the Spanish and French as in the Italian language. Varchi even denies that there was any writer of reputation in the first of these except Juan de la Mena, and the author of *Amadis de Gaul*. Varchi is now chiefly known as the

sacra e nell' Alessandra di Licophrone, p. 219. (edit. 1576.) This is not unjust in itself; but Castelvetro wanted the candour to own, or comprehensiveness to perceive, that a prophecy of the Roman history, couched in allegories, would have had much less effect on Roman readers.

* Rendendola massimamente per questa via difficile ad intendere e meno piacente a uomini idioti, per gli quali principalmente si fanno i poemi. p. 597.

But the Comedy of Dante was about as much written for *gl' idioti*, as the *Principia* of Newton.

† Castelvetro, p. 212. He objects on the same principle to Giraldis Cinthio, that he had chosen a subject for tragedy which never had occurred, nor had been reported to have occurred, and this of royal persons unheard of before, il qual peccato di prendere soggetto tale per la tragedie non è da perdonare. p. 103.

Pinciano, was physician to Charles V., and it was therefore written, in all probability, many years before it appeared from the press. The title is rather quaint, *Philosophia Antigua Poetica*, and it is written in the form of letters. Pinciano is the first who discovered the Poetics of Aristotle, which he had diligently studied, to be a fragment of a larger work, as is now generally admitted. "Whenever Lopez Pinciano," says Bouterwek, "abandons Aristotle, his notions respecting the different poetic styles are as confused as those of his contemporaries; and only a few of his notions and distinctions can be deemed of importance at the present day. But his name is deserving of honourable remembrance, for he was the first writer of modern times who endeavoured to establish a philosophic art of poetry; and, with all his veneration for Aristotle, he was the first scholar who ventured to think for himself, and to go somewhat farther than his master."* The Art of Poetry, by Juan de la Cueva, is a poem of the didactic class, containing some information as to the history of Spanish verse.† The other critical treatises which appeared in Spain about this time seem to be of little importance; but we know by the writings of Cervantes, that the poets of the age of Philip were, as usual, followed by the animal for whose natural prey they are designed, the sharp-toothed and keen-scented critic.

31. France produced very few books of the same class.

The *Institutiones Oratoriæ* of Omer Talon is an elementary and short treatise of rhetoric.‡ Baillet and Goujet give some praise to the Art of Poetry by Pelletier, published in 1555.§ The treatise of Henry Stephens, on the Conformity of the French Language with the Greek, is said to contain very good observations.|| But it must be (for I do not recollect to have seen it) rather a book of grammar than of superior criticism. The *Rhetorique Française* of Fouquelin (1555) seems to be little else than a summary of rhetorical figures.¶ That of Courcelles, in

French
treatises of
criticism.

* Hist. of Span. Lit. p. 323.

† It is printed entire in the eighth volume of *Parnaso Español*.

‡ Gibert, *Maîtres de l'Eloquence*, printed in Baillet, viii. 181.

§ Baillet, iii. 351. Goujet, iii. 97.

Pelletier had previously rendered Horace's Art of Poetry into French verse, id. 66.

|| Baillet, iii. 353.

¶ Gibert, p. 184.

1557, is not much better.* All these relate rather to prose than to poetry. From the number of versifiers in France, and the popularity of Ronsard and his school, we might have expected a larger harvest of critics. Pasquier, in his valuable miscellany, *Les Recherches de la France*, has devoted a few pages to this subject, but not on an extensive or systematic plan; nor can the two *Bibliothèques Françaises*, by La Croix du Maine and Verdier, both published in 1584, though they contain a great deal of information as to the literature of France, with some critical estimates of books, be reckoned in the class to which we are now adverting.

32. Thomas Wilson, afterwards secretary of state, and much employed under Elizabeth, is the author of an “*Art of Rhetorique*,” dated in the preface January, 1553. The rules in this treatise are chiefly from Aristotle, with the help of Cicero and Quintilian, but his examples and illustrations are modern. Warton says that it is the first system of criticism in our language.† But in common use of the word it is no criticism at all, any more than the treatise of Cicero de Oratore; it is what it professes to be, a system of rhetoric in the ancient manner; and, in this sense, it had been preceded by the work of Leonard Cox, which has been mentioned in another place. Wilson was a man of considerable learning, and his *Art of Rhetorique* is by no means without merit. He deserves praise for censuring the pedantry of learned phrases, or as he calls them, “strange *inkhorn* terms,” advising men “to speak as is commonly received;” and he censures also what was not less pedantic, the introduction of a French or Italian idiom, which the travelled English affected in order to show their politeness, as the scholars did the former to prove their erudition. Wilson had before published an *Art of Logic*.

33. The first English criticism, properly speaking, that I find, is a short tract by Gascoyne, doubtless the poet of that name, published in 1575; “*Certain Notes of Instruction concerning the making of Verse or Rhyne in English*.” It consists only of ten pages, but the observations are judicious. Gascoyne recommends that the sentence should,

* Gibert, p. 366.

† Hist. of Engl. Poetry, iv. 157.

as far as possible, be finished at the close of two lines in the couplet measure.* Webbe, author of a "Discourse of English Poetry" (1586), is copious in comparison with Gascoyne, though he stretches but to seventy pages. His taste is better shown in his praise of Spenser for the Shepherd's Kalendar, than of Gabriel Harvey for his "reformation of our English verse;" that is, by forcing it into uncouth Latin measures, which Webbe has himself most unhappily attempted.

34. A superior writer to Webbe was George Puttenham, whose "Art of English Poesie," published in 1589, is a small quarto of 258 pages in three books. It is in many parts very well written, in a measured prose, rather elaborate and diffuse. He quotes occasionally a little Greek. Among the contemporary English poets, Puttenham extols "for eclogue and pastoral poetry Sir Philip Sidney and Master Chalonier, and that other gentleman who wrote the late Shepherd's Kalendar. For ditty and amorous ode I find Sir Walter Rawleigh's vein most lofty, insolent, [uncommon] and passionate; Master Edward Dyer for elegy most sweet, solemn, and of high conceit; Gascon [Gascoyne] for a good metre and for a plentiful vein; Phaer and Golding for a learned and well-connected verse, specially in translation, clear, and very faithfully answering their author's intent. Others have also written with much facility, but more commendably perhaps, if they had not written so much nor so popularly. But last in recital and first in degree is the queen our sovereign lady, whose learned, delicate, noble muse easily surmounteth all the rest that have written before her time or since, for sense, sweetness, and subtilty, be it in ode, elegy, epigram, or any other kind of poem, heroic or lyric, wherein it shall please her majesty to employ her pen, even by so much odds as her own excellent estate and degree exceedeth all the rest of her most humble vassals."† On this it may be remarked, that the only specimen of Elizabeth's poetry which, as far as I know, remains, is prodigiously

* Gascoyne, with all the other early English critics, was republished in a collection by Mr. Haslewood in two volumes, 1811 and 1815. † Puttenham, p. 51. of Haslewood's edition, or in *Censura Literaria*, i. 348.

bad.* In some passages of Puttenham, we find an approach to the higher province of philosophical criticism.

35. These treatises of Webbe and Puttenham may have been preceded in order of writing, though not of publication, by the performance of a more illustrious author, Sir Philip Sidney. His defence of Poesy Sidney's Defence of Poesy. was not published till 1595. The Defence of Poesy has already been reckoned among the polite writings of the Elizabethan age, to which class it rather belongs than to that of criticism; for Sidney rarely comes to any literary censure, and is still farther removed from any profound philosophy. His sense is good, but not ingenious, and the declamatory tone weakens its effect.

SECT. III.—ON WORKS OF FICTION.

Novels and Romances in Italy and Spain — Sidney's Arcadia.

36. THE novels of Bandello, three parts of which were published in 1554, and a fourth in 1573, are perhaps Novels of Bandello; the best known and the most admired in that species of composition after those of Boccaccio. They have been censured as licentious, but are far less so than any of preceding times, and the reflections are usually of a moral cast. These, however, as well as the speeches, are very tedious. There is not a little predilection in Bandello for sanguinary stories. Ginguéné praises these novels for just sentiments, adherence to probability, and choice of interesting subjects. In these respects, we often find a superiority in the older novels above those of the nineteenth century, the golden age, as it is generally thought, of fictitious story. But, in the management of these subjects, the Italian and Spanish novelists show little skill; they are worse cooks of better meat; they exert no power over the emotions beyond what the intrinsic nature of the events related must produce; they sometimes describe well, but with no great imagination; they have no strong conception of character, no deep acquaintance

* Ellis's Specimens, ii. 162.

with mankind, not often much humour, no vivacity and spirit of dialogue.

37. The *Hecatomithi*, or *Hundred Tales*, of Giraldi Cinthio; Cinthio have become known in England by the recourse that Shakspeare has had to them in two instances, *Cymbeline* and *Measure for Measure*, for the subjects of his plays. Cinthio has also borrowed from himself in his own tragedies. He is still more fond of dark tales of blood than *Bandello*. He seems consequently to have possessed an unfortunate influence over the stage; and to him, as well as his brethren of the Italian novel, we trace those scenes of improbable and disgusting horror, from which, though the native taste and gentleness of Shakspeare for the most part disdained such helps, we recoil in almost all the other tragedians of the old English school. Of the remaining Italian novelists that belong to this period, it is enough to mention *Erizzo*, better known as one of the founders of medallic science. His *Sei Giornate* contain thirty-six novels, called *Avvenimenti*. They are written with intolerable prolixity, but in a pure and even elevated tone of morality. This character does not apply to the novels of *Lasca*.

38. The French novels, ascribed to Margaret, Queen of Navarre, and first published in 1558, with the title of the Queen of Navarre. "*Histoire des Amans fortunés*," are principally taken from the Italian collections or from the *fabliaux* of the *trouveurs*. Though free in language, they are written in a much less licentious spirit than many of the former, but breathe throughout that anxiety to exhibit the clergy, especially the regulars, in an odious or ridiculous light, which the principles of their illustrious authoress might lead us to expect. *Belleforest* translated, perhaps with some variation, the novels of *Bandello* into French.*

39. Few probably will now dispute, that the Italian novel, a picture of real life, and sometimes of true circumstances, is perused with less weariness than the Spanish romance of chivalry. Spanish romance, the alternative then offered to the lovers of easy reading. But this had very numerous admirers in that generation, nor was the taste confined to Spain. The

* *Bouterwek*, v. 286., mentions by the sixteenth century; I do not know name several other French novelists of any thing of them.

popularity of *Amadis de Gaul* and *Palmerin of Oliva*, with their various continuators, has been already mentioned.* One of these, "*Palmerin of England*," appeared in French at Lyons in 1555. It is uncertain who was the original author, or in what language it was first written. Cervantes has honoured it with a place next to *Amadis*. Mr. Southey, though he condescended to abridge *Palmerin of England*, thinks it inferior to that *Iliad* of romantic adventure. Several of the tales of knight-errantry that are recorded to have stood on the unfortunate shelves of *Don Quixote* belong to this latter part of the century, among which *Don Bellianis of Greece* is better known by name than any other. These romances were not condemned by Cervantes alone. "Every poet and prose writer," says Bouterwek, "of cultivated talent, laboured to oppose the contagion."†

40. Spain was the parent of a romance in a very different style, but, if less absurd and better written, not perhaps much more interesting to us than those of chivalry, the *Diana of Montemayor*. *Sannazaro's* beautiful model of pastoral romance, the *Arcadia*, and some which had been written in Portugal, take away the merit of originality from this celebrated fiction. It formed, however, a school in this department of literature, hardly less numerous, according to Bouterwek, than the imitators of *Amadis*.‡ The

*Diana of
Monte-
mayor.*

* La Noue, a severe Protestant, thinks them as pernicious to the young as the writings of Machiavel had been to the old. This he dwells upon in his sixth discourse. "De tout temps," this honest and sensible writer says, "il y a eu des hommes, qui ont esté diligens d'escrire et mettre en lumière des choses vaines. Ce qui plus les y a conviez est, que ils sçavoient que leurs labeurs seroient agréables à ceux de leurs siècles, dont la plus part a toujours heimé [aimé] la vanité, comme le poisson fait l'eau. Les vieux romans dont nous voyons encor les fragmens par-ci et par-là, à savoir de *Lancelot du Lac*, de *Perceforest*, *Tristan*, *Giron le courtois*, et autres, font foy de ceste vanité antique. On s'en est repeu l'espace de plus de cinq cens ans, jusques à ce que nostre langage estant devenu plus orné et nostres esprits plus frétilans, il a fallu inventer quelque nouveauté pour les égayer. Voilà comment les

livres d'*Amadis* sont venus en évidence parmi nous en ce dernier siècle. Mais pour en parler au vrai, l'Espagne les a engendrez, et la France les a seulement revêtus de plus beaux habillemens. Sous le règne du roy Henry second, ils ont eu leur principale vogue; et croy qui si quelqu'un les eust voulu alors blâmer, en luy eust craché au visage," &c. p. 153. edit. 1558.

† In the opinion of Bouterwek (v. 282.), the taste for chivalrous romance declined in the latter part of the century, through the prevalence of a classical spirit in literature, which exposed the mediæval fictions to derision. The number of shorter and more amusing novels might probably have more to do with it; the serious romance has a terrible enemy in the lively. But it revived, with a little modification, in the next age.

‡ Hist. Span. Lit. p. 305.

language of Montemayor is neither laboured nor affected, and though sometimes of rather too formal a solemnity, especially in what the author thought philosophy, is remarkably harmonious and elevated; nor is he deficient in depth of feeling or fertility of imagination. Yet the story seems incapable of attracting any reader of this age. The *Diana*, like Sannazaro's *Arcadia*, is mingled with much lyric poetry, which, Bouterwek thinks, is the soul of the whole composition. Cervantes indeed condemns all the longer of these poems to the flames, and gives but limited praise to the *Diana*. Yet this romance, and a continuance of it by Gil Polo, had inspired his own youthful genius in the *Galatea*. The chief merit of the *Galatea*, published in 1584, consists in the poetry which the story seems intended to hold together. In the *Diana* of Montemayor, and even in the *Galatea*, it has been supposed that real adventures and characters were generally shadowed—a practice not already without precedent, and which, by the French especially, was carried to a much greater length in later times.

41. Spain became celebrated about the end of this century for her novels in the *picaresque* style, of which Lázaro de Tormes is the oldest extant specimen. The continuation of this little work is reckoned inferior to the part written by Mendoza himself; but both together are amusing and inimitably short.* The first edition of the most celebrated romance of this class, *Guzman d'Alfarache*, falls within the sixteenth century. It was written by Matthew Aleman, who is said to have lived long at court. He might there have acquired, not a knowledge of the tricks of common rogues, but an experience of mankind, which is reckoned one of the chief merits of his romance. Many of his stories also relate to the manners of a higher class than that of his hero. *Guzman d'Alfarache* is a sort of prototype of *Gilblas*, though, in fact, *La Sage* has borrowed very freely from all the Spanish novels of this school. The adventures are numerous and diversified enough to amuse an idle reader, and Aleman has displayed a great

* Though the continuation of Lázaro de Tormes is reckoned inferior to the original, it contains the only story in

the whole novel which has made its fortune, that of the man who was exhibited as a sea-monster.

Novels in
the pica-
resque
style.

Guzman d'
Alfarache.

deal of good sense in his reflections, which are expressed in the pointed, condensed style affected by most writers of Spain. Cervantes has not hesitated to borrow from him one of Sancho's celebrated adjudications, in the well-known case of the lady, who was less pugnacious in defence of her honour than of the purse awarded by the court as its compensation. This story is, however, if I am not mistaken, older than either of them.*

42. It may require some excuse that I insert in this place *Las Guerras de Granada*, a history of certain Moorish factions in the last days of that kingdom, both because it has been usually referred to the seventeenth century, and because many have conceived it to be a true relation of events. It purports to have been translated by Gines Perez de la Hita, an inhabitant of the city of Murcia, from an Arabic original of one Aben Hamili. Its late English translator seems to entertain no doubt of its authenticity; and it has been sagaciously observed that no Christian could have known the long genealogies of Moorish nobles which the book contains. Most of those, however, who read it without credulity, will feel, I presume, little

*Las Guer-
ras de Gra-
nada.*

* The following passage, which I extract from the *Retrospective Review*, vol. v. p. 199., is a fair and favourable specimen of Aleman as a moralist, who is however apt to be tedious, as moralists usually are:—

"The poor man is a kind of money that is not current, the subject of every idle housewife's chat, the offscum of the people, the dust of the street, first trampled under foot, and then thrown on the dunghill; in conclusion, the poor man is the rich man's ass. He dineth with the last, fareth with the worst, and payeth dearest; his sixpence will not go so far as the rich man's three-pence; his opinion is ignorance, his discretion foolishness, his suffrage scorn, his stock upon the common, abused by many, and abhorred by all. If he come into company he is not heard; if any chance to meet him, they seek to shun him; if he advise, though never so wisely, they grudge and murmur at him; if he work miracles, they say he is a witch; if virtuous, that he goeth about to deceive; his venial sin is a blas-

phemy; his thought is made treason; his cause, be it never so just, is not regarded; and to have his wrongs righted, he must appeal to that other life. All men crush him; no man favoureth him. There is no man that will relieve his wants; no man that will bear him company when he is alone and oppressed with grief. None help him, all hinder him; none give him, all take from him; he is debtor to none, and yet must make payment to all. O the unfortunate and poor condition of him that is poor, to whom even the very hours are sold which the clock striketh, and payeth custom for the sunshine in August!"

This is much in the style of our English writers in the first part of the seventeenth century, and confirms what I have suspected, that they formed it in a great measure on the Spanish school. Guzman d'Alfarache was early translated into English, as most other Spanish books were; and the language itself was more familiar in the reigns of James and Charles than it became afterwards.

difficulty in agreeing with Antonio, who ranks it "among Milesian fables, though very pleasing to those who have nothing to do." The Zegris and Abencerrages, with all their romantic exploits, seem to be mere creations of Castilian imagination; nor has Conde, in his excellent history of the Moors in Spain, once deigned to notice them even as fabulous; so much did he reckon this famous production of Perez de la Hita below the historian's regard. Antonio mentions no edition earlier than that of Alcalá in 1604; the English translator names 1601 for the date of its publication, an edition of which year is in the Museum; nor do I find that any one has been aware of an earlier, published at Saragoça in 1595, except Brunet, who mentions it as rare and little known. It appears by the same authority that there is another edition of 1598.

43. The heroic and pastoral romance of Spain contributed something, yet hardly so much as has been supposed, to Sir Philip Sidney's *Arcadia*, the only original production of this kind worthy of notice which our older literature can boast. The *Arcadia* was published in 1590, having been written, probably, by its highly accomplished author about ten years before.

44. Walpole, who thought fit to display the dimensions of his own mind, by announcing that he could perceive nothing remarkable in Sir Philip Sidney (as if the suffrage of Europe in what he admits to be an age of heroes were not a decisive proof that Sidney himself over-topped those sons of Anak), says of the *Arcadia*, that it is "a tedious, lamentable, pedantic pastoral romance, which the patience of a young virgin in love cannot now wade through." We may doubt whether Walpole could altogether estimate the patience of a reader so extremely unlike himself; and his epithets, except perhaps the first, are inapplicable: the *Arcadia* is more free from pedantry than most books of that age; and though we are now so accustomed to a more stimulant diet in fiction, that few would read it through with pleasure, the story is as sprightly as most other romances, sometimes indeed a little too much so, for the *Arcadia* is not quite a book for "young virgins," of which some of its admirers by hearsay seem not to have been aware. By the

epithet "pastoral," we may doubt whether Walpole knew much of this romance beyond its name; for it has far less to do with shepherds than with courtiers, though the idea might probably be suggested by the popularity of the *Diana*. It does not appear to me that the *Arcadia* is more tiresome and uninteresting than the generality of that class of long romances, proverbially among the most tiresome of all books; and, in a less fastidious age, it was read, no doubt, even as a story, with some delight.* It displays a superior mind, rather complying with a temporary taste than affected by it, and many pleasing passages occur, especially in the tender and innocent loves of Pyrocles and Philoclea. I think it, nevertheless, on the whole, inferior in sense, style, and spirit to the *Defence of Poesy*. The following passage has some appearance of having suggested a well-known poem in the next age to the lover of *Sacharissa*; we may readily believe that Waller had turned over, in the glades of *Penshurst*, the honoured pages of her immortal uncle†:—

45. "The elder is named *Pamela*, by many men not deemed inferior to her sister; for my part, when I marked them both, methought there was (if at least such perfections may receive the word of more) more sweetness in *Philoclea*, but more majesty in *Pamela*: methought love played in *Philoclea*'s eyes, and threatened in *Pamela*'s; methought *Philoclea*'s beauty only persuaded, but so persuaded as all hearts must yield; *Pamela*'s beauty used violence, and such violence as no heart could resist, and it seems that such proportion is between their minds. *Philoclea* so bashful, as if her excellencies had stolen into her before she was aware; so humble, that she will put all pride out of countenance; in sum, such proceeding as will stir hope, but teach hope good manners; *Pamela*, of high thoughts, who avoids not pride with not knowing her excellencies, but by making that one of her excellencies to be void of pride; her mother's

* "It appears," says Drake, "to have been suggested to the mind of Sir Philip Sidney two models of very different ages, and to have been built, in fact, on their admixture; these are the *Ethiopic History* of *Heliodorus*, bishop of *Tricca* in *Thessaly*, and the *Arcadia* of *Sannazaro*,"

p. 549. A translation of *Heliodorus* had been published a short time before.

† The poem I mean is that addressed to *Amoret*, "Fair! that you may truly know," drawing a comparison between her and *Sacharissa*.

wisdom, greatness, nobility, but, if I can guess aright, knit with a more constant temper.”

46. The Arcadia stands quite alone among English fictions of this century. But many were translated in the reign of Elizabeth from the Italian, French, Spanish, and even Latin, among which Painter's Palace of Pleasure, whence Shakspeare took several of his plots, and the numerous labours of Antony Munday may be mentioned. Palmerin of England in 1580, and Amadis of Gaul in 1592, were among these; others of less value were transferred from the Spanish text by the same industrious hand; and since these, while still new, were sufficient to furnish all the gratification required by the public, our own writers did not much task their invention to augment the stock. They would not have been very successful, if we may judge by such deplorable specimens as Breton and Greene, two men of considerable poetical talent, have left us.* The once famous story of the Seven Champions of Christendom, by one Johnson, is of rather a superior class; the adventures are not original, but it is by no means a translation from any single work.† Mallory's famous romance, *La Morte d'Arthur*, is of much earlier date, and was first printed by Caxton. It is, however, a translation from several French romances, though written in very spirited language.

* The *Mavillia* of Breton, the *Dorastus* and *Fawnia* of Greene, will be found in the collections of the indefatigable Sir Egerton Brydges. The first is below contempt; the second, if not quite so ridiculous, is written with a quaint, affected, and empty Euphuism. *British Bibliographer*, i. 508. But as truth is

generally more faithful to natural sympathies than fiction, a little tale, called *Never too Late*, in which Greene has related his own story, is unaffected and pathetic. *Drake's Shakspeare and his Times*, i. 489.

† *Drake*, i. 529.

CHAPTER VIII.

HISTORY OF PHYSICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS LITERATURE
FROM 1500 TO 1600.

SECT. I.—ON MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

Algebraists of this Period — Vieta — Slow Progress of Copernican Theory — Tycho Brahe — Reform of Calendar — Mechanics — Stevinus — Gilbert.

1. THE breach of faith towards Tartaglia, by which Cardan communicated to the world the method of solving cubic equations, having rendered them enemies, the injured party defied the aggressor to a contest, wherein each should propose thirty-one problems to be solved by the other. Cardan accepted the challenge, and gave a list of his problems, but devolved the task of meeting his antagonist on his disciple Ferrari. The problems of Tartaglia are so much more difficult than those of Cardan, and the latter's representative so frequently failed in solving them, as to show the former in a high rank among algebraists, though we have not so long a list of his discoveries.* This is told by himself in a work of miscellaneous mathematical and physical learning, *Quesiti ed invenzioni diverse*, published in 1546. In 1555 he put forth the first part of a treatise, entitled *Trattato di numeri e misure*, the second part appearing in 1560.

2. Pelletier of Mans, a man advantageously known both in literature and science, published a short treatise on algebra in 1554. He does not give the method of solving cubic equations, but Hutton is mistaken in supposing that he was ignorant of Cardan's work, which he quotes. In fact he promises a third book, this treatise being divided into two, on the higher parts of algebra; but I do not know whether this be found in any subsequent edition. Pelletier does not employ the signs + and —, which had been invented

* Montucla, p. 568.

by Stifelius, using p and m instead, but we find the sign $\sqrt{}$ of irrationality. What is perhaps the most original in this treatise is, that its author perceived that, in a quadratic equation, where the root is rational, it must be a divisor of the absolute number.*

3. In the Whetstone of Wit, by Robert Record, in 1557, we find the signs $+$ and $-$, and, for the first time, that of equality $=$, which he invented.† Record knew that a quadratic equation has two roots. The scholar, for it is in dialogue, having been perplexed by this as a difficulty, the master answers, "That variety of roots doth declare that one equation in number may serve for two several questions. But the form of the question may easily instruct you which of these two roots you shall take for your purpose. Howbeit, sometimes you may take both."‡ He says nothing of cubic equations, having been prevented by an interruption, the nature of which he does not divulge, from continuing his algebraic lessons. We owe therefore nothing to Record but his invention of a sign. As these artifices not only abbreviate, but clear up the process of reasoning, each successive improvement in notation deserves, even in the most concise sketch of mathematical history, to be remarked.

* Pelletier seems to have arrived at this not by observation, but in a scientific method. Comme $x^2 = 2x + 15$ (I substitute the usual signs for clearness), il est certain que x que nous cherchons doit estre contenu également en 15, puisque x^2 est égal a deux x , et 15 davantage, et que tout nombre *censique* (quarré) contient les racines également et précisément. Maintenant puisque $2x$ font certain nombre de racines, il faut donc que 15 fasse l'achèvement des racines qui sont nécessaires pour accomplir x^2 . p. 40. (Lyon. 1554.)

† "And to avoid the tedious repetition of these words, 'is equal to,' I will set, as I do often in work use, a pair of parallels, *gemowee* lines of one length thus $=$, because no two things can be more equal." The word *gemowee*, from the French *gemeau*, twin (Cotgrave), is very uncommon: it was used for a double ring, a *gemel* or *gemow* ring. Todd's Johnson's Dictionary.

‡ This general mode of expression might lead us to suppose, that Record

was acquainted with negative as well as positive roots, the fictæ radices of Cardan. That a quadratic equation of a certain form has two positive roots, had long been known. In a very modern book, it is said that Mohammed ben Musa, an Arabian of the reign of Al-mamon, whose algebra was translated by the late Dr. Rosen in 1831, observes that there are two roots in the form $ax^2 + b = cx$, but that this cannot be in the other three cases. Libri, Hist. des Sciences Mathématiques en Italie, vol. ii. (1838). Leonard of Pisa had some notion of this, but did not state it, according to M. Libri, so generally as Ben Musa. Upon reference to Colebrooke's Indian Algebra, it will appear that the existence of two positive roots in some cases, though the conditions of the problem will often be found to exclude the application of one of them, is clearly laid down by the Hindoo algebraists. But one of them says, "People do not approve a negative absolute number."

But certainly they do not exhibit any peculiar ingenuity, and might have occurred to the most ordinary student.

4. The great boast of France, and indeed of algebraical science generally, in this period, was Francis Viète, oftener called Vieta, so truly eminent a man that he may well spare laurels which are not his own. It has been observed in another place, that after Montucla had rescued from the hands of Wallis, who claims every thing for Harriott, many algebraical methods indisputably contained in the writings of his own countryman, Cossali has come forward, with an equal cogency of proof, asserting the right of Cardan to the greater number of them. But the following steps in the progress of algebra may be justly attributed to Vieta alone. 1. We must give the first place to one less difficult in itself, than important in its results. In the earlier algebra, alphabetical characters were not generally employed at all, except that the Res, or unknown quantity, was sometimes set down R. for the sake of brevity. Stifelius, in 1544, first employed a literal notation, A. B. C., to express unknown quantities, while Cardan, and according to Cossali, Luca di Borgo, to whom we may now add Leonard of Pisa himself, make some use of letters to express indefinite numbers.* But Vieta first applied them as general symbols of

Vieta.

His discoveries.

* Vol. i. p. 54. A modern writer has remarked, that Aristotle employs letters of the alphabet to express indeterminate quantities, and says it has never been observed before. He refers to the *Physics*, in *Aristot. Opera*, i. 543. 550. 565, &c., but without mentioning any edition. The letters α , β , γ , &c. express force, mass, space or time. *Libri, Hist. des Sciences Mathématiques en Italie*, i. 104. Upon reference to Aristotle, I find many instances in the sixth book of the *Physicæ Auseultationes*, and in other places.

Though I am reluctant to mix in my text, which is taken from established writers, any observations of my own on a subject wherein my knowledge is so very limited as in mathematics, I may here remark, that although Tartaglia and Cardan do not use single letters as symbols of known quantity, yet, when they refer to a geometrical construction, they employ in their equations double letters, the usual signs of lines. Thus we find,

in the *Ars Magna*, $ABmAC$, where we should put $a-b$. The want of a good algorithm was doubtless a great impediment, but it was not quite so deficient as from reading modern histories of algebraical discovery, without reference to the original writers, we might be led to suppose.

The process by which the rule for solving cubic equations was originally discovered, seems worthy, as I have intimated in another place (*Vol. I. p. 453.*) of exciting our curiosity. Maseres has investigated this in the *Philosophical Transactions* for 1780, reprinted in his *Tracts on Cubic and Biquadratic Equations*, p. 55—69., and in *Scriptores Logarithmici*, vol. ii. It is remarkable, that he does not seem to have been aware of what Cardan has himself told us on the subject in the sixth chapter of the *Ars Magna*; yet he has nearly guessed the process which Tartaglia pursued; that is, by a geometrical construction. It is

quantity, and by thus forming the scattered elements of specious analysis into a system, has been justly reckoned the founder of a science, which, from its extensive application, has made the old problems of mere numerical algebra appear elementary and almost trifling. "Algebra," says Kästner, "from furnishing amusing enigmas to the Cossists," as he calls the first teachers of the art, "became the logic of geometrical invention."* It would appear a natural conjecture, that the improvement, towards which so many steps had been taken by others, might occur to the mind of Vieta simply as a means of saving the trouble of arithmetical operations in working out a problem. But those who refer to his treatise entitled *De Arte Analytica Isagoge*, or even the first page of it, will, I conceive, give credit to the author for a more scientific view of his own invention. He calls it *logistica speciosa*, as opposed to the *logistica numerosa* of the older analysis†; his theorems are all general, the given quantities being considered as indefinite, nor does it appear that he substituted letters for the known quantities in the investigation of particular problems. Whatever may have suggested this great invention to the mind of Vieta, it has altogether changed the character of his science.

5. Secondly, Vieta understood the transformation of equations, so as to clear them from co-efficients or surd roots, or to eliminate the second term. This, however, is partly claimed by Cossali for Cardan. Yet it seems that the process em-

manifest, by all that these algebraists have written on the subject, that they had the clearest conviction they were dealing with continuous, or geometrical, not merely with discrete, or arithmetical, quantity. This gave them an insight into the fundamental truth, which is unintelligible, so long as algebra passes for a specious *arithmetic*, that every value, which the conditions of the problem admit, may be assigned to unknown quantities, without distinction of rationality and irrationality. To abstract number itself irrationality is inapplicable.

* Geschichte der Mathematik, i. 63.

† Forma autem Zetesi inveniendi ex arte propria est, non jam in numeris suam logicam exercentem, quæ fuit oscitantia veterum alistarum, sed per lo-

gisticen sub specie noviter inducendam, feliciorum multo et potiorum numerosa, ad comparandum inter se magnitudines, proposita primum homogeniorum lege, &c. p. i. edit. 1646.

A profound writer on algebra, Mr. Peacock, has lately defined it, "the science of general reasoning by symbolical language." In this sense there was very little algebra before Vieta, and it would be improper to talk of its being known to the Greeks, Arabs, or Hindoos. The definition would also include the formulæ of logic. The original definition of algebra seems to be, the science of finding an equation between known and unknown quantities, per oppositionem et restaurationem.

ployed by Cardan was much less neat and short than that of Vieta, which is still in use.* 3. He obtained a solution of cubic equations in a different method from that of Tartaglia. 4. "He shows," says Montucla, "that when the unknown quantity of any equation may have several positive values, for it must be admitted that it is only these that he considers, the second term has for its co-efficient the sum of these values with the sign —, the third has the sum of the products of these values multiplied in pairs; the fourth the sum of such products multiplied in threes, and so forth; finally, that the absolute term is the product of all the values. Here is the discovery of Harriott pretty nearly made." It is at least no small advance towards it.† Cardan is said to have gone some way towards this theory, but not with much clearness, nor extending it to equations above the third degree. 5. He devised a method of solving equations by approximation, analogous to the process of extracting roots, which has been superseded by the invention of more compendious rules.‡ 6. He has been regarded by some as the true author of the application of algebra to geometry, giving copious examples of the solution of problems by this method, though all belonging to straight lines. It looks like a sign of the geometrical relation under which he contemplated his own science, that he uniformly denominates the first power of the unknown quantity *latus*. But this will be found in older writers.§

* It is fully explained in his work *De Recognitione Æquationum*, cap. 7.

† Some theorems given by Vieta very shortly, and without demonstration, show his knowledge of the structure of equations. I transcribe from Maseres, who has expressed them in the usual algebraic language. Si $a + b \times x - x^2$ æquatur ab , x explicabilis est de qualibet illarum duarum a vel b . The second theorem is:—

$$\text{Si } x^3 - b \left\{ x^2 + \frac{ab}{bc} \right\} x$$

æquatur abc , x explicabilis est de qualibet illarum trium a , b , vel c . The third and fourth theorems extend this to higher equations.

‡ Montucla, i. 603. Hutton's Ma-

thematical Dictionary. Biog. Univers. art. Viète.

§ It is certain that Vieta perfectly knew the relation of algebra to magnitude as well as number, as the first pages of his *In Artem Analyticam Isagoge* fully show. But it is equally certain, as has been observed before, that Tartaglia and Cardan, and much older writers, Oriental as well as European, knew the same; it was by help of geometry, which Cardan calls *via regia*, that the former made his great discovery of the solution of cubic equations. Cossali, ii. 147. Cardan, *Ars Magna*, ch. xi.

Latus and *radix* are used indifferently for the first power of the unknown quantity in the *Ars Magna*. Cossali contends that Fra Luca had applied algebra to

6. "Algebra," says a philosopher of the present day, "was still only an ingenious art, limited to the investigation of numbers; Vieta displayed all its extent, and instituted general expressions for particular results. Having profoundly meditated on the nature of algebra, he perceived that the chief characteristic of the science is to express relations. Newton with the same idea defined algebra an universal arithmetic. The first consequences of this general principle of Vieta were his own application of his specious analysis to geometry, and the theory of curve lines, which is due to Descartes; a fruitful idea, from which the analysis of functions, and the most sublime discoveries, have been deduced. It has led to the notion that Descartes is the first who applied algebra to geometry; but this invention is really due to Vieta; for he resolved geometrical problems by algebraic analysis, and constructed figures by means of these solutions. These investigations led him to the theory of angular sections, and to the general equations which express the values of chords."* It has been observed above, that this requires a slight limitation as to the solution of problems.

geometry. Vieta, however, it is said, was the first who taught how to construct geometrical figures by means of algebra. Montucla, p. 604. But compare Cossali, p. 427.

A writer lately quoted, and to whose knowledge and talents I bow with deference, seems, as I would venture to suggest, to have over-rated the importance of that employment of letters to signify quantities, known or unknown, which he has found in Aristotle, and in several of the moderns, and in consequence to have depreciated the real merit of Vieta. Leonard of Pisa, it seems, whose algebra this writer has for the first time published, to his own honour and the advantage of scientific history, makes use of letters as well as lines to represent quantities. Quelquefois il emploie des lettres pour exprimer des quantités indéterminées, connues ou inconnues, sans les représenter par des lignes. On voit ici comment les modernes ont été amenés à se servir des lettres d'alphabet (même pour exprimer des quantités connues) long temps avant Viète, à qui on a attribué à tort une notation qu'il faudrait peut-être faire remonter

jusqu'à Aristote, et que tant d'algebraistes modernes ont employée avant le géomètre Français. Car outre Leonard di Pise, Paciolo et d'autres géomètres Italiens firent usage des lettres pour indiquer les quantités connues, et c'est d'eux plutôt que d'Aristote que les modernes ont appris cette notation. Libri, vol. ii p. 34. But there is surely a wide interval between the use of a short symbolic expression for particular quantities, as M. Libri has remarked in Aristotle, or even the *partial* employment of letters to designate known quantities, as in the Italian algebraists, and the method of stating general relations by the exclusive use of letters, which Vieta first introduced. That Tartaglia and Cardan, and even, as it now appears, Leonard of Pisa, went a certain way towards the invention of Vieta, cannot much diminish his glory; especially when we find that he entirely apprehended the importance of his own *logistica speciosa* in science. I have mentioned above, that, as far as my observation has gone, Vieta does not work particular problems by the specious algebra.

* M. Fourier, quoted in *Biographie Universelle*.

7. The Algebra of Bombelli, published in 1589, is the only other treatise of the kind during this period that seems worthy of much notice. Bombelli saw better than Cardan the nature of what is called the irreducible case in cubic equations. But Vieta, whether after Bombelli or not is not certain, had the same merit.* It is remarkable that Vieta seems to have paid little regard to the discoveries of his predecessors. Ignorant, probably, of the writings of Record, and perhaps even of those of Stifelius, he neither uses the sign $=$ of equality, employing instead the clumsy word *Æquatio*, or rather *Æquetur*†, nor numeral exponents; and Hutton observes that Vieta's algebra has, in consequence, the appearance of being older than it is. He mentions, however, the signs $+$ and $-$, as usual in his own time.

8. Amidst the great progress of algebra through the sixteenth century, the geometers, content with what the ancients had left them, seem to have had little Geometers of this period. care but to elucidate their remains. Euclid was the object of their idolatry; no fault could be acknowledged in his elements, and to write a verbose commentary upon a few propositions was enough to make the reputation of a geometer. Among the almost innumerable editions of Euclid that appeared, those of Commandin and Clavius, both of them in the first rank of mathematicians for that age, may be distinguished. Commandin, especially, was much in request in England, where he was frequently reprinted, and Montucla calls him the model of commentators for the pertinence and sufficiency of his notes. The commentary of Clavius, though a little prolix, acquired a still higher reputation. We owe to Commandin editions of the more difficult geometers, Archimedes, Pappus, and Apollonius; but he attempted little, and that without success, beyond the province of a translator and a commentator. Maurolycus of Messina had no superior among contemporary geometers. Besides his edition of Archimedes, and other labours on the ancient mathematicians, he struck out the

* Cossali. Hutton.

† Vieta uses $=$, but it is to denote that the proposition is true both of $+$ and $-$; where we put \pm . It is almost a presumption of copying one from another,

that several modern writers say Vieta's word is *æquatio*. I have always found it *æquetur*; a difference not material in itself.

elegant theory, in which others have followed him, of deducing the properties of the conic sections from those of the cone itself. But we must refer the reader to Montucla, and other historical and biographical works, for the less distinguished writers of the sixteenth age.*

9. The extraordinary labour of Joachim Rhæticus in his trigonometrical calculations has been mentioned in our first volume. His *Opus Palatinum de Triangulis* was published from his manuscript by Valentine Otho, in 1594. But the work was left incomplete, and the editor did not accomplish what Joachim had designed. In his tables the sines, tangents, and secants are only calculated to ten, instead of fifteen places of decimals. Pitiscus, in 1613, not only completed Joachim's intention, but carried the minuteness of calculation a good deal farther.†

10. It can excite no wonder that the system of Copernicus, simple and beautiful as it is, met with little encouragement for a long time after its promulgation, when we reflect upon the natural obstacles to its reception. Mankind can in general take these theories of the celestial movements only upon trust from philosophers; and in this instance it required a very general concurrence of competent judges to overcome the repugnance of what called itself common sense, and was in fact a prejudice as natural, as universal, and as irresistible as could influence human belief. With this was united another, derived from the language of Scripture; and though it might have been sufficient to answer, that phrases implying the rest of the earth and motion of the sun are merely popular, and such as those who are best convinced of the opposite doctrine must employ in ordinary language, this was neither satisfactory to the vulgar, nor recognised by the church. Nor were the astronomers in general much more favourable to the new theory than either the clergy or the multitude. They had taken pains to familiarise their understandings with the Ptolemaic hypothesis; and it may be often observed that those who have once mastered a complex theory are better pleased with it than with one of more simplicity. The

* Montucla. Kästner. Hutton. Biog. Univ.

† Montucla, p. 581.

whole weight of Aristotle's name, which, in the sixteenth century, not only biassed the judgment, but engaged the passions, connected as it was with general orthodoxy and the preservation of established systems, was thrown into the scale against Copernicus. It was asked what demonstration could be given of his hypothesis; whether the movements of the heavenly bodies could not be reconciled to the Ptolemaic; whether the greater quantity of motion, and the complicated arrangement which the latter required, could be deemed sufficient objections to a scheme proceeding from the Author of nature, to whose power and wisdom our notions of simplicity and facility are inapplicable; whether the moral dignity of man, and his peculiar relations to the Deity, unfolded in Scripture, did not give the world he inhabits a better claim to the place of honour in the universe, than could be pretended, on the score of mere magnitude, for the sun. It must be confessed, that the strongest presumptions in favour of the system of Copernicus were not discovered by himself.

11. It is easy, says Montucla, to reckon the number of adherents to the Copernican theory during the sixteenth century. After Rhæticus, they may be nearly reduced to Reinold, author of the Prussian tables; Rothman, whom Tycho drew over afterwards to his own system; Christian Wursticius (Ursticius), who made some proselytes in Italy; finally, Mæstlin, the illustrious master of Kepler. He might have added Wright and Gilbert, for the credit of England. Among the Italian proselytes made by Wursticius, we may perhaps name Jordano Bruno, who strenuously asserts the Copernican hypothesis; and two much greater authorities in physical science, Benedetti and Galileo himself. It is evident that the preponderance of valuable suffrages was already on the side of truth.*

12. The predominant disinclination to contravene the apparent testimonies of sense and Scripture had, perhaps, more effect than the desire of originality in suggesting the middle course taken by Tycho Brahe. He was a Dane of noble birth, and early drawn, by the impulse of natural genius, to the study of astronomy.

* Montucla, p. 638.

Frederic III., his sovereign, after Tycho had already obtained some reputation, erected for him the observatory of Uraniburg in a small isle of the Baltic. In this solitude he passed above twenty years, accumulating the most extensive and accurate observations which were known in Europe before the discovery of the telescope and the improvement of astronomical instruments. These, however, were not published till 1606, though Kepler had previously used them in his *Tabulæ Rodolphinæ*. Tycho himself did far more in this essential department of the astronomer than any of his predecessors; his resources were much beyond those of Copernicus, and the latter years of this century may be said to make an epoch in physical astronomy. Frederic, Landgrave of Hesse, was more than a patron of the science. The observations of that prince have been deemed worthy of praise long after his rank had ceased to avail them. The emperor Rodolph, when Tycho had been driven by envy from Denmark, gave him an asylum and the means of carrying on his observations at Prague, where he died in 1601. He was the first in modern times who made a catalogue of stars, registering their positions as well as his instruments permitted him. This catalogue, published in his *Progymnasmata* in 1602, contained 777, to which, from Tycho's own manuscripts, Kepler added 223 stars.*

13. In the new mundane system of Tycho Brahe, which, though first regularly promulgated to the world in his *Progymnasmata*, had been communicated in his epistles to the Landgrave of Hesse, he supposes the five planets to move round the sun, but carries the sun itself with these five satellites, as well as the moon, round the earth. Though this, at least at the time, might explain the known phænomena as well as the two other theories, its want of simplicity always prevented its reception. Except Longomontanus, the countryman and disciple of Tycho, scarce any conspicuous astronomer adopted an hypothesis which, if it had been devised some time sooner, would perhaps have met with better success. But in the seventeenth century,

* Montucla, p. 653—659.

the wise all fell into the Copernican theory, and the many were content without any theory at all.

14. A great discovery in physical astronomy may be assigned to Tycho. Aristotle had pronounced comets to be meteors generated below the orbit of the moon. But a remarkable comet in 1577 having led Tycho to observe its path accurately, he came to the conclusion that these bodies are far beyond the lunar orbit, and that they pass through what had always been taken for a solid firmament, environing the starry orbs, and which plays no small part in the system of Ptolemy. He was even near the discovery of their elliptic revolution; the idea of a curve round the sun having struck him, though he could not follow it by observation.*

15. The acknowledged necessity of reforming the Julian calendar gave in this age a great importance to ^{Gregorian} astronomy. It is unnecessary to go into the details of this change, effected by the authority of Gregory XIII., and the skill of Lilius and Clavius, the mathematicians employed under him. The new calendar was immediately received in all countries acknowledging the pope's supremacy; not so much on that account, though a discrepancy in the ecclesiastical reckoning would have been very inconvenient, as of its real superiority over the Julian. The Protestant countries came much more slowly into the alteration; truth being no longer truth, when promulgated by the pope. It is now admitted that the Gregorian calendar is very nearly perfect, at least as to the computation of the solar year, though it is not quite accurate for the purpose of finding Easter. In that age, it had to encounter the opposition of Mæstlin, an astronomer of deserved reputation, and of Scaliger, whose knowledge of chronology ought to have made him conversant with the subject, but who, by a method of squaring the circle which he announces with great confidence as a demonstration, showed the world that his genius did not guide him to the exact sciences.†

16. The science of optics, as well as all other branches of the mixed mathematics, fell very short of astronomy ^{Optics.} in the number and success of its promoters. It was carried not much farther than the point where Alhazen,

* Montucla, p. 662.

† Id. p. 674—686.

Vitello, and Roger Bacon left it. Maurolycus of Messina, in a treatise published in 1575, though written, according to Montucla, fifty years before, entitled *Theoremata de Lumine et Umbra*, has mingled a few novel truths with error. He explains rightly the fact that a ray of light, received through a small aperture of any shape, produces a circular illumination on a body intercepting it at some distance; and points out why different defects of vision are remedied by convex or concave lenses. He had, however, mistaken notions as to the visual power of the eye, which he ascribed not to the retina but to the crystalline humour; and on the whole, Maurolycus, though a very distinguished philosopher in that age, seems to have made few considerable discoveries in physical science.* Baptista Porta, who invented, or at least made known, the camera obscura, though he dwells on many optical phænomena in his *Magia Naturalis*, sometimes making just observations, had little insight into the principles that explain them.† The science of perspective has been more frequently treated, especially in this period, by painters and architects than by mathematicians. Albert Durer, Serlio, Vignola, and especially Peruzzi, distinguished themselves by practical treatises; but the geometrical principles were never well laid down before the work of Guido Ubaldo in 1600.‡

17. This author, of a noble family in the Apennines, ranks high also among the improvers of theoretical mechanics. This great science, checked, like so many others, by the erroneous principles of Aristotle, made scarce any progress till near the end of the century. Cardan and Tartaglia wrote upon the subject; but their acuteness in abstract mathematics did not compensate for a want of accurate observation and a strange looseness of reasoning. Thus Cardan infers that the power required to sustain a weight on an inclined plane varies in the exact ratio of the angle, because it vanishes when the plane is horizontal, and becomes equal to the weight when the plane is perpendicular. But this must be the case if the power follows any other law of direct variation, as that of the sine of inclination, that is, the height, which it really does.§ Tartaglia, on his part, conceived that

* Montucla, p. 695.

† Id. p. 698.

‡ Id. p. 708.

§ Id. p. 690.

a cannon-ball did not indeed describe two sides of a parallelogram, as was commonly imagined even by scientific writers, but, what is hardly less absurd, that its point-blank direction and line of perpendicular descent are united by a circular arch, to which they are tangents. It was generally agreed, till the time of Guido Ubaldi, that the arms of a lever charged with equal weights, if displaced from the horizontal position, would recover it when set at liberty. Benedetti of Turin had juster notions than his Italian contemporaries; he ascribed the centrifugal force of bodies to their tendency to move in a straight line; he determined the law of equilibrium for the oblique lever, and even understood the composition of motions.*

18. If, indeed, we should give credit to the sixteenth century for all that was actually discovered, and even reduced to writing, we might now proceed to the great name of Galileo. For it has been said that his treatise *Della Scienza Meccanica* was written in 1592, though not published for more than forty years afterwards.† But as it has been our rule, with not many exceptions, to date books from their publication, we must defer any mention of this remarkable work to the next period. The experiments, however, made by Galileo, when lecturer in mathematics at Pisa, on falling bodies, come strictly within our limits. He was appointed to this office in 1589, and left it in 1592. Among the many unfounded assertions of Aristotle in physics, it was one that the velocity of falling bodies was proportionate to their weights; Galileo took advantage of the leaning tower of Pisa to prove the contrary. But this important, though obvious experiment, which laid open much of the theory of motion, displeased the adherents of Aristotle so highly, that they compelled him to leave Pisa. He soon obtained a chair in the university of Padua.

19. But on the same principle that we exclude the work of Galileo on mechanics from the sixteenth century, ^{Statics of Stevinus.} it seems reasonable to mention that of Simon Stevinus of Bruges; since the first edition of his *Statics and Hydrostatics* was printed in Dutch as early as 1585, though

* Montucla, p. 693.

† Playfair has fallen into the mistake of supposing that this treatise was pub-

lished in 1592; and those who, on second thoughts, would have known better, have copied him.

we can hardly date its reception among the scientific public before the Latin edition in 1608. Stevinus has been chiefly known by his discovery of the law of equilibrium on the inclined plane, which had baffled the ancients, and, as we have seen, was mistaken by Cardan. Stevinus supposed a flexible chain of uniform weight to descend down the sides of two connected planes, and to hang in a sort of festoon below. The chain would be in equilibrio, because, if it began to move, there would be no reason why it should not move for ever, the circumstances being unaltered by any motion it could have; and thus there would be a perpetual motion, which is impossible. But the part below, being equally balanced, must, separately taken, be in equilibrio. Consequently the part above, lying along the planes, must also be in equilibrio; and hence the weight of the two parts of the chain must be equal, or if that lying along the shorter plane be called the power, it will be to the other as the lengths; or if there be but one plane, and the power hang perpendicularly, as the height to the length.

Hydrosta-
tics. 20. The first discovery made in hydrostatics since the time of Archimedes is due to Stevinus. He found that the vertical pressure of fluids on a horizontal surface is as the product of the base of the vessel by its height, and showed the law of pressure even on the sides.*

Gilbert on
the magnet. 21. The year 1600 was the first in which England produced a remarkable work in physical science; but this was one sufficient to raise a lasting reputation to its author. Gilbert, a physician, in his Latin treatise on the magnet, not only collected all the knowledge which others had possessed on that subject, but became at once the father of experimental philosophy in this island, and by a singular felicity and acuteness of genius, the founder of theories which have been revived after the lapse of ages, and are almost universally received into the creed of the science. The magnetism of the earth itself, his own original hypothesis, *nova illa nostra et inaudita de tellure sententia*, could not, of course, be confirmed by all the experimental and analogical proof, which has rendered that doctrine accepted

* Montucla, ii. 180.

in recent philosophy; but it was by no means one of those vague conjectures that are sometimes unduly applauded, when they receive a confirmation by the favour of fortune. He relied on the analogy of terrestrial phenomena to those exhibited by what he calls a *terrella*, or artificial spherical magnet. What may be the validity of his reasonings from experiment it is for those who are conversant with the subject to determine, but it is evidently by the torch of experiment that he was guided. A letter from Edward Wright, whose authority as a mathematician is of some value, admits the terrestrial magnetism to be proved. Gilbert was also one of our earliest Copernicans, at least as to the rotation of the earth*; and with his usual sagacity inferred, before the invention of the telescope, that there are a multitude of fixed stars beyond the reach of our vision.†

* Mr. Whewell thinks that Gilbert was more doubtful about the annual than the diurnal motion of the earth, and informs us that in a posthumous work he seems to hesitate between Tycho and Copernicus. Hist. of Inductive Sciences, i. 389. Gilbert's argument for the diurnal motion would extend to the annual. Non probabilis modo sed manifesta videtur terræ diurna circumvolutio, cum natura semper agit per pauciora magis quam plura, atque rationi magis consentaneum videtur unum exiguum corpus telluris diurnam volutionem efficere quam mundum totum circumferri.

† l. 6. c. 3. The article on Gilbert in the Biographie Universelle is discreditably to that publication. If the author was so very ignorant as not to have known any thing of Gilbert, he might at least have avoided the assumption that nothing was to be known.

Sarpi, who will not be thought an incompetent judge, names Gilbert with Vieta, as the only original writers among his contemporaries. Non ho veduto in questo secolo uomo quale abbia scritto cosa sua propria, salvo Vieta in Francia e Gilberti in Inghilterra. Lettere di Fra Paolo, p. 31.

[Griselini, who published some memoirs of Father Paul in 1760, and had seen his manuscripts, thinks fit to claim for him the priority as to all the magnetic observations of Gilbert. Ora io dico che nel trattato del Gilbert non v'è cosa che non sia stata prima osservata ed esperimentata dal Sarpi. Le medesime sono le sue viste; e riguardo a' fenomeni, tutta la varietà si riduce al modo di esporli, o ne' ragguagli. Frà Paolo è semplice, conciso, e non fa deduzioni sistematiche, e segue la massima inculcata dappoi da Bacone di Verulamio, cioè storia, osservazioni e sperienze. Cited in Vita di F. Paolo Sarpi, per Bianchi Giovini. Bruxelles, 1836. It is for the reader to consider whether Sarpi would have praised Gilbert's originality as he has done, without a hint that he had made the same discoveries.

It may be added, that Griselini was no great master of scientific subjects, as appears in Biographie Universelle, art. Sarpi.

This is not said to depreciate the physical science of Sarpi, who was a wonderful man upon almost every subject, and had, I have no doubt, collected much as to magnetism. — 1847.]

SECT. II.—ON NATURAL HISTORY.

Zoology — Gesner, Aldrovandus. Botany, Lobel, Cæsalpin, and others.

22. ZOOLOGY and botany, in the middle of the sixteenth century, were as yet almost neglected fields of Gesner's Zoology. knowledge; scarce any thing had been added to the valuable history of animals by Aristotle, and those of plants by Theophrastus and Dioscorides. But in the year 1551 was published the first part of an immense work, the History of Animals, by that prodigy of general erudition, Conrad Gesner. This treats of viviparous quadrupeds; the second, which appeared in 1554, of the oviparous; the third, in 1555, of birds; the fourth, in the following year, of fishes and aquatic animals; and one, long afterwards, published in 1587, relates to serpents. The first part was reprinted with additions in 1560, and a smaller work, of wood-cuts and shorter descriptions, called *Icones Animalium* appeared in 1553.

23. This work of the first great naturalist of modern times is thus eulogised by one of the latest:—Its character by Cuvier. “Gesner’s History of Animals,” says Cuvier, “may be considered as the basis of all modern zoology; copied almost literally by Aldrovandus, abridged by Jonston, it has become the foundation of much more recent works; and more than one famous author has borrowed from it silently most of his learning; for those passages of the ancients, which have escaped Gesner, have scarce ever been observed by the moderns. He deserved their confidence by his accuracy, his perspicuity, his good faith, and sometimes by the sagacity of his views. Though he has not laid down any natural classification by genera, he often points out very well the true relations of beings.”*

24. Gesner treats of every animal under eight heads or Gesner's arrangement. chapters:—1. Its name in different languages; 2. Its external description and usual place of habi-

* Biogr. Universelle, art. Gesner.

tation; 3. Its natural actions, length of life, diseases, &c.; 4. Its disposition, or, as we may say, moral character; 5. Its utility, except for food and medicine; 6. Its use as food; 7. Its use in medicine; 8. The philological relations of the name and qualities, their proper and figurative use in language, which is subdivided into several sections. So comprehensive a notion of zoology displays a mind accustomed to encyclopedic systems, and loving the labours of learning for their own sake. Much of course would have a very secondary value in the eyes of a good naturalist. His method is alphabetical, but it may be reckoned an alphabet of genera; for he arranges what he deems cognate species together. In the *Icones Animalium* we find somewhat more of classification. Gesner divides quadrupeds into *Animalia Mansueta* and *Animalia Fera*; the former in two, the latter in four orders. Cuvier, in the passage above cited, writing probably from memory, has hardly done justice to Gesner in this respect. The delineations in the *History of Animals* and in the *Icones* are very rude; and it is not always easy, with so little assistance from engraving, to determine the species from his description.

25. Linnæus, though professing to give the synonyms of his predecessors, has been frequently careless and unjust towards Gesner; his mention of several quadrupeds (the only part of the latter's work at which I have looked) having been unnoticed in the *Systema Naturæ*. We do not find, however, that Gesner had made very considerable additions to the number of species known to the ancients; and it cannot be reckoned a proof of his acuteness in zoology, that he placed the hippopotamus among aquatic animals, and the bat among birds. In the latter extraordinary error he was followed by all other naturalists till the time of Ray. Yet he shows some judgment in rejecting plainly fabulous animals. In the edition of 1551 I find but few quadrupeds, except those belonging to the countries round the Mediterranean, or mentioned by Pliny and Ælian.* The Rein-deer, which it is doubtful whether the

His additions
to known
quadrupeds.

* In Cardan, *De Subtilitate*, lib. 10., published in 1550, I find the ant-eater, *ursus formicarius*, which, if I am not mis-

taken, Gesner has omitted, though it is in Hernando d'Oviedo; also a *cercopithecus*, as large as man, which persists long in

ancients knew, though there seems reason to believe that it was formerly an inhabitant of Poland and Germany, he found in Albertus Magnus; and from him too Gesner had got some notion of the Polar Bear. He mentions the Musk-deer, which was known through the Arabian writers, though unnoticed by the ancients. The new world furnished him with a scanty list. Among these is the Opossum, or Simi-Vulpa (for which Linnæus has not given him credit), an account of which he may have found in Pinzon or Peter Martyr*; the Manati, of which he found a description in Hernando's History of the Indies; and the Guinea Pig, Cuniculus Indus, which he says was, within a few years, first brought to Europe from the New World, but was become every where common. In the edition of 1560, several more species are introduced. Olaus Magnus had, in the mean time, described the Glutton; and Belon had found an Armadillo among itinerant quacks in Turkey, though he knew that it came from America.† Belon had also described the Axis deer of India. The Sloth appears for the first time in this edition of Gesner, and the Sagoin, or Ouistiti, as well as what he calls Mus Indicus alius, which Linnæus refers to the Racoon, but seems rather to be the Nasua, or Coati Mondî. Gesner has given only three cuts of monkies, but was aware that there were several kinds, and

standing erect, amat pueros et mulieres, conaturque concumbere, quod nos vidimus. This was probably one of the large baboons of Africa.

* In the voyage of Pinzon, the companion of Columbus in his last voyage, when the continent of Guiana was discovered, which will be found in the Novus Orbis of Grynæus, a specimen of the genus Didelphis is mentioned with the astonishment which the first appearance of the marsupial type would naturally excite in an European. Conspectere etiamnum ibi animal quadrupes, prodigiosum quidem; nam pars anterior vulpem, posterior vero simiam præsentabat, nisi quod pedes effingit humanos; aures autem habet nocturæ, et infra consuetam alvum aliam habet instar crumenæ, in qua delitescunt catuli ejus tantisper, donec tuto prodire queant, et absque parentis tutela cibatum quærere, nec unquam exeunt crumenam,

nisi cum sugunt. Portentosum hoc animal cum catulis tribus Sibiliam delatum est; et ex Sibilis Illiberim, id est Granatam, in gratiam regum, qui novis semper rebus oblectantur. p. 116. edit. 1532. In Peter Martyr, De Rebus Oceanicis, dec. i. lib. 9., we find a longer account of the monstrosum illud animal vulpino rostro, cercopithecea cauda, vespertilionis auribus, manibus humanis, pedibus simiam æmulans; quod natos jam filios alio gestat quocunque proficiscatur utero exteriore in modum magnæ crumenæ. This animal, he says, lived some months in Spain, and was seen by him after its death. Several species are natives of Guiana.

† Tatus, quadrupes peregrina. The species figured in Gesner is *Dasypos novemcinctus*. This animal, however, is mentioned by Hernando d' Oviedo under the name Bardati.

distinguishes them in description. I have not presumed to refer his cuts to particular species, which probably, on account of their rudeness, a good naturalist would not attempt. The *Simia Inuus*, or Barbary ape, seems to be one, as we might expect.* Gesner was not very diligent in examining the histories of the New World. Peter Martyr and Hernando would have supplied him with several he has overlooked, as the Tapir, the Pecary, the Ant-eater, and the fetid Polecat.†

26. Less acquainted with books but with better opportunities of observing nature than Gesner, his contemporary Belon made greater accessions to zoology.

Belon.

Besides his excellent travels in the Levant and Egypt, we have from him a history of fishes in Latin, printed in 1553, and translated by the author into French, with alterations and additions; and one of birds, published in French in 1555, written with great learning, though not without fabulous accounts, as was usual in the earlier period of natural history. Belon was perhaps the first, at least in modern times, who had glimpses of a great typical conformity in nature. In one of his works he places the skeletons of a man and a bird in apposition, in order to display their essential analogy. He introduced also many exotic plants into France. Every one knows, says a writer of the last century, that our gardens owe all their beauty to Belon.‡ The same writer has satisfactorily cleared this eminent naturalist from the charge of plagiarism, to which credit had been hastily given.§ Belon may, on the whole, be placed by the side of Gesner.

27. Salviani published in 1558 a history of fishes (*Animalium Aquatilium Historia*), with figures well executed, but by no means numerous. He borrows most of his materials from the ancients, and having

Salviani and
Rondelet's
Ichthyology.

* *Sunt et cynocephalorum diversa genera, nec unum genus caudatorum.* I think he knew the leading characteristics founded on the tail, but did not attend accurately to subordinate distinctions, though he knew them to exist.

† The Tapir is mentioned by Peter Martyr, the rest in Hernando.

‡ Liron, *Singularités Historiques*, i. 456.

§ *Id.* p. 438. It had been suspected that the manuscripts of Gilles, the author of a compilation from *Ælian*, who had himself travelled in the East, fell into the hands of Belon, who published them as his own. Gesner has been thought to insinuate this; but Liron is of opinion that Belon was not meant by him.

frequently failed in identifying the species they describe, cannot be read without precaution.* But Rondelet (De Piscibus Marinis, 1554) was far superior as an ichthyologist, in the judgment of Cuvier, to any of his contemporaries, both by the number of fishes he has known, and the accuracy of his figures, which exceed three hundred for fresh-water and marine species. His knowledge of those which inhabit the Mediterranean Sea was so extensive that little has been added since his time. "It is the work," says the same great authority, "which has supplied almost every thing which we find on that subject in Gesner, Aldrovandus, Willoughby, Artedi, and Linnæus; and even Lacepede has been obliged, in many instances, to depend on Rondelet." The text, however, is far inferior to the figures, and is too much occupied with an attempt to fix the ancient names of the several species.†

28. The very little book of Dr. Caius on British Dogs, published in 1570, the whole of which, I believe, has been translated by Pennant in his British Zoology, Aldrovandus. is hardly worth mentioning; nor do I know that zoological literature has any thing more to produce till almost the close of the century, when the first and second volumes of Aldrovandus's vast natural history was published. These, as well as the third, which appeared in 1603, treat of birds; the fourth is on insects; and these alone were given to the world by the laborious author, a professor of natural history at Bologna. After his death in 1605, nine more folio volumes, embracing with various degrees of detail most other parts of natural history, were successively published by different editors. "We can only consider the works of Aldrovandus," says Cuvier, "as an immense compilation without taste or genius; the very plan and materials being in a great measure borrowed from Gesner; and Buffon has had reason to say that it would be reduced to a tenth part of its bulk by striking out the useless and impertinent matter."‡ Buffon, however, which Cuvier might have gone on to say, praises the method of Aldrovandus and his fidelity of description, and even ranks his work above every other natural history.§ I am not ac-

* Biog. Univ. (Cuvier).

† Id.

‡ Id.

§ Hist. Naturelle, Premier Discours.
The truth is, that all Buffon's censures

quainted with its contents ; but according to Linnæus, Aldrovandus, or the editors of his posthumous volumes, added only a very few species of quadrupeds to those mentioned by Gesner, among which are the Zebra, the Jerboa, the Musk Rat of Russia, and the Manis or Scaly Ant-eater.*

29. A more steady progress was made in the science of botany, which commemorates, in those living memoirs with which she delights to honour her cultivators, several names still respected, and several books that have not lost their utility. Our countryman, Dr. Turner, published the first part of a New Herbal in 1551 ; the second and third did not appear till 1562 and 1568. "The arrangement," says Pulteney, "is alphabetical according to the Latin names, and after the description he frequently specifies the places and growth. He is ample in his discrimination of the species, as his great object was to ascertain the *Materia Medica* of the ancients, and of Dioscorides in particular, throughout the vegetable kingdom. He first gives names to many English plants ; and allowing for the time when specific distinctions were not established, when almost all the small plants were disregarded, and the *Cryptogamia* almost wholly overlooked, the number he was acquainted with is much beyond what could easily have been imagined in an original writer on his subject."†

Botany ;
Turner.

30. The work of Maranta, published in 1559, on the method of understanding medicinal plants, is, in the judgment of a late writer of considerable reputation, nearly at the head of any in that age. The author is independent, though learned, extremely acute in discriminating plants known to the ancients, and has discovered many himself, ridiculing those who dared to add nothing to Diosco-

Maranta ;
Botanical
Gardens.

on Aldrovandus fall equally on Gesner, who is not less accumulative of materials not properly bearing on natural history, and not much less destitute of systematic order. The remarks of Buffon on this waste of learning are very just, and applicable to the works of the sixteenth century on almost every subject as well as zoology.

* Collections of natural history seem to have been formed by all who applied

themselves to the subject in the sixteenth century ; such as Cordus, Mathioli, Mercati, Gesner, Agricola, Belon, Rondelet, Ortelius, and many others. Hakluyt mentions the cabinets of some English collectors from which he had derived assistance. Beckmann's *Hist. of Inventions*, ii. 57.

† Pulteney's *Historical Sketch of the Progress of Botany in England*, p. 68.

rides.* Maranta had studied in the private garden, formed by Pinelli at Naples. But public gardens were common in Italy. Those of Pisa and Padua were the earliest, and perhaps the most celebrated. One established by the duke of Ferrara, was peculiarly rich in exotic plants procured from Greece and Asia.† And perhaps the generous emulation in all things honourable between the houses of Este and Medici led Ferdinand of Tuscany, some time afterwards near the end of the century, to enrich the gardens of Pisa with the finest plants of Asia and America. The climate of France was less favourable; the first public garden seems to have been formed at Montpellier, and there was none at Paris in 1558.‡ Meantime the vegetable productions of newly discovered countries became familiar to Europe. Many are described in the excellent History of the Indies by Hernando d' Oviedo, such as the Cocos, the Cactus, the Guaiacum. Another Spanish author, Carate, first describes the Solanum Tuberosum, or potato, under the name of Papas.§ It has been said that tobacco is first mentioned, or at least first well described by Benzoni, in Nova Novi Orbis Historia (Geneva, 1578).|| Belon went to the Levant soon after the middle of the century, on purpose to collect plants; several other writers of voyages followed before its close. Among these was Prosper Alpinus, who passed several years in Egypt, but his principal work, *De Plantis Exoticis*, is posthumous, and did not appear till 1627. He is said to be the first European author who has mentioned coffee.¶

31. The critical examination of the ancients, the establishment of gardens, the travels of botanists thus furnished a great supply of plants; it was now required to compare and arrange them. Gesner first undertook this; he had formed a garden of his own at Zurich, and

* Sprengel, *Historia Rei Herbariæ*, (1807), i. 345.

† Id. 360.

‡ Id. 363.

§ Id. 378.

|| Id. 373.

¶ Id. 384. Corniani, vi. 25. Biogr. Univ. Yet, in the article on Rauwolf, a German naturalist, who published an account of his travels in the Levant as

early as 1581, he is mentioned as one of the first qui ait parlé de l'usage de boire du café, et en ait décrit la préparation avec exactitude. It is possible that this book of Rauwolf being written in German, and the author being obscure in comparison with Prosper Alpinus, his prior claim has been till lately overlooked.

has the credit of having discovered the true system of classifying plants according to the organs of fructification; which however he does not seem to have made known, nor were his botanical writings published till the last century. Gesner was the first who mentions the Indian Sugar-cane and the Tobacco, as well as many indigenous plants. It is said that he was used to chew and smoke tobacco, "by which he rendered himself giddy, and in a manner drunk."* As Gesner died in 1564, this carries back the knowledge of tobacco in Europe several years beyond the above-mentioned treatise of Benzonei.

32. Dodoens, or Dodonæus, a Dutch physician, in 1553, translated into his own language the history of plants by Fuchs, to which he added 133 figures. Dodoens. These, instead of using the alphabetical order of his predecessor, he arranged according to a method which he thought more natural. "He explains," says Sprengel, "well and learnedly the ancient botanists, and described many plants for the first time;" among these are the *Ulex Europæus*, and the *Hyacinthus non scriptus*. The great aim of rendering the modern *Materia Medica* conformable to the ancient seems to have made the early botanists a little inattentive to objects before their eyes. Dodoens himself is rather a physician than a botanist, and is more diligent about the uses of plants than their characteristics. He collected all his writings, under the title *Stirpium Historiæ Pemptades Sex*, at Antwerp in 1583, with 1341 figures, a greater number than had yet been published.

33. The *Stirpium Adversaria*, by Pena and Lobel, the latter of whom is best known as a botanist, was published at London in 1570. Lobel. Lobel indeed, though a native of Lille, having passed most of his life in England, may be fairly counted among our botanists. He had previously travelled much over Europe. "In the execution of this work," says Pulteney, "there is exhibited, I believe, the first sketch, rude as it is, of a natural method of arrangement, which however extends no farther than throwing the plants into large tribes, families, or orders, according to the external appearance or habit of the whole plant or

* Sprengel, 373. 390.

flower, without establishing any definitions or characters. The whole forms forty-four tribes. Some contain the plants of one or two modern genera, others many, and some, it must be owned, very incongruous to each other. On the whole, they are much superior to Dodoens's divisions."* Lobel's *Adversaria* contains descriptions of 1200 or 1500 plants, with 272 engravings; the former are not clear or well expressed, and in this he is inferior to his contemporaries; the latter are on copper, very small, but neat.† In a later work, the *Plantarum Historia*, Antwerp, 1576, the number of figures is very considerably greater, but the book has been less esteemed, being a sort of complement to the other. Sprengel speaks more highly of Lobel than the *Biographie Universelle*.

34. Clusius or Lecluse, born at Arras, and a traveller, like many other botanists, over Europe, till he settled at Leyden as professor of botany in 1593, is generally reckoned the greatest master of his science whom the age produced. His descriptions are remarkable for their exactness, precision, elegance, and method, though he seems to have had little regard to natural classification. He has added a long list to the plants already known. Clusius began by a translation of Dodoens into Latin; he published several other works within the century.‡

35. Cæsalpin was not only a botanist, but greater in this than in any other of the sciences he embraced. He was the first (the writings of Gesner, if they go so far, being in his time unpublished,) who endeavoured to establish a natural order of classification on philosophical principles. He founded it on the number, figure, and position of the fructifying parts, observing the situation of the calix and flower relatively to the germen, the divisions of the former, and in general what has been regarded in later systems as the basis of arrangement. He treats of trees and of herbs separately, as two grand divisions, but under each follows his own natural system. The distinction of sexes he thought needless in plants, on account of their simplicity; though he admits it to exist in some, as in the hemp and

* Historical Sketch, p. 102.

† Sprengel, 399.

‡ † Sprengel, 407. Biogr. Univ. Pulteney.

the juniper. His treatise on Plants, in 1583, is divided into sixteen books; in the first of which he lays down the principles of vegetable anatomy and physiology. Many ideas, says Du Petit Thouars, are found there, of which the truth was long afterwards recognised. He analysed the structure of seeds, which he compares to the eggs of animals; an analogy, however, which had occurred to Empedocles among the ancients. "One page alone," the same writer observes, "in the dedication of Cæsalpin to the duke of Tuscany, concentrates the principles of a good botanical system so well, that, notwithstanding all the labours of later botanists, nothing material could be added to his sketch, and if this one page out of all the writings of Cæsalpin remained, it would be enough to secure him an immortal reputation."* Cæsalpin unfortunately gave no figures of plants, which may have been among the causes that his system was so long overlooked.

36. The *Historia Generalis Plantarum* by Dalechamps, in 1587, contains 2731 figures, many of which, however, appear to be repetitions. These are divided Dalechamps;
Bauhin. into eighteen classes according to their form and size, but with no natural method. His work is imperfect and faulty; most of the descriptions are borrowed from his predecessors.† Tabernæmontanus, in a book in the German language, has described 5800 species, and given 2480 figures.‡ The *Phytopinax* of Gerard Bauhin (Basle, 1596) is the first important work of one who, in conjunction with his brother John, laboured for forty years in the advancement of botanical knowledge. It is a catalogue of 2460 plants, including, among about 250 others that were new, the first accurate description of the potato, which, as he informs us, was already cultivated in Italy.§

37. Gerard's *Herbal*, published in 1597, was formed on the basis of Dodoens, taking in much from Lobel Gerard's
Herbal. and Clusius; the figures are from the blocks used by Tabernæmontanus. It is not now esteemed at all by

* Biogr. Univ. Sprengel, after giving an analysis of the system of Cæsalpin, concludes: *En primi systematis carpologici specimen, quod licet imperfectum sit, ingenii tamen summi monumentum* et aliorum omnium ad Gærtnerium usque exemplar est. p. 430.
† Sprengel, 432.
‡ Id. 496.
§ Id. 451.

botanists, at least in this first edition ; “but,” says Pulteney, “from its being well timed, from its comprehending almost the whole of the subjects then known, by being written in English, and ornamented with a more numerous set of figures than had ever accompanied any work of the kind in this kingdom, it obtained great repute.” *

SECT. III.—ON ANATOMY AND MEDICINE.

Fallopian, Eustachius, and other Anatomists — State of Medicine.

38. FEW sciences were so successfully pursued in this period as that of anatomy. If it was impossible to snatch from Vesalius the pre-eminent glory that belongs to him as almost its creator, it might still be said that two men now appeared who, had they lived earlier, would probably have gone as far, and who, by coming later, were enabled to go beyond him. These were Fallopian and Eustachius, both Italians. The former is indeed placed by Sprengel even above Vesalius, and reckoned the first anatomist of the sixteenth century. No one had understood that delicate part of the human structure, the organ of hearing, so well as Fallopian, though even he left much for others. He added several to the list of muscles, and made some discoveries in the intestinal and generative organs.†

39. Eustachius, though on the whole inferior to Fallopian, went beyond him in the anatomy of the ear, in which a canal, as is well known, bears his name. One of his biographers has gone so far as to place him above every anatomist for the number of his discoveries. He has treated very well of the teeth, a subject little understood before, and was the first to trace the vena azygos through all its ramifications. No one as yet had exhibited the structure of the human kidneys, Vesalius having examined them only in dogs.‡

* Hist. Sketch, p. 122.

† Portal. Sprengel, Hist. de la Médecine.

‡ Portal.

The scarcity of human subjects was in fact an irresistible temptation to take upon trust the identity between quadrupeds and man, which misled the great anatomists of the sixteenth century.* Comparative anatomy was therefore not yet promoted to its real dignity, both as an indispensable part of natural history, and as opening the most conclusive and magnificent views of teleology. Coiter, an anatomist born in Holland, but who passed his life in Italy, Germany, and France, was perhaps the first to describe the skeletons of several animals; though Belon, as we have seen, had views far beyond his age in what is strictly comparative anatomy. Coiter's work bears the date of 1575; in 1566 he had published one on human osteology, where that of the fœtus is said to be first described, though some attribute this merit to Fallopius. Coiter is called in the *Biographie Universelle* one of the creators of pathological anatomy.

Coiter.

40. Columbus, (*De Re Anatomica*, Venice, 1559,) the successor of Vesalius at Padua, and afterwards professor at Pisa and Rome, has announced the discovery of several muscles, and given the name of vomer to the small bone which sustains the cartilage of the nose, and which Vesalius had taken for a mere process of the sphenoid. Columbus, though too arrogant in censuring his great predecessor, generally follows him.† Arantius, in 1571, is among the first who made known the anatomy of the gravid uterus, and the structure of the fœtus.‡ He was also conversant, as Vidius, a professor at Paris of Italian birth, as early as 1542, had already been, with the anatomy of the brain. But this was much improved by Varoli in his *Anatomia*, published in 1573, who traced the origin of the optic nerves, and gave a better account than any one before him of the eye and of the voice. Piccolomini (*Anatomix Prælectiones*, 1586) is one of the first who described the cellular tissue, and in other respects has made valuable observations. Ambrose Paré, a French surgeon, is deemed the founder of chirurgic science,

Columbus.

* The church had a repugnance to permit the dissection of dead bodies, but Fallopius tells us that the duke of Tuscany was sometimes obliging enough to send a living criminal to the anatomists, *quem interficimus nostro modo et anatomi-*

samus. Sprengel suggests that "nostro modo" meant by opium; but this seems to be merely a conjecture. *Hist. de la Médecine*, iv. 11.

† Portal, i. 541.

‡ Id. vol. ii. p. 3.

at least in that country. His works were first collected in 1561 ; but his treatise on gunshot wounds is as old as 1545. Several other names are mentioned with respect by the historians of medicine and anatomy ; such as those of Alberti, Benivieni, Donatus, and Schank. Never, says Portal, were anatomy and surgery better cultivated, with more emulation or more encouragement, than about the end of the sixteenth century. A long list of minor discoveries in the human frame are recorded by this writer and by Sprengel. It will be readily understood that we give these names, which of itself it is rather an irksome labour to enumerate, with no other object than that none of those who by their ability and diligence carried forward the landmarks of human knowledge should miss, in a history of general literature, of their meed of remembrance. We reserve to the next period those passages in the anatomists of this age, which have seemed to anticipate the great discovery that immortalises the name of Harvey.

Circulation
of the blood.

41. These continual discoveries in the anatomical structure of man tended to guide and correct the theory of medicine. The observations of this period became more acute and accurate. Those of Plater and Foresti, especially the latter, are still reputed classical in medical literature. Prosper Alpinus may be deemed the father in modern times of diagnostic science.* Plater, in his *Praxis Medica*, made the first, though an imperfect attempt, at a classification of diseases. Yet the observations made in this age, and the whole practical system, are not exempt from considerable faults ; the remedies were too topical, the symptoms of disease were more regarded than its cause ; the theory was too simple and general ; above all, a great deal of credulity and superstition prevailed in the art.† Many among the first in science believed in demoniacal possessions and sorcery, or in astrology. This was most common in Germany, where the school of Paracelsus, discredibly to the national understanding, exerted much influence. The best physicians of the century were either Italian or French.

42. Notwithstanding the bigoted veneration for Hippocrates that most avowed, several physicians, not at all

Medicinal
science.

* Sprengel, iii. 173.

† Id. 156.

adhering to Paracelsus, endeavoured to set up a rational experience against the Greek school, when they thought them at variance. Joubert of Montpellier, in his *Paradoxes* (1566), was a bold innovator of this class; but many of his paradoxes are now established truths. Botal of Asti, a pupil of Fallopius, introduced the practice of venesection on a scale before unknown, but prudently aimed to show that Hippocrates was on his side. The faculty of medicine, however, at Paris condemned it as erroneous and very dangerous. His method, nevertheless, had great success, especially in Spain.*

SECT. IV. — ON ORIENTAL LITERATURE.

43. THIS is a subject over which, on account of my total ignorance of Eastern languages, I am glad to hasten. The first work that appears after the middle of the century is a grammar of the Syriac, Chaldee, and Rabbinical, compared with the Arabic and Ethiopic languages, which Angelo Canini, a man as great in Oriental as in Grecian learning, published at Paris in 1554. In the next year Widmandstadt gave, from the press of Vienna, the first edition of the Syriac version of the New Testament.† Several lexicons and grammars of this tongue, which is in fact only a dialect not far removed from the Chaldee, though in a different alphabetical character, will be found in the bibliographical writers. The Syriac may be said to have been now fairly added to the literary domain. The Antwerp Polyglot of Arias Montanus, besides a complete Chaldee paraphrase of the Old Testament, the Complutensian having only contained the Pentateuch, gives the New Testament in Syriac, as well as Pagnini's Latin translation of the Old.‡

* Sprengel, iii. p. 215.

† Schelhorn, *Amœnitates Literariæ*, xiii. 234. *Biog. Universelle*. Andrès, xix. 45. Eichhorn, v. 435. In this edition the Syriac text alone appeared;

Henry Stephens reprinted it with the Greek and with two Latin translations.

‡ Andrès, xix. 49. The whole edition is richer in materials than that of Ximenes.

44. The Hebrew language was studied, especially among the German Protestants, to a considerable extent, if we may judge from the number of grammatical works published within this period. Among these Morhof selects the *Erotemata Linguae Hebrææ* by Neander, printed at Basle in 1567. Tremillius, Chevalier, and Drusius among Protestants, Masius and Clarius in the church of Rome, are the most conspicuous names. The first, an Italian refugee, is chiefly known by his translation of the Bible into Latin, in which he was assisted by Francis Junius. The second, a native of France, taught Hebrew at Cambridge, and was there the instructor of Drusius, whose father had emigrated from Flanders on the ground of religion. Drusius himself, afterwards professor of Hebrew at the university of Franeker, has left writings of more permanent reputation than most other Hebraists of the sixteenth century; they relate chiefly to biblical criticism and Jewish antiquity, and several of them have a place in the *Critici Sacri* and in the collection of Ugolini.* Clarius is supposed to have had some influence on the decree of the council of Trent, asserting the authenticity of the Vulgate.† Calasio was superior, probably, to them all, but his principal writings do not belong to this period. No large proportion of the treatises published by Ugolini ought, so far as I know their authors, to be referred to the sixteenth century.

45. The Hebrew language had been early studied in England, though there has been some controversy as to the extent of the knowledge which the first translators of the Bible possessed. We find that both Chevalier read lectures on Hebrew at Cambridge not long after the queen's accession, and his disciple Drusius at Oxford, from 1572 to 1576.‡ Hugh Broughton was a

* Drusius is extolled by all critics except Scaliger (*Scaligerana Secunda*), who seems to have conceived one of his personal prejudices against the Franeker professor, and depreciates his moral character. Simon thinks Drusius the most learned and judicious writer we find in the *Critici Sacri*. *Hist. Critique du V. T.*, p. 498. *Biogr. Univ. Blount*.
† Clarius, according to Simon, knew

Hebrew but indifferently, and does little more than copy Munster, whose observations are too full of Judaism, as he consulted no interpreters but the rabbinical writers. Masius, the same author says, is very learned, but has the like fault of dealing in rabbinical expositions. p. 499.

‡ Wood's *Hist. and Antiquities*. In 1574, he was appointed to read publicly in Syriac.

deeply learned rabbinical scholar. I do not know that we could produce any other name of marked reputation; and we find that the first Hebrew types, employed in any considerable number, appear in 1592. These are in a book not relating directly to Hebrew, Rhesis *Institutiones Linguae Cambro-Britannicæ*. But a few Hebrew characters, very rudely cut in wood, are found in Wakefield's Oration, printed as early as 1524.*

46. The Syriac and Chaldee were so closely related to Hebrew, both as languages, and in the theological purposes for which they were studied, that they did not much enlarge the field of Oriental literature.

Arabic begins to be studied.

The most copious language, and by far the most fertile of books, was the Arabic. A few slight attempts at introducing a knowledge of this had been made before the middle of the century. An Arabic as well as Syriac press at Vienna was first due to the patronage of Ferdinand I. in 1554, but for a considerable time no fruit issued from it. But the increasing zeal of Rome for the propagation of its faith, both among infidels and schismatics, gave a larger sweep to the cultivation of Oriental languages. Gregory XIII. founded a Maronite College at Rome in 1584, for those Syrian Christians of Libanus who had united themselves to the Catholic church; the cardinal Medici, afterwards grand duke of Florence, established an Oriental press, about 1580, under the superintendence of John Baptista Raimondi; and Sixtus V. in 1588 that of the Vatican, which, though principally designed for early Christian literature, was possessed of types for the chief Eastern languages. Hence the Arabic, hitherto almost neglected, began to attract more attention; the Gospels in that language, were published at Rome in 1590 or 1591; some works of Euclid and Avicenna had preceded; one or two elementary books on grammar appeared in Germany; and several other publications belong to the last years of the century.† Scaliger now entered upon the study of Arabic with all his indefatigable activity. Yet, at the end of the century, few had penetrated far into a region so novel and extensive, and in which the subsidiary means of know-

* Preface to Herbert's *Typographical Antiquities*.

† Eiehhorn, v. 641. et alibi. Tiraboschi, viii. 195. Ginguéné, vol. vii. p. 258.

ledge were so imperfect. The early grammars are represented by Eichhorn as being very indifferent, and in fact very few Arabic books had been printed. The edition of the Koran by Pagninus in 1529 was unfortunately suppressed, as we have before mentioned, by the zeal of the court of Rome. Casaubon, writing to Scaliger in 1597, declares that no one within his recollection had even touched with the tips of his fingers that language, except Postel in a few rhapsodies; and that neither he nor any one else had written any thing on the Persic.* Gesner, however, in his *Mithridates*, 1558, had given the Lord's Prayer in twenty-two languages; to which Rocca at Rome, in 1591, added three more; and Megiser increased the number, in a book published next year at Frankfort, to forty.†

SECT. V.—ON GEOGRAPHY.

Voyages in the Indies — Those of the English — Of Ortelius and others.

47. A MORE important accession to the knowledge of Europe as to the rest of the world, than had hitherto been made through the press, is due to Ramusio, a Venetian who had filled respectable offices under the republic. He published, in 1550, the first volume of his well-known collection of Travels; the second appeared in 1559, and the third in 1565. They have been reprinted several times, and all the editions are not equally complete. No general collection of travels had hitherto been published, except the *Novus Orbis* of Grynæus, and though the greater part perhaps of those included in Ramusio's three volumes had appeared separately, others came forth for the first time. The *Africa* of Leo Africanus, a baptized Moor, with which

* *Nostra autem memoria, qui eas linguas vel ακρη, quod aiunt, δακτυλω attingerit, novi neminem, nisi quod Postellum nescio quid muginatum esse de lingua Arabica memini. Sed illa quam*

tenuia, quam exilia l de Persicâ, quod equidem memini neque ille, neque alius quisquam vel γρη το λεγομενον. Epist. ciii.

† *Biogr. Univ. arts. Megiser and Rocca.*

Ramusio begins, is among these ; and it is upon this work that such knowledge as we possessed, till very recent times, as to the interior of that continent, was almost entirely founded. Ramusio in the remainder of this volume gives many voyages in Africa, the East Indies, and Indian Archipelago, including two accounts of Magellan's circumnavigation of the world, and one of Japan, which had very lately been discovered. The second volume is dedicated to travels through northern Europe and Asia, beginning with that of Marco Polo, including also the curious, though very questionable voyage of the Zeni brothers, about 1400, to some unknown region north of Scotland. In the third volume we find the conquests of Cortes and Pizarro, with all that had already been printed of the excellent work of Hernando d' Ovedo on the Western world. Few subsequent collections of voyages are more esteemed for the new matter they contain than that of Ramusio.*

48. The importance of such publications as that of Ramusio was soon perceived, not only in the stimulus they gave to curiosity or cupidity towards following up the paths of discovery, but in calling the attention of reflecting minds, such as Bodin and Montaigne, to so copious a harvest of new facts, illustrating the physical and social character of the human species. But from the want of a rigid investigation, or more culpable reasons, these early narratives are mingled with much falsehood, and misled some of the more credulous philosophers almost as often as they enlarged their knowledge.

49. The story of the Portuguese conquests in the East, more varied and almost as wonderful as romance, was recounted in the Asia of Joam de Barros (1552), and in that of Castanheda in the same and two ensuing years ; these have never been translated. The great voyage of Magellan had been written by one of his companions, Pigafetta. This was first published in Italian in 1556. The History of the Indies by Acosta, 1590, may perhaps belong more strictly to other departments of literature than to geography.

* Biog. Univ.

50. The Romish missionaries, especially the Jesuits, spread themselves with intrepid zeal during this period over Accounts of China. infidel nations. Things strange to European prejudice, the books, the laws, the rites, the manners, the dresses of those remote people, were related by them on their return, for the most part orally, but sometimes through the press. The vast empire of China, the Cathay of Marco Polo, over which an air of fabulous mystery had hung, and which is delineated in the old maps with much ignorance of its position and extent, now first was brought within the sphere of European knowledge. The Portuguese had some traffic to Canton; but the relations they gave were uncertain, till, in 1577, two Augustin friars persuaded a Chinese officer to take them into the country. After a residence of four months they returned to Manilla, and in consequence of their reports, Philip II. sent, in 1580, an embassy to the court of Pekin. The History of China by Mendoza, as it is called, contains all the knowledge that the Spaniards were able to collect by these means; and it may be said, on comparison with later books on the same subject, to be as full and ample an account of China as could have been given in such circumstances. This book was published in 1585, and from that time, but no earlier, do we date our acquaintance with that empire.* Maffei, in his History of India, threw all the graces of a pure Latin style over his description of the East. The first part of a scarce and curious collection of voyages to the two Indies, with the names of De Bry and Merian as its editors, India and Russia. appeared at Frankfort in 1590. Six other volumes were published at intervals down to 1634. Possevin, meantime, told us more of a much nearer state, Muscovy, than was before familiar to western Europe, though the first information had been due to England.

51. The spirit of lucre vied with that of religion in penetrating unknown regions. In this the English discoveries in the Northern Seas. English have most to boast: they were the first to pass the Icy Cape and anchor their ships in the White Sea. This was in the famous voyage of Chancellor in 1553. Anthony Jenkinson soon afterwards, through the

* Biogr. Univ. This was translated least I believe it to be the same work, into English by R. Parke in 1588; at but have never seen the original.

heart of Russia, found his way to Bokhara and Persia. They followed up the discoveries of Cabot in North America ; and, before the end of the century, had ascertained much of the coasts about Labrador and Hudson's Bay, as well as those of Virginia, the first colony. These English voyages were recorded in the three parts of the *Collection of Voyages*, by Hakluyt, published in 1598, 1599, and 1600. Drake, second to Magellan in that bold enterprise, traversed the circumference of the world ; and the reign of Elizabeth, quite as much as any later age, bears witness to the intrepidity and skill, if not strictly to the science, of our sailors. For these undaunted navigators, traversing the unexplored wildernesses of ocean in small ill-built vessels, had neither any effectual assistance from charts, nor the means of making observations themselves, or of profiting by those of others. Hence, when we come to geographical knowledge, in the proper sense of the word, we find it surprisingly scanty, even at the close of the sixteenth century.

52. It had not, however, been neglected, so far as a multiplicity of books could prove a regard to it. Ortelius, in his *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, (the first edition of which was in 1570, augmented afterwards by several maps of later dates,) gives a list of about 150 geographical treatises, most of them subsequent to 1560. His own work is the first general atlas since the revival of letters, and has been justly reckoned to make an epoch in geography, being the basis of all collections of maps since formed, and deserving, it is said, even yet to be consulted, notwithstanding the vast progress of our knowledge of the earth.* The maps in the later editions of the sixteenth century bear various dates. That of Africa is of 1590 ; and though the outline is tolerably given, we do not find the Mauritius Isles, while the Nile is carried almost to the Cape of Good Hope, and made to issue from a great lake. In the map of America, dated 1587, the outline on the N.E. side contains New France, with the *city* of Canada ; the St. Lawrence traverses the country, but without lakes ; Florida is sufficiently distinguished, but the intervening coast is loosely laid down. Estotiland, the supposed discovery of the Zeni, appears to the north, and

Geographical
books ;
Ortelius.

* Biog. Univ.

Greenland beyond. The outline of South America is worse, the southern parts covering nearly as much longitude as the northern, an error which was in some measure diminished in a map of 1603. An immense solid land, as in all the older maps, connects Terra del Fuego with New Guinea. The delineation of the southern coasts of Asia is not very bad, even in the earlier maps of Ortelius, but some improvement is perceived in his knowledge of China and the adjacent seas in that of the world, given in the edition of 1588. The maps of Europe in Ortelius are chiefly defective as to the countries on the Baltic Sea and Russia; but there is a general incorrectness of delineation which must strike the eye at once of any person slightly experienced in geography.

53. Gerard Mercator, a native of the duchy of Juliers, where he passed the greater part of his life, was perhaps superior to Ortelius. His fame is most diffused by the invention of a well-known mode of delineating hydrographical charts, in which the parallels and meridians intersect each other at right angles. The first of these was published in 1569; but the principle of the method was not understood till Edward Wright, in 1599, explained it in his *Correction of Errors in Navigation*.^{*} The Atlas of Mercator, in an edition of 1598, which contains only part of Europe, is superior to that of Ortelius; and as to England, of which there had been maps published by Lluyd in 1569, and by Saxton in 1580, it may be reckoned very tolerably correct. Lluyd's map, indeed, is published in the Atlas of Ortelius. But in the northern regions of Europe we still find a mass of arbitrary, erroneous conjecture.

54. Botero, the Piedmontese Jesuit mentioned in another place, has given us a cosmography, or general description of as much of the world as was then known, entitled *Relazioni Universali*; the edition I have seen is undated, but he mentions the discovery of Nova Zembla in 1594. His knowledge of Asia is very limited, and chiefly derived from Marco Polo. China, he says, extends from 17° to 52° of latitude, and has 22° of longitude. Japan is sixty leagues from China and 150 from America. The coasts, Botero observes, from Bengal to China are so dangerous, that two or three are lost

^{*} Montucla, ii. 651. Biogr. Univ. art. Mercator.

out of every four ships, but the master who succeeds in escaping these perils is sure to make his fortune.

55. But the best map of the sixteenth century is one of uncommon rarity, which is found in a very few copies of the first edition of Hakluyt's *Voyages*. This contains Davis's Straits (*Fretum Davis*), Virginia by name, and the lake Ontario. The coast of Chili is placed more correctly than in the prior maps of Ortelius; and it is noticed in the margin that this trending of the coast less westerly than had been supposed was discovered by Drake in 1577, and confirmed by Sarmiento and Cavendish. The huge *Terra Australis* of the old geography is left out. Corea is represented near its place, and China with some degree of correctness; even the north coast of New Holland is partially traced. The strait of Anian, which had been presumed to divide Asia from America, has disappeared, while a marginal note states that the distance between those two continents in latitude 38° is not less than 1200 leagues. The Ultra-Indian region is inaccurate; the sea of Aral is still unknown, and little pains have been taken with central and northern Asia. But upon the whole it represents the utmost limit of geographical knowledge at the close of the sixteenth century, and far excels the maps in the edition of Ortelius at Antwerp in 1588.*

SECT. VI. — ON HISTORY.

56. THE history of Italy by Guicciardini, though it is more properly a work of the first part of the century, was not published till 1564. It is well known for the ^{Guicciardini,} solidity of the reflections, the gravity and impartiality with which it is written, and the prolixity of the narration; a fault, however, frequent and not unpardonable in historians contemporary and familiar with the events they relate. If the siege of Pisa in 1508 appeared so uninteresting a hundred years afterwards, as to be the theme of ridicule with Boccalini,

* [This map is in the British Museum. — 1842.]

it was far otherwise to the citizens of Florence soon after the time. Guicciardini has generally held the first place among Italian historians, though he is by no means equal in literary merit to Machiavel. Adriani, whose continuation of Guicciardini extends to 1574, is little read, nor does he seem to be much recommended by style. No other historian of that country need be mentioned for works published within the sixteenth century.

57. The French have ever been distinguished for those personal memoirs of men more or less conversant with public life, to which Philip de Comines led the way. Several that fell within this period are deserving of being read, not only for their relation of events, with which we do not here much concern ourselves, but for a lively style, and occasionally for good sense and acute thinking. Those of Montluc may be praised for the former. Spain had a considerable historian in Mariana, twenty books of whose history were published in Latin in 1592, and five more in 1595; the concluding five books do not fall within the century. The style is vigorous and classical, the thoughts judicious. Buchanan's History of Scotland has already been praised for the purity of its language. Few modern histories are more redolent of an antique air. We have nothing to boast in England; our historical works of the Elizabethan age are mere chronicles, and hardly good even as such. Nor do I know any Latin historians of Germany or the Low Countries who, as writers, deserve our attention.

SECT. VII.—GENERAL STATE OF LITERATURE.

58. THE great Italian universities of Bologna, Padua, Pisa, and Pavia, seem to have lost nothing of their lustre throughout the century. New colleges, new buildings in that stately and sumptuous architecture which distinguishes this period, bore witness to a continual patronage, and a public demand for knowledge. It is true that the best days of classical literature had passed away in Italy. But

the revival of theological zeal and of those particular studies which it fostered, might perhaps more than compensate in its effect on the industry of the learned for this decline of philology. The sciences also of medicine and mathematics attracted many more students than before. The Jesuit colleges, and those founded by Gregory XIII., have been already mentioned. They were endowed at a large expense in that palmy state of the Roman see.

59. Universities were founded at Altdorf and Leyden in 1575, at Helmstadt in 1576. Others of less im-
In other countries.
 portance began to exist in the same age. The University of Edinburgh derives its origin from the charter of James in 1582. Those of Oxford and Cambridge, reviving as we have seen after a severe shock at the accession of Elizabeth, continued through her reign to be the seats of a progressive and solid erudition. A few colleges were founded in this age. I should have wished to give some sketch of the mode of instruction pursued in these two universities. But sufficient materials have not fallen in my way; what I have been able to glean, has already been given to the reader in some pages of the first volume. It was the common practice at Oxford, observed in form down to this century, that every candidate for the degree of bachelor of arts, independently of other exercises, should undergo an examination (become absolutely nominal), in the five sciences of grammar, logic, rhetoric, ethics, and geometry; every one for that of master of arts, in the additional sciences of physics, metaphysics, Hebrew, and some more. These were probably the ancient trivium and quadrivium; enlarged, perhaps after the sixteenth century, according to the increase of learning, and the apparent necessity of higher qualifications.* But it would be, I conceive, a great mistake to imagine that the requisitions for academical degrees were ever much insisted upon. The universities sent forth abundance of illiterate graduates in every age. And as they had little influence, at least of a favourable sort, either on philosophy or polite

* ["The quadrivials, I mean arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy, are now little regarded in either of the universities." Harrison's Description of

England, p. 252. Hence we may infer that the more modern division in use at Oxford was made after his time. — 1842.]

literature, we are not to overrate their importance in the history of the intellectual progress of mankind.*

60. Public libraries were considerably enlarged during this period. Those of Rome, Ferrara, and Florence in Italy, of Vienna and Heidelberg in Germany, stood much above any others. Sixtus V. erected the splendid repository of the Vatican. Philip II. founded that of the Escorial, perhaps after 1580, and collected books with great labour and expense; all who courted the favour of Spain contributing also by presents of rarities.† Ximenes had established the library of Alcala; and that of Salamanca is likewise more ancient than this of the Escorial. Every king of France took a pride in adding to the royal library of Paris. By an ordinance of 1556, a copy of every book printed with privilege was to be deposited in this library. It was kept at Fontainebleau, but transferred to Paris in 1595. During the civil wars its progress was slow.‡ The first prince of Orange founded the public library of Leyden, which shortly became one of the best in Europe. The catalogue was published in 1597. That bequeathed by Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, to the university of Oxford, was dispersed in the general havoc made under Edward VI. At the close of the century, the university had no public library. But Sir Thomas Bodley had already, in 1597, made the generous offer of presenting his own, which was carried into effect in the first years of the ensuing

* Lord Bacon animadverts (*De Cogitationis et Visis*) on the fetters which the universities imposed on the investigation of truth; and Morhof ascribes the establishment of the academies in Italy to the narrow and pedantic spirit of the universities. l. i. c. 14.

† Mariana, in a long passage wherein he describes the Escorial palace, gives this account of the library: *Vestibulo bibliotheca imposita, majori longitudine omnino pedum centum octoginta quinque, lata pedes triginta duos, libros servat præsertim Græcos manuscriptos, præcipuè plerosque vetustatis; qui ex omnibus Europæ partibus ad famam novi operis magno numero confluerunt: auro pretiosiores thesauri, digni quorum evolendorum major eruditus hominibus fucullus contingeret. Quod enim ex cop-*

tinis et majestate revinctis literis emolumentum? *De Rege et Regis Institutione*, l. iii. c. 10. The noble freedom of Mariana breaks out, we see, in the midst of his praise of royal magnificence. Few, if any, libraries, except those of the universities, were accessible to men of studious habits; a reproach that has been very slowly effaced. I have often been astonished, in considering this, that so much learning was really acquired.

‡ Jugler's *Hist. Literaria*, c. iii. a. 5. This very laborious work of the middle of the last century, contains the most ample account of public libraries throughout Europe that I have been able to find. The German libraries, with the two exceptions of Vienna and Heidelberg, do not seem to have become of much importance in the sixteenth century.

age.* In the colleges there were generally libraries. If we could believe Scaliger, these were good; but he had never been in England, and there is no reason, I believe, to estimate them highly.† Archbishop Parker had founded, or at least greatly enlarged, the public library of Cambridge. Many private persons of learning and opulence had formed libraries in England under Elizabeth; some of which still subsist in the mansions of ancient families. I incline to believe that there was at least as competent a stock of what is generally called learning among our gentry as in any continental kingdom; their education was more literary, their habits more peaceable, their religion more argumentative. Perhaps we should make an exception for Italy, in which the spirit of collecting libraries was more prevalent.‡

61. The last forty years of the sixteenth century were a period of uninterrupted peace in Italy. Notwithstanding the pressure of governments always jealous, and sometimes tyrannical, it is manifest that at least the states of Venice and Tuscany had grown in wealth, and in the arts that attend it. Those who had been accustomed to endure the license of armies, found a security in the rule of law which compensated for many abuses. Hence that sort of property, which is most exposed to pillage, became again a favourite acquisition; and, among the costly works of art, which adorned the houses of the wealthy, every relic of antiquity found its place. Gems and medals, which the books of Vico and Erizzo had taught the owners to arrange and to appreciate, were sought so eagerly, that, according to Hubert Goltzius, as quoted by Pinkerton, there were in Italy 380 of such collections. The marbles and bronzes, the inscriptions of antiquity, were not less in request, and the well-known word, *virtuosi*, applied to these lovers of what was rare and beautiful in art or nature, bespoke the honour in which their pursuits were held. The

Collections
of antiqui-
ties in Italy.

* Wood's Hist. and Ant. p. 922.

† Scalig. Secunda, p. 236. De mon temps, he says, in the same place, il y avoit à Londres douze bibliothèques complètes, et à Paris quatre-vingt. I do not profess to understand this epithet.

‡ [Morhof, i. 3. mentions several large private libraries in Italy and France: that of the younger Aldus Manutius contained 80,000 volumes. — 1842.]

luxury of literature displayed itself in scarce books, elegant impressions, and sumptuous bindings.

62. Among the refined gentlemen, who devoted to these graceful occupations their leisure and their riches, none was more celebrated than Gian Vincenzo Pinelli. He was born of a good family at Naples in 1538. A strong thirst for knowledge, and the consciousness that his birth exposed him to difficulties and temptations at home which might obstruct his progress, induced him to seek, at the age of twenty-four, the university of Padua, at that time the renowned scene of learning and of philosophy.* In this city he spent forty-three years, the remainder of his life. His father was desirous that he should practise the law; but after a short study of this, Pinelli resumed his favourite pursuits. His fortune, indeed, was sufficiently large to render any sacrifice of them unreasonable; and it may have been out of dislike of his compulsory reading, that in forming this vast library he excluded works of jurisprudence. This library was collected by the labour of many years. The catalogues of the Frankfort fairs, and those of the principal booksellers in Italy, were diligently perused by Pinelli; nor did any work of value appear from the press on either side of the Alps which he did not instantly add to his shelves. This great library was regularly arranged, and though he did not willingly display its stores to the curious and ignorant, they were always accessible to scholars. He had also a considerable museum of globes, maps, mathematical instruments, and fossils; but he only collected the scarcer coins. In his manners, Pinelli was a finely-polished gentleman, but of weak health, and for this cause devoted to books, and seldom mingling with gay society, nor even belonging to the literary academies of the city, but carrying on an extensive correspondence, and continually employed in writing extracts or annotations. Yet he has left nothing that has been published. His own house was as it were a perpetual academy,

* Animadverterat autem hic noster, domi, inter amplexus parentum et familiarium obsequia, in urbe deliciarum plena, militaribus et equestribus, quam musarum studiis aptiore, non preventurum sese ad eam gloriæ metam

quam sibi destinaverat, ideo gymnasi Patavini fama permotus, &c. Gualdi, Vita Pinelli. This life by a contemporary, or nearly such, is republished in the Vitæ Illustrium Virorum by Bates.

frequented by the learned of all nations. If Pinelli was not a man of great genius, nor born to be of much service to any science, we may still respect him for a love of learning, and a nobleness of spirit, which has preserved his memory.*

63. The literary academies of Italy continued to flourish even more than before; many new societies of the same kind were founded. Several existed at Flo-^{Italian academies.} rence, but all others have been eclipsed by the Della Crusca, established in 1582. Those of another Tuscan city, which had taken the lead in such literary associations, did not long survive its political independence; the jealous spirit of Cosmo extinguished the Rozzi of Sienna in 1568. In governments as suspicious as those of Italy, the sort of secrecy belonging to these meetings, and the encouragement they gave to a sentiment of mutual union, might appear sufficient reasons for watchfulness. We have seen how the academy of Modena was broken up on the score of religion. That of Venice, perhaps for the same reason, was dissolved by the senate in 1561, and did not revive till 1593. These, however, were exceptions to the rule; and it was the general policy of governments to cherish in the nobility a love of harmless amusements. All Lombardy and Romagna were full of academies; they were frequent in the kingdom of Naples, and in the ecclesiastical states.† They are a remarkable feature in the social condition of Italy, and could not have existed perhaps in any other country. They were the encouragers of a numismatic and lapidary erudition, elegant in itself, and throwing for ever its little sparks of light on the still ocean of the past, but not very favourable to comprehensive observation, and tending to bestow on an unprofitable pedantry the honours of real learning. This, indeed, is the inherent vice of all literary societies, accessible too frequently to those who, for amusement or fashion's sake, love as much knowledge as can be reached with faci-

* Gualdi. Tiraboschi, vi. 214. The library of Pinelli was dispersed, and in great part destroyed by pirates not long afterwards. That long since formed by one of his family is well known to book collectors.

† Tiraboschi, viii. 125—179., is so full

on this subject, that I have not recourse to the other writers who have, sometimes with great prolixity, investigated a subject more interesting in its details to the Italians than to us. Ginguéné adds very little to what he found in his predecessor.

lity, and from the nature of their transactions seldom capable of affording scope for any extensive research.

64. No academy or similar institution can be traced at this time, as far as I know, in France or Germany. But it is deserving of remark, that one sprung up in England, not indeed of the classical and polite character that belonged to the *Inflammati* of Padua, or the *Della Crusca* of Florence, yet useful in its objects, and honourable alike to its members and to the country. This was the Society of Antiquaries, founded by Archbishop Parker in 1572. Their object was the preservation of ancient documents, illustrative of history, which the recent dissolution of religious houses, and the shameful devastation attending it, had exposed to great peril. They intended also, by the reading of papers at their meetings, to keep alive the love and knowledge of English antiquity. In the second of these objects this society was more successful than in the first; several short dissertations, chiefly by Arthur Agard, their most active member, have been afterwards published. The Society comprised very reputable names, especially of lawyers, and continued to meet till early in the reign of James, who, from some jealousy, thought fit to dissolve it.*

65. The chief cities on this side of the Alps, whence new editions came forth, were Paris, Basle, Lyons, Leyden, Antwerp, Brussels, Strasburg, Cologne, Heidelberg, Frankfort, Ingolstadt, and Geneva. In all these, and in many other populous towns, booksellers, who were generally also printers, were a numerous body. In London at least forty or fifty were contemporaneous publishers in the latter part of Elizabeth's reign; but the number elsewhere in England was very small. The new books on the Continent, and within the Alps and Pyrenees, found their principal mart at the annual Frankfort fairs. Catalogues of such books began to be published, according to Beckmann, in 1554.† In a collective catalogue of all

* See life of Agard, in *Biogr. Brit.* and in Chalmers. But the best account is in the Introduction to the first volume of the *Archæologia*. The present Society of Antiquaries is the representative, but after long intermission, of this Elizabethan progenitor.

† *Hist. of Inventions*, iii. 120. "George Willer, whom some improperly call Viller, and others Walter, a bookseller at Augsburg, who kept a large shop, and frequented the Frankfort fairs, first fell upon the plan of causing to be printed every fair a catalogue of all the new

books offered for sale at Frankfort, from 1564 to 1592, I find the number, in Latin, Greek, and German, to be about 16,000. No Italian or French appear in this catalogue, being probably reserved for another. Of theology in Latin there are 3200, and in this department the catholic publications rather exceed the protestant. But of the theology in the German language the number is 3700, not one fourth of which is catholic. Scarcely any mere German poetry appears, but a good deal in both languages with musical notes. Law furnishes about 1600 works. I reckoned twenty-seven Greek and thirty-two Latin grammars, not counting different editions of the same. There are at least seventy editions of parts of Aristotle. The German books are rather more than one third of the whole. Among the Latin I did not observe one book by a writer of this island. In a compilation by Clesius, in 1602, purporting to be a conspectus of the publications of the sixteenth century, formed partly from catalogues of fairs, partly from those of public libraries, we find, at least in the copy I have examined, but which seems to want one volume, a much smaller number of productions than in the former, but probably with more selection. The books in modern languages are less than 1000, half French, half Italian. In this catalogue also the catholic theology rather out-numbers the protestant, which is perhaps not what we should have expected to find.

66. These catalogues, in the total absence of literary journals, were necessarily the great means of communicating to all the lovers of learning in Cisalpine Europe (for Italy had resources of her own) some knowledge of its progress. Another source of information was the correspondence of scholars with each other. It was their constant usage, far more than in modern times, to preserve an epistolary intercourse. If their enmities were often bitter, their contentions almost always violent, many beautiful instances of friendship and sympathy might be adduced on the other side; they deemed themselves a distinct cast, a priesthood of the same altar, not ashamed of poverty, nor disheartened by the

Literary correspondence.

books, in which the size and printers' names were marked." There seems to be some doubt whether the first year of these catalogues was 1554 or 1564; the collection mentioned in the text leads us rather to suspect the latter.

world's neglect, but content with the praise of those whom themselves thought worthy of praise, and hoping something more from posterity than they obtained from their own age.

67. We find several attempts at a literary or rather bibliographical history of a higher character than these catalogues. The *Bibliotheca Universalis* of Gesner was reprinted in 1574, with considerable enlargements by Simler. Conrad Lycosthenes afterwards made additions to it, and Verdier published a supplement. Verdier was also the author of a *Bibliothèque Française*, of which the first edition appeared in 1584. Another with the same title was published in the same year by La Croix du Maine. Both these follow the strange alphabetical arrangement by Christian instead of family names, so usual in the sixteenth century. La Croix du Maine confines himself to French authors, but Verdier includes all who had been translated. The former is valued for his accuracy and for curious particulars in biography; the second for the extracts he has given. Doni pretended to give a history of books in his *Libreria*, but it has not obtained much reputation, and falls, according to the testimony of those who are acquainted with it, below the compilations above mentioned.*

68. The despotism of the state, and far more of the church, bore heavily on the press in Italy. Spain, mistress of Milan and Naples, and Florence under Cosmo I., were jealous governments. Venice, though we are apt to impute a rigid tyranny to its senate, appears to have indulged rather more liberty of writing on political topics to its subjects, on the condition, no doubt, that they should eulogise the wisdom of the republic; and, comparatively to the neighbouring regions of Italy, the praise both of equitable and prudent government may be ascribed to that aristocracy. It had at least the signal merit of keeping ecclesiastical oppression at a distance; a Venetian might write with some freedom of the papal court. One of the accusations against Venice, in her dispute with Paul V., was for allowing the publication of books that had been censured at Rome.†

Bibliographical works.

Restraints on the press.

* Morhcf. Goujet. Biogr. Univ.

† Ranke, ii. 330.

69. But Rome struck a fatal blow, and perhaps more deadly than she intended, at literature in the Index Ex-^{Index Ex-} purgatorius of prohibited books. It had long been the regulation that no book should be printed without a previous license. This was of course a restraint on the freedom of writing, but it was less injurious to the trade of the printer and bookseller than the subsequent prohibition of what he had published or purchased at his own cost and risk. The first list of books prohibited by the church was set forth by Paul IV. in 1559. His Index includes all Bibles in modern languages, enumerating forty-eight editions, chiefly printed in countries still within the obedience of the church. Sixty-one printers are put under a general ban; all works of every description from their presses being forbidden. Stephens and Oporinus have the honour of being among these.* This system was pursued and rigorously acted upon by the successors of the imperious Caraffa. The council of Trent had its own list of condemned publications. Philip II. has been said to have preceded the pope himself in a similar proscription. Wherever the sway of Rome and Spain was felt, books were unsparingly burned, and to this cause is imputed the scarcity of many editions.

70. In its principle, which was apparently that of preserving obedience, the prohibitory system might seem to have untouched many great walks of learning and science.^{Its effects.} It is of course manifest that it fell with but an oblique blow upon common literature. Yet, as a few words or sentences were sufficient to elicit a sentence of condemnation, often issued with little reflection, it was difficult for any author to be fully secure; and this inspired so much apprehension into printers, that they became unwilling to incur the hazard of an obnoxious trade. These occupations, says Galluzzi, which had begun to prosper at Florence, never recovered the wound inflicted by the severe regulations of Paul IV. and Pius V.† The art retired to Switzerland and Germany. The booksellers were at the mercy of an Inquisition, which every day contrived new methods of harassing

* Schelhorn, *Amœnit. Liter.* vii. 98. viii. 342. and 485. The two dissertations on prohibited books here quoted are full of curious information.

† *Ist. del Gran Ducato*, iii. 442.

them. From an interdiction of the sale of certain prohibited books, the church proceeded to forbid that of all which were not expressly permitted. The Giunti, a firm not so eminent as it had been in the early part of the century, but still the honour of Florence, remonstrated in vain. It seems probable, however, that after the death of Pius V., one of the most rigorous and bigoted pontiffs that ever filled the chair, some degree of relaxation took place.

71. The restraints on the printing and sale of books in England, though not so overpowering as in Italy, must have stood in the way of useful knowledge under Elizabeth. The Stationers' Company, founded in 1555, obtained its monopoly at the price of severe restrictions. The Star Chamber looked vigilantly at the dangerous engine it was compelled to tolerate. By the regulations it issued in 1585, no press was allowed to be used out of London, except one at Oxford, and another at Cambridge. Nothing was to be printed without allowance of the council; extensive powers both of seizing books and of breaking the presses were given to the officers of the crown.* Thus every check was imposed on literature, and it seems unreasonable to dispute that they had some efficacy in restraining its progress, though less, perhaps, than we might in theory expect, because there was always a certain degree of connivance and indulgence. Even the current prohibition of importing popish books, except for the use of such as the council should permit to use them, must have affected the trade in modern Latin authors beyond the bounds of theology.

72. These restrictions do not seem to have had any material operation in France, in Germany, or the Low Countries. And they certainly tended very considerably to keep up the usage of writing in Latin; or rather, perhaps, it may be said, they were less rigorously urged in those countries, because Latin continued to be the customary tongue of scholars. We have seen that great license was used in political writings in that language. The power of reading Latin was certainly so diffused, that no secrecy could be affected by writing it; yet it seemed to be a voluntary abstaining from an appeal to the passions of the

Restric-
tions in
England.

Latin more
employed
on this
account.

* Herbert, iii. 1668.

multitude, and passed better without censure than the same sense in a modern dress.

73. The influence of literature on the public mind was already very considerable. All kinds of reading had become deeper and more diffused. Pedantry is the usual, perhaps the inevitable, consequence of a genuine devotion to learning, not surely in each individual, but in classes and bodies of men. And this was an age of pedants. To quote profusely from ancient writers seemed to be a higher merit than to rival them; they furnished both authority and ornament, they did honour to the modern, who shone in these plumes of other birds with little expense of thought, and sometimes the actual substance of a book is hardly discernible under this exuberance of rich incrustations. Tacitus, Sallust, Cicero, and Seneca (for the Greeks were in comparison but little read), and many of the Latin poets, were the books that, directly, or by the secondary means of quotation, had most influence over the public opinion. Nor was it surprising that the reverence for antiquity should be still undiminished; for, though the new literature was yielding abundant crops, no comparison between the ancients and moderns could as yet fairly arise. Montaigne, fearless and independent as he was, gave up altogether the pretensions of the latter; yet no one was more destined to lead the way to that renunciation of the authority of the former which the seventeenth century was to witness. He and Machiavel were the two writers who produced the greatest effect upon this age. Some others, such as Guevara and Castiglione, might be full as much read, but they did not possess enough of original thought to shape the opinions of mankind. And the former two, to whom we may add Rabelais, seem to be the only writers of the sixteenth century, setting aside poets and historians, who are now much read by the world.

PART III.

**ON THE LITERATURE OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.**

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY OF ANCIENT LITERATURE IN EUROPE, FROM
1600 TO 1650.

SECT. I.

Decline of merely Philological, especially Greek, Learning — Casaubon — Viger — Editions of Greek and Latin Classics — Critical Writings — Latin Style — Scioppius — Vossius — Successive Periods of modern Latinists.

1. IN every period of literary history, if we should listen to the complaints of contemporary writers, all learning and science have been verging towards extinction. None remain of the mighty, the race of giants is no more; the lights that have been extinguished burn in no other hands; we have fallen on evil days, when letters are no longer in honour with the world, nor are they cultivated by those who deserve to be honoured. Such are the lamentations of many throughout the whole sixteenth century; and with such do Scaliger and Casaubon greet that which opened upon them. Yet the first part of the seventeenth century may be reckoned eminently the learned age; rather, however, in a more critical and exact erudition with respect to historical fact, than in what is strictly called philology, as to which we cannot, on the whole, rank this so high as the preceding period. Neither Italy nor Germany maintained its reputation, which, as it has been already mentioned, had begun to wane towards the close of the sixteenth century. The same causes were at work, the same preference of studies very foreign to polite letters, metaphysical philosophy, dogmatic theology, patristic or mediæval ecclesiastical history, or, in some countries, the physical sciences, which were rapidly gaining ground. And

Learning of
17th century
less philo-
logical.

to these we must add a prevalence of bad taste, even among those who had some pretensions to be reckoned scholars. Lipsius had set an example of abandoning the purest models; and its followers had less sense and taste than himself. They sought obsolete terms from Pacuvius and Plautus, they affected pointed sentences, and a studied conciseness of period, which made their style altogether dry and jejune.* The universities, and even the gymnasia, or schools of Germany, grew negligent of all the beauties of language. Latin itself was acquired in a slovenly manner, by help of modern books, which spared the pains of acquiring any subsidiary knowledge of antiquity. And this neglect of the ancient writers in education caused even eminent scholars to write ill, as we perceive in the supplements of Freinshemius to Curtius and Livy.†

2. A sufficient evidence of this is found in the vast popularity which the writings of Comenius acquired in Germany. This author, a man of much industry, some ingenuity, and little judgment, made himself a temporary reputation by his *Orbis Sensualium Pictus*, and still more by his *Janua Linguarum Reserata*, the latter published in 1631. This contains, in 100 chapters subdivided into 1000 paragraphs, more than 9300 Latin words, exclusive, of course, of such as recur. The originality of its method consists in weaving all useful words into a series of paragraphs, so that they may be learned in a short time, without the tediousness of a nomenclature. It was also intended to blend a knowledge of things with one of words.‡ The *Orbis Sensualium Pictus* has the same end. This is what has since been so continually attempted in books of education, that some may be surprised to hear of its originality. No one, however, before Comenius seems to have thought of this method. It must, unquestionably, have appeared to facilitate the early acquirement of knowledge in a very great degree; and even with reference to language, if a compendious mode of getting at Latin words were the object, the works of Comenius would answer the purpose beyond those of any classical author. In a country where Latin was a living and spoken tongue, as was in some measure the case with Germany, no great strict-

* Biogr. Univ. art. Grævius. Eichhorn, iii. 1. 320.

† Eichhorn, 326.
‡ Biogr. Univ.

ness in excluding barbarous phrases is either practicable or expedient. But, according to the received principles of philological literature, they are such books as every teacher would keep out of the hands of his pupils. They were, nevertheless, reprinted and translated in many countries; and obtained a general reception, especially in the German empire, and similarly circumstanced kingdoms.*

3. The Greek language, meantime, was thought unnecessary, and few, comparatively speaking, continued to prosecute its study. In Italy it can merely be said, Decline of
Greek
learning. that there were still professors of it in the universities; but no one Hellenist distinguishes this century. Most of those who published editions of Greek authors in Germany, and they were far from numerous, had been formed in the last age. The decline was progressive; few scholars remained after 1620, and a long blank ensued, until Fabricius and Kuster restored the study of Greek near the end of the century. Even in France and Holland, where many were abundantly learned, and some, as we shall see, accomplished philologers, the Greek language seems to have been either less regarded, or at least less promoted by eminent scholars, than in the preceding century.†

4. Casaubon now stood on the pinnacle of critical renown. His Persius in 1605, and his Polybius in 1609, Casaubon. were testimonies to his continued industry in this

* Baillet, Critiques Grammairiens, Part of the Jugemens des Sçavans, (whom I cite by the number or paragraph, on account of the different editions,) No. 634., quotes Lancelot's remark on the Janua Linguarum, that it requires a better memory than most boys possess to master it, and that commonly the first part is forgotten before the last is learned. It excites disgust in the scholar, because he is always in a new country, every chapter being filled with words he has not seen before; and the successive parts of the book have no connexion with one another.

Morhof, though he would absolutely banish the Janua Linguarum from all schools where good Latinity is required, seems to think rather better of the Orbis Sensualium Pictus, as in itself a

happy idea, though the delineations are indifferent, and the whole not so well arranged as it might be. Polyhistor. lib. ii. c. 4.

† Scaliger, even in 1602, says: Quia hodie nescit Græcè? sed quis est doctus Græcè? Non dubito esse aliquot, sed paucos, et quos non novi ne de nomine quidem. Te unum novi et memorizæ avorum et nostri sæculi Græcè doctissimum, qui unus in Græcis præstiteris, quæ post renatas apud nos bonas literas omnes nunquam præstare potuissent. He goes on to speak of himself, as standing next to Casaubon, and the only competent judge of the extent of his learning; qui de præstantia doctrinæ tuæ certo judicare possit, ego aut unicus sum, aut qui cæteros hac in re magno intervallo vinco. Scal. Epist. 77.

LITERATURE OF EUROPE

vince.* But with this latter edition the philological labours of Casaubon came to an end. In 1610 he accepted the invitation of James I., who bestowed upon him, though a layman, a prebend in the church of Canterbury, and, as some, perhaps erroneously, have said, another in that of Westminster.† He died in England within four years after, having consumed the intermediate time in the defence of his royal patron against the Jesuits, and in writing Animadversions on the Annals of Baronius; works ill-suited to his peculiar talent, and in the latter of which he is said to have had but little success. He laments, in his epistles, the want of leisure for completing his labours on Polybius; the king which he could pursue his studies.‡ “I gave up,” he says, “at last, with great sorrow, my commentary on Polybius, to which I had devoted so much time, but the good king must obeyed.”§ Casaubon was the last of the great scholars of the sixteenth century. Joseph Scaliger, who, especially in his recorded conversation, was very sparing of praise, says expressly, “Casaubon is the most learned man now living.” It is not impossible that he meant to except himself; which would by no means be unjust, if we take in the whole range of erudition; but in the exactly critical knowledge of the Greek language, Casaubon had not even a rival in Scaliger.

* The translation that Casaubon has here given of Polybius has generally passed for excellent, though some have thought him a better scholar in Greek than in Latin, and consequently not always able to render the sense as well as he conceived it. Baillet, n. 902. Schweighauser praises the annotations, but not without the criticism for which a later editor generally finds room in an earlier. Reiske, he says, had pointed out many errors.

† The latter is contradicted by Beloe, *Anecdotes of Literature*, vol. v. p. 126., on the authority of Le Neve's *Fasti Ecclesie Anglicanæ*.

‡ Jacent curæ Polybianæ, et fortasse æternum jacebunt, neque enim satis commodus ad illa studia est locus. *Epist.* 705. Plura adderem, nisi omni librorum presidio meorum deficerem. Quare etiam de commentariis Polybianis noli

meminisse, quando rationes priorum meorum studiorum hoc iter mirificè conturbavit, ut vix sine suspirio ejus incepti possim meminisse, quod tot vigiliis mihi constitit. Sed neque adest mea bibliotheca, neque ea studia multum sunt ad gustum illius, cujus solius, quamdiu his sum futurus, habenda mihi ratio. *Ep.* 704. (Feb. 1611.) Rex optimus atque evocatus rebus theologicis ita delectatur, ut aliis curis literariis non multum operæ impendat. *Ep.* 872. Ego quid hic agam, si cupis scire, hoc unum respondebo, omnia priora studia mea funditus interiisse. Nam maximus rex et liberalissimus unico genere literarum incipitur, ut suum et suorum ingenia illo detineat. *Ep.* 753.

§ Dececi gemens a Polybiano commentario, quem tot laboribus concinveram; sed regi optimo parendum est. *Ep.* 854. Feb. 1613.

5. A long period ensued, during which no very considerable progress was made in Greek literature. Few books occur before the year 1650 which have obtained a durable reputation. The best known, and, as I conceive, by far the best of a grammatical nature, is that of Viger de Idiotismis præcipuis Græcæ Linguæ, which Hoo-geveen and Zeunius successively enlarged in the last century. Viger was a Jesuit of Rouen, and the first edition was in 1632. It contains, even as it came from the author, many valuable criticisms, and its usefulness to a Greek scholar is acknowledged. But, in order to determine the place of Viger among grammarians, we should ascertain by comparison with preceding works, especially the Thesaurus of Stephens, for how much he is indebted to their labours. He would probably, after all deductions, appear to merit great praise. His arrangement is more clear, and his knowledge of syntax more comprehensive, than that of Caninius or any other earlier writer; but his notions are not unfrequently imperfect or erroneous, as the succeeding editors have pointed out. In common with many of the older grammarians, he fancied a difference of sense between the two aorists, wherein even Zeunius has followed him.*

6. In a much lower rank, we may perhaps next place Weller, author of a Greek grammar, published in 1638, of which its later editor, Fischer, says that it has always stood in high repute as a school-book, and been frequently reprinted; meaning, doubtless, in Germany. There is nothing striking in Weller's grammar; it may deserve praise for clearness and brevity; but, in Vergara, Caninius, and Sylburgius, there is much more instruction for those who are not merely schoolboys. What is most remarkable is, that Weller claims as his own the reduction of the declensions to three, and of the conjugations to one; which, as has been seen in another place†, is found in the grammar of Sylburgius, and is probably due to Ramus.

Viger de
Idiotismis.

Weller's
Greek
grammar.

* An earlier treatise on Greek particles by Devarius, a Greek of the Ionian Islands, might have been mentioned in the last period. It was republished by Reusmann, who calls Devarius, homo olim haud ignobilis, at hodie pæne neg-

lectus. He is thought too subtle in grammar, but seems to have been an excellent scholar. I do not perceive that Viger has borrowed from him.

† Vol. I. p. 483.

This is rather a piece of effrontery, as he could scarcely have lighted by coincidence on both these innovations. Weller has given no syntax ; what is added in Fischer's edition is by Lambert Bos.

7. Philip Labbe, a French Jesuit, was a laborious compiler, among whose numerous works not a few relate to the grammar of the Greek language. He had, says Niceron, a wonderful talent in multiplying title-pages ; we have fifteen or sixteen grammatical treatises from him, which might have been comprised in two or three ordinary volumes. Labbe's *Regulæ Accentuum*, published in 1635, was once, I believe, of some repute ; but he has little or nothing of his own.* The Greek grammars published in this age by Alexander Scot and others are ill-digested, according to Lancelot, without order or principle, and full of useless and perplexing things† ; and that of Vossius, in 1642, which is only an improved edition of Clenardus, appears to contain little which is not taken from others.‡ Erasmus Schmidt is said by Eichhorn to be author of a valuable work on Greek dialects§ ; George Pasor is better known by his writings on the Hellenistic dialect, or that of the Septuagint and New Testament. Salmasius, in his *Commentarius de Hellenistica*, (Leyden, 1643,) has gone very largely into this subject. This, he says, is a question lately agitated, whether there be a peculiar dialect of the Greek Scriptures ; for, in the last age, the very name of Hellenistic was unknown to scholars. It is not above half a century old. It was supposed to be a Hebrew idiom in Greek words ; which, as he argues elaborately and with great learning, is not sufficient to constitute a distinct dialect, none of the ancients having ever mentioned one by this name. This is evidently much of a verbal dispute ; since no one would apply the word to the scriptural Greek, in the same sense that he does to the Doric and Attic. Salmasius lays down two essential characteristics of a dialect : one, that it should be spoken by people of a certain locality ; another, that it should be distinguishable by single words, not merely by idiom. A profusion of

Labbe and
others.

Salmasius
de Lingua
Hellenistica.

* Niceron, vol. xxv.

† Baillet, n. 706.

‡ Baillet, n. 711.

§ Geschichte der Cultur, iii. 325.

learning is scattered all round, but not pedantically or impertinently; and this seems a very useful book in Greek or Latin philology. He may perhaps be thought to underrate the peculiarities of language in the Old and New Testament, as if they were merely such as passed current among the contemporary Greeks. The second part of this Commentary relates to the Greek dialects generally, without reference to the Hellenistic. He denies the name to what is usually called the common dialect, spoken, or at least written, by the Greeks in general after the time of Alexander. This also is of course a question of words; perhaps Salmasius used a more convenient phraseology than what is often met with in grammarians.

8. Editions of Greek classics are not so numerous as in the former period. The Pindar of Erasmus Schmidt, in 1614, and the Aristotle of Duval, in 1619, may be mentioned: the latter is still in request, as a convenient and complete edition. Meursius was reckoned a good critical scholar, but his works as an editor are not very important. The chief monument of his philological erudition is the *Lexicon Græco-Barbarum*, a glossary of the Greek of the lower empire. But no edition of a Greek author published in the first part of the seventeenth century is superior, at least in magnificence, to that of Chrysostom by Sir Henry Savile. This came forth, in 1612, from a press established at Eton by himself, provost of that college. He had procured types and pressmen in Holland, and three years had been employed in printing the eight volumes of this great work; one which, both in splendour of execution and in the erudition displayed in it by Savile, who had collected several manuscripts of Chrysostom, leaves immeasurably behind it every earlier production of the English press. The expense, which is said to have been eight thousand pounds, was wholly defrayed by himself, and the tardy sale of so voluminous a work could not have reimbursed the cost.* Another edition, in fact, by a Jesuit,

Greek
editions —
Savile's
Chrysos-
tom.

* Beloe's *Anecdotes of Literature*, vol. v. p. 103. The copies sold for 9*l.* each; a sum equal in command of commodities to nearly 30*l.* at present, and from the relative wealth of the country, to considerably more. What wonder that the sale was slow? Fuller however tells us, that when he wrote, almost half

Fronto Ducæus (Fronton le Duc), was published at Paris within two years afterwards, having the advantage of a Latin translation, which Savile had imprudently waved. It has even been imputed to Ducæus, that, having procured the sheets of Savile's edition from the pressmen while it was under their hands, he printed his own without alteration. But this seems an apocryphal story.* Savile had the assistance, in revising the text, of the most learned coadjutors he could find in England.

9. A very few more Greek books were printed at Eton soon afterwards; and though that press soon ceased, some editions of Greek authors, generally for schools, appeared in England before 1650. One of these, the *Poetæ Minores* of Winterton, is best known, and has sometimes been reprinted: it appears to differ little, if at all, from the collection printed by Crispin in 1570, and of which there had been many subsequent editions, with the title *Vetustissimorum Auctorum Georgica, Bucolica et Gnomonica*; but the text, though still very corrupt, has been amended, and a few notes, generally relating to prosody, have been subjoined. The Greek language, however, was now much studied †; the

a century afterwards, the book was become scarce. Chrysostomus, says Casaubon, a Savilio editur privata impensa, animo regio. Ep. 738. (apud Beloe). The principal assistants of Savile were Matthew Bust, Thomas Allen, and especially Richard Montagu, afterwards celebrated in our ecclesiastical history as bishop of Chichester, who is said to have corrected the text before it went to the press. As this is the first work of learning, on a great scale, published in England, it deserves the particular commemoration of those to whom we owe it.

* It is told by Fuller, and I do not know that it has any independent confirmation. Savile himself says of Fronto Ducæus, "Vir doctissimus, et cui Chrysostomus noster plurimum debet." Fuller, it may be observed, says, that the Parisian edition followed Savile's "in a few months," whereas the time was two years; and as Brunet (*Manuel du Libraire*) justly observes, there is no apparent necessity to suppose an unfair communication of the sheets, even if the text should be proved to be copied.

† It might appear, at first sight, that Casaubon intended to send his son Meric to Holland, under the care of Heinsius, because he could not get a good classical education in England. Cupio in Græcis, Latinis, et Hebraicis literis ipsum serio exerceri. Hoc in Anglia posse fieri sperare non possumus; nam hic locupletissima sunt collegia, sed quorum ratio toto genere diversa est ab institutis omnium aliorum collegiorum. Ep. 962. (1614). But possibly he meant that, on account of his son's foreign birth, he could not be admitted on the foundation of English colleges, though the words do not clearly express this. At the king's command, however, Meric was sent to Oxford. One of Casaubon's sons went to Eton school; literis dat operam in gymnasio Etonensi. Ep. 737. (quoted in Beloe's *Anecdotes*; I had overlooked the passage). Theological learning, in the reign of James, opposed polite letters and philology. Est in Anglia, says Casaubon, theologorum ingens copia; eo enim fere omnes studia sua referunt. Ep. 762.

age of James and Charles was truly learned ; our writers are prodigal of an abundant erudition, which embraces a far wider range of authors than are now read ; the philosophers of every class, the poets, the historians and orators of Greece, to whom few comparatively had paid regard in the days of Elizabeth, seem as familiar to the miscellaneous writers of her next successors, as the fathers of the church are to the theologians. A few, like Jeremy Taylor, are equally copious in their libations from both streams. But though thus deeply read in ancient learning, our old scholars were not very critical in philology.

10. In Latin criticism, the pretensions of the seventeenth century are far more considerable than in Greek. The first remarkable edition, however, that of ^{Latin editions —} Horace by Torrentius, a Belgian ecclesiastic, though ^{Torrentius.} it appeared in 1602, being posthumous, belongs strictly to the preceding age. It has been said that Dacier borrowed much for his own notes from this editor ; but Horace was so profusely illustrated in the sixteenth century, that little has been left for later critics, except to tamper, as they have largely done, with his text. This period is not generally conspicuous for editions of Latin authors ; but some names of high repute in grammatical and critical lore belong to it.

11. Gruter, a native of Antwerp, who became a professor in several German universities, and finally in that of ^{Gruter.} Heidelberg, might have been mentioned in our history of the sixteenth century, before the expiration of which some of his critical labours had been accomplished. Many more belong to the first twenty years of the present. No more diligent and indefatigable critic ever toiled in that quarry. His *Suspiciones*, an early work, in which he has explained and amended miscellaneous passages, his annotations on the Senecas, on Martial, on Statius, on the Roman historians, as well as another more celebrated compilation which we shall have soon to mention, bear witness to his immense industry. In Greek he did comparatively but little ;

Venio ex Anglia (Grotius writes in 1613), *literarum ibi tenuis est merces ; theologi regnant, leguleii rem faciunt ; unus ferme Casaubonus habet fortunam* satis faventem, sed, ut ipse judicat, minus certam. Ne huic quidem locus fuisset in Anglia ut literatori, theologum induere debuit. *Epist. Grot. p. 751.*

yet he is counted among good scholars in that language. All others of his time, it has been said, appear mere drones in comparison with him.* Scaliger, indeed, though on intimate terms with Gruter, in one of his usual fits of spleen, charges him with a tasteless indifference to the real merit of the writers whom he explained, one being as good as another for his purpose, which was only to produce a book.† In this art Gruter was so perfect, that he never failed to publish one every year, and sometimes every month.‡ His eulogists have given him credit for acuteness and judgment, and even for elegance and an agreeable variety; but he seems not to have preserved much repute except for his laborious erudition.

12. Daniel Heinsius, conspicuous as secretary of the synod of Dort, and a Latin poet of distinguished name, ^{Heinsius.} was also among the first philologists of his age. Many editions of Greek and Latin writers, or annotations upon them, Theocritus, Hesiod, Maximus Tyrius, Aristotle, Horace, Terence, Silius, Ovid, attest his critical skill. He is praised for a judicious reserve in criticism, avoiding the trifles by which many scholars had wearied their readers, and attending only to what really demanded the aid of a critic, as being corrupt or obscure. His learning was very extensive and profound, so that in the panegyrical tone of the times, he is set above all the living, and almost above all the dead.§

13. Grotius contributed much to ancient philology. His ^{Grotius.} editions of Aratus, Stobæus, the fragments of the lost Greek dramas, Lucan and Tacitus, are but a part of those which he published. In the power of illustrating a writer by parallel or resembling passages from others, his taste and fondness for poetry, as much as his vast erudition, have made him remarkable. In mere critical skill, he was not quite so great a master of the Greek as of the Latin language; nor was he equal to restoring the text of the dramatic poets.

14. The Variæ Lectiones of Rutgersius, in 1618, whose

* Baillet, n. 483. Bayle. Nicéron, vol. ix.

† Non curat utrum charta sit cacata, modo libros multos excudat. Scalig. Secunda.

‡ Bayle, art. Gruter, note I.

§ Baillet, n. 517.

premature death cut off a brilliant promise of erudition, are in six books, almost entirely devoted to emendation of the text, in such a miscellaneous and desultory series of criticisms, as the example of Turnebus and other scholars had rendered usual.* Reinesius, a Saxon physician, in 1640, put forth a book with the same title, a thick volume of about 700 pages, of multifarious learning, chiefly, but not exclusively, classical. He is more interpretative, and less attentive to restore corrupted texts than Rutgersius.† The *Adversaria* of Gaspar Barthius are better known. This work is in sixty books, and extends to about 1500 pages in folio. It is exactly like those of Turnebus and Muretus, an immense repertory of unconnected criticisms and other miscellaneous erudition. The chapters exceed in number the pages, and each chapter contains several articles. There is, however, more connexion, alphabetical or otherwise, than in Turnebus; and they are less exclusively classical, many relating to mediæval and modern writers. The sixtieth book is a commentary on a part of Augustin de Civitate Dei. It is difficult to give a more precise notion of Barthius; he is more *æsthetic* than Turnebus, but less so than Muretus; he explains and corrects fewer intricate texts than the former, but deals more in parallel passages and excursive illustration.‡ Though

Rutgersius,
Reinesius,
Barthius.

* "This work," says Nicéron (vol. xxxii.), "is in esteem: the style is neat and polite, the thoughts are just and refined; it has no more quotations than the subject requires."

† Bayle observes of the writings of Reinesius in general, that "good judges of literature have no sooner read some pages, but they place him above those philologers who have only a good memory, and rank him with critics who go beyond their reading and know more than books have taught them. The penetration of their understanding makes them draw consequences, and form conjectures, which lead them to discover hidden treasures. Reinesius was one of these, and made it his chief business to find out what others had not said."

‡ The following are the heads of the fourth chapter of the first book, which may serve as a specimen of the *Adversaria*: — Ad Victoris Uticensis librum

primum notæ et emendationes. Limites. Collimitia. Quantitas. H. Stephanus notatur. Impendere. Totum. Omnimodè. Dextrales. Asta. Franciis Balduini audacia castigatur. Tormenta antiqua. Liguamen Arx Capitia. Memorise. Cruciari. Balduinus denuo aliquoties notatur. It is true that all this farrago arises out of one passage in Victor of Utica, and Barthius is far from being so desultory as Turnebus; but 3000 columns of such notes make but a dictionary without the help of the alphabet. Barthius tells us himself that he had finished two other volumes of *Adversaria*, besides correcting the first. See the passage in Bayle, note K. But he does not stand on very high ground as a critic, on account of the rapidity with which he wrote, and for the same reason has sometimes contradicted himself. Bayle. Baillet, n. 528. Nicéron, vol. vii. Morhof, lib. v. l. 10.

Greek appears more than in Turnebus, by far the greater part of Barthius's *Adversaria* relates to Latin, in the proportion of at least fifteen to one. A few small poems are printed from manuscripts for the first time. Barthius, according to Morhof, though he sometimes explains authors very well, is apt to be rash in his alterations, hasty in his judgments, and has too much useless and frivolous matter. Bayle is not more favourable. Barthius published an edition of Statius, and another of Claudian.

15. Rigault, or Rigaltius, Petit, Thysius, and several Other critics
— English. more, do honour to France and the Low Countries during this period. Spain, though not strong in classical philology, produced Ramiresius de Prado, whose *Πεντηκονταρχος*, sive quinquaginta militum ductor, 1612, is but a book of criticism with a quaint title.* In Latin literature we can hardly say that England made herself more conspicuous than in Greek. The notes of John Bond on Horace, published in 1606, are properly a work of the age of Elizabeth: the author was long a schoolmaster in that reign. These notes are only little marginal scholia for the use of boys of no great attainments; and in almost every instance, I believe, taken from Lambinus. This edition of Horace, though Antony Wood calls the author a most noted critic and grammarian, has only the merit of giving the observations of another concisely and perspicuously. Thomas Farnaby is called by Baillet one of the best scholiasts, who says hardly any thing useless, and is very concise.† He has left notes on several of the Latin poets. It is possible that the notes are compiled, like those of Bond, from the foreign critics. Farnaby also was a schoolmaster, and schoolmasters do not write for the learned. He has, however, been acknowledged on the Continent for a diligent and learned man. Wood says he was “the chief grammarian, rhetorician, poet, Latinist, and Grecian of his time; and his school was so much frequented, that more churchmen and statesmen issued thence than from any school taught by one man in England.”‡

* This has been ascribed by some to his master Sanctius, author of the *Minnerva*, Ramirez himself having been

thought unequal to such remarks as we find in it, Baillet, n. 527.

† N. 521.

‡ *Athenæ Oxonienses*, vol. iil.

16. But the greatest in this province of literature was Claude Saumaise, best known in the Latin form ^{Salmasius.} Salmasius, whom the general suffrage of his compeers placed at their head. An incredible erudition, so that it was said, what Salmasius did not know was beyond the bounds of knowledge, a memory such as none but those great scholars of former times seem to have possessed, a life passed, naturally enough, in solitary labour, were sufficient to establish his fame among the learned. His intellectual strength has been more questioned; he wrote, it has been alleged, on many subjects that he did not well understand, and some have reduced his merit to that of a grammatical critic, without altogether rating this so highly as the world has done.* Salmasius was very proud, self-confident, disdainful, and has consequently fallen into many errors, and even contradictions, through precipitancy. In his controversy with Milton, for which he was little fitted, he is rather feeble, and glad to escape from the severity of his antagonist by a defence of his own Latinity.† The works of Salmasius are numerous, and on very miscellaneous subjects; among the philological, his Annotations on the *Historiæ Augustæ Scriptores* seem to deserve mention. But the most remarkable, besides the Commentary on the Hellenistic Dialect, of which an account has been given, is the *Plinianæ Exercitationes*, published in 1629. These remarks, nominally on Pliny, are, in the first instance, on Solinus. Salmasius tells us that he had spent much time on Pliny; but finding it beyond the powers of one man to write a commentary on the whole Natural History of that author, he had chosen Solinus, who is a mere compiler from Pliny, and contains nothing from any other source. The *Plinianæ Exercitationes* is a mass of learning on the geography and natural history of Pliny in more than 900 pages, following the text of the Polyhistor of Solinus.‡

* Baillet, n. 511., is excessively severe on Salmasius; but the homage due to his learning by such an age as that in which he lived cannot be extenuated by the censure of a man like Baillet, of extensive, but rather superficial attainments, and open to much prejudice.

† Milton began the attack by objecting to the use of *persona* for an individual

man; but in this mistaken criticism uttered himself the solecism *vopulandum*. See Johnson's *Lives of the Poets*. This expression had previously been noticed by Vavasour.

‡ Nemo adeo ut propriam, suumque veluti regnum, sibi criticon vindicatum ivit, ac Claudius Salmasius, qui, quem admodum nihil unquam scripsit, in quo

17. It had been the desire of those who aspired to reputation for taste and eloquence to write well in Latin, the sole language, on this side of the Alps and Pyrenees, to which the capacity of choice and polished expression was conceded. But when the French tongue was more cultivated and had a criticism of its own, this became the natural instrument of polite writers in France, and the Latin fell to the merely learned who neglected its beauties. In England it had never been much studied for the purposes of style; and though neither in Germany nor the Low Countries it was very customary to employ the native language, the current Latin of literature was always careless and often barbarous. Even in Italy the number of good writers in that language was now very scanty. Two deserve to be commemorated with praise, both historians of the same period. The History and Annals of Grotius, in which he seems to have emulated, with more discretion than some others, the nervous brevity of Tacitus, though not always free from a certain hardness and want of flow, nor equal, consequently, in elegance to some productions of the sixteenth century, may be deemed a monument of vigorous and impressive language. The Decads of Famianus Strada, a Roman Jesuit, contain a history of the Flemish war, not written certainly in imitation of Tacitus, whom the author depreciated, but with more classical spirit than we usually find in that age. Scarcely any Latin, however, of this period is equal to that of Barclay in the *Argenis* and *Euphormio*. His style, though rather diffuse, and more florid than that of the Augustan age, is perhaps better suited to his subjects, and reminds us of Petronius Arbiter, who was probably his model.

18. Of the grammatical critics, whose attention was solely turned to the purity of Latin style, two are conspicuous, Gaspar Scioppius and Gerard Vossius. The first, one of those restless and angry spirits whose hand is

non insignia multa artis criticæ vestigia deprehendat, ita imprimis, ut auctores cum notis et castigationibus absolutissimis editos taceamus, vasto illo Plinianarum Exercitationum opere, quantum in eo eruditionis genere valeret demonstratum dedit. Morhof, lib. v. c. 1. § 12. The Jesuits, Petavius and

Harduin, who did not cordially praise any Protestant, charged this book with passing over real difficulties, while a mass of heterogeneous matter was foisted in. Le Clerc (or La Croze) vindicates Salmasius against some censures of Harduin in *Bibl. Univ.* vol. iv.

against all the world, lived a long life of controversy and satire. His productions, as enumerated by Nicéron, mostly anonymous, are about one hundred; twenty-seven of which, according to another list, are grammatical.* The Protestants whom he had abandoned, and the Jesuits whom he would not join, are equally the objects of his anger. In literature, he is celebrated for the bitterness of his attacks on Cicero, whom he spared as little as he did his own contemporaries. But Scioppius was an admirable master of the Latin language. All that is remembered of his multifarious publications relates to this. We owe to him a much improved edition of the *Minerva* of Sanctius. His own *Grammatica Philosophica*, (Milan, 1628,) notwithstanding its title, has no pretensions to be called any thing more than an ordinary Latin grammar. In this I observed nothing remarkable but that he denies the gerund and supine to be parts of the verb, considering the first as passive participles, and the second as nouns substantive.

His Philo-
sophical
Grammar.

19. The *Infamia Famiani* of Scioppius was written against *Famianus Strada*, whom he hated both as a Jesuit, and as one celebrated for the beauty of his style. This book serves to show how far those who wrote with some eloquence, as *Strada* certainly did, fell short of classical purity. The faults pointed out are often very obvious to those who have used good dictionaries. Scioppius is however so fastidious as to reject words employed by *Seneca*, *Tacitus*, and even *Phædrus*, as of the silver age; and sometimes probably is wrong in his dogmatic assertion of a negative, that no good authority can be found for them.

His Infamia
Famiani.

20. But his most considerable work is one called *Judicium de Stylo Historico*, subjoined to the last, and published after his death, in 1650. This treatise consists chiefly of attacks on the Latin style of *Thuanus*, *Lipsius*, *Casaubon*, and other recent authors; but in the course of it we find the remarks of a subtle and severe observer on the ancients themselves. The *silver* age he dates from the latter years of *Augustus*, placing even *Ovid* within it. The *brazen* he carries up to *Vespasian*. In the silver

Judicium de
Stylo His-
torico.

* Nicéron, vol. xxxv. Biog Univ.

period he finds many single words as well as phrases not agreeable to the usage of more ancient authors. As to the moderns, the Transalpine writers, he says (speaking as an Italian), are always deficient in purity; they mingle the phraseology of different ages as preposterously as if they were to write Greek in a confusion of dialects; they affect obscurity, a broken structure of periods, a studied use of equivocal terms. This is particularly perceived in the school of Lipsius, whose own faults, however, are redeemed by many beauties even of style.* The Italians, on the contrary, he proceeds to say, read nothing but what is worthy of imitation, and shun every expression that can impair the clearness

* Transalpinis hominibus ex quotidiano Latini sermonis inter ipsos usu, multa sive barbaræ, sive plebeïæ ac deterioris notæ, sic adhærescere solent, ut postea cum stylum arripere, de Latinitate eorum dubitare nequaquam iis in mentem veniat. Inde fit ut scripta eorum plerumque minus puritatis habeant, quamvis gratia et venustas in iis minimè desideretur. Nam hæc natura duce melius fiebant, quam arte aut studio. Accedit alia causa cur non æquè pura sit multorum Transalpinorum oratio, quod nullo ætatis discrimine ac delectu in autorum lectione versantur, et ex omnium commixtione varium quoddam ac multifforme pro suo quisque ingenio dicendi genus effingunt, contempto hoc Fabii monito: "Diu non nisi optimum quisque et qui credentem sibi minime fallat, legendus est, sed diligenter ac pæne ad scribendi sollicitudinem; nec per partes modo scrutanda omnia, sed perlectus liber utique ex integro resumendus." Itaque genus illud corruptæ orationis, seu *κακοῦργίας*, effugere nequeunt, quod *κοινισμὸν* vocant, quæ est quædam mista ex variarum linguarum ratione oratio, ut si Atticis Dorica, Ionica, Æolica etiam dicta confundas; cui simile est si quis sublimia humilibus, vetera novis, poetica vulgaribus, Sallustiana Tullianis, ænæa et ferreæ ætatis vocabula aureis et argenteis misceat, qui Lipsio deductisque ab eo viris, solennis et jam olim familiaris est morbus. In quibus hoc amplius, verba maxime impropria, comprehensionem obscuram, compositionem fractam, aut in frustula concisam, vocum similium aut

ambiguarum puerilem captationem passim animadvertas. Magnis tamen, non nego, virtutibus vitia sua Lipsius redimit, imprimis acumine, venere, alibus (ut excellens viri ingenium ferebat) tum plurimis lectissimis verbis loquendique modis, ex quibus non tam facultatem bene scribendi, ejusque, quod melius est, intellectum ei deesse, quam voluntatem, quo minus rectoria malit, ambitioscule, plaususque popularis studio præpediri intelligas. Italorum longè dispar ratio. Primum enim non nisi optimum legere et ad imitandum sibi proponere solent; quod judicio quo cæteras nationes omnium consensu superant, imprimis est consentaneum. Deinde nihil non faciunt, ut evitent omnia unde aliquid injucundæ et contaminandæ orationis periculi ostenditur. Latine igitur nunquam loquuntur, quod fieri vix posse persuasum habeant, quin quotidianus ejus linguæ usus ad instar torrentis lutulentus fluat, et ejusque modi verborum sordes secum rapiat, quæ postea quodam familiaritatis jure sic se scribentibus ingerant, ut etiam diligentissimos fallant, et haud dubie pro Latinis habeantur. Hoc eorum consilium cum non intelligant Transalpini, id eorum incitiæ perperam assignant. Sic rectè Paulo Manutio usu venit, ut quoniam vix tria verba Latina in familiari sermone proferre poterat, eum Germani complures, qui loquentem audituri ad eum venerunt, vehementer præ se contemnerent. Huic tamen nemo qui sanus sit ad puritatis et elegantie Latine summam quicquid defuisse dixerit. p. 65.

and purity of a sentence. Yet even in Manutius and in the Jesuit Maffei he finds instances of barbarism, much more in the French and German scholars of the sixteenth age; expressing contempt upon this account for his old enemy, Joseph Scaliger. Thuanus, he says, is full of modern idioms; a crime not quite unpardonable, when we remember the immensity of his labour, and the greater importance of other objects that he had in view.

21. Gerard Vossius, a far greater name in general literature than Scioppius, contributed more essentially to these grammatical rules; and to him, perhaps, rather than to any other one man, we may refer the establishment of as much correctness of writing as is attainable in a dead language. Besides several works on rhetoric and poetry, which, as those topics were usually treated in ages of more erudition than taste or philosophy, resolved themselves into philological disquisitions, looking only to the language of the ancient writers, we have several more strictly within that province. The long use of Latin in writings on modern subjects, before the classical authors had been studied, had brought in a host of barbarisms, that even yet were not expelled. His treatise *De Vitiis Sermonis et Glossematis Latino-barbaris* is in nine books; four published in 1645, during the author's life; five in 1685. The former are by far the most copious. It is a very large collection of words in use among modern writers, for which there is no adequate authority. Of these many are plainly barbarous, and taken from the writers of the middle ages, or at best from those of the fifth and sixth centuries. Few such would be used by any tolerable scholar. He includes some which, though in themselves good, have a wrong sense given to them. Words however occur, concerning which one might be ignorant without discredit, especially before the publication of this treatise, which has been the means of correcting the ordinary dictionaries.

Gerard
Vossius,
*De Vitiis
Sermonis.*

22. In the five posthumous books, which may be mentioned in this place, having probably been written before 1650, we find chiefly what the author had forgotten to notice in the former, or had since observed. But the most valuable part relates to the "*falso suspecta*," which fastidious critics

have unreasonably rejected, generally because they do not appear in the Augustan writers. Those whom he calls "Nizoliani verius quam Ciceroniani," disapproved of all words not found in Cicero.* It is curious to perceive, as Vossius shows us, how many apparently obvious words do not occur in Cicero; yet it would be mere affectation to avoid them. This is perhaps the best part of Vossius's treatise.

23. We are indebted to Vossius for a still more important work on grammar, the Aristarchus, sive de Arte Grammatica, which first appeared in 1635. This is in seven books; the first treats of grammar in general, and especially of the alphabet; the second of syllables, under which head he dwells at great length on prosody†; the third (which, with all the following, is separately entitled *De vocum Analogia*) of words generally, and of the genders, numbers, and cases of nouns. The same subject occupies the fourth book. In the fifth he investigates verbs; and in the sixth, the remaining parts of speech. The last book relates to syntax. This work is full of miscellaneous observations, placed for the most part alphabetically under each chapter. It has been said that Vossius has borrowed almost every thing in this treatise from Sanctius and Scioppius. If this be true, we must accuse him of unfairness; for he never mentions the Minerva. But the edition of this grammar by Scioppius was not published till after the death of Vossius. Salmasius extolled that of the latter above all which had been published.‡

24. In later times the ambition of writing Latin with

* Paulus Manutius scrupled to use words on the authority of Cicero's correspondents, such as Cælius or Pollio; a ridiculous affectation, especially when we observe what Vossius has pointed out, that many common words do not occur in Cicero. It is amazing to see the objections of these Ciceronian critics.

† In this we find Vossius aware of the rule in Terentianus Maurus, but brought to light by Dawes, and now familiar, that a final vowel is rarely short before a word beginning with *s* and a mute consonant.

‡ Tuum de grammatica à te accepi exactissimum in hoc genere opus, ac cui nullum priorum aut prisce ævi aut nostri possit comparari. Apud Blount in Vossio. Daunou says of the grammatical and rhetorical writings of Vossius, Ces livres se recommandent par l'exactitude, par la méthode, par une littérature très-étendue. Gibert en convient, mais il trouve de la prolixité. D'autres pourraient n'y voir qu'une instruction sérieuse, souvent austère, et presque toujours profitable." Biogr. Univ.

accuracy and elegance has so universally declined, that the diligence of Scioppius and Vossius has become hardly valuable except to schoolmasters. It is, however, ^{Progress of Latin style.} an art not contemptible, either in respect to the taste and discernment for which it gives scope in composition, or for the enhanced pleasure it reflects on the pages of ancient writers. We may distinguish several successive periods in its cultivation since the first revival of letters. If we begin with Petrarch, since before his time there was no continuous imitation of classical models, the first period will comprise those who desired much, but reached little, the writers of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, destitute of sufficient aids, and generally incapable of clearly discriminating the pure from the barbarous in Latin. A better era may be dated from Politian; the ancients were now fully known, and studied with intense labour; the graces of style were frequently caught; yet something was still wanting to its purity and elegance. At the end of a series of improvements, a line marked by Bembus, Sadolet, and Longolius, we arrive at a third period, which we may call that of Paulus Manutius, the golden age of modern Latinity. The diligence in lexicography of Robert Stephens, of Nizolius, of Manutius himself, and the philological treatises of their times, gave a much greater nicety of expression; while the enthusiasm with which some of the best writers emulated the ancients inspired them with a sympathetic eloquence and grace. But towards the end of the century, when Manutius, and Muretus, and Maphæus, and others of that school had been removed by death, an age of worse taste and perhaps of more negligence in grammar came on, yet one of great scholars, and of men powerful even in language—the age of Lipsius, of Scaliger, of Grotius. This may be called the fourth period; and in this apparently the purity of the language, as well as its beauty, rather declined. Finally, the publications of Scioppius and Vossius mark the beginning of another period, which we may consider as lasting to the present day. Grammatical criticism had nearly reached the point at which it now stands; the additions, at least, which later philologists, Perizonius, Burman, Bentley, and many others have made, though by no means inconsiderable, seem hardly sufficient to constitute a

distinct period, even if we could refer them properly to any single epoch. And the praise of eloquent composition has been so little sought after the close of the years passed in education, or attained only in short and occasional writings, which have left no durable reputation behind, that the Latin language may be said, for this purpose, to have silently expired in the regions of polite literature.

SECT. II.

Antiquities of Rome and Greece — Gruter — Meursius — Chronology.

25. THE antiquities of Greece and Rome, though they did not occupy so great a relative space in the literature of this period as of the sixteenth century, were, Gruter's collection of inscriptions. from the general increase of erudition, not less frequently the subject of books than before. This field, indeed, is so vast, that its harvest had in many parts been scarcely touched, and in others very imperfectly gathered by those we have already commemorated, the Sigonii, the Manutii, the Lipsii, and their fellow-labourers in ancient learning. The present century opened with a great work, the *Corpus Inscriptionum* by Gruter. A few endeavours had long before been made* to collect the ancient inscriptions, of which the countries once Roman, and especially Italy, were full. The best work hitherto was by Martin Smetius of Bruges, after whose death his collection of inscriptions was published at Leyden in 1588, under the superintendence of Dousa and Lipsius.

26. Scaliger first excited his friend Gruter to undertake the task of giving an enlarged edition of Smetius.† Assisted by Scaliger He made the index for this himself, devoting the labour of the entire morning for ten months (a summo mane ad tempus cœnæ) to an occupation from which so little glory could accrue. “Who,” says Burman, “would not admire

* See Vol. I. p. 326.

† Burman in *Prefatione ad Gruteri Corpus Inscript.* Several of Scaliger's

epistles prove this, especially the 405th, addressed to Gruter.

the liberal erudition and unpretending modesty of the learned of that age, who, worn as they were by those long and weary labours of which they freely complain in their correspondence with each other, though they knew that such occupations as these could gain for them no better name than that of common clerks or mere drudges, yet hesitated not to abandon for the advantage of the public those pursuits which a higher fame might be expected to reward? Who in these times would imitate the generosity of Scaliger, who, when he might have ascribed to himself this addition to the work of Smetius, gave away his own right to Gruter, and declined to let his name be prefixed either to the index which he had wholly compiled, or to the many observations by which he corrects and explains the inscriptions, and desired, in recompense for the industry of Gruter, that he alone should pass with posterity as the author of the work?"* Gruter, it is observed by Le Clerc, has committed many faults: he often repeats the same inscriptions, and still more frequently has printed them from erroneous copies; his quotations from authors, in whom inscriptions are found, sometimes want exactness; finally, for which he could not well be answerable, a vast many have since been brought to light.† In consequence of the publication of Gruter's Inscriptions, the learned began with incredible zeal to examine old marbles for inscriptions, and to insert them in any work that had reference to antiquity. Reinesius collected as many as make a respectable supplement.‡ But a sort of era in lapidary learning was made, in 1629, by Selden's description of the marbles brought by the Earl of Arundel from Greece, and which now belong to the university of Oxford. These contain a chronology of the early times of Greece, on which great reliance has often been placed, though their antiquity is not accounted very high in comparison with those times.

27. The Jesuit Donati published, in 1633, *Roma vetus et nova*, which is not only much superior to any thing previously

* Burman, p. 6.

† Bibl. Choisie, vol. xiv. p. 51. Burman, ubi supra, gives a strange reason for reprinting Gruter's Inscriptions with all their blemishes, even the repetitions; namely, that it was convenient to pre-

serve the number of pages which had been so continually referred to in all learned works, the simple contrivance of keeping the original numeration in the margin not having occurred to him.

‡ Burman, ubi supra.

written on the antiquities of the city, but is preferred by some competent judges to the later and more known work of Nardini. Both these will be found, with others of an earlier date, in the third and fourth volumes of Grævius. The tenth volume of the same collection contains a translation from the history of the Great Roads of the Roman Empire, published in French by Nicolas Bergier in 1622; ill arranged, it has been said, and diffuse, according to the custom of his age, but inferior, Grævius declares, in variety of learning to no one work that he has inserted in his numerous volumes. Guther, whose treatise on the pontifical law of Rome appears in the fifth volume, was, says the editor, “a man of various and extended reading, who had made extracts from every class of writers, but had not always digested his learning or weighed what he wrote. Hence much has been found open to criticism in his writings, and there remains a sufficient harvest of the same kind for any one who should care to undertake it.” The best work on Roman dress is by Octavius Ferrarius, published partly in 1642, partly in 1654. This has been called superficial by Spanheim; but Grævius, and several other men of learning, bestow more praise.* The Isiac tablet, covered with emblems of Egyptian antiquity, was illustrated by Pignoria, in a work bearing different titles in the successive editions from 1605; and his explanations are still considered probable. Pignoria’s other writings were also in high esteem with the antiquaries.† It would be tedious to enumerate the less important productions of this kind. A minute and scrupulous criticism, it has been said, distinguished the antiquaries of the seventeenth century. Without, perhaps, the comprehensive views of Sigonius and Panvinius, they were more severely exact. Hence forgery and falsehood stood a much worse chance of success than before. Anniius of Viterbo had deceived half the scholars of the preceding age. But when Inghirami, in 1637, published his *Etruscarum Antiquitatum Fragmenta*, monuments of Etruscan antiquity, which he pretended to have discovered at Volterra, the imposture was speedily detected.‡

* Nicéron, v. 80. Tiraboschi, xi. 300.

† Salfi (Continuation de Ginguéné),

† Nicéron, vol. xxi. Biog. Univ.

xi. 358.

28. The *Germania Antiqua* of Cluverius was published in 1616, and his *Italia Antiqua* in 1624. These form a sort of epoch in ancient geography. The latter, especially, has ever since been the great repository of classical illustration on this subject. Cluverius, however, though a man of acknowledged ability and erudition, has been thought too bold an innovator in his Germany, and to have laid down much on his own conjecture.*

Geography
of Cluve-
rius.

29. Meursius, a native of Holland, began when very young, soon after the commencement of the century, those indefatigable labours on Grecian antiquity, by which he became to Athens and all Hellas what Sigonius had been to Rome and Italy. Nicéron has given a list of his publications, sixty-seven in number, including some editions of ancient writers, but for the most part confined to illustrations of Greek usages; some also treat of Roman. The *Græcia feriata*, on festivals and games; the *Orchestra*, on dancing; the *Eleusinia*, on that deeply interesting, and in his time almost untouched subject, the ancient mysteries, are collected in the works of this very learned person, or scattered through the *Thesaurus Antiquitatum Græcarum* of Gronovius. "Meursius," says his editor, "was the true and legitimate mystagogue to the sanctuaries of Greece." But his peculiar attention was justly shown to "the eye of Greece," Athens. Nothing that bore on her history, her laws and government, her manners and literature, was left by him. The various titles of his works seem almost to exhaust Athenian antiquity: *De Populis Atticæ* — *Athenæ Atticæ* — *Cecropia* — *Regnum Atticum* — *Archontes Athenienses* — *Pisistratus* — *Fortuna Attica* — *Atticarum Lectionum Libri IV.* — *Piræeus* — *Themis Attica* — *Solon* — *Areopagus* — *Panathenæa* — *Eleusinia* — *Theseus* — *Æschylus* — *Sophocles et Euripides*. It is manifest that all later learning must have been built upon his foundations. No one was equal to Meursius in this province; but the second place is perhaps due to Ubbo Emmius, professor of Greek at Groningen, for his *Vetus Græcia Illustrata*, 1626.

Meursius.

Ubbo
Emmius.

The facilities of elucidating the topography of that country

* Blount. Nicéron, vol. xxi. Biogr. Univ.

were by no means such as Cluverius had found for Italy ; and in fact little was done in respect to local investigation in order to establish a good ancient geography till recent times. Samuel Petit, a man placed by some in the very first list of the learned, published in 1635 a commentary on the Athenian laws, which is still the chief authority on that subject.

30. In an age so peculiarly learned as this part of the seventeenth century, it will be readily concluded that many books must have a relation to the extensive subject of this section ; though the stream of erudition had taken rather a different course, and watered the provinces of ecclesiastical and mediæval still more than those of heathen antiquity. But we can only select one or two which treat of chronology, and that chiefly because we have already given a place to the work of Scaliger.

31. Lydiat was the first who, in a small treatise on the various calendars, 1605, presumed in several respects to differ from that of the dictator of literature.

Chronology
of Lydiat.
Calvisius.

He is in consequence reviled in Scaliger's Epistles as the most stupid and ignorant of the human race, a portentous birth of England, or at best an ass and a beetle, whom it is below the dignity of the author to answer.* Lydiat was, however, esteemed a man of deep learning, and did not flinch from the contest. His *Emendatio Temporum*, published in 1609, is a more general censure of the Scaligerian chronology, but it is rather a short work for the extent of the subject. A German, Seth Calvisius, on the other hand, is extolled to the skies by Scaliger for a chronology founded on his own principles. These are applied in it to the whole series of events, and thus Calvisius may be said to have made an epoch in historical literature. He made more use of eclipses than any preceding writer ; and his dates are reckoned as accurate in modern as in ancient history.†

* Ante aliquot dies tibi scripsi, ut scirem ex te quis sit Thomas Lydiat iste, quo monstro nullum portentosius in vestra Anglia natum puto ; tanta est inscitia hominis et confidentia. Ne semel quidem illi verum dicere accidit. And again : — Non est similis morio in orbe terrarum. Paucis asinitatem ejus

perstringam ut lector rideat. Nam in tam prodigiōse imperitum scarabæum scribere, neque nostræ dignitatis est, neque otii. Scalig. Epist. 291. Usher, nevertheless, if we may trust Wood, thought Scaliger worsted by Lydiat. Ath. Oxon. iii. 187.

† Blount. Biogr. Univ.

32. Scaliger, nearly twenty years after his death, was assailed by an adversary whom he could not have thought it unworthy of his name to repel. ^{Petavius.} Petau, or Petavius, a Jesuit of uncommon learning, devoted the whole of the first of two large volumes, entitled *Doctrina Temporum*, 1627, to a censure of the famous work *De Emendatione Temporum*. This volume is divided into eight books; the first on the popular year of the Greeks; the second on the lunar; the third on the Ægyptian, Persian, and Armenian; the fourth on the solar year; the fifth treats of the correction of the paschal cycle and the calendar; the sixth discusses the principles of the lunar and solar cycles; the seventh is entitled an introduction to computations of various kinds, among which he reckons the Julian period; the eighth is on the true motions of the sun and moon, and on their eclipses. In almost every chapter of the first five books, Scaliger is censured, refuted, reviled. It was a retribution upon his own arrogance; but published thus after his death, with no justice done to his great learning and ability, and scarcely the common terms of respect towards a mighty name, it is impossible not to discern in this work of Petavius both signs of an envious mind, and a partial desire to injure the fame of a distinguished Protestant. His virulence, indeed, against Scaliger becomes almost ridiculous. At the beginning of each of the first five books, he lays it down as a theorem to be demonstrated, that Scaliger is always wrong on the particular subjects to which it relates; and at the close of each, he repeats the same in geometrical form as having been proved. He does not even give him credit for the invention of the Julian period, though he adopts it himself with much praise, positively asserting that it is borrowed from the Byzantine Greeks.* The second volume is in five books, and is dedicated to the historical part of chronology, and the application of the principles laid down before. A third volume, in 1630, relating to the same subjects, though bearing a different title, is generally considered as part of the work. Petavius, in 1633, published an abridgement of his chronological system, entitled *Rationarium Temporum*, to which he

* Lib. vii. c. 7.

subjoined a table of events down to his own time, which in the larger work had only been carried to the fall of the empire. This abridgement is better known, and more generally useful than the former.

33. The merits of Petavius as a chronologer have been differently appreciated. Many, of whom Huet is one, from religious prejudices rejoiced in what they hoped to be a discomfiture of Scaliger, whose arrogance had also made enemies of a large part of the literary world. Even Vossius, after praising Petavius, declares that he is unwilling to decide between men who have done for chronology more than any others.* But he has not always been so favourably dealt with. Le Clerc observes, that as Scaliger is not very perspicuous, and Petavius has explained the former's opinions before he proceeds to refute them, those who compare the two will have this advantage, that they will understand Scaliger better than before.† This is not very complimentary to his opponent. A modern writer of respectable authority gives us no reason to consider him victorious. "Though the great work of Petavius on chronology," says M. St. Martin, "is certainly a very estimable production, it is not less certain that he has in no degree contributed to enlarge the boundaries of the science. The author shows too much anxiety to refute Scaliger, whether right or wrong; his sole aim is to destroy the edifice perhaps too boldly elevated by his adversary. It is not unjust to say that Petavius has literally done nothing for positive chronology; he has

* Vossius apud Nicéron, xxxvii. 111. Dionysius Petavius permulta post Scaligerum optime observavit. Sed nolim iudicium interponere inter eos, quorum uterque præclare adeo de chronologia meritus est, ut nullis plus hæc scientia debeat. . . . Qui sine affectu ac partium studio conferre volet quæ de temporibus scripsere, conspiciet esse ubi Scaligero major laus debeatur, comperiet quoque ubi longe Petavio malit assentiri; erit etiam ubi ampliandum videatur; imo ubi nec facile veritas à quoquam possit indagari. The chronology of Petavius was animadverted upon by Salmasius with much rudeness, and by several other contemporaries engaged in the same controversy. If we were to

believe Baillet, Petavius was not only the most learned of the order of Jesuits, but surpassed Salmasius himself *de plusieurs coudées*. Jugemens des Sçavans, n. 513. But to judge between giants we should be a little taller ourselves than most are. Baillet, indeed, quotes Henry Valois for the preference of Petavius to any other of his age; which, in other words, is much the same as to call him the most learned man that ever lived; and Valois was a very competent judge. The words, however, are found in a funeral panegyric.

† Bibl. Choisie, ii. 186. A short abstract of the Petavian scheme of chronology will be found in this volume of Le Clerc.

not even determined with accuracy what is most incontestable in this science. Many of the dates which he considers as well established are still subject to great doubt, and might be settled in a very different manner. His work is clear and methodical ; and, as it embraces the whole of chronology, it might have become of great authority : but these very qualities have rendered it injurious to the science. He came to arrest the flight, which, through the genius of Scaliger, it was ready to take, nor has it made the least progress ever since ; it has produced nothing but conjectures, more or less showy, but with nothing solid and undeniable for their basis.” *

* Biogr. Univ. art. Petavius.

CHAPTER II.

HISTORY OF THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE IN EUROPE,
FROM 1600 TO 1650.

Claim of Popes to temporal Power — Father Paul Sarpi — Gradual Decline of papal Power — Unpopularity of Jesuits — Controversy of Catholics and Protestants — Deference of some of the latter to Antiquity — Wavering in Casaubon — Still more in Grotius — Calixtus — An opposite School of Theologians — Daillé — Chillingworth — Hales — Rise of the Arminian Controversy — Episcopius — Socinians — Question as to Rights of Magistrates in Religion — Writings of Grotius on this Subject — Question of Religious Toleration — Taylor's Liberty of Prophesying — Theological Critics and Commentators — Sermons of Donne — and Taylor — Deistical Writers — English Translation of the Bible.

1. THE claim of the Roman see to depose sovereigns was like the retractile claws of some animals, which would be liable to injury were they not usually sheathed. If the state of religion in England and France towards the latter part of the sixteenth century required the assertion of these pretended rights, it was not the policy of a court, guided as often by prudence as by zeal or pride, to keep them for ever before the eyes of the world. Clement VIII. wanted not these latter qualities, but they were restrained by the former; and the circumstances in which the new century opened did not demand any direct collision with the civil power. Henry IV. had been received back into the bosom of the church; he was now rather the ally, the favoured child of Rome, than the object of her proscription. Elizabeth, again, was out of the reach of any enemy but death, and much was hoped from the hereditary disposition of her successor. The temporal supremacy would therefore have been left for obscure and unauthorised writers to vindicate, if an unforeseen circumstance had not called out again its most celebrated champion. After the detection of the gunpowder conspiracy, an oath of allegiance was imposed in England, containing a renunciation, in strong terms, of the

Temporal
supremacy
of Rome.

tenet that princes excommunicated by the pope might be deposed or murdered by their subjects. None of the English catholics refused allegiance to James; and most of them probably would have felt little scruple at taking the entire oath, which their arch-priest, Blackwell, had approved. But the see of Rome interfered to censure those who took the oath; and a controversy singularly began with James himself in his "Apology for the Oath of Allegiance." Bellarmin answered, in 1610, under the name of Matthew Tortus; and the duty of defending the royal author was devolved on one of our most learned divines, Lancelot Andrews, who gave to his reply the quaint title, *Tortura Torti*.^{*} But this favourite tenet of the Vatican was as ill fitted to please the Gallican as the English church. Barclay, a lawyer of Scottish family, had long defended the rights of the crown of France against all opponents. His posthumous treatise on the temporal power of the pope with respect to sovereign princes was published at London in 1609. Bellarmin answered it next year in the ultra-montane spirit which he had always breathed; the parliament of Paris forbade the circulation of his reply.[†]

2. Paul V. was a pope imbued with the arrogant spirit of his predecessors, Paul IV. and Pius V.; no one was more prompt to exercise the despotism which the Jesuits were ready to maintain. After some minor disputes with the Italian states, he came, in 1605, to his famous conflict with the republic of Venice, on the very important question of the immunity of ecclesiastics from the civil tribunals. Though he did not absolve the subjects of Venice from their

Contest with
Venice.

^{*} Biogr. Britann. art. Andrews. Collier's Ecclesiastical History. Butler's English Catholics. vol. i. Matthew Tortus was the almoner of Bellarmin, whose name he thought fit to assume as a very slight disguise.

[†] Il pretesto, says Father Paul of Bellarmin's book, è di scrivere contra Barclajo; ma il vero fine si vede esser per ridurre il papa al colmo dell'onnipotente. In questo libro non si tratta altro, che il suddetto argomento, e più di venti cinque volte è replicato, che quando il papa giudica un principe indegno per sua colpa d'aver governo, ovvero inetto, o pur conosce, che per il bene della chiese sia cosa utile, lo può

privare. Dice più volte, che quando il papa comanda, che non sia ubbidito ad un principe privato da lui, non si può dire, che comandi che principe non sia ubbidito, ma che privata persona, perchè il principe privato dal papa non è più principe. E passa tanto innanzi, che viene à dire, il papa può disporre secondo che giudica ispediente de' tutti i beni di qual si voglia Christiano, ma tutto sarebbe niente, se solo dicesse che tale è la sua opinione; dice, ch'è un articolo della fede catholica, ch'è eretico, chi non sente così, e questo con tanta petulantia, che non vi si può aggiungere. Lettere di Sarpi, 50.

allegiance, he put the state under an interdict, forbidding the celebration of divine offices throughout its territory. The Venetian clergy, except the Jesuits and some other regulars, obeyed the senate rather than the pope. The whole is matter of known history. In the termination of this dispute, it has been doubted which party obtained the victory; but in the ultimate result and effect upon mankind, we cannot, it seems, well doubt that the see of Rome was the loser.* Nothing was more worthy of remark, especially in literary history, than the appearance of one great man, Fra Paolo Sarpi, the first who, in modern times and in a Catholic country, shook the fabric not only of papal despotism, but of ecclesiastical independence and power. For it is to be observed that in the Venetian business the pope was contending for what were called the rights of the church, not for his own supremacy over it. Sarpi was a man of extraordinary genius, learning, and judgment: his physical and anatomical knowledge was such as at least to have caused several great discoveries to be assigned to him†; his reasoning was concise and cogent; his style perspicuous and animated. A treatise, “*Delle Materie Beneficarie*,” in other words, on the rights, revenues, and privileges, in secular matters, of the ecclesiastical order, is a model in its way. The history is so short and yet so sufficient, the sequence so natural and clear, the proofs so judiciously introduced, that it can never be read without delight and admiration of the author’s skill. And this is more striking to those who have toiled at the verbose books of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where tedious quotations, accumulated, not selected, disguise the argument they are meant to confirm. Except the first book of Machiavel’s *History of Florence*, I do not remember any earlier summary of facts so lucid and pertinent to the object. That object was, with Father Paul, neither more nor less than to represent the wealth and power of the church as ill-

* Ranke is the best authority on this dispute, as he is on all other matters relating to the papacy in this age. vol. ii. p. 324.

† He was supposed to have discovered the valves of the veins, the circulation of the blood, the expansion and contraction of the pupil, the variation of the com-

pass. A quo, says Baptista Porta of Sarpi, aliqua didicisse non solum fateri non erubescimus, sed gloriamur, cum eo doctiorem, subtiliorem, quotquot adhuc videre contigerit, neminem cognovimus ad encyclopædiam. *Magia Naturalis*, lib. vii. apud Ranke.

gotten and excessive. The Treatise on Benefices led the way, or rather was the seed thrown into the ground, that ultimately produced the many efforts both of the press and of public authority to break down ecclesiastical privileges.*

3. The other works of Sarpi are numerous, but none require our present attention except the most celebrated, his History of the Council of Trent. The manuscript of this having been brought to London History of
Council of
Trent. by Antonio de Dominis, was there published, in 1619, under the name of Pietro Soave Polano, the anagram of Paolo Sarpi Veneto. It was quickly translated into several languages, and became the text-book of protestantism on the subject. Many incorrectnesses have been pointed out by Pallavicini, who undertook the same task on the side of Rome; but the general credibility of Father Paul's history has rather gained by the ordeal of hostile criticism. Dupin observes that the long list of errors imputed by Pallavicini, which are chiefly in dates and such trifling matters, make little or no difference as to the substance of Sarpi's history; but that its author is more blamable for a malicious disposition to impute political motives to the members of the council, and idle reasonings which they did not employ.† Ranke, who has given this a more minute scrutiny than Dupin could have done, comes nearly to the same result. Sarpi is not a fair, but he is, for those times, a tolerably exact historian. His work exhibits the general excellences of his manner; freedom from redundancy, a clear, full, agreeable style; a choice of what is most pertinent and interesting in his materials. Much has been disputed about the religious tenets of Father Paul; it appears to me quite out of doubt, both by the tenour of his history, and still more unequivocally, if possible, by some of his letters, that he was entirely hostile to the church, in the usual sense, as well as to the court of Rome, sympathising in affection, and concurring generally in opinion, with the reformed denomination.‡ But as he continued in

* A long analysis of the Treatise on Benefices will be found in Dupin, who does not blame it very much. The treatise is worth reading through, and has been commended by many good judges of history.

† Hist. Eccles. Cent. 17.

‡ The proofs of this it would be endless to adduce from the history: they strike the eye in every page, though it cannot be expected that he should declare his way of thinking in express

the exercise of his functions as a Servite monk, and has always passed at Venice more for a saint than a heretic, some of the Gallican writers have not scrupled to make use of his authority, and to extenuate his heterodoxy. There can be no question but that he inflicted a severe wound on the spiritual power.

4. That power, predominant as it seemed in the beginning of the seventeenth century, met with adversaries besides Sarpi. The French nation, and especially the parliament of Paris, had always vaunted what were called the liberties of the Gallican church; liberties, however, for which neither the church itself, nor the king, the two parties interested, were prone to display much regard. A certain canonist, Richer, published in 1611 a book on ecclesiastical and political power; in which he asserted the government of the church to be a monarchy tempered with aristocracy; that is, that the authority of the pope was limited

Gallican
liberties.
Richer.

terms. Even in his letters he does not this. They were printed, with the date, at least, of Verona, in 1673. Sully's fall he laments, "having become partial to him on account of his firmness in religion." Lett. 53. Of the republic of the United Provinces he says, *La nascita di quale si come Dio ha favorito con grazie inestimabili, così pare che la malizia del diavolo oppugni con tutte le arti.* Lett. 23. After giving an account of one Marsilio, who seems to have been a Protestant, he adds: *Credo se non fosse per ragion di stato, si troverebbero diversi, che saltarebbono da questo fosso di Roma nella cima dell' riforma; ma chi teme una cosa, chi un' altra. Dio però par che goda la più minima parte dei pensieri umani. So ch' ella nui intende senza passar più oltre.* Lett. 81. Feb. 1612. Sarpi speaks with great contempt of James I., who was occupied like a pedant about Vorstius and such matters. *Se il re d' Inghilterra non fosse dottore, si potrebbe sperare qualche bene, e sarebbe un gran principio, perchè Spagna non si può vincere, se non levato il pretesto della religione, ne questo si leverà se non introducendo i reformati nell' Italia. E si il rè sapesse fare, sarebbe facile e in Torino, e qui.* Lett. 88. He wrote, however, a remarkable letter to Casaubon much about this time, hinting at his wish to find an asylum in

England, and using rather too different language about the king: *In eo, rarum, cumulata virtutes principis ac viri. Regum idea est, ad quam forte ante actis sæculis nemo formatus fuit. Si ego ejus protectione dignus essem, nihil mihi deesse putarem ad mortalis vitæ felicitatem. Tu, vir præstantissime, nihil te dignius efficere potes, quam tanto principi mea studia commendare.* Casaubon, Epist. 811. For *mea* in another edition is read *tua*; but the former seems preferable. Casaubon replied, that the king wished Paul to be a light to his own country; but if any thing should happen, he had written to his ambassador, *ut nulla in re tibi desit.*

[The above collection of letters, published at Geneva, with the date of Verona, is said by a late biographer of Sarpi, and one very far from Catholic orthodoxy, to have been most incorrectly printed, and even interpolated, for the purpose of giving a more protestant cast to his opinions; so that, though in the main his own, they cannot be quoted in evidence. *Vita di Sarpi*, per Bianchi-Giovini, Bruxelles, 1836, vol. ii. p. 191. But the letter to Casaubon is certainly genuine; and we have no proof of interpolation in those of Geneva, though we may have of incorrectness. The History, however, is sufficient to demonstrate Sarpi's protestantism.—1847.]

in some respects by the rights of the bishops. Though this has since become a fundamental principle among the Cisalpine catholics, it did not suit the high notions of that age; and the bishops were content to sacrifice their rights by joining in the clamour of the papal party. A synod assembled by cardinal du Perron, archbishop of Sens, condemned the book of Richer, who was harassed for the rest of his life by the persecution of those he had sought to defend against a servitude which they seemed to covet. His fame has risen in later times. Dupin concludes a careful analysis of Richer's treatise with a noble panegyric on his character and style of writing.*

5. The strength of the ultra-montane party in the Gallican church was Perron, a man of great natural capacity, Perron. a prodigious memory, a vast knowledge of ecclesiastical and profane antiquity, a sharp wit, a pure and eloquent style, and such readiness in dispute that few cared to engage him.† If he did not always reason justly, or upon consistent principles, these are rather failings in the eyes of lovers of truth, than of those, and they are the many, who sympathise with the dexterity and readiness of a partisan. He had been educated as a Protestant, but, like half the learned of that religion, went over from some motive or other to the victorious side. In the conference at Fontainebleau with Du Plessis Mornay, it has been mentioned already that he had a confessed advantage; but victory in debate follows the combatant rather than the cause. The supporters of Gallican liberties were discouraged during the life of this cardinal. He did not explicitly set himself against them, or deny, perhaps, the principles of the council of Constance; but by

* Hist. Eccles. Cent. 17. l. ii. c. 7. Nicéron, vol. xxvii. The Biographie Universelle talks of the republican principles of Richer: it must be in an ecclesiastical sense, for nothing in the book, I think, relates to civil politics. Father Paul thought Richer's scheme might lead to something better, but did not highly esteem it. Quella mistura del governo ecclesiastico di monarchia e aristocrazia mi pare una composizione di oglio e acqua, che non possono mai mischiarsi insieme. Lettere di Sarpi, 109. Richer entirely denies the infalli-

bility of the pope in matters of faith, and says there is no authority adduced for it but that of the popes themselves. His work is written on the principles of the Jansenizing Gallicans of the eighteenth century, and probably goes farther than Bossuet, or any who wished to keep on good terms with Rome would have openly approved. It is prolix, extending to two volumes 4to. Some account of Richer will be found in Histoire de la Mère et du Fils, ascribed to Mezeray, or Richelieu.

† Dupin.

preventing any assertion of them, he prepared the way, as it was hoped at Rome, for a gradual recognition of the whole system of Bellarmin. Perron, however, was neither a Jesuit nor very favourable to that order. Even so late as 1638, a collection of tracts by the learned brothers Du Puy, on the liberties of the church, was suppressed at the instance of the nuncio, on the pretext that it had been published without permission. It was reprinted some years afterwards, when the power of Rome had begun to decline.*

6. Notwithstanding the tone still held by the court of Rome and its numerous partisans, when provoked by any demonstration of resistance, they generally avoided aggressive proceedings, and kept in reserve the tenets which could not be pleasing to any civil government. We should doubtless find many assertions of the temporal authority of the pope by searching into obscure theology during this period; but after Bellarmin and Perron were withdrawn from the stage, no prominent champions of that cause stood forth; and it was one of which great talents and high station alone could overcome the intrinsic unpopularity. Slowly and silently the power of Rome had much receded before the middle of the seventeenth century. Paul V. was the last of the imperious pontiffs who exacted obedience as sovereigns of Christendom. His successors have had recourse to gentler methods, to a paternal rather than regal authority; they have appealed to the moral sense, but have rarely or never alarmed the fears of their church. The long pontificate of Urban VIII. was a period of transition from strength to weakness. In his first years, this pope was not inactively occupied in the great cause of subduing the Protestant heresy. It has been lately brought to light, that soon after the accession of Charles I. he had formed a scheme, in conjunction with France and Spain, for conquering and partitioning the British islands: Ireland was to be annexed to the ecclesiastical state, and governed by a viceroy of the Holy See.† But he after-

* Dupin, l. iii. c. 1. Grot. Epist. 1105. Liber de libertatibus ecclesiæ Gallicanæ ex actis desumptus publicis, quo regis regnique jura contra molitiones pontificias defenduntur, ipsius regis jussu vendi est prohibitus. See also Epist. 519.

† Ranke, ii. 518. It is not at all probable that France and Spain would have seriously coalesced for any object of this kind: the spoil could not have been safely divided. But the scheme serves to show the ambition, at that time, of the Roman see.

wards gave up these visionary projects, and limited his ambition to more practicable views of aggrandisement in Italy. It is certain that the temporal principality of the popes has often been an useful diversion for the rest of Europe: the duchy of Urbino was less in our notions of importance than Germany or Britain; but it was quite as capable of engrossing the thoughts and passions of a pope.

7. The subsidence of catholic zeal before the middle of this age deserves especially to be noted at a time when, in various directions, that church is beginning to exalt her voice, if not to rear her head, and we are ostentatiously reminded of the sudden revival of her influence in the sixteenth century. It did undoubtedly then revive; but it is equally manifest that it receded once more. Among the leading causes of this decline in the influence, not only of what are called ultra-montane principles, but of the zeal and faith that had attended them, a change as visible, and almost as rapid as the re-action in favour of them which we have pointed out in the latter part of the sixteenth century, we must reckon the increasing prejudices against the Jesuit order. Their zeal, union, indefatigable devotion to the cause, had made them the most useful of allies, the most formidable of enemies; but in these very qualities were involved the seeds of public hatred and ultimate ruin. Obnoxious to Protestant states for their intrigues, to the lawyers, especially in France, for their bold theories of political power and encroaching spirit, to the Dominicans for the favour they had won, they had become long before the close of this period rather dangerous supporters of the see of Rome.* Their fate, in countries where the temper of their order had displayed itself with less restraint, might have led reflecting men to anticipate the consequences of urging too far the patience of mankind by the ambition of an insulated order of priests. In the first part of this century the Jesuits possessed an extensive influence in Japan, and had re-united the kingdom of Abyssinia to the Roman church. In the course of a few years more, they were driven out from both; their intriguing

Unpopularity of the Jesuits.

* Clement VIII. was tired of the Jesuits, as we are told by Perron, who did not much love them. Perroniana, p. 286. 288.

ambition had excited an implacable animosity against the church to which they belonged.

8. Cardinal Richelieu, though himself a theological writer, took great care to maintain the liberties of the French crown and church. No extravagance of Hildebrandic principles would find countenance under his administration. Their partisans endeavoured sometimes to murmur against his ecclesiastical measures; it was darkly rumoured that he had a scheme of separating the Catholic church of France, something in the manner of Henry VIII., from the supremacy of Rome, though not from her creed; and one Hersent published, under the name of Optatus Gal-
Richelieu's
care of
Gallican
liberties.lus, a book so rapidly suppressed, as to be of the greatest rarity, the aim of which was to excite the public apprehension of this schism.* It was in defence of the Gallican liberties, so far as it was yet prudent to assert them, that De Marca was employed to write a treatise, *De Concordantiâ Sacerdotii et Imperii*. This book was censured at Rome; yet it does not by any means come up to the language afterwards usual in the Gallican church; it belongs to its own age, the transitional period in which Rome had just ceased to act, but not to speak as a mistress. De Marca was obliged to make some concessions before he could obtain the bulls for a bishopric. He rose, however, afterwards to the see of Paris. The first part of his work appeared in 1641, the second after the death of the author.

9. In this most learned period, according to the sense in which the word was then taken, that Europe has ever seen, it was of course to be expected that the studious ecclesiastics of both the Romish and Protestant denomination would pour forth a prodigal erudition in their great controversy. It had always been the aim of the former to give an historical character to theological inquiry; it was their business to ascertain the faith of the Catholic church as a matter of fact, the single principle of its infallibility being assumed as the basis of all investigation. But their opponents, though less concerned in the
Controversy of
Catholics
and Pro-
testants.

* Biogr. Univ. — Grot. epist. 982. 1354. By some other letters of Grotius, it appears that Richelieu tampered with those schemes of reconciling the

different religions which were then afloat, and all which went on setting the pope nearly aside. Ruarus intimates the same. Epist. Ruar. p. 401.

issue of such questions, frequently thought themselves competent to dispute the field ; and conversant as they were with ecclesiastical antiquity, found in its interminable records sufficient weapons to protract the war, though not to subdue the foe. Hence, partly in the last years of the sixteenth century, but incomparably more in the present, we find an essential change in the character of theological controversy. It became less reasoning, less scriptural, less general and popular, but far more patristic, that is, appealing to the testimonies of the fathers, and altogether more historical than before. Several consequences of material influence on religious opinion sprang naturally from this method of conducting the defence of Protestantism. One was, that it contracted very greatly the circle of those who, upon any reasonable interpretation of the original principle of personal judgment, could exercise it for themselves ; it became the privilege of the deeply learned alone. Another that, from the real obscurity and incoherence of ecclesiastical authorities, those who had penetrated farthest into that province of learning were least able to reconcile them ; and however they might disguise it from the world while the pen was in their hands, were themselves necessarily left, upon many points, in an embarrassing state of doubt and confusion. A third effect was, that upon these controversies of Catholic tradition, the church of Rome had very often the best of the argument ; and this was occasionally displayed in those wrestling matches between religious disputants, which were held, publicly or privately, either with the vain hope of coming to an agreement, or to settle the faith of the hearers. And from the two last of these causes it arose, that many Protestants went over to the church of Rome, and that a new theological system was contrived to combine what had been deemed the incompatible tenets of those who had burst from each other with such violence in the preceding century.

Increased
respect for
the fathers.

10. This retrocession, as it appeared, and as in spirit it was, towards the system abandoned in the first impetuosity of the Reformation, began in England about the conclusion of the sixteenth century. It was evidently connected with the high notions of ecclesiastical

Especially
in England.
Laud.

power, of an episcopacy by unbroken transmission from the apostles, of a pompous ritual, which the rulers of the Anglican church took up at that time in opposition to the Puritans. It rapidly gained ground in the reign of James, and still more of his son. Andrews, a man far more learned in patristic theology than any of the Elizabethan bishops, or perhaps than any of his English contemporaries except Usher, was, if not the founder, the chief leader of this school. Laud became afterwards, from his political importance, its more conspicuous head; and from him it is sometimes styled. In his conference with the Jesuit Fisher, first published in 1624, and afterwards with many additions in 1639, we find an attempt, not feeble, and we may believe, not feigned, to vindicate the Anglican Protestantism, such as he meant it to be, against the church of Rome, but with much deference to the name of Catholic, and the authority of the ancient fathers.* It is unnecessary to observe, that this was the prevalent language of the English church in that period of forty years, which was terminated by the civil war; and that it was accompanied by a marked enhancement of religious ceremonies, as well as by a considerable approximation to several doctrines and usages of the Romanists.

11. The progress of the latter church for the first thirty years of the present century was as striking and uninterrupted as it had been in the final period of the sixteenth. Victory crowned its banners on every side. The signal defeats of the elector-palatine and the king of Denmark, the reduction of Rochelle, displayed an evident superiority in the ultimate argument to which the Protestants had been driven, and which silences every other; while a rigid system of exclusion from court favour and of civil discouragement, or even of banishment, and suppression of

Defections
to the Ca-
tholic
church.

* Ce qu'il y a de particulier dans cette conférence, c'est qu'on y cite beaucoup plus les pères de l'église, que n'ont accoutumé de faire les Protestans de deçà la mer. Comme l'église Anglicane a une vénération toute particulière pour l'antiquité, c'est par là que les Catholiques Romains l'attaquent ordinairement. Bibl. Univ. i. 336. Laud, as well as Andrews, maintained "that the true and real body of Christ is in that blessed

sacrament." Conference with Fisher, p. 299. (edit. 1639.) And afterwards, "for the church of England, nothing is more plain than that it believes and teaches the true and real presence of Christ in the eucharist." Nothing is more plain than the contrary, as Hall, who belonged to a different school of theology, though the friend of Laud, has in equivalent words observed. Hall's works (Pratt's edition), vol. ix. p. 374.

public worship, as in the Austrian dominions, brought round the wavering and flexible to acquiesce with apparent willingness in a despotism which they could neither resist nor escape. The nobility, both in France and Germany, who at the outset had been the first to embrace a new faith, became afterwards the first to desert it. Many also of the learned and able Protestants gave evidence of the jeopardy of that cause by their conversion. It is not, however, just to infer that they were merely influenced by this apprehension. Two other causes mainly operated; one, to which we have above alluded, the authority ascribed to the traditions of the church, as recorded by the writers called fathers, and with which it was found very difficult to reconcile all the Protestant creed; another, the intolerance of the reformed churches, both Lutheran and Calvinistic, which gave as little latitude as that which they had quitted.

12. The defections, from whatever cause, are numerous in the seventeenth century. But two, more eminent than any who actually renounced the Protestant religion, must be owned to have given evident signs of wavering, Casaubon and Grotius. The proofs of this are not founded merely on anecdotes which might be disputed, but on their own language.* Casaubon was staggered by

Wavering of
Casaubon.

* In his correspondence with Scaliger, no indications of any vacillation as to religion appear. Of the unfortunate conference between Du Plessis Mornay and Du Perron, in the presence of Henry IV., where Casaubon himself had been one of the umpires, he speaks with great regret, though with a full acknowledgment that his champion had been worsted. *Quod scribis de congressu Diomedis cum Glaucō, sic est omnino, ut tu judicas rectè. Vir optimus, si eum sua prudentia orbi Gallico satis explorata non defecisset, nunquam ejus certaminis aleam subiisset.* After much more he concludes: *Equidem in lacrymas prope adducor, quoties subit animo tristissima illius diei species, cum de ingenua nobilitate, de excellenti ingenio, de ipsa denique veritate pompaticè adeo vidi triumphatum.* Epist. 214. (Oct. 1600.) See also a letter to Heinsius on the same subject. Casaub. Epist. 809. In a letter to Perron himself, in 1604, he professed to adhere to Scripture alone,

against those who *vetustatis auctoritatem pro ratione obtendunt.* Epist. 417. A change, however, came gradually over his mind, and he grew fascinated by this very authority of antiquity. In 1609 he had, by the king's command, a conference on religion with Du Perron, but very reluctantly, and, as his biographer owns, *quibusdam visus est quodammodo cespitasse.* Casaubon was, for several reasons, no match in such a disputation for Perron. In the first place, he was poor and weak, and the other powerful, which is a reason that might dispense with our giving any others; but, secondly, he had less learning in the fathers; and, thirdly, he was entangled by deference for these same fathers; finally, he was not a man of as much acuteness and eloquence as his antagonist. The issue of battle does not follow the better cause, but the sharper sword; especially when there is so much *ignoratio elenchi* as in this case.

the study of the fathers, in which he discovered many things, especially as to the eucharist, which he could not in any manner reconcile with the tenets of the French Huguenots.* Perron

* Perron continued to persecute Casaubon with argument, whenever he met him in the king's library. Je vous confesse (the latter told Wytenbogart) qu'il m'a donné beaucoup des scrupules qui me restent, et auxquels je ne sçais pas bien répondre . . . il me fâche de rougir. L'escapade que je prens est que je n'y puis répondre, mais que j'y penserai. Casauboni Vita (ad edit. Epistolarum, 1709). And in writing to the same Wytenbogart, Jan. 1610, we find similar signs of wavering. Me, ne quid dissimulem, hæc tanta diversitas a fide veteris ecclesiæ non parum turbat. Ne de aliis dicam, in re sacramentaria a majoribus discessit Lutherus, a Luthero Zuinglius, ab utroque Calvinus, a Calvino qui postea scripserunt. Nam constat mihi ac certissimum est, doctrinam Calvini de sacra eucharistia longe aliam esse ab ea quæ in libro observandi viri Molinæi nostri continetur, et quæ vulgo in ecclesiis nostris auditur. Itaque Molinæum qui oppugnant, Calvinum illi non minus objiciunt, quam aliquem è veteribus ecclesiæ doctoribus. Si sic pergimus, quis tandem erit exitus? Jam quod idem Molinæus, omnes veterum libros suæ doctrinæ contrarios respuit, ut *ὑποβολιμαίους*, cui mediocriter docto fidem faciet? Falsus illi Cyrillus, Hierosolymorum episcopus; falsus Gregorius Nysenus, falsus Ambrosius, falsi omnes. Mihi liquet falli ipsum, et illa scripta esse verissima, quæ ille pronuntiat *ψευδεπιγραφα*. Ep. 670. See also Epist. 1043, written from Paris in the same year. He came now to England, and to his great satisfaction found the church and its prelates exactly what he would wish. Illud solatio mihi est, quod in hoc regno speciem agnosco veteris ecclesiæ, quam ex patrum scriptis didici. Adde quod episcopis *σημεραι συνδιαγω* doctissimis, sapientissimis, *ευσθεστατοις*, et quod novum mihi est, prisæ ecclesiæ amantissimis. (Lond. 1611.) Ep. 703. His letters are full of similar language. See 743, 744. 772, &c. He combined this inordinate respect for authority with its natural concomitant, a desire to restrain free inquiry. Though his patristic lore should have made him not unfavourable to the Arminians, he writes to Bertius, one of

their number, against the liberty of conscience they required. *Illam quam passim celebras, prophetandi libertas, bonis et piis hujus ecclesiæ viris mirum in modum suspecta res est et odiosa.* Nemo enim dubitat de pietate Christiana actum esse inter vos, si quod videris agere, illustrissimis ordinibus fuerit semel persuasum, ut liberum unicuique esse velint, via regia relicta semitam ex animi libidine sibi aliisque aperire. Atqui veritas, ut seīs, in omnibus rebus scientiis et disciplinis unica est, et *το φανεῖν ταυτο* inter ecclesiæ veræ notas, fateantur omnes, non est postrema. Ut nulli esse dubium possit, quin tot *πολυσχιδεις* semitæ totidem sint errorum diverticula. Quod olim de politicis rebus prudentissimi philosophorum dixerunt, id mihi videtur multo etiam magis in ecclesiasticis locum habere, *την αἰαν ελευθεριαν εις δουλειαν ἐξ αναγκης τελευτᾶν, et πᾶσαν τυραννίδα αναρχίας* esse *κρείττην* [sic!] et optabiliorem. . . . Ego qui inter pontificios diu sum in patri mea versatus, hoc tibi possum affirmare, nulla re magis stabiliri *την τυραννίδα του χξξ*, quam dis-sensionibus nostris et dissidiis.

Meric Casaubon's "Pietas contra maledicos Patrii Nominis ac Religionis Hostes," is an elaborate vindication of his father against all charges alleged by his adversaries. The only one that presses is that of wavering in religion. And here Meric candidly owns that his father had been shaken by Perron about 1610. (See this tract subjoined to Almelooven's edition of the Epistles, p. 89.) But afterwards, by dint of theological study, he got rid of the scruples the cardinal had infused into him, and became a Protestant of the new Anglican school, admiring the first six centuries, and especially the period after Constantine: Hoc sæculum cum duobus sequentibus *αιχραι της εκκλησιας*, flos ipse ecclesiæ et ætas illius aurea queat nuncupari. Prolegomena in Exercitationes in Baronium. His friend Scaliger had very different notions of the fathers. "The fathers," says he, in his blunt way, "are very ignorant, know nothing of Hebrew, and teach us little in theology. Their interpretations of Scripture are strangely perverse. Even Polycarp, who was a disciple of the

used to assail him with arguments he could not parry. If we may believe this cardinal, he was on the point of declaring publicly his conversion before he accepted the invitation of James I. to England; and even while in England he promoted the Catholic cause more than the world was aware.* This is more than we can readily believe; and we know that he was engaged both in maintaining the temporal rights of the crown against the school of Bellarmine, and in writing animadversions on the ecclesiastical annals of Baronius. But this opposition to the extreme line of the ultra-montanists might be well compatible with a tendency towards much that the reformers had denounced. It seemed, in truth, to disguise the corruptions of the Catholic church by rendering the controversy almost what we might call personal; as if Rome alone, either by usurping the headship of the church, which might or might not have bad consequences, or by its encroachments on the civil power, which were only maintained by a party, were the sole object of that religious opposition, which had divided one half of Europe from the other. Yet if Casaubon, as he had much inclination to do, being on ill terms with some in England, and disliking the country†, had

apostles, is full of errors. It will not do to say that, because they were near the apostolic age, they are never wrong." *Scaligerana Secunda*. Le Clerc has some good remarks on the deference shown by Casaubon to the language held by the fathers about the eucharist, which shook his protestantism. *Bibl. Choisie*, xix. 230.

* Perroniana. *Grot. Epist.* p. 939.

† Several of his letters attest his desire of returning. He wrote to Thuanus imploring his recommendation to the queen-regent. But he had given much offence by writing against Baronius, and had very little chance of an indemnity for his prebend of Canterbury, if he had relinquished that on leaving England. This country, however, though he sometimes calls it *μικρὸν ἤνθος*, did not suit his disposition. He was never on good terms with Savile, the most presumptuous of the learned, according to him, and most scornful, whom he accused of setting on Montague to anticipate his animadversions on Baronius, with some suspicion, on Casaubon's part, of stealing from him.

Ep. 794. 848, 849. But he seems himself to have become generally unpopular, if we may trust his own account. *Ego mores Anglorum non capio*. Quoscunque habui notos priusquam huc venire, jam ego illis sum ignotus, verè peregrinus, barbarus; nemo illorum me vel verbulo appellat; *appellatus silet*. Hoc quid sit, non scio. Hic ——— [Henricus Wotton] vir doctissimus ante annos viginti mecum Genevæ vixit, et ex eo tempore literis amicitiam coluimus. Postquam ego e Galliis, ille Venetiis huc convenimus, desii esse illi notus; meæ quoque epistolæ responsum dedit nullum; an sit daturus nescio. *Ep.* 841. It seems difficult to account for so marked a treatment of Casaubon, except on the supposition that he was thought to pursue a course unfavourable to the Protestant interest. He charges the English with despising every one but themselves; and ascribes this to the vast wealth of their universities; a very discreditable source of pride in our ancestors, if so it were. But Casaubon's philosophical and critical skill passed for littl

returned to France, it seems probable that he would not long have continued in what, according to the principles he had adopted, would appear a schismatical communion.

13. Grotius was from the time of his turning his mind to theology almost as much influenced as Casaubon by primitive authority, and began, even in 1614, to commend the Anglican church for the respect it showed, very unlike the rest of the reformed, to that standard.* But the

in this country, where it was not known enough to be envied. In mere ecclesiastical learning he was behind some English scholars.

* Casaubon himself hailed Grotius as in the right path. In hodiernis contentionibus in negotio religionis et doctæ et piæ iudicat, et in veneratione antiquitatis cum iis sentit, qui optimè sentiunt. Epist. 883. See also 772, which is addressed to him. This high respect for the fathers and for the authority of the primitive church grew strongly upon him, and the more because he found they were hostile to the Calvinistic scheme. He was quite delighted at finding Jerome and Chrysostom on his side. Grot. Epist. 29. (1614.) In the next year, writing to Vossius, he goes a great length. Caterum ego reformatarum ecclesiarum miseriam in hoc maxime deploro, quod cum symbola condere catholicæ sit ecclesiæ, ipsis inter se nunquam eam in rem convenire sit datum, atque interim libelli apologetici ex re nata scripti ad imperatorem, reges, principes, aut ut in concilio œcumenico exhiberentur, trahi cæperint in usum longè alienum. Quid enim magis est alienum ab unitate catholica quam quod diversis in regionibus pastores diversa populo tradere coguntur? Quam mirata fuisset hoc prodigium pia antiquitas! Sed hæc aliaque multa mussitanda sunt nobis ob iniquitatem temporum. Epist. 66. He was at this time, as he continued till near the end of his life, when he moved on farther, highly partial to the Anglican church. He was, however, too Erastian for the English bishops of the reign of James, as appears, by a letter addressed to him by Overall, who objected to his giving, in his treatise *De Imperio circa Sacra*, a definitive power in controversies of faith to the civil magistrate, and to his putting episcopacy among non-essentials, which the bishops held to be of

divine right. Grotius adhered to his opinion, that episcopacy was not commanded as a perpetual institution, and thought, at that time, that there was no other distinction between bishops and priests than of precedency. Nusquam meminit, he says in one place, Clemens Romanus exsortis illius episcoporum auctoritatis quæ ecclesiæ consuetudine post Marci mortem Alexandriæ, atque eo exemplo alibi, introduci cæpit, sed planè ut Paulus Apostolus, ostendit ecclesias communi presbyterorum, qui iidem omnes et episcopi ipsi Pauloque dicuntur, consilio fuisse gubernatas. Even in his latter writings he seems never to have embraced the notions of some Anglican divines on this subject, but contents himself, in his remarks on Cassander, who had said, singularly as it may be thought, *Convenit inter omnes olim Apostolorum ætate inter episcopos et presbyteros discrimen nullum fuisse, sed postmodum ordinis servandi et schismatis evitandi causa episcopum presbyteris fuisse præpositum, with observing, Episcopi sunt presbyterorum principes; et ista προστasia (præsidentia) à Christo præmonstrata est in Petro, ab Apostolia vero, ubicunque fieri poterat, constituta, et a Spiritu Sancto comprobata in Apocalypsi. Op. Theolog. iv. 579. 621.*

But to return from this digression to our more immediate purpose. Grotius for several years continued in this insulated state, neither approving of the Reformation nor the church of Rome. He wrote in 1622 to Episcopus against those whom he called *Cassandrians*, Qui etiam plerosque Romanæ ecclesiæ errores improbantibus auctores sunt, ne ab ejus communione discedant. Ep. 181. He was destined to become *Cassandrian* himself, or something more. The infallibility of the church was still no doctrine of his. At illa auctoritas ecclesiæ *καθηγου*, quam ecclesiæ, et quidem

ill usage he sustained at the hands of those who boasted their independence of papal tyranny, the caresses of the Gallican

sue, Romanenses ascribunt, cum naturali ratione non sit evidens, nam ipsi fatentur Judaicam ecclesiam id privilegium non habuisse, sequitur ut adversus regantes probari debeat ex sacris literis. *Epist. secunda series*, p. 761. (1620.) And again: Quæ scribit pater de restituendis rebus in eum statum, qui ante concilium Tridentinum fuerat, esset quidem hoc permultum; sed transubstantiatio et ei respondens adoratio pridem Lateranensi concilio definita est, et invocatio peculiaris sanctorum pridem in omnes liturgias recepta. p. 772. (1623.)

Grotius passed most of his latter years at Paris, in the honourable station of ambassador from the court of Sweden. He seems to have thought it a matter of boast that he did not live as a Protestant. See *Ep.* 196. The Huguenot ministers of Charenton requested him to communicate with them, which he declined, p. 854. 856. (1635.) He now was brooding over a scheme of union among Protestants: the English and Swedish churches were to unite, and to be followed by Denmark. Constituto semel aliquo tali ecclesiarum corpore, spes est subinde alios atque alios se aggregaturos. Est autem hæc res eo magis optanda protestantibus, quod quotidie multi eos deserunt et se cœtibus Romanensium addunt, non alia de causa, quam quod non unum est eorum corpus, sed partes distractæ, greges segreges, propria cuique sua sacrorum communio, ingens præterea maledicendi certamen. *Epist.* 866. (1637.) See also p. 827. (1630.) He fancied that by such a weight of authority, grounded on the ancient church, the exercise of private judgment, on which he looked with horror, might be overruled. Nisi interpretandi sacras literas, he writes to Calixtus, libertatem cohibemus intra lineas eorum, quæ omnes illæ non sanctitate minus quam primæva vetustate venerabiles ecclesiæ ex ipsa prædicatione scripturis ubique consentiente hauserint, diuque sub crucis maximè magisterio retinuerint, nisi deinde in iis quæ liberam habuere disputationem fraterna lenitate ferre alii alios discimus, quis erit letium sæpe in factiones, deinde in bella erumpentium finis? *Ep.* 674. (Oct. 1636.) Qui illam optimam antiquitatem se-

quantur ducem, quod te semper fecisse memini, iis non eveniet, ut multum sibi ipsis sint discolors. In Angliâ vides quam bene processerit dogmatum noxiorum repurgatio, hæc maximè de causa quod qui id sanctissimum negotium procurandum suscipere nihil admiscuerunt novi, nihil sui, sed ad meliora sæcula intentam habuere oculorum aciem. *Ep.* 966. (1638.)

But he could not be long in perceiving that this union of Protestant churches was impossible from the very independence of their original constitution. He saw that there could be no practicable re-union except with Rome itself, nor that, except on an acknowledgment of her superiority. From the year 1640 his letters are full of sanguine hopes that this delusive vision would be realised. He still expected some concession on the other side; but, as usual, would have lowered his terms according to the pertinacity of his adversaries, if indeed they were still to be called his adversaries. He now published his famous annotations on Cassander, and the other tracts mentioned in the text, to which they gave rise. In these he defends almost every thing we deem popery, such as transubstantiation (*Opera Theologica*, iv. 619.), stooping to all the nonsensical evasions of a spiritual mutation of substance and the like; the authority of the pope (p. 642.), the celibacy of the clergy (p. 645.), the communion in one kind (*ibid.*), and in fact is less of a Protestant than Cassander. In his epistles he declares himself decidedly in favour of purgatory, as at least a probable doctrine, p. 930. In these writings he seems to have had the countenance of Richelieu. Cardinalis quin *hæreticos* negotium in Gallia successurum sit, dubitare se negat. *Epist. sec. series*, p. 912. Cardinalis Ricelianus rem successuram putat. Ita certè loquitur multis. Archiepiscopus Cantuariensis pœnas dat honestissimi consilii, quod et aliis bonis sæpe evenit. p. 911. Grotius is now run away with by vanity, and fancies all will go according to his wish, showing much ignorance of the real state of things. He was left by some from whom he had entertained hopes, and thought the Dutch Arminians timid. Vossius, ut video,

clergy after he had fixed his residence at Paris, the growing dissensions and virulence of the Protestants, the choice that

præ metu, forte et ex Anglia sic jussus, auxilium suum mihi subtrahit. p. 908. Salmasius adhuc in consiliis fluctuat. Est in religionis rebus sure parti addictior quam putabatur. p. 912. De Episcopo doleo; est vir magni ingenii et probus, sed nimium cupidus alendæ partis. But it is probable that he had misinterpreted some language of these great men, who contemplated with regret the course he was taking, which could be no longer a secret. De Grotii ad papam defectione, a French Protestant of some eminence for learning, writes, tanquam re certa, quod fama istuc distulit, verum non est. Sed non sine magno metu eum aliquid istiusmodi meditantem et conantem quotidie inviti videmus. Inter protestantes cujuslibet ordinis nomen ejus ascribi vetat, quod eos atrociori sugillavit in Appendice de Antichristo, et Annotatis ad Cassandri consultationem. Sarraui Epistolæ, p. 58. (1642.) And again he expresses his strong disapprobation of one of the later treatises. Verissimè dixit ille qui primus dixit Grotium papissare. p. 196. See also p. 31. 53.

In 1642 Grotius had become wholly averse to the Reformation. He thought it had done more harm than good, especially by the habit of interpreting every thing on the papal side for the worse. Malos mores qui mansere corrigi æquum est. Sed an non hoc melius successurum fuerit, si quisque semet repurgans pro repurgatione aliorum preces ad Deum tulisset, et principes et episcopi correctionem desiderantes, non rupta compage, per concilia universalia in id laborassent. Dignum est de quo cogitur. p. 938. Auratus, as he calls him, that is D'Or, a sort of chaplain to Grotius, became a Catholic about this time. The other only says, — Quod Auratus fecit, idem fecit antehac vir doctissimus Petrus Pithæus; idem constituerat facere Casaubonus si in Gallia mansisset, affirmavit enim id inter alios etiam Cordesio. p. 939. Of Casaubon he says afterwards, Casaubonus multo saniores putabat Catholicos Galliæ quam Carentonianos. Anglos autem episcopos putabat a schismatis culpa posse absolvi. p. 940. Every successive year saw him now draw nearer to Rome. Reperio autem quicquid communiter ab ecclesia occidentali quæ Ro-

manæ cohæret recipitur, idem reperiri apud Patres veteres Græcos et Latinos, quorum communionem retinendam esse vix quisquam neget. Si quid præter hoc est, id ad liberales doctorum opinioniones pertinet; in quibus suum quis judicium sequi potest, et communionis jus non amittere. p. 958. Episcopus was for limiting articles of faith to the creed. But Grotius did not agree with this, and points out that it would not preserve uniformity. Quam multa jam sunt de sacramentis, de ecclesiarum regimine, in quibus, vel concordie causa, certi aliquid observari debet. Alioqui compages ecclesiæ tantopere nobis commendata retineri non potest. p. 941. It would be endless to quote every passage tending to the same result. Finally, in a letter to his brother in Holland, he expresses his hope that Wytenbogat, the respectable patriarch of Arminianism, would turn his attention to the means of restoring unity to the church. Velim D. Wytenbogardum, ubi permiserit valetudo, nisi id jam fecerit, scriptum aliquid facere de necessitate restituendæ in ecclesia unitatis, et quibus modis id fieri possit. Multi pro remedio monstrant, si necessaria a non necessariis separentur, in non necessariis sive creditu sive factu relinquatur libertas. At non minor est controversia, quæ sint necessaria quam quæ sint vera. Indicia, aiunt, sunt in scripturis. At certè etiam circa illa loca variat interpretatio. Quare nondum video an quid sit melius, quam ea quæ ad fidem et bona opera nec ducunt retinere, ut sunt in ecclesia catholica; puto enim in iis esse quæ sunt necessaria ad salutem. In cæteris ea quæ conciliorum auctoritate, aut veterum consensu recepta sunt, interpretari eo modo quo interpretati sunt illi qui commodissimè sunt locuti, quales semper aliqui in quaque materia facile reperiuntur. Si quis id a se impetrare non possit, ut taceat, nec propter res de quibus certus non est, sed opinionem tantum quandam habet, turbet unitatem ecclesiæ necessariam, quæ nisi retinetur ubi est, et restituitur ubi non est, omnia ibunt in pejus. p. 960. (Nov. 1643.) Wytenbogart replied very well: Si ita se res habet, ut indicia necessariorum et non necessariorum in scriptura reperiri nequeant, sed quæri debeant in

seemed alone to be left in their communion, between a fanatical anarchy, disintegrating every thing like a church on the

autoritate conciliorum aut veterum consensu, eo modo quo interpretati sunt illi qui commodissime locuti sunt, prout Excellentia tua videtur existimare, nescio an viginti quinque anni, etiamsi illi mihi adhuc restarent, omnesque exigui ingenii corporisque mei vires in mea essent potestate, sufficerent ut maturo cum iudicio perlegam et expendam omnia quæ eo pertinent. This letter is in the *Epistolæ præstantium et eruditorum virorum* edited by Limborch in 1683, p. 826. And Grotius's answer is in the same collection. It is that of a man who throws off a mask he had reluctantly worn. There was in fact no other means of repelling Wytenbogat's just observation on the moral impossibility of tracing for ourselves the doctrine of the Catholic church as an historical inquiry. Grotius refers him to a visible standard. Quare considerandum est, an non facilius et æquius sit, quoniam doctrina de gratia, de libero arbitrio, necessitate fidei bonorumque operum obtinuit in ecclesia quæ pro se habet universale regimen et ordinem successionis, privatos se in aliis accommodare, pacis causa, iis quæ universaliter sunt recepta, sive ea aptissimis explicationibus recipiendo, sive tacendo, quam corpus illud catholicum ecclesiæ in articulo tolerantiae accommodare debere uniuscujusque considerationibus et placitis. Exempli gratiâ: Catholica ecclesia nemini præscribit ut precetur pro mortuis, aut opem precum sanctorum vita hac defunctorum imploret; solummodo requirit, ne quis morem adeo antiquum et generalem condemnet. The church does, in fact, rather more than he insinuates.

I have trespassed on the patience of the general reader in this very long note, which may be thought a superfluous digression in a work of mere literature. But the epistles of Grotius are not much read; nor are they in many private libraries. The index is also very indifferent, so that without the trouble I have taken of going over the volume, it might be difficult to find these curious passages. I ought to mention that Burigny has given references to most of them, but with few quotations. Le Clerc, in the first volume of the *Bibliothèque Univer-*

selle, reviewing the epistles of Grotius, slides very gently over his bias towards popery; and I have met with well-informed persons in England, who had no conception of the lengths to which this had led him. It is of far more importance, and the best apology I can offer for so prolix a note, to perceive by what gradual, but, as I think, necessary steps, he was drawn onward by his excessive respect for antiquity, and by his exaggerated notions of Catholic unity, preferring at last to err with the many, than to be right with the few. If Grotius had learned to look the hydra schism in the face, he would have had less fear of its many heads, and at least would have dreaded to cut them off at the neck, lest the source of life should be in one of them.

That Grotius really thought as the fathers of Trent thought upon all points in dispute cannot be supposed. It was not in the power of a man of his learning and thoughtfulness to divest himself of his own judgment, unless he had absolutely subjugated his reason to religious awe, which was far from being the case. His aim was to search for subtle interpretations, by which he might profess to believe the words of the church, though conscious that his sense was not that of the imposers. It is needless to say that this is not very ingenuous; and even if it could be justifiable relatively to the person, would be an abandonment of the multitude to any superstition and delusion which might be put upon them. Via ad pacem expeditissima mihi videtur, si doctrina, communi consensu recepta, commodè explicetur, mores sanæ doctrinæ adversantes, quantum fieri potest, tollantur, et in rebus mediis accommodet se pars ingenio totius. *Epist.* 1524. Peace was his main object: if toleration had been as well understood as it was afterwards, he would perhaps have compromised less.

Baxter having published a *Treatise of the Grotian Religion*, wherein he imputed to Grotius this inclination towards the church of Rome, archbishop Bramhall replied, after the Restoration, with a vindication of Grotius, in which he does not say much to the purpose, and

one hand, and a domination of bigoted and vulgar ecclesiastics on the other, made him gradually less and less averse to the comprehensive and majestic unity of the Catholic hierarchy, and more and more willing to concede some point of uncertain doctrine, or some form of ambiguous expression. This is abundantly perceived, and has often been pointed out, in his Annotations on the Consultation of Cassander, written in 1641, in his Animadversions on Rivet, who had censured the former treatise as inclining to Popery, in the *Votum pro Pace Ecclesiasticâ* and in the *Rivetiani Apologetici Discussio*; all which are collected in the fourth volume of the theological works of Grotius. These treatises display an uniform and progressive tendency to defend the church of Rome in every thing that can be reckoned essential to her creed; and in fact he will be found to go farther in this direction than Cassander.

14. But if any one could put a different interpretation on these works, which would require a large measure of prejudice, the epistles of Grotius afford such evidence of his secession from the Protestant side, as no reasonable understanding can reject. These are contained in a large folio volume, published in 1687, and amount to 1766 of one series, and 744 of another. I have quoted the former, for distinction's sake, by the number, and the latter by the page. Few, we may presume, have taken the pains to go through them, in order to extract all the passages that bear upon this subject. It will be found that he began, as I have just said, by extolling the authority of the Catholic or universal church, and its exclusive right to establish creeds of faith. He some time afterwards ceased to frequent the Protestant worship, but long kept his middle path, and thought it enough to inveigh against the Jesuits and the exorbitancies of the see of Rome. But his reverence for the writers of the fourth and fifth centuries grew continually stronger; he learned to protest against

seems ignorant of the case. The epistles indeed were not then published.

Besides the passages in these epistles above quoted, the reader who wishes to follow this up may consult *Epist.* 1108. 1460. 1561. 1570. 1706, of the first series; and in the second series, p. 875. 896. 940. 943. 958. 960. 975. But there

are also many to which I have made no reference. I do not quote authorities for the design of Grotius to have declared himself a convert, if he had lived to return to France, though they are easily found; because the testimony of his writings is far stronger than any anecdote.

the privilege, claimed by the reformers, of interpreting Scripture otherwise than the consent of the ancients had warranted ; visions, first of an union between the Lutheran and English churches, and then of one with Rome itself, floated before his eyes ; he sought religious peace with the latter, as men seek it in opposition to civil government, by the redress of grievances and the subsequent restoration of obedience. But in proportion as he perceived how little of concession was to be obtained, he grew himself more ready to concede ; and though at one time he seems to deny the infallibility of the church, and at another would not have been content with placing all things in the state they were before the council of Trent, he came ultimately to think such a favourable sense might be put on all the Tridentine decrees, as to render them compatible with the Confession of Augsburg.

15. From the year 1640 his course seems to have been accelerated ; he intimates no disapprobation of those who went over to Rome ; he found, as he tells us, that whatever was generally received in the church of Rome had the authority of those Greek and Latin fathers, whose communion no one would have refused ; and at length in a remarkable letter to Wytenbogart, bearing date in 1644, he puts it as worthy to be considered, whether it would not be more reasonable for private men, who find the most essential doctrines in a church of an universal hierarchy and a legitimate succession, to wave their differences with it for the sake of peace, by putting the best interpretations they can, only keeping silence on their own opinions, than that the Catholic church should accommodate itself to the separate judgment of such men. Grotius had already ceased to speak of the Arminians as if he were one of themselves, though with much respect for some of their leaders.

16. Upon a dispassionate examination of all these testimonies, we can hardly deem it an uncertain question whether Grotius, if his life had been prolonged, would have taken the easy leap that still remained ; and there is some positive evidence of his design to do so. But dying on a journey and in a Protestant country, this avowed declaration was never made. Fortunately, indeed, for his glory, since his new friends would speedily have put his conversion to the

proof, and his latter years might have been spent, like those of Lipsius, in defending legendary miracles, or in waging war against the honoured dead of the reformation. He did not sufficiently remember that a silent neutrality is never indulged to a suspicious proselyte.

17. It appears to me, nevertheless, that Grotius was very far from having truly subjected his understanding to the church of Rome. The whole bent of his mind was to effect an exterior union among Christians; and for this end he did not hesitate to recommend equivocal senses of words, convenient explanations, and respectful silence. He first took up his reverence for antiquity, because he found antiquity unfavourable to the doctrine of Calvin. His antipathy to this reformer and to his followers led him on to an admiration of the episcopal succession, the organised hierarchy, the ceremonial and liturgical institutions, the high notions of sacramental rites, which he found in the ancient church, and which Luther and Zwingle had cast away. He became imbued with the notion of unity as essential to the Catholic church; but he never seems to have gone the length of abandoning his own judgment, or of asserting any positive infallibility to the decrees of man. For it is manifest that, if the councils of Nice or of Trent were truly inspired, it would be our business to inquire what they meant themselves, not to put the most convenient interpretations, nor to search out for some author or another who may have strained their language to our own opinion. The precedent of Grotius, therefore, will not serve those who endeavour to bind the reason of the enlightened part of mankind, which he respected like his own. Two predominant ideas seem to have swayed the mind of this great man in the very gradual transition we have indicated; one, his extreme reverence for antiquity and for the consent of the Catholic church; the other, his Erastian principles as to the authority of the civil magistrate in matters of religion. Both conspired to give him an abhorrence of the "liberty of prophesying," the right of private men to promulgate tenets inconsistent with the established faith. In friendly conversation or correspondence, even, perhaps, with due reserve, in Latin writings, much might be indulged to the learned; room was to be found for an Erasmus and a

Cassander ; or, if they would themselves consent, for an Episcopus and a Wytenbogart, at least for a Montagu and a Laud ; but no pretext was ever to justify a separation. The scheme of Grotius is, in a modified degree, much the same as that of Hobbes.

18. In the Lutheran church we find an eminent contemporary of Grotius, who may be reckoned his counterpart in the motives which influenced him to seek for Calixtus. an entire union of religious parties, though resembling him far more in his earlier opinions, than in those to which he ultimately arrived. This was George Calixtus, of the university of Helmstadt, a theologian the most tolerant, mild and catholic in his spirit, whom the Confession of Augsburg had known since Melancthon. This university, indeed, which had never subscribed the Form of Concord, was already distinguished by freedom of inquiry, and its natural concomitant, a large and liberal spirit. But in his own church, generally, Calixtus found as rigid schemes of orthodoxy, and perhaps a more invidious scrutiny into the recesses of private opinion, than in that of Rome, with a less extensive basis of authority. The dream of good men in this age, the re-union of Christian churches in a common faith, and meanwhile the tolerance of differences, were ever the aim of Calixtus. But he fell, like the Anglican divines, into high notions of primitive tradition, placing, according to Eichhorn and Mosheim, the unanimity of the first six centuries by the side of Scripture itself. He was assailed by the adherents of the Form of Concord with aggravated virulence and vulgarity ; he was accused of being a Papist and a Calvinist, reproaches equally odious in their eyes, and therefore fit to be heaped on his head ; the inconsistency of calumnies being no good reason with bigots against uttering them.*

19. In a treatise, published long after his death, in 1697, *De tolerantia Reformatorum circa quæstiones inter ipsos et Augustanam confessionem professos controversas consultatio*, it is his object to prove that the Calvinists held no such tenets as should exclude them from Christian communion. He does not deny or extenuate the reality of His attempts at concord.

* Eichhorn, vol. vi. part ii. p. 20. Mosheim. Biogr. Univ.

their differences from the Confession of Augsburg. The Lutherans, though many of them, he says, had formerly maintained the absolute decrees of predestination, were now come round to the doctrine of the first four centuries.* And he admits that the Calvinists, whatever phrases they may use, do not believe a true and substantial presence in the Eucharist.† But neither of these errors, if such they are, he takes to be fundamental. In a shorter and more valuable treatise, entitled *Desiderium et studium concordiae ecclesiasticæ*, Calixtus proposes some excellent rules for allaying religious heats. But he leans far too much towards the authority of tradition. Every church, he says, which affirms what others deny, is bound to prove its affirmation; first by Scripture, in which whatever is contained must be out of controversy; and, secondly, (as Scripture bears witness to the church that it is the pillar and foundation of truth, and especially the primitive church which is called that of the saints and martyrs,) by the unanimous consent of the ancient church, above all, where the debate is among learned men. The agreement of the church is therefore a sufficient evidence of Christian doctrine, not that of individual writers, who are to be regarded rather so far as they testify the Catholic doctrine, than as they propound their own.‡ This deference to an

* *Nostri e quibus olim multi ibidem absolutum decretum approbarunt, paulatim ad sententiam primorum quatuor sæculorum, nempe decretum juxta præscientiam factum, receperunt. Qua in re multum egregiè laboravit Ægidius Hunnius. Difficile autem est hanc sententiam ita proponere, ne quid Pelagianismo habere affine videatur.* p. 14.

† Si tamen non tam quid loquantur quam quid sentiant attendimus, certum est eos veri corporis et sanguinis secundum substantiam acceptorum præsentiam non admittere. Rectius autem fuerit utramque partem simpliciter et ingenuè, quod sentit, profiteri, quam alteram alteri ambiguis loquendi formulis imponere. Qualem conciliandi rationem inierunt olim Philippus et Bucerus, nempe ut præscriberentur formulæ, quarum verba utraque pars amplecteretur, sed singulæ suo sensu acciperent ac interpretarentur. Quem conatum, quamvis ex pio eoque ingente concordie desi-

derio et studio profectum, nulla successus felicitas excepit. p. 70. This observation is very just in the abstract; but in the early period of the reformation, there were strong reasons for evading points of difference, in the hope that the truth would silently prevail in the course of time. We, however, who come later, are to follow the advice of Calixtus, and in judging, as well as we can, of the opinions of men, must not altogether regard their words. Upon no theological controversy, probably, has there been so much of studied ambiguity as on that of the eucharist. Calixtus passes a similar censure on the equivocations of some great men of the preceding century in his other treatise mentioned in the text.

‡ Consensu itaque primæ ecclesiæ ex symbolis et scriptis manifesto doctrina Christiana rectè confirmatur. Intelligimus autem doctrinam fundamentalem et necessariam, non quasvis appendices et questiones, aut etiam quorundam scrip-

imaginary perfection in the church of the fourth or fifth century must have given a great advantage to that of Rome, which is not always weak on such ground, and doubtless serves to account for those frequent desertions to her banner, especially in persons of very high rank, which afterwards occurred in Germany.

20. The tenets of some of those who have been called High-church Anglicans may in themselves be little different from those of Grotius and Calixtus. But High-church party in England. the spirit in which they have been conceived is altogether opposite. The one is exclusive, intolerant, severe, dogmatical, insisting on uniformity of faith as well as of exterior observances; the other Catholic in outward profession, charitable in sentiment, and in fact one mode, though a mode as imprudent as it was oblique, in which the latitudinarian principle was manifested. The language both of Grotius and Calixtus bears this out; and this ought closely to be observed, lest we confound the real laxity of one school with the rigid orthodoxy of the other. One had it in view to reconcile discordant communions by mutual concession, and either by such explication of contrarieties as might make them appear less incompatible with outward unity, or by an avowed tolerance of their profession within the church; the other would permit nothing but submission to its own authority; it loved to multiply rather than to extinguish the risks of dissent, in order to crush it more effectually; the one was a pacific negotiator, the other a conquering tyrant.

21. It was justly alarming to sincere Protestants, that so many brilliant ornaments of their party should either desert to the hostile side, or do their own so much injury by taking up untenable ground.* Nothing, it

Dallé on the right use of the Fathers.

turne locorum interpretationes. De talibus enim unanimis et universalis consensus non poterit erui vel proferri. Et magis apud plerosque spectandum est, quid tanquam communem ecclesiæ sententiam proponunt, quam quomodo eam confirmant aut demonstrant. p. 85. I have not observed in the little I know of Calixtus any proof of his inclination towards the church of Rome.

Gerard Vossius, as Episcopus wrote to Vossius in 1615, declared in his in-

augural lecture as professor of theology, his determination to follow the consent of antiquity, in explicatione Scripturarum et controversiarum diremptionibus diligenter examinare et expendere catholicum et antiquissimum consensum, cum sine dubio illud quod a pluribus et antiquissimis dictum est, verissimum sit. *Epist. Virorum præstantium*, p. 6.

* It was a poor consolation for so many losses, that the famous Antonio de Dominis, archbishop of Spalato, came

appeared to reflecting men, could be trusted to the argument from antiquity ; whatever was gained in the controversy on a few points was lost upon those of the first importance. It was become the only secure course to overthrow the tribunal. Daillé, himself one of the most learned in this patristic erudition whom the French reformed church possessed, was the first who boldly attacked the new school of historical theology in their own strong-hold, not occupying their fortress, but razing it to the ground. The design of his celebrated Treatise concerning the right use of the Fathers, published in 1628, is, in his own words, to show "that they cannot be the judges of the controversies in religion at this day between the Papist and the Protestant," nor, by parity of reasoning, of many others ; "1. Because it is, if not an impossible, yet at least a very difficult thing to find out what their sense hath been touching the same. 2. Because that their sense and judgment of these things, supposing it to be certainly and clearly understood, not being infallible, and without all danger of error, cannot carry with it a sufficient authority for the satisfying the understanding."

22. The arguments adduced by Daillé in support of the former of these two positions, and which occupy the first book of the treatise, are drawn from the paucity of early Christian writers, from the nature of the subjects treated by them having little relation to the present controversies, from the suspicions of forgery and interpolation affecting many of their works, the difficulty of understanding their idioms and figurative expressions, the habit of some of the fathers to say what they did not believe, their changes of mind, the peculiar and individual opinions of some among them, affording little evidence of the doctrine of the church ; finally, the probability that many who differed from those called the fathers, and

over to England, and by his book *De Republica Ecclesiastica*, as well as by his conversation, seemed an undisguised enemy to the church of Rome. The object of his work is to prove that the pope has no superiority over other bishops. James gave *De Dominis* the deanery of Windsor and a living ; but whether he, strictly speaking, belonged to the church of England, I do not re-

member to have read. Preferments were bestowed irregularly in that age. He returned, however, to the ancient fold ; but did not avoid suspicion, being thrown into prison at Rome ; and after his death, the imputations of heresy against him so much increased that his body was dug up and burned. Neither party has been ambitious to claim this vain and insincere, though clever, prelate.

whose writings have not descended to us, may have been of as good authority as themselves.

23. In the second book, which in fact has been very much anticipated in the first, he shows that neither the testimony nor the doctrine of the fathers is infallible (by which word he must be understood to mean that it raises but a slight presumption of truth), proving this by their errors and contradictions. Thus he concludes that, though their negative authority is considerable, since they cannot be presumed ignorant of any material doctrine of religion, we are to be very slow in drawing affirmative propositions from their writings, and much more so in relying upon them as undoubted verities.

24. It has been said of this treatise on the right use of the fathers, that its author had pretty well proved they were of no use at all. This, indeed, is by no means the case; but it has certainly diminished not only the deference which many have been wont to pay to the opinion of the primitive writers, but what is still more contended for, the value of their testimony, whether as to matters of fact, or as to the prevailing doctrines of the Christian church. Nothing can be more certain, though in the warmth of controversy men are apt to disregard it, than that a witness, who deposes in any one case what can be disproved, is not entitled to belief in other assertions which we have no means of confuting, unless it be shown that the circumstances of his evidence render it more trust-worthy in these points than we have found it before. Hence such writers as Justin and Irenæus, for example, ought not, except with great precaution, to be quoted in proof at all, or at least with confidence; their falsehood, not probably wilful, in assertions that have been brought to a test rendering their testimony very precarious upon any other points. Daillé, it may be added, uses some circumspection, as the times, if not his own disposition, required in handling this subject, keeping chiefly in view the controversies between the Romish and Protestant churches; nor does he ever indulge in that tone of banter or acrimony which we find in Whitby, Barbeyrac, Jortin, and Middleton; and which must be condemned by every one who reflects that many of these writers exposed

their lives, and some actually lost them, in the maintenance and propagation of Christianity.

25. This well-timed and important book met with a good reception from some in England, though it must have been very uncongenial to the ruling party. It was extolled and partly translated by Lord Falkland ; and his two distinguished friends, Chillingworth and Hales, found in it the materials of their own bold revolt against church authority. They were both Arminians, and, especially the former, averse in all respects to the Puritan school. But like Episcopius, they scorned to rely, as on these points they might have done, on what they deemed so precarious and inconclusive as the sentiments of the fathers. Chillingworth, as is well known, had been induced to embrace the Romish religion, on the usual ground that a succession of infallible pastors, that is, a collective hierarchy, by adhering to whom alone we could be secure from error, was to be found in that church. He returned again to the Protestant religion on being convinced that no such infallible society could be found. And a Jesuit, by name Knott, having written a book to prove that unrepenting Protestants could not be saved, Chillingworth published, in 1637, his famous answer, *The Religion of Protestants a safe Way to Salvation*. In this he closely tracks the steps of his adversary, replying to every paragraph, and almost every sentence.

26. Knott is by no means a despicable writer ; he is concise, polished, and places in an advantageous light the great leading arguments of his church. Chillingworth, with a more diffuse and less elegant style, is greatly superior in impetuosity and warmth. In his long parenthetical periods, as in those of other old English writers, in his copiousness, which is never empty or tautological, there is an inartificial eloquence springing from strength of intellect and sincerity of feeling, that cannot fail to impress the reader. But his chief excellence is the close reasoning which avoids every dangerous admission, and yields to no ambiguousness of language. He perceived and maintained with great courage, considering the times in which he wrote and the temper of those whom he was not unwilling to keep as friends, his favourite tenet, that all things necessary to be

Chillingworth's Religion of Protestants.

Character of this work.

believed are clearly laid down in Scripture. Of tradition, which many of his contemporary Protestants were becoming as prone to magnify as their opponents, he spoke very slightly; not denying of course a maxim often quoted from Vincentius Lirinensis, that a tradition strictly universal and original must be founded in truth, but being assured that no such could be shown; and that what came nearest, both in antiquity and in evidence of catholic reception, to the name of apostolical, were doctrines and usages rejected alike by all denominations of the church in modern times.* It will be readily conceived, that his method of dealing with the controversy is very different from that of Laud in his treatise against Fisher; wherein we meet chiefly with disputes on passages in the fathers, as to which, especially when they are not quoted at length, it is impossible that any reader can determine for himself. The work of Chillingworth may at least be understood and appreciated without reference to any other; the condition, perhaps, of real superiority in all productions of the mind.

27. Chillingworth was, however, a man versed in patristical learning, by no means less so, probably, than Laud. But he had found so much uncertainty about this course of theological doctrine, seducing as it generally is to the learned, "fathers," as he expresses it, "being set against fathers, and councils against councils," that he declares, in a well-known passage, the Bible exclusively to be the religion of Protestants; and each man's own reason to be, as from the general tenor of his volume it appears that he held it, the interpreter of the Bible.† It was a natural consequence

* "If there were any thing unwritten which had come down to us with as full and universal a tradition as the unquestioned books of canonical Scripture, that thing should I believe as well as the Scripture; but I have long sought for some such thing, and yet I am to seek; nay, I am confident no one point in controversy between Papists and Protestants can go in upon half so fair cards, for to gain the esteem of an apostolic tradition, as those things which are now decried on all hands; I mean the opinion of the Chiliasts and the communicating infants." Chap. iii. § 82. He dilates upon this

insecurity of tradition in some detached papers, subjoined to the best editions of his work.

† This must always be understood with the condition, that the reason itself shall be competently enlightened: if Chillingworth meant more than this, he carried his principle too far, as others have done. The case is parallel in jurisprudence, medicine, mechanics, and every human science; any one man, *primâ facie*, may be a competent judge, but all men are not so. It is hard to prove that there is any different rule for theology; but parties will always con-

that he was a strenuous advocate not so much for toleration of separate churches, as for such an "ordering of the public service of God, that all who believe the Scripture and live according to it might, without scruple, or hypocrisy, or protestation against any part, join in it*;" a scheme when practicable, as it could not perhaps be often rendered, far more eligible than the separation of sects, and hence the favourite object of Grotius and Taylor, as well as of Erasmus and Cassander. And in a remarkable and eloquent passage, Chillingworth declares that "Protestants are inexcusable if they did offer violence to other men's consciences;" which Knott had said to be notorious, as in fact it was, and as Chillingworth ought more explicitly to have admitted.† "Certainly," he observes in another place, "if Protestants are faulty in this matter [of claiming authority], it is for doing it too much and not too little. This presumptuous imposing of the senses of men upon the words of God, the special senses of men upon the general words of God, and laying them upon men's consciences together, under the equal penalty of death and damnation, this vain conceit that we can speak of the things of God better than in the words of God; this deifying our own interpretations and tyrannous enforcing them upon others; this restraining of the word of God from that latitude and generality, and the understandings of men from that liberty wherein Christ and the apostles left them, is and hath been the only fountain of all the schisms of the church, and that which makes them immortal‡; the common incendiary of Christendom, and that which tears in pieces not the coat but the bowels and members of Christ. Take away these walls of separation and all will quickly be one. Take away this persecuting, burning, cursing, damning of men for not subscribing the words of men as the words of God; require of Christians only to believe Christ, and to call no man master but him

tend for extremes; for the rights of bigots to think for others, and the rights of the ignorant to think for themselves.

* Chap. iii. § 81.

† Chap. v. § 96.

‡ "This persuasion," he says in a note, "is no singularity of mine, but the doctrine which I have learned from

divines of great learning and judgment. Let the reader be pleased to peruse the 7th book of Acontius de Stratagematibus Satanae, and Zanchius his last oration delivered by him after the composing of the discord between him and Amerbachius, and he shall confess as much."

only; let those leave claiming infallibility that have no title to it, and let them that in their words disclaim it, disclaim it also in their actions. In a word, take away tyranny*," &c.

28. It is obvious that in this passage, and indeed throughout the volume, Chillingworth contravenes the prevailing theories of the Anglican church, full as distinctly as those of the Roman. He escaped however unscathed by the censure of that jealous hierarchy; his private friendship with Laud, the lustre of his name, the absence of factious and sectarian connexions, and still more, perhaps, the rapid gathering of the storms that swept both parties away, may be assigned as his protection. In later times his book obtained a high reputation; he was called the immortal Chillingworth; he was the favourite of all the moderate and the latitudinarian writers, of Tillotson, Locke, and Warburton. Those of opposite tenets, when they happen to have read his book, can do nothing else but condemn its tendency.

29. A still more intrepid champion in the same cause was John Hales; for his little tract on Schism, not being in any part directed against the church of Rome, could have nothing to redeem the strong protestations against church authority, "which," as he bluntly expresses it, "is none;" words that he afterwards slightly qualified. The aim of Hales, as well as of Grotius, Calixtus, and Chillingworth, was to bring about a more comprehensive communion; but he went still farther; his language is rough and audacious†;

Hales on
Schism.

* Chap. iv. § 17.

† "I must for my own part confess that councils and synods not only may and have erred, but considering the means how they are managed, it were a great marvel if they did not err, for what men are they of whom those great meetings do consist? Are they the best, the most learned, the most virtuous, the most likely to walk uprightly? No, the greatest, the most ambitious, and many times men of neither judgment nor learning; such are they of whom these bodies do consist. Are these men in common equity likely to determine for truth?"—Vol. i. p. 60. edit. 1765.

"Universality is such a proof of truth as truth itself is ashamed of; for universality is but a quainter and a trimmer

name to signify the multitude. Now, human authority at the strongest is but weak, but the multitude is the weakest part of human authority; it is the great patron of error; most easily abused and most hardly disabused. The beginning of error may be and mostly is from private persons, but the maintainer and continuer of error is the multitude. Private persons first beget errors in the multitude and make them public; and publicness of them begets them again in private persons. It is a thing which our common experience and practice acquaints us with, that when some private persons have gained authority with the multitude, and infused some error into them and made it public, the publicness of the error gains authority to it, and interchangeably pre-

his theology in some of his other writings has a scent of Racow; and though these crept slowly to light, there was enough in the earliest to make us wonder at the high name, the epithet Ever-memorable, which he obtained in the English church.

30. It is unnecessary to say that few disputes in theology have been so eagerly conducted, or so extensively ramified, as those which relate to the free-will of man, and his capacity of turning himself towards God.

Controversies on grace and free-will. Augustinian scheme.

In this place nothing more will be expected than a brief statement of the principal question, doing no injustice by a tone of partiality to either side. All shades of opinion, as it seems, may be reduced to two, which have long divided and will long divide the Christian world. According to one of these, the corrupt nature of man is incapable of exerting any power towards a state of acceptance with God, or even of willing it with an earnest desire, until excited by preventing (*præveniens*) grace; which grace is vouchsafed to some only, and is called free, because God is not limited by any respect of those persons to whom he accords this gift. Whether those who are thus called by the influence of the Spirit are so irresistibly impelled to it, that their perseverance in the faith and good works which are the fruits of their election may surely be relied upon, or, on the other hand, may either at first obdurately resist the divine impulses, or finally swerve from their state of grace, is another question, upon which those who agree in the principal doctrine have been at variance. It is also controverted among those who belong to this class of theologians, whether the election thus freely made out of mankind depends upon an eternal decree of predestination, or upon a sentence of God following the fall of man. And a third difference relates to the condition of man after he has been aroused by the Spirit from a state of entire alienation from God; some holding that the completion as well as commencement of the work of conversion is wholly

vails with private persons to entertain it. The most singular and strongest part of human authority is properly in the wisest and most virtuous, and those I throw are not the most universal."—iii. 164.

The treatise on Schism, from which these last passages are not extracted, was printed at Oxford in 1642, with some animadversions by the editor. Wood's *Athenæ*, iii. 414.

owing to the divine influence, while others maintain a co-operation of the will, so that the salvation of a sinner may in some degree be ascribed to himself. But the essential principle of all whom we reckon in this category of divines is the necessity of preventing grace, or, in other words, that it is not in the power of man to do any act, in the first instance, towards his own salvation. This, in some or other of its modifications, used to be deemed the orthodox scheme of doctrine ; it was established in the Latin church by the influence of Augustin, it was generally held by the schoolmen, by most of the early reformers, and seems to be inculcated by the decrees of the council of Trent, as much as by the Articles of the church of England. In a loose and modern acceptation of the word, it often goes by the name of Calvinism, which may perhaps be less improper, if we do not use the term in an exclusive sense, but, if it is meant to imply a particular relation to Calvin, leads to controversial chicane, and a misstatement of the historical part of the question.

31. An opposite class of theological reasoners belong to what is sometimes called the Semi-pelagian school. These concur with the former in the necessity of assistance from the Spirit to the endeavours of man towards subduing his evil tendencies, and renewing his heart in the fear and love of God, but conceive that every sinner is capable of seeking this assistance, which will not be refused him, and consequently of beginning the work of conversion by his own will. They therefore either deny the necessity of preventing grace, except such as is exterior, or, which comes effectively to the same thing, assert that it is accorded in a sufficient measure to every one within the Christian church, whether at the time of baptism, or by some other means. They think the opposite opinion, whether founded on the hypothesis of an eternal decree or not, irreconcilable with the moral attributes of the Deity, and inconsistent with the general tenor of Scripture. The Semi-pelagian doctrine is commonly admitted to have been held by the Greek fathers ; but the authority of Augustin, and the decisions of the Western church, caused it to assume the character of an heresy. Some of the Scotists among the schoolmen appear to have made an approach to it, by their tenet of grace ex

Semi-pelagian hypothesis.

congruo. They thought that the human virtues and moral dispositions of unregenerate men were the predisposing circumstances which, by a sort of fitness, made them the objects of the divine goodness in according the benefits of his grace. Thus their own free-will, from which it was admitted that such qualities and actions might proceed, would be the real, though mediate, cause of their conversion. But this was rejected by the greater part, who asserted the absolute irrespective freedom of grace, and appealed to experience for its frequent efficacy over those who had no inherent virtues to merit it.

32. The early reformers, and none more than Luther, maintained the absolute passiveness of the human will, so that no good actions even after conversion could be ascribed in any proper sense to man, but altogether to the operation of the Spirit. Not only, however, Melancthon espoused the synergistic doctrine, but the Lutheran church, though not in any symbolic book, has been thought to have gone a good way towards Semi-pelagianism, or what passed for such with the more rigid party.* In the reformed church, on the contrary, the Supra-lapsarian tenets of Calvin, or the immutable decrees of election and reprobation from all eternity, were obviously incompatible with any hypothesis that made the salvation of a sinner depend upon himself. But towards the close of the sixteenth century, these severer notions (which it may be observed, by the way, had always been entirely rejected by the Anabaptists, and by some of greater name such as Sebastian Castalio,) began to be impugned by a few learned men. This led in England to what are called the Lambeth articles, drawn up by Whitgift, six of which assert the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, and three deny that of the Semi-pelagians. But these, being not quite approved by the queen, or by Lord Burleigh, were never received by authority in our church. There can nevertheless be no reasonable or even sincere doubt, that Calvinism, in the popular sense, was at this time prevalent; even Hooker

* Le Clerc says that the doctrine of Melancthon, which Bossuet stigmatises as Semi-pelagian, is that of the council of Trent. Bibl. Choisie, v. 341. I

should put a different construction upon the Tridentine canons; but of course my practice in these nice questions is not great.

adopted the Lambeth articles with verbal modifications that do not affect their sense.

33. The few who, in England or in the reformed churches upon the Continent, embraced these novel and heterodox opinions, as they were then accounted, <sup>Rise of Ar-
minianism.</sup> within the sixteenth century, excited little attention in comparison with James Arminius, who became professor of theology at Leyden in 1604. The controversy ripened in a few years; it was intimately connected, not, of course, in its own nature, but by some of those collateral influences which have so often determined the opinions of mankind, with the political relations between the Dutch clergy and the States of Holland, as it was afterwards with the still less theological differences of that government with its Stadtholder; it appealed, on one side, to reason, on the other, to authority and to force; an unequal conflict, till posterity restore the balance. Arminius died in 1609; he has left works on the main topics of debate; but in theological literature, the great chief of the Arminian or Remonstrant church is Simon Episcopius. ^{Episcopius.} The principles of Episcopius are more widely removed from those of the Augustinian school than the five articles, so well known as the leading tenets of Arminius, and condemned at the synod of Dort. Of this famous assembly it is difficult to speak in a few words. The copious history of Brandt is perhaps the best authority; though we must own that the opposite party have a right to be heard. We are here, however, on merely literary ground, and the proceedings of ecclesiastical synods are not strictly within any province of literary history.

34. The works of Episcopius were collectively published in 1650, seven years after his death. They form two volumes in folio, and have been more than once <sup>His writ-
ings.</sup> reprinted. The most remarkable are the *Confessio Remonstrantium*, drawn up about 1624, the *Apology* for it against a censure of the opposite party, and what seems to have been a later work, and more celebrated, his *Institutiones Theologicæ*. These contain a new scheme of religion, compared with that of the established churches of Europe, and may justly be deemed the representative of the liberal or latitudinarian theology. For though the writings of Erasmus,

Cassander, Castalia, and Acontius had tended to the same purpose, they were either too much weakened by the restraints of moderation, or too obscure and transitory, to draw much attention, or to carry any weight against the rigid and exclusive tenets which were sustained by power.

51. The earlier treatises of Episcopius seem to speak on several subjects less unequivocally than the Theological Institutions; a reserve not perhaps to be censured, and which all parties have thought themselves warranted to employ, so long as either the hope of agreement with a powerful adversary, or of mitigating his severity, should remain. Hence the Confession of the Remonstrants explicitly states that they decline the Semi-pelagian controversy, contenting themselves with asserting that sufficient grace is bestowed on all who are called by the Gospel, to comply with that divine call and obey its precepts.* They used a term of words, which might seem equivalent to the tenet of original sin, and they did not avoid or refuse that term. But Episcopius afterwards denies it, at least in the extended sense of most theologians, almost as explicitly as Jeremy Taylor.† It was common in the seventeenth century to charge the Arminians, and especially Episcopius, with Socinianism. Bossuet, who seems to have quarrelled with all parties, and is neither Molinist nor Jansenist, Calvinist, nor Arminian, never doubting but that there is a firm footing between them, having attacked Episcopius and Grotius particularly for Semi-pelagianism and Socinianism, Le Clerc entered on their defence. But probably he would have passed himself with Bossuet, and hardly cared if he did pass, for a heretic, at least of the former denomination.‡

* Episcop. Opera, vol. i. p. 64. De eo nemini licet invenire Remonstrantes. I am not sure that my translation is right; but I think it is what they meant. By preventent grace they seemed to have meant only the exterior grace of the Gospel's promulgation, which is equivalent to the Semi-pelagian scheme, p. 189. Grotius latterly came into this opinion, though he had disclaimed every thing of the kind in his first dealings with theology. I have found the same doctrine in Calixtus; but I have preserved no reference as to either.

† Instit. Theolog. lib. iv. sect. v. c. 2. Corruptionis istius universalis nulla sunt indicia nec signa; imo non pauca sunt signa ex quibus colligitur naturam totam humanam sic corruptam non esse. The whole chapter, Ubi de peccato, quod vocant, originis agitur, et præcipua S. S. loca quibus inniti creditur, examinantur, appears to deny the doctrine entirely; but there may be some shades of distinction which have escaped me. Limborch (Theolog. Christiana, lib. iii. c. iv.) allows it in a qualified sense.

‡ Bibl. Choisie, vol. v.

36. But the most distinguishing peculiarity in the writings of Episcopius was his reduction of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity far below the multitudinous articles of the churches; confining them to propositions which no Christian can avoid acknowledging without manifest blame; such, namely, wherein the subject, the predicate, and the connexion of the two are found in Scripture by express or equivalent words.* He laid little stress on the authority of the church; notwithstanding the advantage he might have gained by the Anti-Calvinistic tenets of the fathers, admitting, indeed, the validity of the celebrated rule of Vincentius Lirinensis, in respect of tradition, which the upholders of primitive authority have always had in their mouths, but adding that it is utterly impossible to find any instance wherein it can be usefully applied.†

Great latitude allowed by them.

37. The Arminian doctrine spread, as is well known, in despite of obloquy and persecution, over much of the Protestant region of Europe. The Lutheran churches were already come into it; and in England there was a predisposing bias in the rulers of the church towards the authority of the primitive fathers, all of whom, before the age of Augustin, and especially the Greek, are generally acknowledged to have been on that side, which promoted the growth of this Batavian theology.‡ Even in France, it was not

Progress of Arminianism.

* *Necessaria quæ scripturis continentur talia esse omnia, ut sine manifesta hominis culpa ignorari, negari, aut in dubium vocari nequeant; quia videlicet tum subjectum, tum prædicatum, tum subjecti cum prædicato connexio necessaria in ipsis scripturis est, aut expressè, aut æquipollenter.* Inst. Theol. l. iv. c. 9.

† *Instit. Theolog. l. iv. sect. i. c. 15.* Dupin says of Episcopius: Il n'a employé dans ses ouvrages que des passages de l'écriture sainte qu'il possédoit parfaitement. Il avoit aussi lu les Rabbins, mais on ne voit pas qu'il eût étudié les pères ni l'antiquité ecclésiastique. Il écrit nettement et méthodiquement, pose des principes, ne dissimule rien des objections qu'on peut faire contre, et y répond du mieux qu'il peut. On voit en lui une tolérance parfaite pour les Sociniens, quoiqu'il se déclare contre eux; pour le parti d'Arminius, jamais il n'a

eu de plus zélé et de plus habile défenseur. Bibliothèque des Auteurs séparés de l'Eglise Romaine, ii. 495.

The life of Episcopius has been written by Limborch. Justice has been done to this eminent person and to the Arminian party which he led, in two recent English works, Nicholls's Calvinism and Arminianism displayed, and Calder's Life of Episcopius (1835). The latter is less verbose and more temperate than the former, and may be recommended, as a fair and useful production, to the general reader. Two theological parties in this country, though opposite in most things, are inveterately prejudiced against the Leyden school.

‡ Gerard Vossius, in his *Historia Pelagiana*, the first edition of which, in 1618, was considerably enlarged afterwards, admitted that the first four centuries did not countenance the predeterminarian scheme of Augustin. This gave

without considerable influence. Cameron, a divine of Saumur, one of the chief Protestant seminaries, devised a scheme of conciliation, which, notwithstanding much opposition, gained ground in those churches. It was supported by some highly distinguished for learning, Amyraut, Daillé, and Blondel. Of this scheme it is remarkable, that while in its literal purport it can only seem a modification of the Augustinian hypothesis, with an awkward and feeble admixture of the other, yet its tendency was to efface the former by degrees, and to slide into the Arminian hypothesis, which ultimately became, I believe, very common in the reformed church.

38. These perplexities were not confined to Protestant theology. The church of Rome, strenuous to maintain the tenets of Augustin, and yet to condemn those who did the same, has been charged with exerting the plenitude of her infallibility to enforce the belief of an incoherent syncretism. She had condemned Baius, as giving too much efficacy to grace; she was on the point of condemning Molina for giving too little. Both Clement VIII. and Paul V. leaned to the Dominicans against the Jesuits in this controversy; but the great services and influence of the latter order prevented a decision which would have humbled them before so many adversaries. It may, nevertheless, be said that the Semi-pelagian, or Arminian doctrine, though consonant to that of the Jesuits, was generally ill received in the church of Rome, till the opposite hypothesis, that of Augustin and Calvin, having been asserted by one man in more unlimited propositions than had been usual, a re-action took place, that eventually both gave an apparent triumph to the Molinist party, and endangered the church itself by the schism to which the controversy gave rise. The Augustinus of Jansenius, bishop of Ypres, was published in 1640, and

offence in Holland; his book was publicly censured; he was excommunicated, and forbidden to teach in public or private. Vossius, like others, remembered that he had a large family, and made, after some years, a sort of retraction, which of course did not express his real opinion. Le Clerc seems to doubt whe-

ther he acted from this motive, or from what he calls simplicity, an expression for weakness. Vossius was, like his contemporary Usher, a man of much more learning than strength of intellect. Bibliothèque Universelle, xvii. 312. 329. Nicéron, vol. xiii.

in the very next year was censured at Rome. But as the great controversy that sprang out of the condemnation of this book belongs more strictly to the next period, we shall defer it for the present.

39. The Socinian academy at Racow which drew to itself several proselytes from other countries, acquired considerable importance in theological literature after the beginning of the century. It was not likely that a sect regarded with peculiar animosity would escape in the general disposition of the Catholic party in Poland to oppress the dissidents whom they had long feared; the Racovian institution was broken up and dispersed in 1638, though some of its members continued to linger in that country for twenty years longer. The *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, published at Amsterdam (in the title-page, Irenopolis) in 1658, contains chiefly the works of Socinian theologians who belong to this first part of the century. The *Prælectiones Theologicæ* of Faustus Socinus himself, being published in 1609, after his death, fall within this class. They contain a systematic theology according to his scheme, and are praised by Eichhorn for the acuteness and depth they often display.* In these, among his other deviations from the general orthodoxy of Christendom, Socinus astonished mankind by denying the evidences of natural religion, resolving our knowledge even of a deity into revelation. This paradox is more worthy of those who have since adopted it, than of so acute a reasoner as Socinus.† It is, in fact, not very congenial to the spirit of his theology, which, rejecting all it thinks incompatible with reason as to the divine attributes, should at least have some established notions of them upon rational principles. The later Socinians, even those nearest to the time, did not follow their master in this part of his tenets.‡ The treatise of Vol-

Socinus.
Volkellius.

* Eichhorn, vi. part 1. p. 283. Simon, however, observes that Socinus knew little Greek or Hebrew, as he owns himself, though he pretends to decide questions which require a knowledge of these languages. I quote from *Bibliothèque Universelle*, vol. xxiii. p. 498.

† Tillotson, in one of his sermons, (I cannot give the reference, writing from memory,) dissents, as might be expected,

from this denial of natural religion, but with such encomiums on Socinus as some archbishops would have avoided.

‡ Socinum sectæ ejus principes nuper Volkellius, nunc Ruarus non probant, in eo quod circa Dei cognitionem petita e natura rerum argumenta abdicaverit. Grot. Epist. 964. See, too, Ruari Epist. p. 210.

kelius, son-in-law of Socinus, *De vera Religione*, is chiefly taken from the latter's writings. It was printed at Racow in 1633, and again in Holland in 1641; but most of the Dutch impression having been burned by order of the magistrates, it is a very scarce book, and copies were formerly sold at great prices. But the hangman's bonfire has lost its charm, and forbidden books, when they happen to occur, are no longer in much request. The first book out of five in this volume of Volkelius, on the attributes of God, is by Crellius.

40. Crellius was, perhaps, the most eminent of the Racovian school in this century.* Many of its members, like himself, were Germans, their sect having gained ground in some of the Lutheran states about this time, as it did also in the United Provinces. Grotius broke a lance with him in his treatise *De Satisfactione Christi*, to which he replied in another with the same title. Each retired from the field with the courtesies of chivalry towards his antagonist. The Dutch Arminians in general, though very erroneously supposed to concur in all the leading tenets of the Racovian theologians, treated them with much respect.† Grotius was often reproached with the intimacies he kept up among these obnoxious sectaries; and many of his letters, as well as those of Curcellæus and other leading Arminians, bear witness to the personal regard they felt for them.‡

* Dupin praises Volkelius highly, but says of Crellius, Il avoit beaucoup étudié, mais il n'étoit pas un esprit fort élevé. *Bibl. des Auteurs séparés*, ii. 614. v. 628. Simon, on the contrary (ubi supra), praises Crellius highly, and says no other commentator of his party is comparable to him.

† The Remonstrants refused to anatomise the Socinians, Episcopus says, on account of the apparent arguments in their favour, and the differences that have always existed on that head. *Apologetica Confessionis*. Episc. Op. vol. i. His own tenets were probably what some would call Arian; thus he says, Personis his tribus divinitatem tribui, non collateraliter aut co-ordinatè, sed subordinatè. *Inst. Theol.* l. iv. c. 2, 32. Grotius says, he finds the Catholics more

tractable about the Trinity than the Calvinists.

‡ Grotius never shrunk from defending his intimacy with Ruarus and Crellius, and after praising the former, concludes, in one of his letters, with this liberal and honest sentiment: *Ego vero ejus sum animi, ejusque instituti, ut mihi cum hominibus cunctis præcipue cum Christianis quantumvis errantibus necessitudinis aliquid putem intercedere, idque me neque dietis neque factis pignet demonstrare*. Epist. 860. *Hæretici nisi aliquid haberent veri ac nobiscum commune, jam hæretici non essent*. 2da Series, p. 873. *Nihil veri eo factum est deterius, quod in id Socinus incidit*. p. 880. This, he thought, was the case in some questions, where Socinus, without designing it, had agreed with antiquity.

Several proofs of this will be also found in the epistles of Ruarus, a book which throws much light on the theological opinions of the age. Ruarus was a man of acuteness, learning, and piety, not wholly concurring with the Racovians, but not far removed from them.* The Commentaries of

Neque me pudeat consentire Socino, si quando is in veram veteremque sententiam incidit, ut sanè fecit in controversia de justitia per fidem, et aliis nonnullis. *Id.* p. 797. Socinus hoc non agens in antiquæ ecclesiæ sensus nonnunquam incidit, et eas partes, ut ingenio valebat, percoluit feliciter. Admiscuit alia quæ etiam vera dicenti auctoritatem detraxere. *Epist.* 966. Even during his controversy with Crellius he wrote to him in a very handsome manner. Bene autem in epistola tua, quæ mihi longè gratissima advenit, de me judicas, non esse me eorum in numero, qui ob sententias salva pietate dissentientes, alieno a quocumque animo, aut boni alicujus amicitiam repudiare. Etiam in libro de vera religione [Volkeli], quem jam percurri, relecturus et posthac, multa invenio summo cum judicio observata; illud vero sæculo gratulor, repertos homines, qui nequitiam in controversiis subtilibus tantum ponunt, quantum in vera vitæ emendatione, et quotidiano ad sanctitatem profectu. *Epist.* 280. (1631.) He wrote with kindness and regret on the breaking up of the establishment at Racow in 1638. *Ep.* 1006. Grotius has been as obnoxious on the score of Socinianism as of Popery. His Commentaries on the Scriptures are taxed with it, and in fact he is not in good odour with any but the Arminian divines, nor do they, we see, wholly agree with him.

* Ruarus nearly agreed with Grotius, as to the atonement; at least the latter thought so. De satisfactione ita mihi respondit, ut nihil admodum controversiæ relinqueretur. *Grot. Epist.* 2da Series, p. 881. See also Ruari *Epistolæ*, p. 148. 282. He paid also more respect to the second century than some of his brethren, p. 100. 439., and even struggles to agree with the Ante-Nicene fathers, though he cannot come up to them. p. 275. 296. But in answer to some of his correspondents who magnified primitive authority, he well replies: Deinde quero quis illos fixit veritati terminos? quis duo illa prima sæcula ab

omni errore absolvit? Annon ecclesiastica historia satis testatur, nonnullas opiniones portentosas jam tum inter eos qui nomen Christi dederant, invaluisse? Quin ut verum fatear, res ipsa docet nonnullos posterioris ævi acutius in enodandis Scripturis versatos; et ut de nostra ætate dicam, valde me pœniteret Calvini vestri ac Bezzæ si nihilo solidius sacras literas interpretarentur, quam video illos ipsos, quos tu mihi obducis, fecisse. p. 183. He lamented the fatal swerving from protestantism into which reverence for antiquity was leading his friend Grotius: fortassis et antiquitatis veneratio, quæ gravibus quibusdam Pontificiorum erroribus præluxit, ultra lineam eum perduxit, p. 277. (1642); and in answer to Mersenne, who seems to have had some hopes of his conversion, and recommended to him the controversy of Grotius with Rivet, he plainly replies that the former had extenuated some things in the church of Rome which ought to be altered. p. 258. This he frequently laments in the course of his letters, but, in comparison with some of the sterner Socinians, treats him with gentleness. It is remarkable that even he and Crellius seem to have excluded the members of the church of Rome, except the "vulgus ineruditum et Cassandri gregales," from salvation; and this while almost all churches were anathematising themselves in the same way. *Ruar. Epist.* p. 9. and p. 167.

This book contains two centuries of epistles, the second of which is said to be very scarce, and I doubt whether many have read the first, which must excuse my quotations. The learning, sense, and integrity of Ruarus, as well as the high respect which Calixtus, Curcellæus, and other great men felt for him, render the book of some interest. He tells us that while he was in England, about 1617, a professorship at Cambridge was offered to him worth 100*l.* per annum, besides as much more from private pupils. p. 71. But he probably mistook the civil speeches of individuals for an offer: he was not eminent enough for

Grotius on the Scriptures have been also charged with Socinianism ; but he pleaded that his interpretations were those of the fathers.

41. Two questions of great importance, which had been raised in the preceding century, became still more interesting in the present, on account of the more frequent occasion that the force of circumstances gave for their investigation, and the greater names that were engaged in it. Both of these arose out of the national establishment of churches, and their consequent relation to the commonwealth. One regarded the power of the magistrate over the church he recognised ; the other involved the right of his subjects to dissent from it by non-conformity, or by a different mode of worship.

42. Erastus, by proposing to substitute for the ancient discipline of ecclesiastical censures, and especially for excommunication, a perpetual superintendence of the civil power over the faith and practice of the church, had given name to a scheme generally denominated Erastianism, though in some respects far broader than any thing he seems to have suggested. It was more elaborately maintained by Hooker in his Ecclesiastical Polity, and had been, in fact, that on which the English reformation under Henry was originally founded. But as it was manifestly opposed to the ultra-montane pretensions of the see of Rome, and even to the more moderate theories of the Catholic church, being of course destructive of her independence, so did it stand in equal contradiction to the presbyterian scheme of Scotland and of the United Provinces. In the latter country, the States of Holland and Gro-
tius. land had been favourable to the Arminians, so far at least as to repress any violence against them ; the clergy were exasperated and intolerant ; and this raised the question of civil supremacy, in which Grotius by one of his early works, entitled *Pietas Ordinum Hollandiæ*, published in 1613, sustained the right of the magistrate to inhibit dangerous controversies.

43. He returned, after the lapse of some years, to the

such a proposal on the part of the university ; and at least he must have been silent about his Socinianism. The morality of the early Socinians was very strict and even ascetic, proofs of which appear in these letters, p. 306. et alibi.

same theme in a larger and more comprehensive work, *De Imperio Summarum Potestatum circa Sacra*. It is written upon the Anglican principles of regal supremacy, which had, however, become far less popular with the rulers of our church, than in the days of Cranmer, Whitgift, and Hooker. After stating the question, and proving the ecclesiastical power of the magistrate by natural law, Scripture, established usage, agreement of Heathen and Christian writers, and the reason of the thing, he distinguishes control over sacred offices from their exercise, and proceeds to inquire whether the magistrate may take the latter on himself; which, though practised in the early ages of the world, he finds inconvenient at present, the manners required for the regal and sacerdotal character being wholly different.*

His treatise on ecclesiastical power of the state.

44. Actions may be prescribed or forbidden by natural divine law, positive divine law, or human law; the latter extending to nothing but what is left indefinite by the other two. But though we are bound not to act in obedience to human laws which contradict the divine, we are also bound not forcibly to resist them. We may defend ourselves by force against an equal, not against a superior, as he proves, first, from the Digest, and, secondly, from the New Testament.† Thus the rule of passive obedience is unequivocally laid down. He meets the recent examples of resistance to sovereigns, by saying that they cannot be approved where the kings have had an absolute power; but where they are bound by compact or the authority of a senate or of estates, since their power is not unlimited, they may be resisted on just grounds by that authority.‡ “Which I remark,” he proceeds to say, “lest any one, as I sometimes have known, should disgrace a good cause by a mistaken defence.”

45. The magistrate can alter nothing which is definitely laid down by the positive law of God; but he may regulate the circumstantial observance even of such; and as to things undefined in Scripture he has plenary jurisdiction; such as

* Cap. 4.

† Cap. 3.

‡ Sin alicubi reges tales fuere, qui pactis sive positivis legibus et senatus alienius aut ordinum decretis adstrin-

gerentur, in hoc, ut summum imperium non obtinent, arma ex optimatum tanquam superiorum sententia sumi iusta de causis potuerunt. Ibid.

the temporalities of the church, the convocation of synods, the election of pastors. The burden of proof lies on those who would limit the civil power by affirming any thing to be prescribed by the divine law.* The authority attributed in Scripture to churches does not interfere with the power of the magistrate, being persuasive and not coercive. The whole church has no coercive power by divine right.† But since the visible church is a society of divine institution, it follows that whatever is naturally competent to a lawful society is competent also to the church, unless it can be proved to be withdrawn from it.‡ It has, therefore, a legislative government (*regimen constitutivum*), of which he gives the institution of the Lord's day as an example. But this does not impair the sovereign's authority in ecclesiastical matters. In treating of that supremacy, he does not clearly show what jurisdiction he attributes to the magistrate; most of his instances relating to the temporalities of the church, as to which no question is likely to arise.§ But on the whole he means undoubtedly to carry the supremacy as far as is done in England.

46. In a chapter on the due exercise of the civil supremacy over the church, he shows more of a Protestant feeling than would have been found in him when he approached the latter years of his life||; and declares fully against submission to any visible authority in matters of faith, so that sovereigns are not bound to follow the ministers of the church in what they may affirm as doctrine. Ecclesiastical synods he deems often useful, but thinks the magistrate is not bound to act with their consent, and that they are sometimes pernicious.¶ The magistrate may determine who shall compose such synods** ; a strong position which he endeavours to prove at great length. Even if the members are elected by

* Cap. 3.

† Cap. 4.

‡ Quandoquidem ecclesia cœtus est divina lege non permissus tantum sed et institutus, de aspectabili cœtu loquor, sequitur ea omnia quæ cœtibus legitimis naturaliter competunt, etiam ecclesiæ competere, quatenus adempta non probantur. Ibid.

§ Cap. 5.

|| Cap. 6. He states the question to be this: An post apostolorum ætatem aut persona aut cœtus sit aliquis aspectabilis, de quâ quove certi esse possimus ac debeamus, quæcunque ab ipsis proponantur, esse indubitatæ veritatis. Negant hoc Evangelici; aiunt Romanenses.

¶ Cap. 7.

** Designare eos, qui ad synodum sunt venturi.

the church, the magistrate may reject those whom he reckons unfit; he may preside in the assembly, confirm, reject, annul its decisions. He may also legislate about the whole organisation of the established church.* It is for him to determine what form of religion shall be publicly exercised; an essential right of sovereignty as political writers have laid it down. And this is confirmed by experience; "for if any one shall ask why the Romish religion flourished in England under Mary, the Protestant under Elizabeth, no cause can be assigned but the pleasure of these queens, or, as some might say, of the queens and parliaments." To the objection from the danger of abuse in conceding so much power to the sovereign, he replies that no other theory will secure us better. On every supposition the power must be lodged in men, who are all liable to error. We must console ourselves by a trust in Divine Providence alone.†

47. The sovereign may abolish false religions and punish their professors, which no one else can. Here again we find precedents instead of arguments; but he says that the primitive church disapproved of capital punishments for heresy, which seems to be his main reason for doing the same. The sovereign may also enjoin silence in controversies, and inspect the conduct of the clergy without limiting himself by the canons, though he will do well to regard them. Legislation and jurisdiction, that is, of a coercive nature, do not belong to the church, except as they may be conceded to it by the civil power.‡ He fully explains the various kinds of ecclesiastical law that have been gradually introduced. Even the power of the keys, which is by divine right, cannot be so exercised as to exclude the appellat jurisdiction of the sovereign; as he proves by the Roman law, and by the usage of the parliament of Paris.§

48. The sovereign has a control (*inspectionem cum imperio*) over the ordination of priests, and certainly possesses

* Cap. 8. Nulla in re magis elucescit vis summi imperii, quam quod in ejus arbitrio est quænam religio publicè exerceatur, idque præcipuum inter majestatis jura ponunt omnes qui politicè scripserunt. Docet idem experientia; si enim quæras cur in Angliâ Maria regnante Romana religio, Elizabetha vero impe-

rante, Evangelica vigerit, causa proxima reddi non poterit, nisi ex arbitrio reginarum, aut, ut quibusdam videtur, reginarum ac parlamenti. p. 242.

† Cap. 8.

‡ Ibid.

§ Cap. 9.

a right of confirmation, that is, the assignment of an ordained minister to a given cure.* And though the election of pastors belongs to the church, this may, for good reasons, be taken into the hands of the sovereign. Instances in point are easily found, and the chapter upon the subject contains an interesting historical summary of this part of ecclesiastical law. In every case, the sovereign has a right of annulling an election, and also of removing a pastor from the local exercise of his ministry.†

49. This is the full development of an Erastian theory, which Cranmer had early espoused, and which Hooker had maintained in a less extensive manner.

Remark
upon this
theory.

Bossuet has animadverted upon it, nor can it appear tolerable to a zealous churchman.‡ It was well received in England by the lawyers, who had always been jealous of the spiritual tribunals, especially of late years, when under the patronage of Laud they had taken a higher tone than seemed compatible with the supremacy of the common law. The scheme, nevertheless, is open to some objections, when propounded in so unlimited a manner; none of which is more striking than that it tends to convert differences of religious opinion into crimes against the state, and furnishes bigotry with new arguments as well as new arms, in its conflict with the free exercise of human reason. Grotius, however, feared rather that he had given too little power to the civil magistrate than too much.§

50. Persecution for religious heterodoxy, in all its degrees, was in the sixteenth century the principle, as well as the

* Cap. 10. Confirmationem hanc summæ potestati acceptam ferendam nemo sanus negaverit.

† Ibid.

‡ See Le Clerc's remarks on what Bossuet has said. Bibliothèque Choisie, p. 349.

§ Ego multo magis vercor, ne minus quam par est magistratibus, aut plusquam par est pastoribus tribuerim, quam ne in alteram partem iterum (?) excesserim, nec sic quidem illis satisfiet qui se ecclesiam vocant. Epist. 42. This was in 1614, after the publication of the *Pietas Ordinum Hollandiæ*. As he drew nearer to the church of Rome, or that of Canterbury, he must probably have

somewhat modified his Erastianism. And yet he seems never to have been friendly to the temporal power of bishops. He writes in August, 1641, *Episcopis Angliæ videtur mansurum nomen prope sine re, accisa et opulentia et auctoritate. Mihi non displicet ecclesiæ pastores et ab inani pompa et a curis secularium rerum sublevari.* p. 1011. He had a regard for Laud, as the restorer of a reverence for primitive antiquity, and frequently laments his fate; but had said, in 1640, *Doleo quod episcopi nimium intendendo potentiam suam nervos odium sibi potius quam amorem populorum pariunt.* Ep. 1390.

practice, of every church. It was held inconsistent with the sovereignty of the magistrate to permit any religion but his own; inconsistent with his duty to suffer any but the true. The edict of Nantes was a compromise between belligerent parties; the toleration of the dissidents in Poland was nearly of the same kind; but no state powerful enough to restrain its sectaries from the exercise of their separate worship had any scruples about the right and obligation to do so. Even the writers of that century, who seemed most strenuous for toleration, Castalio, Celso, and Koornhert, had confined themselves to denying the justice of penal, and especially of capital inflictions for heresy; the liberty of public worship had but incidentally, if at all, been discussed. Acontius had developed larger principles, distinguishing the fundamental from the accessory doctrines of the Gospel; which, by weakening the associations of bigotry, prepared the way for a Catholic toleration. Episcopius speaks in the strongest terms of the treatise of Acontius, *De Stratagematibus Satanæ*, and says that the Remonstrants trod closely in his steps, as would appear by comparing their writings; so that he shall quote no passages in proof, their entire books bearing witness to the conformity.*

Toleration
of religious
tenets;

51. The Arminian dispute led by necessary consequence to the question of public toleration. They sought at first a free admission to the pulpits, and in an excellent speech of Grotius, addressed to the magistrates of Amsterdam in 1616, he objects to a separate toleration as rending the bosom of the church. But it was soon evident that nothing more could be obtained; and their adversaries refused this. They were driven, therefore, to contend for religious liberty, and the writings of Episcopius are full of this plea. Against capital punishments for heresy he raises his voice with indignant severity, and asserts that the whole Christian world abhorred the fatal precedent of Calvin in the death of Servetus.† This indicates a remarkable

claimed by
the Armi-
nians;

* Episcop. Opera, i. 301. (edit. 1665.)

† Calvinus signum primus extulit supra alios omnes, et exemplum dedit in theatro Gebennensi funestissimum, quodque Christianus orbis merito execratur et abominatur; nec hoc contentus tam

atroci facinore, cruento simul animo et calamo parentavit. Apologia pro Confess. Remonstrantium, c. 24. p. 241. The whole passage is very remarkable, as an indignant reproof of a party, who, while living under popish governments,

change already wrought in the sentiments of mankind. No capital punishments for heresy seem to have been inflicted in Protestant countries after this time; nor were they as frequently or as boldly vindicated as before.*

52. The Independents claim to themselves the honour of having been the first to maintain the principles of general toleration, both as to freedom of worship, and immunity from penalties for opinion. But that the Arminians were not as early promulgators of the same noble tenets seems not to have been proved. Crellius in his *Vindiciæ pro Religionis Libertate*, 1636, contended for the Polish dissidents, and especially for his own sect.† The principle is implied, if not expressed, in the writings of Chillingworth, and still more of Hales; but the first famous plea, in this country, for tolerance in religion, on a comprehensive basis and on deep-seated foundations, was the *Liberty of Prophecy* by Jeremy Taylor. This celebrated work was written, according to Taylor's dedication, during his retirement in Wales, whither he was driven, as he expresses it, "by this great storm which hath dashed the vessel of the church all in pieces," and published in 1647. He speaks of himself as without access to books; it is evident, however, from the abundance of his quotations, that he was not much in want of them; and from this, as well as other strong

by the Independents;

and by Jeremy Taylor.

cry out for liberty of conscience, and deny the right of punishing opinions; yet in all their writings and actions, when they have the power, display the very opposite principles. [The council of Geneva, in 1632, little ashamed of the death of Servetus, had condemned one Nicolas Antoine to be strangled and burned for denying the Trinity. *Bibliothèque Raisonnée*, ii. 156. I do not distinctly recollect any later case in Protestant countries of capital punishment for mere heresy.—1842.]

* *De hæreticorum pœnis quæ scripsi, in iis mecum sentit Gallia et Germania, ut puto, omnis.* Grot. *Epist.* p. 941. (1642.) Some years sooner there had been remains of the leaven in France. *Adversus hæreticidia*, he says in 1626, *satis ut arbitror plane locutus sum, certè ita ut hic multos ob id offenderim.* p. 789. Our own Fuller, I am sorry to say, in

his *Church History*, written about 1650, speaks with some disapprobation of the sympathy of the people with Legat and Wightman, burned by James I., in 1614; and this is the more remarkable, as he is a well-natured and not generally bigoted writer. I should think he was the latest Protestant who has tarnished his name by such sentiments.

† This short tract, which will be found among the collected works of Crellius, in the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, contains a just and temperate pleading for religious liberty, but little which can appear very striking in modern times. It is said, nevertheless, to have been translated and republished by D'Holbach about 1760. This I have not seen, but there must, I presume, have been a good deal of *condiment* added to make it stimulating enough for his school.

indications, we may reasonably believe, that a considerable part of his treatise had been committed to paper long before.

53. The argument of this important book rests on one leading maxim, derived from the Arminian divines, as it was in them from Erasmus and Acontius, that <sup>His Liberty of Prophe-
sying.</sup> the fundamental truths of Christianity are comprised in narrow compass, not beyond the Apostles' creed in its literal meaning; that all the rest is matter of disputation, and too uncertain, for the most part, to warrant our condemning those who differ from us, as if their error must be criminal. This one proposition, much expanded, according to Taylor's diffuse style, and displayed in a variety of language, pervades the whole treatise; a small part of which, in comparison with the rest, bears immediately on the point of political toleration, as a duty of civil governments and of churches invested with power. In the greater portion, Taylor is rather arguing against that dogmatism of judgment, which induces men, either singly or collectively, to pronounce with confidence where only a varying probability can be attained. This spirit is the religious, though not entirely the political, motive of intolerance; and by chasing this from the heart, he inferred, not that he should lay wide the door to universal freedom, but dispose the magistrate to consider more equitably the claims of every sect. "Whatsoever is against the foundation of faith, or contrary to good life and the laws of obedience, or destructive to human society and the public and just interests of bodies politic, is out of the limits of my question, and does not pretend to compliance or toleration; so that I allow no indifferency, nor any countenance to those religions whose principles destroy government, nor to those religions, if there be any such, that teach ill life."

54. No man, as Taylor here teaches, is under any obligation to believe that in revelation, which is not so revealed, but that wise men and good men have differed in their opinions about it. And the great variety of opinions in churches, and even in the same church, "there being none that is in prosperity," as he with rather a startling boldness puts it, "but changes her doctrines every age, either by bringing in new doctrines, or by contradicting her old," shows that we can have no term of union, but that wherein <sup>Boldness of
his doc-
trines.</sup>

all agree, the creed of the apostles.* And hence, though we may undoubtedly carry on our own private inquiries as much farther as we see reason, none who hold this fundamental faith are to be esteemed heretics, nor liable to punishment. And here he proceeds to reprove all those oblique acts which are not direct persecutions of men's persons, the destruction of books, the forbidding the publication of new ones, the setting out fraudulent editions and similar acts of falsehood, by which men endeavour to stifle or prevent religious inquiry. "It is a strange industry and an importune diligence that was used by our forefathers: of all those heresies which gave them battle and employment, we have absolutely no record or monument, but what themselves who are adversaries have transmitted to us; and we know that adversaries, especially such who observed all opportunities to discredit both the persons and doctrines of the enemy, are not always the best records or witnesses of such transactions. We see it now in this very age, in the present distemperatures, that parties are no good registers of the actions of the adverse side; and if we cannot be confident of the truth of a story now, now I say that it is possible for any man, and likely that the interested adversary will discover the imposture, it is far more unlikely that after ages should know any other truth, but such as serves the ends of the representers."†

55. None were accounted heretics by the primitive church, who held by the Apostles' creed, till the council of Nice defined some things, rightly, indeed, as Taylor professes to believe, but perhaps with too much alteration of the simplicity of ancient faith, so that, "he had need be a subtle man who understands the very words of the new determinations." And this was carried much farther by later councils, and in the Athanasian creed, of which, though protesting his own persuasion in its truth, he intimates not a little disapprobation. The necessary articles of faith are laid down clearly in Scripture; but no man can be secure,

His notions
of uncertainty
in
theological
tenets.

* "Since no churches believe themselves infallible, that only excepted which all other churches say is most of all deceived, it were strange if, in so many articles, which make up their several bodies of confessions, they had not mistaken, every one of them, in some thing

or other." This is Taylor's fearless mode of grappling with his argument; and any other must give a church that claims infallibility the advantage.

† Vol. vii. p. 424. Heber's edition of Taylor.

as to mysterious points, that he shall certainly understand and believe them in their true sense. This he shows, first, from the great discrepancy of readings in manuscripts (an argument which he overstates in a very uncritical and incautious manner), next, from the different senses the words will bear, which there is no certain mark to distinguish, the infinite variety of human understandings, swayed, it may be, by interest, or determined by accidental and extrinsical circumstances, and the fallibility of those means, by which men hope to attain a clear knowledge of scriptural truth. And after exposing, certainly with no extenuation, the difficulties of interpretation, he concludes that since these ordinary means of expounding Scripture are very dubious, "he that is the wisest, and by consequence the likeliest to expound truest, in all probability of reason, will be very far from confidence; and therefore a wise man would not willingly be prescribed to by others; and if he be also a just man, he will not impose upon others; for it is best every man should be left in that liberty, from which no man can justly take him, unless he could secure him from error; so here there is a necessity to conserve the liberty of prophesying and interpreting Scripture; a necessity derived from the consideration of the difficulty of Scripture in questions controverted, and the uncertainty of any internal medium of interpretation."

56. Taylor would in much of this have found an echo in the advocates of the church of Rome, and in some Protestants of his own communion. But he passes His low opinion of the fathers. onward to assail their bulwarks. Tradition, or the testimony of the church, he holds insufficient and uncertain, for the reasons urged more fully by Daillé; the authority of councils is almost equally precarious, from their inconsistency, their liability to factious passions, and the doubtful authenticity of some of their acts; the pope's claim to infallibility is combated on the usual grounds; the judgment of the fathers is shown to be inconclusive by their differences among themselves, and their frequent errors; and professing a desire that "their great reputation should be preserved as sacred as it ought," he refers the reader to Daillé for other things; and, "shall only consider that the writings of the fathers have been so corrupted by the intermixture of here-

tics, so many false books put forth in their names, so many of their writings lost which would more clearly have explained their sense, and at last an open profession made, and a trade of making the fathers speak not what themselves thought, but what other men pleased, that it is a great instance of God's providence and care of his church, that we have so much good preserved in the writings which we receive from the fathers, and that all truth is not as clear gone as is the certainty of their great authority and reputation."*

57. The authority of the church cannot be any longer
Difficulty
of finding
out truth. alleged when neither that of popes and councils,
 nor of ancient fathers, is maintainable; since the
 diffusive church has no other means of speaking,
 nor can we distinguish by any extrinsic test the greater or
 better portion of it from the worse. And thus, after dis-
 missing respectfully the pretences of some to expound Scrip-
 ture by the Spirit, as impertinent to the question of dictating
 the faith of others, he comes to the reason of each man, as
 the best judge, for himself, of religious controversies; rea-
 son, that may be exercised either in choosing a guide, if it
 feel its own incompetency, or in examining the grounds of
 belief. The latter has great advantages, and no man is
 bound to know any thing of that concerning which he is not
 able to judge for himself. But reason may err, as he goes
 on to prove, without being culpable; that which is plain to
 one understanding being obscure to another, and among
 various sources of error which he enumerates as incidental to
 mankind, that of education being "so great and invincible a
 prejudice, that he who masters the inconvenience of it is
 more to be commended than he can justly be blamed that
 complies with it." And thus not only single men but whole
 bodies take unhesitatingly and unanimously opposite sides

* It seems not quite easy to reconcile this with what Taylor has just before said of his desire to preserve the reputation of the fathers sacred. In no writer is it more necessary to observe the *animus* with which he writes: for, giving way to his impetuosity, when he has said any thing that would give offence, or which he thought incautious, it was not his custom, so far as we can judge, to ex-

punge or soften it, but to insert something else of an opposite colour, without taking any pains to harmonise his context. This makes it easy to quote passages, especially short ones, from Taylor, which do not exhibit his real way of thinking; if indeed his way of thinking itself did not vary with the wind that blew from different regions of contro-
 versy.

from those who have imbibed another kind of instruction ; and “ it is strange that all the Dominicans should be of one opinion in the matter of predestination and immaculate conception, and all the Franciscans of the quite contrary, as if their understandings were formed in a different mould, and furnished with various principles by their very rule.” These and the like prejudices are not absolute excuses to every one, and are often accompanied with culpable dispositions of mind ; but the impossibility of judging others renders it incumbent on us to be lenient towards all, and neither to be peremptory in denying that those who differ from us have used the best means in their power to discover the truth, nor to charge their persons, whatever we may their opinions, with odious consequences which they do not avow.

58. This diffuse and not very well arranged vindication of diversity of judgment in religion, comprised in the first twelve sections of the Liberty of Prophesying, ^{Grounds of toleration.} is the proper basis of the second part, which maintains the justice of toleration as a consequence from the former principle. The general arguments, or prejudices, on which punishment for religious tenets had been sustained, turned on their criminality in the eyes of God, and the duty of the magistrate to sustain God’s honour, and to guard his own subjects from sin. Taylor, not denying that certain and known idolatry, or any sort of practical impiety, may be punished corporally, because it is matter of fact, asserts that no matter of mere opinion, no errors that of themselves are not sins, are to be persecuted or punished by death or corporal infliction. He returns to his favourite position, that “ we are not sure not to be deceived ; ” mingling this, in that insequent allocation of his proofs which frequently occurs in his writings, with other arguments of a different nature. The governors of the church, indeed, may condemn and restrain, as far as their power extends, any false doctrine which encourages evil life, or destroys the foundations of religion ; but if the church meddles farther with any matters of question, which have not this tendency, so as to dictate what men are to believe, she becomes tyrannical and uncharitable ; the Apostles’ creed being sufficient to conserve the peace of the church and the unity of her doctrine. And with

respect to the civil magistrate, he concludes that he is bound to suffer the profession of different opinions, which are neither directly impious and immoral, nor disturb the public peace.

59. The seventeenth chapter, in which Taylor professes to consider which among the sects of Christendom are to be tolerated, and in what degree, is written in a tone not easily reconciled with that of the rest. Though he begins by saying that diversity of opinions does more concern public peace than religion, it certainly appears, in some passages, that on this pretext of peace, which with the magistrate has generally been of more influence than that of orthodoxy, he withdraws a great deal of that liberty of prophesying which he has been so broadly asserting. Punishment for religious tenets is doubtless not at all the same as restraint of separate worship ; yet we are not prepared for the shackles he seems inclined to throw over the latter. Laws of ecclesiastical discipline, which, in Taylor's age, were understood to be binding on the whole community, cannot, he holds, be infringed by those who take occasion to disagree, without rendering authority contemptible ; and if there are any as zealous for obedience to the church, as others may be for their opinions against it, the toleration of the latter's disobedience may give offence to the former : an argument strange enough in this treatise ! But Taylor is always more prone to accumulate reasons than to sift their efficiency. It is indeed, he thinks, worthy to be considered in framing a law of church discipline, whether it will be disliked by any who are to obey it ; but, after it is once enacted, there seems no further indulgence practicable than what the governors of the church may grant to particular persons by dispensation. The laws of discipline are for the public good, and must not so far tolerate a violation of themselves as to destroy the good that the public ought to derive from them.*

* This single chapter is of itself conclusive against the truth of Taylor's own allegation that he wrote his *Liberty of Prophesying* in order to procure toleration for the episcopal church of England at the hands of those who had overthrown it. No one ever dreamed of refusing

freedom of opinion to that church ; it was only about public worship that any difficulty could arise. But, in truth, there is not one word in the whole treatise which could have been written with the view that Taylor pretends.

[It has been suggested, by an anony-

60. I have been inclined to suspect that Taylor, for some cause, interpolated this chapter after the rest of the treatise was complete. It has as little bearing upon, and is as inconsistent in spirit with, the following sections as with those that precede. To use a familiar illustration, the effect it produces on the reader's mind is like that of coming on deck at sea, and finding that, the ship having put about, the whole line of coast is reversed to the eye. Taylor, however, makes but a short tack. In the next section he resumes the bold tone of an advocate for freedom; and, after discussing at great length the leading tenet of the Anabaptists, concludes that, resting as it does on such plausible though insufficient grounds, we cannot exclude it by any means from toleration, though they may be restrained from preaching their other notions of the unlawfulness of war, or of oaths, or of capital punishment; it being certain that no good religion teaches doctrines whose consequences would destroy all government. A more remarkable chapter is that in which Taylor concludes in favour of tolerating the Romanists, except when they assert the pope's power of deposing princes, or of dispensing with oaths. The result of all, he says, is this: "Let the prince and the secular power have a care the commonwealth be safe. For whether such or such a sect of Christians be to be permitted, is a question rather political than religious."

His general
defence of
toleration.

61. In the concluding sections he maintains the right of particular churches to admit all who profess the Apostles' creed to their communion, and of private men to communicate with different churches, if they require no unlawful condition.

mous correspondent, that I have put a wrong construction on this seventeenth chapter, and that Taylor's design was to withstand that Puritan party within the church, who refused to submit to the established laws of ecclesiastical discipline. It is certain that much which he has said will bear that construction; but, if he meant only this, he has not expressed himself with uniform clearness and consistency, as indeed is too common with him. He is so far from being distinct in the whole treatise as to what he aims at, that his editor, Heber, imagines

him to have contended under the name Liberty of Prophesying, not for toleration of sectaries, but of an exemption from fixed articles of faith for the clergy themselves. I conceive this to be a mistake; but Heber was not deficient in acuteness, and could hardly have misunderstood a plain meaning. The hypothesis of my correspondent, it may be observed, strengthens the presumption that the Liberty of Prophesying was chiefly written while the church of England was still in the ascendant. — 1842.]

But "few churches, that have framed bodies of confession and articles, will endure any person that is not of the same confession; which is a plain demonstration that such bodies of confession and articles do much hurt." "The guilt of schism may lie on him who least thinks it; he being rather the schismatic who makes unnecessary and inconvenient impositions, than he who disobeys them, because he cannot do otherwise without violating his conscience."* The whole treatise on the Liberty of Prophesying ends with the celebrated parable of Abraham, found, as Taylor says, "in the Jews' books," but really in an Arabian writer. This story Franklin, as every one now knows, rather unhandsomely appropriated to himself; and it is a strange proof of the ignorance as to our earlier literature which then prevailed, that for many years it continued to be quoted with his name. It was not contained in the first editions of the Liberty of Prophesying; and indeed the book from which Taylor is supposed to have borrowed it was not published till 1651.

62. Such is this great pleading for religious moderation; a production not more remarkable in itself than for the quarter from which it came. In the polemical writings of Jeremy Taylor we generally find a staunch and uncompromising adherence to one party; and from the abundant use he makes of authority, we should infer that he felt a great veneration for it. In the Liberty of Prophesying, as has appeared by the general sketch, rather than analysis we have just given, there is a prevailing tinge of the contrary turn of mind, more striking than the comparison of insulated passages can be. From what motives, and under what circumstances, this treatise was written, is not easily discerned. In the dedication to Lord Hatton of the collective edition of his controversial writings after the Restoration, he declares that "when a persecution did arise against the church of England, he intended to make a reservative for his brethren and himself, by pleading for a liberty to our consciences to persevere in that profession, which was warranted by all the laws of God and our

* This is said also by Hales, in his tract on Schism, which was published some years before the Liberty of Prophesying. It is, however, what Taylor would have thought without a prompter.

superiors." It is with regret we are compelled to confess some want of ingenuousness in this part of Taylor's proceedings. No one reading the *Liberty of Prophesying* can perceive that it had the slightest bearing on any toleration that the episcopal church, in the time of the civil war, might ask of her victorious enemies. The differences between them were not on speculative points of faith, nor turning on an appeal to fathers and councils. That Taylor had another class of controversies in his mind is sufficiently obvious to the attentive reader of his work, and I can give no proof in this place to any other.

63. This was the third blow that the new school of Leyden had aimed in England at the positive dogmatists, who, in all the reformed churches, as in that of ^{Effect of} Rome, laboured to impose extensive confessions of faith, abounding in inferences of scholastic theology, as conditions of exterior communion, and as peremptory articles of faith. Chillingworth and Hales were not less decisive; but the former had but in an incidental manner glanced at the subject, and the short tract on Schism had been rather deficient in proof of its hardy paradoxes. Taylor, therefore, may be said to have been the first who sapped and shook the foundations of dogmatism and pretended orthodoxy; the first who taught men to seek peace in unity of spirit rather than of belief; and, instead of extinguishing dissent, to take away its sting by charity, and by a sense of human fallibility. The mind thus freed from bigotry is best prepared for the public toleration of differences in religion; but certainly the despotic and jealous temper of governments is not so well combated by Taylor as by later advocates of religious freedom.

64. In conducting his argument, he falls not unfrequently into his usual fault. Endowed with a mind of prodigious fertility, which a vast erudition rendered ^{its defects.} more luxuriant, he accumulates without selection whatever presents itself to his mind; his innumerable quotations, his multiplied reasonings, his prodigality of epithets and appositions, are poured along the interminable periods of his writings, with a frequency of repetition, sometimes of the same phrases, which leaves us to suspect that he revised but little what he had very rapidly composed. Certain it is that,

in his different works, he does not quite adhere to himself; and it would be more desirable to lay this on the partial views that haste and impetuosity produce, than on a deliberate employment of what he knew to be insufficient reasoning. But I must acknowledge that Taylor's fairness does not seem his characteristic quality.

65. In some passages of the *Liberty of Prophesying*, he seems to exaggerate the causes of uncertainty, and to take away from ecclesiastical antiquity even that moderate probability of truth which a dispassionate inquirer may sometimes assign to it. His suspicions of spuriousness and interpolation are too vaguely sceptical, and come ill from one who has no sort of hesitation, in some of his controversies, to allege as authority what he here sets aside with little ceremony. Thus, in the *Defence of Episcopacy*, published in 1642, he maintains the authenticity of the first fifty of the apostolic canons, all of which, in the *Liberty of Prophesying*, a very few years afterwards, he indiscriminately rejects. But this line of criticism was not then in so advanced a state as at present; and, from a credulous admission of every thing, the learned had come sometimes to more sweeping charges of interpolation and forgery than would be sustained on a more searching investigation. Taylor's language is so unguarded that he seems to leave the authenticity of all the fathers precarious. Doubtless there is a greater want of security as to books written before the invention of printing than we are apt to conceive, especially where independent manuscripts have not been found; but it is the business of a sagacious criticism, by the aid of internal or collateral evidence, to distinguish, not dogmatically as most are wont, but with a rational, though limited assent, the genuine remains of ancient writers from the incrustations of blundering or of imposture.

66. A prodigious reach of learning distinguishes the theologians of these fifty years, far greater than even in the sixteenth century; and also, if I am not mistaken, more critical and pointed, though in these latter qualities it was afterwards surpassed. And in this erudition the Protestant churches, we may perhaps say, were, upon the whole, more abundant than that of Rome. But it would be unprofitable to enumerate works which we are in-

Great erudition of this period.

competent to appreciate. Blondel, Daillé, and Salmasius on the Continent, Usher in England, are the most conspicuous names. Blondel sustained the equality of the apostolic church both against the primacy of Rome, and the episcopacy for which the Anglicans contended; Salmasius and Daillé fought on the same side in that controversy. The writings of our Irish primate, Usher, who maintained the antiquity of his order, but not upon such high ground as many in England would have desired, are known for their extraordinary learning, in which he has perhaps never been surpassed by an English writer. But for judgment and calm appreciation of evidence, the name of Usher has not been altogether so much respected by posterity as it was by his contemporaries. The church of Rome had its champions of less eminent renown: Gretser, perhaps the first among them, is not very familiar to our ears; but it is to be remembered, that some of the writings of Bellarmine fall within this period. The *Dogmata Theologica* of the jesuit Petavius, though but a compilation from the fathers and ancient councils, and not peculiarly directed against the tenets of the reformed, may deserve mention as a monument of useful labour.* Labbe, Sirmond, and several others, appear to range more naturally under the class of historical than theological writers. In mere ecclesiastical history — the records of events rather than opinions — this period was far more profound and critical than the preceding. The annals of Baronius were abridged and continued by Spondanus.

67. A numerous list of writers in sacred criticism might easily be produced. Among the Romanists, Cornelius à Lapide has been extolled above the rest by his fellow-jesuit André. His Commentaries, published from 1617 to 1642, are reckoned by others too diffuse; but he seems to have a fair reputation with Protestant critics.† The Lutherans extol Gerhard, and especially Glass, author of the *Philologia Sacra*, in hermeneutical theology. Rivet was the highest name among the Calvinists. Arminius, Episcopius,

Usher,
Petavius.

Sacred criticism.

* The *Dogmata Theologica* is not a complete work; it extends only as far as the head of free-will. It belongs to the class of *Loci Communes*. Morhof, ii. 539.

† André, Blount. Simon, however, says he is full of an erudition not to the purpose, which, as his Commentaries on the Scriptures run to twelve volumes, is not wonderful.

the *Fratres Poloni*, and indeed almost every one who had to defend a cause, found no course so ready, at least among Protestants, as to explain the Scriptures consistently with his

Grotius,
Coccejus.

own tenets. Two natives of Holland, opposite in character, in spirit, and principles of reasoning, and consequently the founders of opposite schools of disciples, stand out from the rest—Grotius and Coccejus. Luther, Calvin, and the generality of Protestant interpreters in the sixteenth century had, in most instances, rejected with some contempt the allegorical and multifarious senses of Scripture which had been introduced by the fathers, and had prevailed through the dark ages of the church. This adherence to the literal meaning was doubtless promoted by the tenet they all professed, the facility of understanding Scripture. That which was designed for the simple and illiterate was not to require a key to any esoteric sense. Grotius, however, in his *Annotations on the Old and New Testament*, published in 1633—the most remarkable book of this kind that had appeared, and which has had a more durable reputation than any perhaps of its precursors—carried the system of literal interpretation still farther, bringing great stores of illustrative learning from profane antiquity, but merely to elucidate the primary meaning, according to ordinary rules of criticism. Coccejus followed a wholly opposite course. Every passage, in his method, teemed with hidden senses; the narratives, least capable of any ulterior application, were converted into typical allusion, so that the Old Testament became throughout an enigmatical representation of the New. He was also remarkable for having viewed, more than any preceding writer, all the relations between God and man under the form of covenants, and introduced the technical language of jurisprudence into theology. This became a very usual mode of treating the subject in Holland, and afterwards in England. The Coccejans were numerous in the United Provinces, though not perhaps deemed quite so orthodox as their adversaries, who, from Gisbert Voet, a theologian of the most inflexible and polemical spirit, were denominated Voetians. Their disputes began a little before the middle of the century, and lasted till nearly its close.* The *Summa Doctrinæ* of

* Eichhorn, vi. part i. p. 264. Mosheim.

Coccejus appeared in 1648, and the *Dissertationes Theologicæ* of Voet in 1649.

68. England gradually took a prominent share in this branch of sacred literature. Among the divines of this period, comprehending the reigns of James and Charles, we may mention Usher, Gataker, Mede, Lightfoot, Jackson, Field, and Leigh.* English commentators. Gataker stood, perhaps, next to Usher, in general erudition. The fame of Mede has rested, for the most part, on his interpretations of the Apocalypse. This book had been little commented upon by the reformers; but in the beginning of the seventeenth century, several wild schemes of its application to present or expected events had been broached in Germany. England had also taken an active part, if it be true what Grotius tells us, that eighty books on the prophecies had been published here before 1640.† Those of Mede have been received with favour by later interpreters. Lightfoot, with extensive knowledge of the rabbinical writers, poured his copious stores on Jewish antiquities, preceded in this by a more obscure labourer in that region, Ainsworth. Jackson had a considerable name, but I do not think that he has been much quoted in modern times. Field on the Church has been much praised by Coleridge; it is, as it seemed to me, a more temperate work in ecclesiastical theory than some have represented it to be, and written almost wholly against Rome. Leigh's *Critica Sacra* can hardly be reckoned, nor does it claim to be, more than a compilation from earlier theologians: it is an alphabetical series of words from the Hebrew and Greek Testaments, the author candidly admitting that he was not very conversant with the Latin language. Leigh, it should be added, was a layman.

* "All confess," says Selden, in the *Table-talk*, "there never was a more learned clergy — no man taxes them with ignorance." In another place, indeed, he is represented to say, "The jesuits and the lawyers of France, and the Low Country-men have engrossed all learning; the rest of the world make nothing but homilies." As far as these sentences are not owing to difference of humour in the time of speaking, he seems to have

taken learning in a larger sense the second time than the first. Of learning not theological, the English clergy had no extraordinary portion.

† Si qua in re libera esse debet sententia, certè in vaticiniis, præsertim cum jam Protestantium libri prodierint fermè centum (in his octoginta in Anglia sola, ut mihi Anglici legati dixere,) super illis rebus, inter se plurimum discordes. Grot. *Epist.* 895.

69. The style of preaching before the Reformation had been often little else than buffoonery, and seldom respectable. For the most part, indeed, the clergy wrote in Latin what they delivered to the multitude in the native tongue. A better tone began with Luther. His language was sometimes rude and low, but persuasive, artless, powerful. He gave many useful precepts, as well as examples, for pulpit eloquence. Melancthon and several others, both in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as well in the Lutheran as in the reformed church, endeavoured by systematic treatises to guide the composition of sermons. The former could not, however, withstand the formal, tasteless, and polemical spirit that overspread their theology. In the latter a superior tone is perceived. Of these, according to Eichhorn, the Swiss preachers were most simple and popular, the Dutch most learned and copious, the French had most taste and eloquence, the English most philosophy.* It is more than probable that in these characteristics he has meant to comprise the whole of the seventeenth century. Few continental writers, as far as I know, that belong to this its first moiety, have earned any remarkable reputation in this province of theology. In England several might be distinguished out of a large number. Sermons have been much more frequently published here than in any other country; and, from the beginning of the seventeenth century, form a large proportion of our theological literature. But it is of course not requisite to mention more than the very few which may be said to have a general reputation.

70. The sermons of Donne have sometimes been praised in late times. They are undoubtedly the productions of a very ingenious and a very learned man; and two folio volumes by such a person may be expected to supply favourable specimens. In their general character, they will not appear, I think, much worthy of being rescued from oblivion. The subtilty of Donne, and his fondness for such inconclusive reasoning as a subtle disputant is apt to fall into, runs through all of these sermons at which I have looked. His learning he seems to have perverted in order to

* Eichhorn, vi. part ii. p. 219. et post.

cull every impertinence of the fathers and schoolmen, their remote analogies, their strained allegories, their technical distinctions; and to these he has added much of a similar kind from his own fanciful understanding. In his theology, Donne appears often to incline towards the Arminian hypotheses, which, in the last years of James and the first of his son, the period in which these sermons were chiefly preached, had begun to be accounted orthodox at court; but I will not vouch for his consistency in every discourse. Much, as usual in that age, is levelled against Rome: Donne was conspicuously learned in that controversy; and though he talks with great respect of antiquity, is not induced by it, like some of his Anglican contemporaries, to make any concession to the adversary.*

71. The sermons of Jeremy Taylor are of much higher reputation; far, indeed, above any that had preceded them in the English church. An imagination essentially poetical, and sparing none of the decorations which, by critical rules, are deemed almost peculiar to verse; a warm tone of piety, sweetness, and clarity; an accumulation of circumstantial accessories whenever he reasons, or persuades, or describes; an erudition pouring itself forth in quotation, till his sermons become in some places almost a garland of flowers from all other writers, and especially from those of classical antiquity, never before so redundantly scattered from the pulpit, distinguish Taylor from his contemporaries by their degree, as they do from most of his successors by their kind. His sermons on the Marriage Ring, on the House of Feasting, on the Apples of Sodom, may be named without disparagement to others, which perhaps ought to stand in equal place. But they are not without considerable faults, some of which have just been hinted. The eloquence of Taylor is great, but it is not eloquence of the highest class; it is far too Asiatic, too much in the

Of Jeremy
Taylor.

* Donne incurred some scandal by a book entitled *Biathanatos*, and considered as a vindication of suicide. It was published long after his death, in 1651. It is a very dull and pedantic performance, without the ingenuity and acuteness of paradox; distinctions, objections, and

quotations from the rabble of bad authors whom he used to read, fill up the whole of it. It is impossible to find a less clear statement of argument on either side. No one would be induced to kill himself by reading such a book, unless he were threatened with another volume.

style of the declaimers of the fourth century, by the study of whom he had probably vitiated his taste ; his learning is ill-placed, and his arguments often as much so ; not to mention that he has the common defect of alleging nugatory proofs ; his vehemence loses its effect by the circuitry of his pleonastic language ; his sentences are of endless length, and hence not only altogether unmusical, but not always reducible to grammar. But he is still the greatest ornament of the English pulpit up to the middle of the seventeenth century ; and we have no reason to believe, or rather much reason to disbelieve, that he had any competitor in other languages.

72. The devotional writings of Taylor, several of which belong to the first part of the century, are by no means of less celebrity or less value than his sermons. Such are the *Life of Christ*, the *Holy Living and Dying*, and the collection of meditations, called the *Golden Grove*. A writer as distinguished in works of practical piety was Hall. His *Art of Divine Meditation*, his *Contemplations*, and indeed many of his writings, remind us frequently of Taylor. Both had equally pious and devotional tempers ; both were full of learning, both fertile of illustration ; both may be said to have had strong imagination and poetical genius, though Taylor let his predominate a little more. Taylor is also rather more subtle and argumentative ; his copiousness has more real variety. Hall keeps more closely to his subject, dilates upon it sometimes more tediously, but more appositely. In his sermons there is some excess of quotation and far-fetched illustration, but less than in those of Taylor. In some of their writings these two great divines resemble each other, on the whole, so much, that we might for a short time not discover which we were reading. I do not know that any third writer comes close to either. The *Contemplations* of Hall are among his most celebrated works. They are prolix, and without much of that vivacity or striking novelty we meet with in the devotional writings of his contemporary, but are perhaps more practical and generally edifying.*

* Some of the moral writings of Hall in the seventeenth century, and had much success. Niceron, xi. 348.

73. The religious treatises of this class, even those which by their former popularity, or their merit, ought to be mentioned in a regular history of theological literature, are too numerous for these pages. A mystical and ascetic spirit diffused itself more over religion, struggling sometimes, as in the Lutherans of Germany, against the formal orthodoxy of the church, but more often in subordination to its authority, and co-operating with its functions. The writings of St. Francis de Sales, titular bishop of Geneva, especially his treatise on the Love of God, published in 1616, make a sort of epoch in the devotional theology of the church of Rome. Those of St. Teresa, in the Spanish language, followed some years afterwards; they are altogether full of a mystical theopathy. But De Sales included charity in his scheme of divine love; and it is to him, as well as others of his age, that not only a striking revival of religion in France, which had been absolutely perverted or disregarded in the sixteenth century, was due, but a reformation in the practices of monastic life, which became more active and beneficent, with less of useless penance and asceticism than before. New institutions sprung up with the spirit of association, and all other animating principles of conventual orders, but free from the formality and torpor of the old.*

74. Even in the German churches, rigid as they generally were in their adherence to the symbolical books, some voices from time to time were heard for a more spiritual and effective religion. Arndt's *Treatise of True Christianity*, in 1605, written on ascetic and devotional principles, and with some deviation from the tenets of the very orthodox Lutherans, has been reckoned one of the first protests against their barren forms of faith†; and the mystical theologians, if they had not run into such extravagances as did dishonour to their name, would have been accessions to the same side. The principal mystics or theosophists have generally been counted among philosophers, and will therefore find their place in the next chapter. The German nation is constitutionally disposed to receive those forms of

* Ranke, ii. 430.

† Eichhorn, vi. part i. p. 355. Biogr. Univ. Chalmers.

religion which address themselves to the imagination and the heart. Much, therefore, of this character has always been written, and become popular, in that language. Few English writings of the practical class, except those already mentioned, can be said to retain much notoriety. Those of George Herbert are best known; his *Country Parson*, which seems properly to fall within this description, is, on the whole, a pleasing little book; but the precepts are sometimes so overstrained, according to our notions, as to give an air of affectation.

75. The disbelief in revelation, of which several symptoms had appeared before the end of the sixteenth century, became more remarkable afterwards both in France and England, involving several names not obscure in literary history. The first of these, in point of date, is Charron. The religious scepticism of this writer has not been generally acknowledged, and indeed it seems repugnant to the fact of his having written an elaborate defence of Christianity; yet we can deduce no other conclusion from one chapter in his most celebrated book, the *Treatise on Wisdom*. Charron is so often little else than a transcriber, that we might suspect him in this instance also to have drawn from other sources; which, however, would leave the same inference as to his own tenets, and I think this chapter has an air of originality.

76. The name of Charron, however, has not been generally associated with the charge of irreligion. A more audacious, and consequently more unfortunate writer was Lucilio Vanini, a native of Italy whose book *De Admirandis Naturæ Reginæ Deæque Mortalium Arcanis*, printed at Paris in 1616, caused him to be burned at the stake by a decree of the parliament of Toulouse in 1619. This treatise, as well as one that preceded it, *Amphitheatrum Æternæ Providentiæ*, Lyons, 1615, is of considerable rarity, so that there has been a question concerning the atheism of Vanini, which some have undertaken to deny.* In the *Amphitheatrum* I do not perceive any thing which leads to such an imputation, though I will not pretend to have read the whole of a book full of the unintelligible metaphysics of the

Infidelity
of some
writers.
Charron.

Vanini.

* Brucker, v. 678.

later Aristotelians. It professes, at least, to be a vindication of the being and providence of the Deity. But the later work, which is dedicated to Bassompierre, and published with a royal privilege of exclusive sale for six years, is of a very different complexion. It is in sixty dialogues, the interlocutors being styled Alexander and Julius Cæsar, the latter representing Vanini himself. The far greater part of these dialogues relate to physical, but a few to theological subjects. In the fiftieth, on the religion of the heathens, he avows his disbelief of all religion, except such as nature, which is God, being the principle of motion, has planted in the hearts of man; every other being the figment of kings to keep their subjects in obedience, and of priests for their own lucre and honour*; observing plainly of his own Amphitheatrum, which is a vindication of providence, that he had said many things in it which he did not believe.† Vanini was infatuated

* In quam religione verè et piè Deum coli vetusti philosophi existimârunt? In unica Naturæ lege, quam ipsa Natura, quæ Deus est (est enim principium motûs), in omnium gentium animis inscripsit; cæteras vero leges non nisi figmenta et illusiones esse asserebant, non a cacodæmone aliquo inductas, fabulosum namque illorum genus dicitur a philosophis, sed a principibus ad subditorum pædagogiam excogitatas, et a sacerdotibus ob honoris et auri aucupium confirmatas, non miraculis, sed scriptura, cujus nec originale ullibi adinventur, quæ miracula facta recitet, et bonarum ac malarum actionum repromissiones polliceatur, in futura tamen vita, ne fraus detegi possit. p. 366.

† Multa in eo libro scripta sunt, quibus a me nulla præstatur fides. Così va il mondo. — ALEX. Non miror, nam ego crebris vernaculis hoc usurpo sermonibus: Questo mondo è una gabbia de' matti. Reges excipio et Pontifices. Nam de illis scriptum est: Cor Regis in manu Domini, &c. Dial. LVI. p. 428.

The concluding pages are enough to show with what justice Buhle and Tennemann have gravely recorded Vanini among philosophers. Quæso, mi Juli, tuam de animæ immortalitate sententiam explices. — J. C. Excusatum me habecas rogo. — AL. Cur ita? — J. C. Vovi Deo meo quæstionem hanc me non pertractaturum, antequam senex dives et

germanus evasero. — AL. Dii tibi Nestoreos pro literariæ reipublicæ emolumento dies impertiant: vix trigesimum nunc attigisti annum et tot præclaræ eruditionis monumenta admirabili cum laude edidisti. — J. C. Quid hæc mihi prosunt? — AL. Celebrem tibi laudem comparârunt. — J. C. Omnes famæ rumusculos cum uno amasiæ basiolo commutandos plerique philosophi suadent. — AL. At alter ea perfrui potest. — J. C. Quid inde admittit? . . . — AL. Uberimos voluptatis fructus percepisti in Naturæ arcanis investigandis. — J. C. Corpus mihi est studiis enervatum exhaustumque; neque in hac humana caligine perfectam rerum cognitionem assequi possumus; cum ipsummet Aristotelem philosophorum Deum infinitis propemodum locis hallucinatum fuisse adverto, cumque medicam facultatem præ reliquis certissimam adhuc incertam et fallacem experior, subscribere cuperem Agrippæ libello quem de scientiarum vanitate conscripsit. — AL. Laborum tuorum præmium jam consecutus es; æternitati nomen jam consecrasti. Quid jucundius in extremo tuæ ætatis curriculum accipere potes, quam hoc canticum? Et superest sine te nomen in orbe tuum. — J. C. Si animus meus una cum corpore, ut Athei fingunt, evanescat, quas ille ex fama post obitum delicias nancisci poterit? Forsitan gloriolæ voculis, et fiduculis ad cadaveris domicilium per-

with presumption, and, if he resembled Jordano Bruno in this respect, fell very short of his acuteness and apparent integrity. His cruel death, and perhaps the scarcity of his works, has given more celebrity to his name in literary history than it would otherwise have obtained.

77. Lord Herbert of Cherbury, in his treatise *De Veritate* and still more in that *De Religione Gentilium*, has been justly deemed inimical to every positive religion. He admits, indeed, the possibility of immediate revelation from heaven, but denies that any tradition from others can have sufficient certainty. Five fundamental truths of natural religion he holds to be such as all mankind are bound to acknowledge, and damns those heathens who do not receive them as summarily as any theologian.*

78. The progress of infidelity in France did not fail to attract notice. It was popular in the court of Louis XIII., and, in a certain degree, in that of Charles I. But this does not belong to the history of literature. Among the writers who may have given some proofs of it we may reckon La Mothe le Vayer, Naudé, and Guy Patin.† The writings of Hobbes will be treated at length

trahatur? Si animus, ut credimus liber et speramus, interitui non est obnoxius, et ad superos evolabit, tot ibi perfruetur cupediis et voluptatibus, ut illustres ac splendidas mundi pompas et laudationes nec pili faciat. Si ad purgatorias flammās descendet, gravior erit illi illius orationis, Dies iræ, dies illa, mulierculis gratissima recitatio, quam omnes Tulliani glossuli, dicendique lepores, quam subtilissimæ et pene divinæ Aristotelis ratiocinationes: si Tartareo, quod Deus avertat, perpetuo carceri emancipatur, nullum ibi solatium, nullam redemptionem inveniet. — AL. O utinam in adolescentiæ limine has rationes exceperissem! — J. C. Præterita mala ne cogites, futura ne cures, præsentia fugias. — AL. Ah! — J. C. Liberaliter inspiras. — AL. Illius versiculi recordor. Perduto è tutto il tempo, che in amor non si spende. — J. C. Eja quoniam inclinato jam die ad vesperam perducta est disputatio, (cujus singula verba divino Romanæ ecclesiæ oraculo, infallibilis cujus interpretes a Spiritu Sancto modo constitutus est Paulus V., serenis-

simæ Burghesiæ familiæ soboles, subiecta esse volumus, ita ut pro non dictis habeantur, si quæ forsitan sunt, quod vix crediderim, quæ illius placitis ad amissim non consentiant,) laxemus paulisper animos, et a severitate ad hilaritatem risumque traducamus. Heus pueri! lussorias tabulas huc adferite. The wretched man, it seems, had not much reason to think himself a gainer by his speculations; yet he knew not that the worst was still behind.

* These five articles are—1. *Esse Deum summum.* — 2. *Coli debere.* — 3. *Virtutem pietatemque esse præcipuas partes cultûs divini.* — 4. *Dolendum esse ob peccata, ab iisque respiciendum.* — 5. *Dari ex bonitate justitiæque divinæ præmium vel pœnam tum in hac vita, tum post hanc vitam.* . . . Hisce quippe ubi superstitiones figmentaque commiscuerint, vel animas suas criminibus quæ nulla satis eluat penitentia, commaculaverint, a seipsis perditio propria, Deo vero summo in æternum sit gloria. *De Religione Gentilium, cap. 1.*

† La Mothe le Vayer has frequently

hereafter. It is probable that this sceptical spirit of the age gave rise to those vindications of revealed religion which were published in the present period. Among these the first place is due to the well-known and extensively circulated treatise of Grotius. This was originally sketched in Dutch verse, and intended for the lower classes of his countrymen. It was published in Latin in 1627.* Few, if any, books of the kind have been so frequently reprinted; but some parts being not quite so close and critical as the modern state of letters exacts, and the arguments against Jews and Mahometans seeming to occupy too much space, it is less read than formerly.

79. This is not a period in which many editions or versions of the Scriptures were published. The English translation of the Bible had been several times revised, or re-made, since the first edition by Tyndal.

English
translation
of the Bible.

It finally assumed its present form under the authority of James I. Forty-seven persons, in six companies, meeting at Westminster, Oxford, and Cambridge, distributed the labour among them; twenty-five being assigned to the Old Testament, fifteen to the New, seven to the Apocrypha. The rules imposed for their guidance by the king were designed, as far as possible, to secure the text against any novel interpretation; the translation, called the Bishop's Bible, being established as the basis, as those still older had been in that; and the work

been reckoned among those who carried their general scepticism into religion. And this seems a fair inference, unless the contrary can be shown; for those who doubt of what is most evident, will naturally doubt of what is less so. In La Mothe's fourth dialogue, under the name of Oratius Tubero, he pretends to speak of faith as a gift of God, and not founded on evidence; which was probably but the usual subterfuge. The Naudeana are full of broad intimations that the author was, as he expresses it, *bien déniâé*; and Guy Patin's letters, except those near the end of his life, lead to a similar conclusion. One of them has certainly the appearance of implicating Gassendi, and has been quoted as such by Sir James Mackintosh, in his Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy. Patin tells us, that Naudé, Gassendi, and he were to sup together the following

Sunday. Ce sera une débauche, mais philosophique, et peut-être quelque chose d'avantage, pour être tous trois guéris du loup-garou, et être délivrés du mal des scrupules qui est le tyran des consciences, nous irons peut-être jusque fort près du sanctuaire. Je fis l'an passé ce voyage de Gentilly avec M. Naudé, moy seul avec luy, tête-à-tête; il n'y avoit point de témoins, aussi n'y en faloit-il point; nous y parlâmes fort librement de tout, sans que personne en ait été scandalisé. p. 32. I should not, nevertheless, lay much stress on this letter, in opposition to the many assertions of belief in religion which the writings of Gassendi contain. One of them, indeed, quoted by Dugald Stewart, in note Q. to his first Dissertation, is rather suspicious, as going too far into a mystical strain for his cold temperament.

* Nicéron, vol. xix. Biogr. Univ.

of each person or company being subjected to the review of the rest. The translation, which was commenced in 1607, was published in 1611.*

80. The style of this translation is in general so enthusiastically praised, that no one is permitted either to
Its style. qualify or even explain the grounds of his approbation. It is held to be the perfection of our English language. I shall not dispute this proposition; but one remark as to a matter of fact cannot reasonably be censured, that, in consequence of the principle of adherence to the original versions which had been kept up ever since the time of Henry VIII., it is not the language of the reign of James I. It may, in the eyes of many, be a better English, but it is not the English of Daniel, or Raleigh, or Bacon, as any one may easily perceive. It abounds, in fact, especially in the Old Testament, with obsolete phraseology, and with single words long since abandoned, or retained only in provincial use. On the more important question, whether this translation is entirely, or with very trifling exceptions, conformable to the original text, it seems unfit to enter. It is one which is seldom discussed with all the temper and freedom from oblique views which the subject demands, and upon which, for this reason, it is not safe for those who have not had leisure or means to examine it for themselves, to take upon trust the testimony of the learned. A translation of the Old Testament was published at Douay in 1609, for the use of the English Catholics.

* Fuller's Church History.

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY FROM 1600 TO 1650.

SECT. I.

*Aristotelian Logic — Campanella — Theosophists — Lord Herbert of Cherbury —
Gassendi's Remarks upon him.*

1. IN the two preceding periods, we have had occasion to excuse the heterogeneous character of the chapters that bear this title. The present is fully as much open to verbal criticism ; and perhaps it is rather by excluding both moral and mathematical philosophy, that we give it some sort of unity, than from a close connexion in all the books that will come under our notice in the ensuing pages. But any tabular arrangement of literature, such as has often been attempted with no very satisfactory result, would be absolutely inappropriate to such a work as the present, which has already to labour with the inconvenience of more subdivisions than can be pleasing to the reader, and would interfere too continually with that general regard to chronology, without which the name of history seems incongruous. Hence the metaphysical inquiries that are conversant with the human mind, or with natural theology, the general principles of investigating truth, the comprehensive speculations of theoretical physics, subjects very distinct and not easily confounded by the most thoughtless, must fall, with no more special distribution, within the contents of this chapter. But since, during the period which it embraces, men arose, who have laid the foundations of a new philosophy, and thus have rendered it a great epoch in the intellectual history of man-

Subjects of
this chap-
ter.

kind, we shall not very strictly, though without much deviation, follow a chronological order, and after reviewing some of the less important labourers in speculative philosophy, come to the names of three who have most influenced posterity, Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes.

2. We have seen in a former chapter how little progress had been made in this kind of philosophy during the sixteenth century. At its close the schools of logic were divided, though by no means in equal proportion, between the Aristotelians and the Ramists; the one sustained by ancient renown, by civil, or at least academical power, and by the common prejudice against innovation; the other deriving some strength from the love of novelty, and the prejudice against established authority, which the first age of the reformation had generated, and which continued, perhaps, to preserve a certain influence in the second. But neither from one nor the other had philosophy, whether in material or intellectual physics, much to hope; the disputations of the schools might be technically correct; but so little regard was paid to objective truth, or at least so little pains taken to ascertain it, that no advance in real knowledge signalled either of these parties of dialecticians. According, indeed, to a writer of this age, strongly attached to the Aristotelian party, Ramus had turned all physical science into the domain of logic, and argued from words to things still more than his opponents.* Lord Bacon, in the bitterest language, casts on him a similar reproach.† It seems that he caused this branch of philosophy to retrograde rather than advance.

3. It was obvious, at all events, that from the universities,

* Keckermann, *Præcognita Logica*, p. 129. This writer charges Ramus with plagiarism from Ludovicus Vives, placing the passages in apposition, so as to prove his case. Ramus, he says, never alludes to Vives. He praises the former, however, for having attacked the scholastic party, being himself a genuine Aristotelian.

† Ne vero, fili, cum hanc contra Aristotelem sententiam fero, me cum rebellis ejus quodam neoterico Petro Ramo conspirasse augurare. Nullum mihi commercium cum hoc ignorantiae latibulo, perniciosissima literarum tinea, compen-

diorum patre, qui cum methodi sua et compendii vinclis res torqueat et premet, res quidem, si qua fuit, elabitur protinus et exsilit; ipse vero aridas et desertissimas nugas stringit. Atque Aquinas quidam cum Scoto et sociis etiam in rebus rerum varietatem effinxit, hic ve etiam in rebus non rerum solitudine æquavit. Atque hoc hominis cum humanos tamen usus in ore habet impendens, ut mihi etiam pro [præ?] sophi prævaricari videatur. Bacon, *De Interpretatione Naturæ*.

or from the church, in any country, no improvement in philosophy was to be expected; yet those who had strayed from the beaten track, a Paracelsus, a Jordano Bruno, even a Telesio, had but lost themselves in irregular mysticism, or laid down theories of their own, as arbitrary and destitute of proof as those they endeavoured to supersede. The ancient philosophers, and especially Aristotle, were, with all their errors and defects, far more genuine high-priests of nature than any moderns of the sixteenth century. But there was a better prospect at its close, in separate though very important branches of physical science. Gilbert, Kepler, Galileo, were laying the basis of a true philosophy; and they, who do not properly belong to this chapter, laboured very effectually to put an end to all antiquated errors, and to check the reception of novel paradoxes.

No improvement till near the end of the century.

4. We may cast a glance, meantime, on those universities which still were so wise in their own conceit, and maintained a kind of reputation by the multitude of their disciples. Whatever has been said of the scholastic metaphysicians of the sixteenth century, may be understood as being applicable to their successors during the present period. Their method was by no means extinct, though the books which contain it are forgotten. In all that part of Europe which acknowledged the authority of Rome, and in all the universities which were swayed by the orders of Franciscans, Dominicans, and Jesuits, the metaphysics of the thirteenth century, the dialectics of the Peripatetic school, were still taught. If new books were written, as was frequently the case, they were written upon old systems. Brucker, who sometimes transcribes Morhof word for word, but frequently expands with so much more copiousness, that he may be presumed to have had a direct acquaintance with many of the books he mentions, has gone most elaborately into this unpropitious subject.* The chairs of philosophy in Protestant German universities, except where the Ramists had got possession of them, which was not very common, especially after the first years of this period, were occupied by avowed Aristotelians; so that if one should enumerate the professors

Methods of the universities.

* Morhof, vol. ii. l. 1. c. 13, 14. Brucker, iv. cap. 2, 3.

of physics, metaphysics, logic, and ethics, down to the close of the century, he would be almost giving a list of strenuous adherents of that system.* One cause of this was the "Philippic method," or course of instruction in the philosophical books of Melancthon, more clear and elegant, and better arranged than those of Aristotle himself or his commentators. But this, which long continued to prevail, was deemed by some too superficial, and tending to set aside the original authority. Brucker, however, admits, what seems at least to limit some of his expressions as to the prevalence of Peripateticism, that many reverted to the scholastic metaphysics, which raised its head about the beginning of the seventeenth century, even in the Protestant regions of Germany. The universities of Altdorf and Helmstadt were the chief nurseries of the genuine Peripateticism.†

5. Of the metaphysical writers whom the older philosophy brought forth we must speak with much ignorance. Scholastic writers. Suarez of Granada is justly celebrated for some of his other works; but of his Metaphysical Disputations, published at Mentz, in 1614, in two folio volumes, and several times afterwards, I find no distinct character in Morhof or Brucker. They both, especially the former, have praised Lalemandet, a Franciscan, whose *Decisiones Philosophicæ*, on logic, physics, and metaphysics, appeared at Munich, in 1644 and 1645. Lalemandet, says Morhof, has well stated the questions between the Nominalist and Realist parties; observing that the difference between them is like that of a man who casts up a sum of money by figures, and one who counts the coins themselves.‡ Vasquez, Tellez, and several more names, without going for the present below the middle of the century, may be found in the two writers quoted. Spain was peculiarly the nurse of these obsolete and unprofitable metaphysics.

6. The Aristotelian philosophy, unadulterated by the figments of the schoolmen, had eminent upholders in the Italian universities, especially in that of Padua. Cæsar Cremonini taught in that famous city till his death in 1630. Fortunio Liceto, his successor, was as staunch a disciple of the Peri-

* Brucker, iv. 243.

† *Id.* p. 248—253.

‡ Morhof, vol. ii. lib. i. cap. 14. sect. 15. Brucker, iv. 129.

patetic sect. We have a more full account of these men from Gabriel Naudé, both in his recorded conversation, the *Naudæana*, and in a volume of letters, than from any other quarter. His twelfth letter, especially, enters into some detail as to the state of the university of Padua, to which, for the purpose of hearing Cremonini, he had repaired in 1625. He does not much extol its condition; only Cremonini and one more were deemed by him safe teachers: the rest were mostly of a common class; the lectures were too few, and the vacations too long. He observes, as one might at this day, the scanty population of the city compared with its size, the grass growing and the birds singing in the streets, and, what we should not find now to be the case, the "general custom of Italy, which keeps women perpetually locked up in their chambers, like birds in cages."* Naudé in many of these letters speaks in the most panegyrical terms of Cremonini†, and particularly for his standing up almost alone in defence of the Aristotelian philosophy, when Telesio, Patrizi, Bruno, and others had been propounding theories of their own. Liceto, the successor of Cremonini, maintained, he afterwards informs us, with little support, the Peripatetic verity. It is probable that, by this time, Galileo, a more powerful adversary than Patrizi or Telesio, had drawn away the students of physical philosophy from Aristotle; nor did Naudé himself long continue in the faith he had imbibed from Cremonini. He became the intimate friend of Gassendi, and embraced a better system without repugnance, though he still kept up his correspondence with Liceto.

7. Logic had never been more studied, according to a writer who has given a sort of history of the science about the beginning of this period, than in the preceding age; and in fact he enumerates above fifty treatises on the subject, between the time of Ramus and his own.‡ The Ramists, though of little importance in Italy, in Spain, and even in France, had much influence in Germany, England, and Scotland.§ None, however, of the logical works of the

Treatises
on logic.

* Naudæi Epistolæ, p. 52. (edit. 1667.)

† P. 27. et alibi sæpius.

‡ Keckermann, *Præcognita Logica*, p. 110. (edit. 1606.)

§ Id. p. 147.

sixteenth century obtained such reputation as those by Smiglecius, Burgersdicius, and our countryman Crakanthorp, all of whom flourished, if we may use such a word for those who bore no flowers, in the earlier part of the next age. As these men were famous in their generation, we may presume that they at least wrote better than their predecessors. But it is time to leave so jejune a subject, though we may not yet be able to produce what is much more valuable.

8. The first name, in an opposite class, that we find in descending from the sixteenth century, is that of Campanella ; Thomas Campanella, whose earliest writings belong to it. His philosophy being wholly dogmatical, must be classed with that of the paradoxical innovators whom he followed and eclipsed. Campanella, a Dominican friar, and, like his master Telesio, a native of Cosenza, having been accused, it is uncertain how far with truth, of a conspiracy against the Spanish government of his country, underwent an imprisonment of twenty-seven years; during which almost all his philosophical treatises were composed and given to the world. Ardent and rapid in his mind, and, as has just been seen, not destitute of leisure, he wrote on logic, physics, metaphysics, morals, politics, and grammar. Upon all these subjects his aim seems to have been to recede as far as possible from Aristotle. He had early begun to distrust this guide, and had formed a noble resolution to study all schemes of philosophy, comparing them with their archetype, the world itself, that he might distinguish how much exactness was to be found in those several copies, as they ought to be, from one autograph of nature.*

9. Campanella borrowed his primary theorems from Telesio, but enlarged that his theory taken from Telesio. Parmenidean philosophy by the inventions of his own fertile and imaginative genius. He lays down the fundamental principle, that the perfectly wise and good Being has created certain signs and types (*statuas atque imagines*) of himself, all of which, severally as well as collectively, represent power, wisdom, and love, and the objects of these attributes, namely, existence, truth, and excellence, with more or less

* Cypriani Vita Campanellæ, p. 7.

evidence. God first created space, the basis of existence, the primal substance, an immovable and incorporeal capacity of receiving body. Next he created matter without form or figure. In this corporeal mass God called to being two workmen, incorporeal themselves, but incapable of subsisting apart from body, the organs of no physical forms, but of their Maker alone. These are heat and cold, the active principles diffused through all things. They were enemies from the beginning, each striving to occupy all material substances itself; each therefore always contending with the other, while God foresaw the great good that their discord would produce.* The heavens, he says in another passage, were formed by heat out of attenuated matter, the earth by cold out of condensed matter; the sun, being a body of heat, as he rolls round the earth, attacks the colder substance, and converts part of it into air and vapour.† This last part of his theory Campanella must have afterwards changed in words, when he embraced the Copernican system.

10. He united to this physical theory another, not wholly original, but enforced in all his writings with singular confidence and pertinacity, the sensibility of all created beings. All things, he says, feel; else would the world be a chaos. For neither would fire tend upwards, nor stones downwards, nor waters to the sea; but every thing would remain where it was, were it not conscious that destruction awaits it by remaining amidst that which is contrary to itself, and that it can only be preserved by seeking that which is of a similar nature. Contrariety is necessary for the decay and reproduction of nature; but all things strive against their contraries, which they could not do, if they did not perceive what is their contrary.‡ God, who is

Notion of
universal
sensibility.

* In hac corporea mole tantæ materia statæ, dixit Deus, ut nascerentur fabri duo incorporei, sed non potentes nisi a corpore subsistere, nullarum physicarum formarum organa, sed formatoris tantummodo. Ideo nati calor et frigus, principia activa principalia, ideoque suæ virtutis diffusiva. Statim inimici fuerunt mutuo, dum uterque cupit totam substantiam materialem occupare. Hinc contra se invicem pugnare cœperunt, providente Deo ex hujusmodi discordia

ingens bonum. *Philosophia Realis Epilogistica*, (Frankfort, 1623,) sect. 4.

† This is in the *Compendium de Rerum Natura* pro *Philosophia humana*, published by Adami in 1617. In his *Apology for Galileo*, in 1622, Campanella defends the Copernican system, and says that the modern astronomers think they cannot construct good ephemerides without it.

‡ Omnia ergo sentiunt; alias mundus esset chaos. *Ignis enim non sursum*

primal power, wisdom, and love, has bestowed on all things the power of existence, and so much wisdom and love as is necessary for their conservation during that time only for which his providence has determined that they shall be. Heat, therefore, has power, and sense, and desire of its own being; so have all other things, seeking to be eternal like God; and in God they are eternal, for nothing dies before him, but is only changed.* Even to the world, as a sentient being, the death of its parts is no evil, since the death of one is the birth of many. Bread that is swallowed dies to revive as blood, and blood dies, that it may live again in our flesh and bones; and thus as the life of man is compounded out of the deaths and lives of all his parts, so is it with the whole universe.† God said, Let all things feel, some more, some less, as they have more or less necessity to imitate my being. And let them desire to live in that which they understand to be good for them, lest my creation should come to nought.‡

11. The strength of Campanella's genius lay in his imagination, which raises him sometimes to flights of impressive eloquence on this favourite theme. "The sky and stars are endowed with the keenest sensi-

His imagination and eloquence.

tenderet, nec aquæ in mare, nec lapides deorsum; sed res omnis ubi primo reperiretur, permaneret, cum non sentiret sui destructionem inter contraria nec sui conservationem inter similia. Non esset in mundo generatio et corruptio nisi esset contrarietas, sicut omnes physiologi affirmant. At si alterum contrarium non sentiret alterum sibi esse contrarium, contra ipsum non pugnaret. Sentiant ergo singula. De Sensu Rerum, l. i. c. 4.

* Igitur ipse Deus, qui est prima potentia, prima sapientia, primus amor, largitus est rebus omnibus potentiam vivendi, et sapientiam et amorem quantum sufficit conservationi ipsarum in tanto tempore necessariae, quantum determinavit ejus mens pro rerum regimine in ipso ente, nec præteriri potest. Calor ergo potest, sentit, amat esse; ita et res omnis, cupitque æternari sicut Deus, et Deo res nulla moritur, sed solummodo mutatur, &c. l. ii. c. 26.

† Non est malus ignis in suo esse;

terræ autem malus videtur, non autem mundo; nec vipera mala est, licet homini sit mala. Ita de omnibus idem prædico. Mors quoque rei unius si nativitas est multarum rerum, mala non est. Moritur panis manducatus, ut fiat sanguis, et sanguis moritur, ut in carnem nervos et ossa vertatur ac vivat; neque tamen hoc universo displicet animali, quamvis partibus mors ipsa, hoc est, transmutatio dolorifica sit, displiceatque. Ita utilis est mundo transmutatio eorum particularium noxia displicensque illis. Totus homo compositus est ex morte ac vita partialibus, quæ integrant vitam humanam. Sic mundus totus ex mortibus ac vitabus compositus est, quæ totius vitam efficiunt. Philosoph. Realis, c. 10.

‡ Sentiant alia magis, alia minus, prout magis minusque opus habent, ut me imitentur in essendo. Ibidem ament omnia vivere in proprio esse præcognito ut bono, ne corrumpat factura mea. Id. c. 10.

bility; nor is it unreasonable to suppose that they signify their mutual thoughts to each other by the transference of light, and that their sensibility is full of pleasure. The blessed spirits that inform such living and bright mansions behold all things in nature and in the divine ideas; they have also a more glorious light than their own, through which they are elevated to a supernatural beatific vision.”* We can hardly read this, without recollecting the most sublime passage, perhaps, in Shakspeare:—

“ Sit, Jessica · look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold;
There’s not the smallest orb, which thou behold’st,
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubim:
Such harmony is in immortal souls;
But, while this muddy vesture of decay
Does grossly close us in, we cannot hear it.”†

12. “The world is full of living spirits,” he proceeds; “and when the soul shall be delivered from this dark cavern, we shall behold their subtle essences. But now we cannot discern the forms of the air, and the winds as they rush by us; much less the angels and dæmons who people them. Miserable as we are, we recognise no other sensation than that which we observe in animals and plants, slow and half extinguished, and buried under a weight that oppresses it. We will not understand that all our actions and appetites and motions and powers flow from heaven. Look at the manner in which light is diffused over the earth, penetrating every part of it with endless variety of operation, which we must believe that it does not perform without exquisite pleasure.”‡

* *Animæ beatæ habitantes sic vivas lucidasque mansiones, res naturales vident omnes divinasque ideas, habent quoque lumen gloriosius quo elewantur ad visionem supernaturalem beatificam, et veluti apud nos lucēs plurimæ sese mutuo tangunt, intersecant, decussant, sentiuntque, ita in cœlo lucēs distinguuntur, ununtur, sentiunt. De Sensu Rerum, l. iii. c. 4.*

† *Merchant of Venice, act v.*

‡ *Prætervolant in conspectu nostro venti et aer, at nihil eos videmus, multo minus videmus Angelos Dæmonasque, quorum plenus est mundus.*

Infelices qui sensum alium nullum agnoscimus, nisi obtusum animalium plantarumque, tardum, demortuum, aggravatum, sepultum: nec quidem intelligere volumus omnem actionem nostram et appetitum et sensum et motum et vim a cœlo manare. Ecce lux quanto acutissimo expanditur sensu super terram, quo multiplicatur, generatur, amplificatur, idque non sine magna efficere voluptate existimanda est. l. iii. c. 5.

Campanella used to hear, as he tells us, whenever any evil was impending, a voice calling him by his name, sometimes with other words; he doubted

And hence there is no vacuum in nature, except by violent means; since all bodies delight in mutual contact, and the world no more desires to be rent in its parts than an animal.

13. It is almost a descent in Campanella from these visions of the separate sensibility of nature in each particle, when he seizes hold of some physical fact or analogy to establish a subordinate and less paradoxical part of his theory. He was much pleased with Gilbert's treatise on the magnet, and thought it, of course, a proof of the animation of the earth. The world is an animal, he says, sentient as a whole, and enjoying life in all its parts.* It is not surprising that he ascribes intelligence to plants; but he here remarks that we find the male and female sexes in them, and that the latter cannot fructify without the former. This is manifest in siliquose plants and in palms, (which on this account he calls in another place the wiser plants, *plantæ sapientiores*,) in which the two kinds incline towards each other for the purpose of fructification.†

14. Campanella, when he uttered from his Neapolitan prison these dulcet sounds of fantasy, had the advantage of finding a pious disciple who spread them over other parts of Europe. This was Tobias Adami, initiated, as he tells us, in the same mysteries as himself (*nostræ philosophiæ symmysta*), who dedicated to the philosophers of Germany his own *Prodromus Philosophiæ Instauratio*, prefixed to his edition of Campanella's *Compendium de Rerum Natura*, published at Frankfort in 1617. Most of the other writings of the master seem to have preceded this edition; for Adami enumerates them in his *Prodromus*. Campanella did not fully obtain his liberty till 1629, and died some years afterwards in France, where he had experienced the kindness of Peiresc, and the patronage of Richelieu. His philosophy made no very deep impression;

His works
published
by Adami.

whether this were his proper *dæmon*, or the air itself speaking. It is not wonderful that his imagination was affected by length of confinement.

* *Mundum esse animal, totum sentiens, omnesque portiones ejus communi gaudere vita.* l. i. c. 9.

† *Invenimus in plantis sexum masculinum et femininum, ut in animalibus,*

et feminam non fructificare sine masculi congressu. Hoc patet in siliquis et in palmis, quarum mas feminaque inclinantur mutuo alter in alterum et sese osculantur, et femina impregnatur, nec fructificat sine mare; immo conspicitur dolens, squalida mortuaque, et pulvere illius et odore reviviscit.

it was too fanciful, too arbitrary, too much tinctured with marks of an imagination rendered morbid by solitude, to gain many proselytes in an age that was advancing in severe science. Gassendi, whose good nature led him to receive Campanella, oppressed by poverty and ill usage, with every courteous attention, was of all men the last to be seduced by his theories. No one, probably, since Campanella, aspiring to be reckoned among philosophers, has ventured to assert so much on matters of high speculative importance and to prove so little. Yet he seems worthy of the notice we have taken of him, if it were only as the last of the mere dogmatists in philosophy. He is doubtless much superior to Jordano Bruno, and I should presume, except in mathematics, to Cardan.*

15. A less important adversary of the established theory in physics was Sebastian Basson, in his "*Philosophiæ Naturalis adversus Aristotelem Libri XII.*, in quibus abstrusa veterum physiologia restauratur, et Aristotelis errores solidis rationibus refelluntur. Genevæ, 1621." Basson. This book shows great animosity against Aristotle, to whom, what Lord Bacon has himself insinuated, he allows only the credit of having preserved fragments of the older philosophers, like pearls in mud. It is difficult to give an account of this long work. In some places we perceive signs of a just philosophy; but in general his explanations of physical phænomena seem as bad as those of his opponents, and he displays no acquaintance with the writings and the discoveries of his great contemporaries. We find also some geometrical paradoxes; and in treating of astronomy he writes as if he had never heard of the Copernican system.

16. Claude Berigard, born at Moulins, became professor of natural philosophy at Pisa and Padua. In his "*Circuli Pisani*, published in 1643, he attempted to Berigard. revive, as it is commonly said, the Ionic or corpuscular philosophy of Anaxagoras, in opposition to the Aristotelian. The book is rare; but Brucker, who had seen it, seems to have satisfactorily repelled the charge of atheism, brought by some

* Brucker (vol. v. p. 106—144.) has given a laborious analysis of the philosophy of Campanella.

against Berigard.* Another Frenchman domiciled in Italy,

Magnen.

Magnen, trod nearly the same path as Berigard, professing, however, to follow the modification of the corpuscular theory introduced by Democritus.† It seems to be observable as to these writers, Basson and the others, that coming with no sufficient knowledge of what had recently been discovered in mathematical and experimental science, and following the bad methods of the universities, even when they deviated from their usual doctrines, dogmatising and asserting when they should have proved, arguing synthetically from axioms, and never ascending from particular facts, they could do little good to philosophy, except by contributing, so far as they might be said to have had any influence, to shake the authority of Aristotle.

17. This authority, which at least required but the deference of modest reason to one of the greatest of mankind, was ill exchanged, in any part of science, for the unintelligible dreams of the school of Paracelsus, which had many disciples in Germany, and a very few in England. Germany, indeed, has been the native soil of mysticism in Europe. The tendency to reflex observation of the mind, characteristic of that people, has exempted them from much gross error, and given them insight into many depths of truth, but at the expense of some confusion, some liability to self-deceit, and to some want of strictness in metaphysical reasoning. It was accompanied by a profound sense of the presence of Deity; yet one which, acting on their thoughtful spirits, became rather an impression than an intellectual judgment, and settled into a mysterious indefinite theopathy, when it did not even evaporate in pantheism.

18. The founder, perhaps, of this sect was Tauler of Strasburg, in the fourteenth century, whose sermons in the native language, which, however, are supposed to have been translated from Latin, are full of what many have called by the vague word mysticism, an intense aspiration for the union of the soul with God. An anonymous

* Brucker, iv. 460. Nicéron, xxxi., where he is inserted by the name of Beauregard, which is probably more correct, but against usage.

† Brucker (p. 504.) thinks that Mag-

nen misunderstood the atomic theory of Democritus, and substituted one quite different in his *Democritus reviviscens*, published in 1646.

work generally entitled *The German Theology*, written in the fifteenth century, pursues the same track of devotional thought. It was a favourite book with Luther, and was translated into Latin by Castalio.* These, indeed, are to be considered chiefly as theological; but the study of them led readily to a state of mental emotion, wherein a dogmatic pseudo-philosophy, like that of Paracelsus, abounding with assertions that imposed on the imagination, and appealing frequently both to scriptural authority and the evidence of inward light, was sure to be favourably received. The mystics, therefore, and the theosophists belonged to the same class, and it is not uncommon to use the names indifferently.

19. It may appear not here required to dwell on a subject scarcely falling under any province of literary history, but two writers within this period have been Fludd sufficiently distinguished to deserve mention. One of these was Robert Fludd, an English physician, who died in 1637; a man of indefatigable diligence in collecting the dreams and follies of past ages, blending them in a portentous combination with new fancies of his own. The Rabbinical and Cabalistic authors, as well as the Paracelsists, the writers on magic, and whatever was most worthy to be rejected and forgotten, formed the basis of his creed. Among his numerous works the most known was his "*Mosaic Philosophy*," in which, like many before his time as well as since, he endeavoured to build a scheme of physical philosophy on the first chapters in *Genesis*. I do not know whether he found there his two grand principles or forces of nature; a northern force of condensation, and a southern force of dilatation. These seem to be the *Parmenidean* cold and heat, expressed in a jargon affected in order to make dupes. In peopling the universe with *dæmons*, and in ascribing all *phænomena* to their invisible agency, he pursued the steps of *Agrippa* and *Paracelsus*, or rather of the whole school of fanatics and impostors called magical. He took also from older writers the doctrine of a constant analogy between universal nature, or the *macrocosm*, and that of man, or the *microcosm*; so that what was known in one might lead us to what was unknown

* *Episcopus* places the author of the *Theologia Germanica*, with Henry Nicolas and David George, among mere enthusiasts.

in the other.* Fludd possessed, however, some acquaintance with science, especially in chemistry and mechanics; and his rhapsodies were so far from being universally contemned in his own age, that Gassendi thought it not unworthy of him to enter into a prolix confutation of the Fluddian philosophy.†

20. Jacob Behmen, or rather Boehm, a shoemaker of Gorlitz, is far more generally familiar to our ears than his contemporary Fludd. He was, however, much inferior to him in reading, and in fact seems to have read little but the Bible and the writings of Paracelsus. He recounts the visions and ecstasies during which a supernatural illumination had been conveyed to him. It came indeed without the gift of transferring the light to others; for scarce any have been able to pierce the clouds in which his meaning has been charitably presumed to lie hid. The chief work of Behmen is his *Aurora*, written about 1612, and containing a record of the visions wherein the mysteries of nature were revealed to him. It was not published till 1641. He is said to have been a man of great goodness of heart, which his writings display; but, in literature, this cannot give a sanction to the incoherencies of madness. His language, as far as I have seen any extracts from his works, is coloured with the phraseology of the alchemists and astrologers; as for his philosophy, so to style it, we find, according to Brucker, who has taken some pains with the subject, manifest traces of the system of emanation, so ancient and so attractive; and from this and several other reasons, he is inclined to think the unlearned shoemaker of Gorlitz must have had assistance from men of more education in developing his visions.‡ But the emanative theory is one into which a mind absorbed in contemplation may very naturally fall. Behmen had his disciples, which such enthusiasts rarely want; and his name is sufficiently known to justify the mention of it even in philosophical history.

21. We come now to an English writer of a different class, little known as such at present, but who, without

* This was a favourite doctrine of Paracelsus. Campanella was much too fanciful not to embrace it. *Mundus*, he says, *habet spiritum qui est cælum, crasum corpus quod est terra, sanguinem*

qui est mare. Homo igitur compendium epilogusque mundi est. De Sensu Rerum, l. ii. c. 32.

† Brucker, iv. 691. Buhle, iii. 157.

‡ Brucker, iv. 698.

doing much for the advancement of metaphysical philosophy, had at least the merit of devoting to it with a sincere and independent spirit the leisure of high rank, and of a life not obscure in the world — Lord Herbert of Cherbury. The principal work of this remarkable man is his Latin treatise, published in 1624, “On Truth as it is distinguished from Revelation, from Probability, from Possibility, and from Falsehood.” Its object is to inquire what are the sure means of discerning and discovering truth. This, as, like other authors, he sets out by proclaiming, had been hitherto done by no one, and he treats both ancient and modern philosophers rather haughtily, as being men tied to particular opinions, from which they dare not depart. “It is not from an hypocritical or mercenary writer, that we are to look for perfect truth. Their interest is not to lay aside their mask, or think for themselves. A liberal and independent author alone will do this.”* So general an invective, after Lord Bacon, and indeed after others, like Campanella, who could not be charged with following any conceits rather than their own, bespeaks either ignorance of philosophical literature, or a supercilious neglect of it.

22. Lord Herbert lays down seven primary axioms.

1. Truth exists : 2. It is coeval with the things to which it relates : 3. It exists every where : 4. It is self-evident† : 5. There are as many truths, as there are differences in things : 6. These differences are made known to us by our natural faculties : 7. There is a truth belonging to these truths : “Est veritas quædam harum veritatum.” This axiom he explains as obscurely, as it is strangely expressed. All truth he then distinguishes into the truth of the thing or object, the truth of the appearance, the truth of the perception, and the truth of the understanding. The truth of the object is the inherent conformity of the object with itself, or

Lord Herbert
De Veritate.

His axioms.

* Non est igitur a larvato aliquo vel stipendioso scriptore ut verum consummatum opperiaris : Illorum apprimè interest ne personam deponant, vel aliter quidem sentiant. Ingenuus et sui arbitrii ista solummodo præstabit auctor. Epist. ad Lectorem.

† Hæc veritas est in se manifesta. He observes that what are called false appearances, are true as such, though not true according to the reality of the object : sua veritas apparentiæ falsæ inest, verè enim ita apparebit, vera tamen ex veritate rei non erit.

that which makes every thing what it is.* The truth of appearance is the conditional conformity of the appearance with the object. The truth of perception is the conditional conformity of our senses (*facultates nostras prodromas*) with the appearances of things. The truth of understanding is the due conformity between the aforesaid conformities. All truth therefore is conformity, all conformity relation. Three things are to be observed in every inquiry after truth; the thing or object, the sense or faculty, and the laws or conditions by which its conformity or relation is determined. Lord Herbert is so obscure, partly by not thoroughly grasping his subject, partly by writing in Latin, partly perhaps by the “*sphalmata et errata in typographo, quædam fortasse in seipso*,” of which he complains at the end, that it has been necessary to omit several sentences as unintelligible, though what I have just given is far enough from being too clear.

23. Truth, he goes on to say, exists as to the object, or ^{Conditions of truth.} outward thing itself, when our faculties are capable of determining every thing concerning it; but though this definition is exact, it is doubtful, he observes, whether any such truth exists in nature. The first condition of discerning truth in things, is that they should have a relation to ourselves (*ut intra nostram stet analogiam*); since multitudes of things may exist which the senses cannot discover. The three chief constituents of this condition seem to be: 1. That it should be of a proper size, neither immense, nor too small; 2. That it should have its determining difference, or principle of individuation, to distinguish it from other things; 3. That it should be accommodated to some sense or perceptive faculty. These are the universally necessary conditions of truth (that is of knowledge) as it regards the object. The truth of appearance depends on others, which are more particular; as that the object should be perceived for a sufficient time, through a proper medium, at a due distance, in a proper situation.† Truth of perception is

* *Inhærens illa conformitas rei cum seipsa, sive illa ratio, ex qua res unaquæque sibi constat.*

† Lord Herbert defines appearance, *icetypum, seu forma vicaria rei, quæ sub conditionibus istis cum prototypo suo*

conformata, cum conceptu denuo sub conditionibus etiam suis, conformari et modo quodam spirituali, tanquam ab objecto decisa, etiam in objecti absentia conservari potest.

conditional also, and its conditions are, that the sense should be sound, and the attention directed towards it. Truth of understanding depends on the κοιναι εννοιαι, the common notions possessed by every man of sane mind, and implanted by nature. The understanding teaches us by means of these, that infinity and eternity exist, though our senses cannot perceive them. The understanding deals also with universals, and truth is known as to universals, when the particulars are rightly apprehended.

24. Our faculties are as numerous as the differences of things; and thus it is, that the world corresponds by perfect analogy to the human soul, degrees of perception being as much distinct from one another as different modes of it. All our powers may however be reduced to four heads; natural instinct, internal perception, external sensation, and reason. What is not known by one of these four means cannot be known at all. Instinctive truths are proved by universal consent. Here he comes to his general basis of religion, maintaining the existence of κοιναι εννοιαι, or common notions of mankind on that subject, principles against which no one can dispute, without violating the laws of his nature.* Natural instinct he defines to be an act of those faculties existing in every man of sane mind, by which the common notions as to the relations of things not perceived by the senses (*rerum internarum*), and especially such as tend to the conservation of the individual, of the species, and of the whole, are formed without any process of reasoning. These common notions, though excited in us by the objects of sense, are not conveyed to us by them; they are implanted in us by nature, so that God seems to have imparted to us not only a part of his image, but of his wisdom.† And whatever is understood and perceived by all men alike deserves to be accounted one of these notions. Some of them are instinctive, others are deduced from such as are. The former are distinguishable by six marks; priority, independence, universality, certainty, so that no man can

* Principia illa sacrosancta, contra quæ disputare nefas. p. 44. I have translated this in the best sense I could give it; but to use *fas* or *nefas*, before we

have defined their meaning, or proved their existence, is but indifferent logic.

† P. 48.

doubt them without putting off as it were his nature, necessity, that is, usefulness for the preservation of man, lastly, intuitive apprehension, for these common notions do not require to be inferred.*

25. Internal perceptions denote the conformity of objects with those faculties existing in every man of sane mind, which being developed by his natural instinct, are conversant with the internal relations of things, in a secondary and particular manner, and by means of natural instinct.† By this ill-worded definition he probably intends to distinguish the general power, or instinctive knowledge, from its exercise and application in any instance. But I have found it very difficult to follow Lord Herbert. It is by means, he says, of these internal senses that we discern the nature of things in their intrinsic relations, or hidden types of being.‡ And it is necessary well to distinguish the conforming faculty in the mind or internal perception, from the bodily sense. The cloudiness of his expression increases as we proceed, and in many pages I cannot venture to translate or abridge it. The injudicious use of a language in which he did not write with facility, and which is not very well adapted, at the best, to metaphysical disquisition, has doubtless increased the perplexity into which he has thrown his readers.

26. In the conclusion of this treatise, Herbert lays down the five common notions of natural religion, implanted, as he conceives, in the breasts of all mankind. § 1. That there is a God; 2. That he ought to be worshipped; 3. That virtue and piety are the chief parts of worship; 4. That we are to repent and turn from our sins; 5. That there are rewards and punishments in another life. § Nothing can be admitted in religion which contradicts these primary notions; but if any one has a revelation from heaven in addition to these, which may happen to him sleeping or waking, he should keep it to himself, since nothing can be of importance to the human race, which is not established by the

Five notions
of natural
religion.

* P. 60.

† Sensus interni sunt actus conformitatum objectorum cum facultatibus illis in omni homine sano et integro existentibus, quæ ab instinctu naturali expositæ, circa analogiam rerum internam,

particulariter, secundario, et ratione instinctus naturalis versantur. p. 66.

‡ Circa analogiam rerum internam, sive signaturas et characteras rerum penitiores versantur. p. 68.

§ P. 222.

evidence of their common faculties. Nor can any thing be known to be revealed, which is not revealed to ourselves ; all else being tradition and historic testimony, which does not amount to knowledge. The specific difference of man from other animals he makes not reason, but the capacity of religion. It is a curious coincidence, that John Wesley has said something of the same kind.* It is also remarkable that we find in another work of Lord Herbert, *De Religione Gentilium*, which dwells again on his five articles of natural religion, essential, as he expressly lays it down, to salvation, the same illustration of the being of a Deity from the analogy of a watch or clock, which Paley has since employed. I believe that it occurs in an intermediate writer.†

27. Lord Herbert sent a copy of his treatise *De Veritate* several years after its publication to Gassendi. We have a letter to the noble author in the third volume of the works of that philosopher, showing, in the candid and sincere spirit natural to him, the objections that struck his mind in reading the book.‡ Gassendi observes that the distinctions of four kinds of truth are not new ; the *veritas rei* of Lord Herbert being what is usually called substance, his *veritas apparentiæ* no more than accident, and the other two being only sense and reason. Gassendi seems not wholly to approve, but gives as the best, a definition of truth little differing from Herbert's, the agreement of the

Remarks of
Gassendi on
Herbert.

* I have somewhere read a profound remark of Wesley, that, considering the sagacity which many animals display, we cannot fix upon reason as the distinction between them and man ; the true difference is, that we are formed to know God, and they are not.

† Et quidem si horologium per diem et noctem integram horas signanter indicans, viderit quispiam non mente captus, id consilio arteque summa factum judicaverit. Equis non planè demens, qui hanc mundi machinam non per viginti quatuor horas tantum, sed. per tot sæcula circuitus suos obeuntem animadvertit, non id omne sapientissimo utique potentissimoque alicui auctori tribuat ? *De Relig. Gentil.* cap. xiii.

[The original idea, as has been rightly pointed out to me by M. Alphonse Borghers, the translator of this work, as

well as of my *History of the Middle Ages*, is in Cicero *de Nat. Deorum*, ii. 34. Quod si in Scythiam aut in Britanniam, spheram aliquis tulerit hanc, quam nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, ejus singulæ conversiones idem efficiunt in sole, et in lunâ, et in quinque stellis errantibus, quod efficitur in cœlo singulis diebus et noctibus : quis in illa barbarie dubitet, quin ea sphaera sit perfecta ratione ? And with respect to intermediate writers between Lord Herbert and Paley, I have been referred, by two other correspondents, to Hale's *Primitive Origination of Mankind*, where I had myself suspected it to be, and to Nieuwentyt's *Religious Philosopher*, (English translation, 1730,) p. xlv. of preface. — 1842.]

‡ Gassendi Opera, iii. 411.

cognisant intellect with the thing known : “Intellectûs cognoscentis cum re cognita congruentia.” The obscurity of the treatise *De Veritate* could ill suit an understanding like that of Gassendi, always tending to acquire clear conceptions ; and though he writes with great civility, it is not without smartly opposing what he does not approve. The aim of Lord Herbert’s work, he says, is that the intellect may pierce into the nature of things, knowing them as they are in themselves, without the fallacies of appearance and sense. But for himself he confesses that such knowledge he has always found above him, and that he is in darkness when he attempts to investigate the real nature of the least thing ; making many of the observations on this which we read also in Locke. And he well says that we have enough for our use in the accidents or appearances of things without knowing their substances, in reply to Herbert, who had declared that we should be miserably deficient, if while nature has given us senses to discern sounds and colours and such fleeting qualities of things, we had no sure road to internal, eternal, and necessary truths.* The universality of those innate principles, especially moral and religious, on which his correspondent had built so much, is doubted by Gassendi on the usual grounds, that many have denied, or been ignorant of them. The letter is imperfect, some sheets of the autograph having been lost.

28. Too much space may seem to have been bestowed on a writer who cannot be ranked high among metaphysicians. But Lord Herbert was not only a distinguished name, but may claim the priority among those philosophers in England. If his treatise *De Veritate* is not as an entire work very successful, or founded always upon principles which have stood the test of severe reflection, it is still a monument of an original, independent thinker, without rhapsodies of imagination, without pedantic technicalities, and, above all, bearing witness to a sincere love of the truth he sought to apprehend. The ambitious expectation that the real essences of things might be discovered, if it were truly his, as Gassendi seems to suppose, could not be warranted by any thing, at least, within

* *Misere nobiscum actum esset, si ad percipiendos colores, sonos et qualitates cæteras caducas atque momentaneas sub-* *essent media, nulla autem ad veritates illas internas, æternas, necessarias sine errore superesset via.*

the knowledge of that age. But from some expressions of Herbert I should infer that he did not think our faculties competent to solve the whole problem of *quiddity*, as the logicians called it, or the real nature of any thing, at least, objectively without us.* He is, indeed, so obscure, that I will not vouch for his entire consistency. It has been an additional motive to say as much as I have done concerning Lord Herbert, that I know not where any account of his treatise *De Veritate* will be found. Brucker is strangely silent about this writer, and Buhle has merely adverted to the letter of Gassendi. Descartes has spoken of Lord Herbert's book with much respect, though several of their leading principles were far from the same. It was translated into French in 1639, and this translation he found less difficult than the original.†

29. Gassendi himself ought, perhaps, to be counted wholly among the philosophers of this period, since many of his writings were published, and all may have been completed within it. They are contained in six large folio volumes, rather closely printed. The *Exercitationes Paradoxicæ*, published in 1624, are the earliest. These contain an attack on the logic of Aristotle, the fortress that so many bold spirits were eager to assail. But in more advanced life Gassendi withdrew in great measure from this warfare, and his *Logic*, in the *Syntagma Philosophicum*, the record of his latest opinions, is chiefly modelled on the Aristotelian, with sufficient commendation of its author. In the study of ancient philosophy, however, Gassendi was impressed with an admiration of Epicurus. His physical theory, founded on corpuscles and a vacuum, his ethics, in their principle and precepts, his rules of logic and guidance of the intellect, seemed

Gassendi's
defence of
Epicurus.

* Cum facultates nostræ ad analogiam propriam terminatæ quidditates rerum intimas non penetrent: ideo quid res naturalis in seipsa sit, tali ex analogia ad nos ut sit constituta, perfecte sciri non potest. p. 165. In another place he says, it is doubtful whether any thing exist in nature, concerning which we have a complete knowledge. The eternal and necessary truths which Herbert contends for our knowing, seem to have been his communes notitiæ, subjectively un-

derstood, rather than such as relate to external objects.

† Descartes, vol. viii. p. 138. and 168. J'y trouve plusieurs choses fort bonnes, *sed non publici saporis*; car il y a peu de personnes qui soient capables d'entendre la métaphysique. Et, pour le général du livre, il tient un chemin fort différent de celui que j'ai suivi. . . . Enfin, par conclusion, encore que je ne puisse m'accorder en tout aux sentimens de cet auteur, je ne laisse pas de l'estimer beaucoup au-dessus des esprits ordinaires.

to the cool and independent mind of the French philosopher more worthy of regard than the opposite schemes prevailing in the schools, and not to be rejected on account of any discredit attached to the name. Combining with the Epicurean physics and ethics the religious element which had been unnecessarily discarded from the philosophy of the Garden, Gassendi displayed both in a form no longer obnoxious. The *Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri*, published in 1649, is an elaborate vindication of this system, which he had previously expounded in a commentary on the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius. He had already effaced the prejudices against Epicurus himself, whom he seems to have regarded with the affection of a disciple, in a biographical treatise on his life and moral character.

30. Gassendi died in 1656 ; the *Syntagma Philosophicum*, his greatest as well as last work, in which it is natural to seek the whole scheme of his philosophy, was published by his friend Sorbière in 1658. We may therefore properly defer the consideration of his metaphysical writings to the next period ; but the controversy in which he was involved with Descartes will render it necessary to bring his name forward again before the close of this chapter.

His chief
works after
1650.

SECT. II.

On the Philosophy of Lord Bacon.

31. It may be judged from what has been said in a former chapter, as well as in our last pages, that at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the higher philosophy, which is concerned with general truth, and the means of knowing it, had been little benefited by the labours of any modern inquirer. It was become, indeed, no strange thing, at least out of the air of a college, to question the authority of Aristotle ; but his disciples pointed with scorn at the endeavours which had as yet been made to supplant it, and asked whether the wisdom so long revered

Preparation
for the phi-
losophy of

was to be set aside for the fanatical reveries of Paracelsus, the unintelligible chimæras of Bruno, or the more plausible, but arbitrary, hypotheses of Telesio.

32. Francis Bacon was born in 1561.* He came to years of manhood at the time when England was rapidly emerging from ignorance and obsolete methods of study, in an age of powerful minds, full himself of ambition, confidence, and energy. If we think on the public history of Bacon, even during the least public portion of it, philosophy must appear to have been but his amusement; it was by his hours of leisure, by time hardly missed from the laborious study and practice of the law and from the assiduities of a courtier's life, that he became the father of modern science. This union of an active with a reflecting life had been the boast of some ancients, of Cicero and Antonine; but what comparison, in depth and originality, between their philosophy and that of Bacon?

Lord Bacon.

33. This wonderful man, in sweeping round the campaign of universal science with his powerful genius, found as little to praise in the recent, as in the ancient methods of investigating truth. He liked as little the empirical presumption of drawing conclusions from a partial experience as the sophistical dogmatism which relied on unwarranted axioms and verbal chicanery. All, he thought, was to be constructed anew; the investigation of facts, their arrangement for the purposes of inquiry, the process of eliciting from them the required truth. And for this he saw, that, above all, a thorough purgation of the mind itself would be necessary, by pointing out its familiar errors, their sources, and their remedies.

His plan of philosophy.

34. It is not exactly known at what age Bacon first conceived the scheme of a comprehensive philosophy, but it was, by his own account, very early in life.†

Time of its conception.

* Those who place Lord Bacon's birth in 1560, as Mr. Montagu has done, must be understood to follow the old style, which creates some confusion. He was born the 22d of January, and died the 9th of April, 1626, in the sixty-sixth year of his age, as we are told in his life by Rawley, the best authority we have.

† In a letter to Father Fulgentio, which bears no date in print, but must have been written about 1624, he refers to a juvenile work about forty years before, which he had confidently entitled *The Greatest Birth of Time*. Bacon says: *Equidem memini me quadraginta abhinc annis juvenile opusculum circa has res confecisse, quod magna prorsus*

Such noble ideas are most congenial to the sanguine spirit of youth, and to its ignorance of the extent of labour it undertakes. In the dedication of the *Novum Organum* to James in 1620, he says that he had been about some such work near thirty years, "so as I made no haste." "And the reason," he adds, "why I have published it now, specially being imperfect, is, to speak plainly, because I number my days, and would have it saved. There is another reason of my so doing, which is to try whether I can get help in one intended part of this work, namely, the compiling of a natural and experimental history, which must be the main foundation of a true and active philosophy." He may be presumed at least to have made a very considerable progress in his undertaking before the close of the sixteenth century.

fiducia et magnifico titulo, "Temporis Partum maximum" inscripsi. The apparent vain-glory of this title is somewhat extenuated by the sense he gave to the phrase, Birth of Time. He meant that the lapse of time and long experience were the natural sources of a better philosophy, as he says in his dedication of the *Instauratio Magna*: Ipse certè, ut ingenue fateor, soleo æstimare hoc opus magis pro partu temporis quam ingenii. Illud enim in eo solummodo mirabile est, initia rei, et tantas de iis quæ invaluerunt suspiciones, alicui in mentem venire potuisse. Cætera non illibenter sequuntur.

No treatise with this precise title appears. But we find prefixed to some of the short pieces a general title, *Temporis Partus Masculus*, sive *Instauratio Magna Imperii Universi in Humanum*. These treatises, however, though earlier than his great works, cannot be referred to so juvenile a period as his letter to Fulgentio intimates, and I should rather incline to suspect that the *opusculum* to which he there refers has not been preserved. Mr. Montagu is of a different opinion. See his Note I. to the Life of Bacon in vol. xvi. of his edition. The Latin tract *De Interpretatione Naturæ* Mr. M. supposes to be the germ of the *Instauratio*, as the *Cogitata et Visa* are of the *Novum Organum*. I do not dissent from this; but the former bears marks of having been written after Bacon had been immersed in active life. The most probable conjecture appears to be

that he very early perceived the meagreness and imperfection of the academical course of philosophy, and of all others which fell in his way, and formed the scheme of affording something better from his own resources; but that he did not commit much to paper, nor had planned his own method till after he was turned of thirty, which his letter to the king intimates.

In a recent and very brilliant sketch of the Baconian philosophy, (*Edinb. Review*, July, 1837,) the two leading principles that distinguish it throughout all its parts are justly denominated *utility* and *progress*. To do good to mankind, and do more and more good, are the ethics of its inductive method. We may only regret that the ingenious author of this article has been hurried sometimes into the low and contracted view of the deceitful word *utility*, which regards rather the enjoyments of physical convenience, than the general well-being of the individual and the species. If Bacon looked more frequently to the former, it was because so large a portion of his writings relates to physical observation and experiment. But it was far enough from his design to set up physics in any sort of opposition to ethics, much less in a superior light. I dissent also from some of the observations in this article, lively as they are, which tend to depreciate the originality and importance of the Baconian methods. The reader may turn to a note on this subject by Dugald Stewart, at the end of the present section.

But it was first promulgated to the world by the publication of his *Treatise on the Advancement of Learning* in 1605. In this, indeed, the whole of the Baconian philosophy may be said to be implicitly contained, except perhaps the second book of the *Novum Organum*. In 1623, he published his more celebrated Latin translation of this work, if it is not rather to be deemed a new one, entitled, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*. I find, upon comparison, that more than two thirds of this treatise are a version, with slight interpolation or omission, from the *Advancement of Learning*, the remainder being new matter.

35. The *Instauratio Magna* had been already published in 1620, while Lord Bacon was still chancellor. Fifteen years had elapsed since he gave to the world ^{*Instauratio Magna.*} his *Advancement of Learning*, the first fruits of such astonishing vigour of philosophical genius, that, inconceivable as the completion of the scheme he had even then laid down in prospect for his new philosophy by any single effort must appear, we may be disappointed at the great deficiencies which this latter work exhibits, and which he was not destined to fill up. But he had passed the interval in active life, and in dangerous paths, deserting, as in truth he had all along been prone enough to do, the "shady spaces of philosophy," as Milton calls them, for the court of a sovereign, who, with some real learning, was totally incapable of sounding the depths of Lord Bacon's mind, or even of estimating his genius.

36. The *Instauratio Magna*, dedicated to James, is divided, according to the magnificent ground-plot of its author, into six parts. The first of these he ^{*First part: Partitiones Scientiarum.*} entitles *Partitiones Scientiarum*, comprehending a general summary of that knowledge which mankind already possess; yet not merely treating this affirmatively, but taking special notice of whatever should seem deficient or imperfect; sometimes even supplying, by illustration or precept, these vacant spaces of science. This first part he declares to be wanting in the *Instauratio*. It has been chiefly supplied by the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*; yet perhaps even that does not fully come up to the amplitude of his design.

37. The second part of the *Instauratio* was to be, as he expresses it, "the science of a better and more perfect use of reason in the investigation of things, and of the true aids of the understanding;" the new logic, or inductive method, in which what is eminently styled the Baconian philosophy consists. This, as far as he completed it, is known to all by the name of the *Novum Organum*. But he seems to have designed a fuller treatise in place of this; the aphorisms into which he has digested it being rather the heads or theses of chapters, at least in many places, that would have been farther expanded.* And it is still more important to observe, that he did not achieve the whole of this summary that he had promised; but out of nine divisions of his method we only possess the first, which he denominates '*prærogativæ instantiarum*.' Eight others, of exceeding importance to his logic, he has not touched at all, except to describe them by name and to promise more. "We will speak," he says, "in the first place, of prerogative instances; secondly, of the aids of induction; thirdly, of the rectification of induction; fourthly, of varying the investigation according to the nature of the subject; fifthly, of prerogative natures (or objects), as to investigation, or the choice of what shall be first inquired into; sixthly, of the boundaries of inquiry, or the synoptical view of all natures in the world; seventhly, on the application of inquiry to practice, and what relates to man; eighthly, on the preparations (*parascævæ*) for inquiry; lastly, on the ascending and descending scale of axioms."† All these, after the first, are wanting, with the exception of a few slightly handled in separate parts of Bacon's writings; and the deficiency, which is so important, seems to have been sometimes overlooked by those who have written about the *Novum Organum*.

38. The third part of the *Instauratio Magna* was to com-

* It is entitled by himself, *Partis secundæ Summa, digesta in aphorismos*.

† *Dicemus itaque primo loco de prærogativis instantiarum; secundo, de adminiculis inductionis; tertio de rectificatione inductionis; quarto, de variatione inquisitionis pro natura subjecti; quinto, de prærogativis naturarum quatenus ad inquisitionem, sive de eo quod inquiren-*

dum est prius et posterius; sexto, de terminis inquisitionis, sive de synopsi omnium naturarum in universo; septimo, de deductione ad praxin, sive de eo quod est in ordine ad hominem; octavo, de parascævis ad inquisitionem; postremo autem, de scala ascensoria et descensoria axiomatum, lib. ii. 22.

prise an entire natural history, diligently and scrupulously collected from experience of every kind; including under that name of natural history every thing wherein the art of man has been employed on natural substances either for practice or experiment; no method of reasoning being sufficient to guide us to truth as to natural things, if they are not themselves clearly and exactly apprehended. It is unnecessary to observe that very little of this immense chart of nature could be traced by the hand of Bacon, or in his time. His Centuries of Natural History, containing about one thousand observed facts and experiments, are a very slender contribution towards such a description of universal nature as he contemplated: these form no part of the *Instauratio Magna*, and had been compiled before. But he enumerates one hundred and thirty particular histories which ought to be drawn up for his great work. A few of these he has given in a sort of skeleton, as samples rather of the method of collecting facts, than of the facts themselves; namely, the History of Winds, of Life and Death, of Density and Rarity, of Sound and Hearing.

Third part:
Natural
History.

39. The fourth part, called *Scala Intellectûs*, is also wanting, with the exception of a very few introductory pages. "By these tables," says Bacon, "we mean not such examples as we subjoin to the several rules of our method, but types and models, which place before our eyes the entire process of the mind in the discovery of truth, selecting various and remarkable instances."* These he compares to the diagrams of geometry, by attending to which the steps of the demonstration become perspicuous. Though the great brevity of his language in this place renders it rather difficult to see clearly what he understood by these models, some light appears to be thrown on this passage by one in the treatise *De Augmentis*, where he enumerates among the desiderata of logic what he calls

Fourth
part: *Scala
Intellectûs*.

* Neque de iis exemplis loquimur, quæ singulis præceptis ac regulis illustrandi gratia adjiciuntur, hoc enim in secunda operis parte abunde præstitimus, sed plane typos intelligimus ac plasmata, quæ universum mentis processum atque inveniendi continuatam fabricam et or-

dinem in certis subjectis, iisque variis et insignibus tanquam sub oculos ponant. Etenim nobis venit in mentem in mathematicis, astante machina, sequi demonstrationem facilem et perspicuam; contra absque hac commoditate omnia videri involuta et quam revera sunt subtiliora.

'traditio lampadis,' or a delivery of any science or particular truth according to the order wherein it was discovered.* "The methods of geometers," he there says, "have some resemblance to this art;" which is not however, the case as to the synthetical geometry with which we are generally conversant. It is the history of analytical investigation, and many beautiful illustrations of it have been given since the days of Bacon in all subjects to which that method of inquiry has been applied.

40. In a fifth part of the *Instauratio Magna* Bacon had designed to give a specimen of the new philosophy which he hoped to raise, after a due use of his natural history and inductive method, by way of anticipation or sample of the whole. He calls it *Prodromi, sive Anticipationes Philosophiæ Secundæ*. And some fragments of this part are published by the names *Cogitata et Visa, Cogitationes de Natura Rerum, Filum Labyrinthi*, and a few more, being as much, in all probability, as he had reduced to writing. In his own metaphor, it was to be like the payment of interest, till the principal could be raised; *tantum fœnus reddatur, donec sors haberi possit*. For he despaired of ever completing the work by a sixth and last portion, which was to display a perfect system of philosophy, deduced and confirmed by a legitimate, sober, and exact inquiry according to the method which he had invented and laid down. "To perfect this last part is above our powers and beyond our hopes. We may, as we trust, make no despicable beginnings, the destinies of the human race must complete it; in such a manner, perhaps, as men, looking only at the present, would not readily conceive. For upon this will depend not only a

Fifth part:
Anticipa-
tions Phil-
osophiæ.

Sixth part:
Philosophiæ
Secundæ.

* Lib. vi. c. 2. *Scientia quæ aliis tantquam tela pertexendo traditur, eadem methodo, si fieri possit, animo alterius est insinuanda, qua primitus inventa est. Atque hoc ipsum fieri sane potest in scientia per inductionem acquisita: sed in anticipata ista et præmatura scientia, qua utimur, non facile dicat quis quo itinere ad eam quam nactus est scientiam pervenerit. Attamen sane secundum majus et minus possit quis scientiam*

propriam revisere, et vestigia suæ cognitionis simul et consensûs remetiri; atque hoc facto scientiam sic transplantare in animum alienum, sicut crevit in suo. . . . Cujus quidem generis traditionis, methodus mathematicorum in eo subjecto similitudinem quamdam habet. I do not well understand the words, in eo subjecto; he may possibly have referred to analytical processes.

speculative good, but all the fortunes of mankind, and all their power." And with an eloquent prayer that his exertions may be rendered effectual to the attainment of truth and happiness, this introductory chapter of the *Instauratio*, which announces the distribution of its portions, concludes. Such was the temple, of which Bacon saw in vision before him the stately front and decorated pediments, in all their breadth of light and harmony of proportion, while long vistas of receding columns and glimpses of internal splendour revealed a glory that it was not permitted him to comprehend. In the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, and in the *Novum Organum*, we have less, no doubt, than Lord Bacon, under different conditions of life, might have achieved; he might have been more emphatically the high-priest of nature, if he had not been the chancellor of James I.; but no one man could have filled up the vast outline which he alone, in that stage of the world, could have so boldly sketched.

41. The best order of studying the Baconian philosophy would be to read attentively the *Advancement of Learning*; next, to take the treatise *De Augmentis*, comparing it all along with the former, and afterwards to proceed to the *Novum Organum*. A less degree of regard has usually been paid to the *Centuries of Natural History*, which are the least important of his writings, or even to the other philosophical fragments, some of which contain very excellent passages; yet such, in great measure, as will be found substantially in other parts of his works. The most remarkable are the *Cogitata et Visa*. It must be said, that one who thoroughly venerates Lord Bacon will not disdain his repetitions, which sometimes, by variations of phrase, throw light upon each other. It is generally supposed that the Latin works were translated from the original English by several assistants, among whom George Herbert and Hobbes have been named, under the author's superintendence.* The Latin style of these writings is singularly concise, energetic, and impressive, but frequently crabbed, uncouth, and obscure; so that we read with more admiration

Course of
studying
Lord Bacon.

* The translation was made, as Archbishop Tenison informs us, "by Mr. Herbert and some others, who were esteemed masters in the Roman eloquence."

of the sense than delight in the manner of delivering it. But Rawley, in his *Life of Bacon*, informs us that he had seen about twelve autographs of the *Novum Organum*, wrought up and improved year by year, till it reached the shape in which it was published, and he does not intimate that these were in English, unless the praise he immediately afterwards bestows on his English style may be thought to warrant that supposition.* I do not know that we have positive evidence as to any of the Latin works being translations from English, except the treatise *De Augmentis*.

42. The leading principles of the Baconian philosophy are contained in the *Advancement of Learning*. These are amplified, corrected, illustrated, and developed in the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, from the fifth book of which, with some help from other parts, is taken the first book of the *Novum Organum*, and even a part of the second. I use this language, because, though earlier in publication, I conceive that the *Novum Organum* was later in composition. All that very important part of this fifth book which relates to *Experientia Litterata*, or *Venatio Panis*, as he calls it, and contains excellent rules for conducting experiments in natural philosophy, is new, and does not appear in the *Advancement of Learning*, except by way of promise of what should be done in it. Nor is this, at least so fully and clearly, to be found in the *Novum Organum*. The second book of this latter treatise he professes not to anticipate. *De Novo Organo silemus*, he says, *neque de eo quicquam prælibamus*. This can only apply to the second book, which he considered as the real exposition of his method, after clearing away the fallacies which form the chief subject of the first. Yet what is said of *Topica particularis*, in this fifth book *De Augmentis* (illustrated by “articles of inquiry concerning gravity and

* Ipse reperi in archivis dominationis suæ, autographa plus minus duodecim Organi Novi de anno in annum elaborati, et ad incudem revocati, et singulis annis, ulteriore lima subinde politi et castigati, donec in illud tandem corpus adoleverat, quo in lucem editum fuit; sicut multa ex animalibus fœtus lambere consuescunt usque quo ad membrorum firmitudinem eos perducant. In libris suis componendis verborum vigorem et perspicui-

tatem præcipuè sectabatur, non elegantiam aut concinnitatem sermonis, et inter scribendum aut dictandum sæpe interrogavit, num sensus ejus clare admodum et perspicuè redditus esset? Quippe qui sciret æquum esse ut verba famularentur rebus, non res verbis. Et si in styulum forsitan politiorem incidisset, siquidem apud nostrates eloquii Anglicani artifex habitus est, id evenit, quia evitare arduum ei erat.

levity”), goes entirely on the principles of the second book of the *Novum Organum*.

43. Let us now see what Lord Bacon’s method really was. He has given it the name of induction, but carefully distinguishes it from what bore that name in the old logic, that is, an inference from a perfect enumeration of particulars to a general law of the whole. For such an enumeration, though of course conclusive, is rarely practicable in nature, where the particulars exceed our powers of numbering.* Nor, again, is the Baconian method to be con-

Nature of
the Baconian in-
duction.

* *Inductio quæ procedit per enumerationem simplicem, res puerilis est, et precario concludit, et periculo exponitur ab instantia contradictoria, et plerumque secundum pauciora quam par est, et ex his tantummodo quæ præsto sunt pronuntiat. At inductio quæ ad inventionem et demonstrationem scientiarum et artium erit utilis, naturam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; ac deinde post negativas tot quot sufficiunt, super affirmativas concludere; quod adhuc factum non est, nec tentatum certe, nisi tantummodo a Platone, qui ad excutiendas definitiones et ideas, hæc certe forma inductionis aliquatenus utitur. Nov. Org. i. 105.* In this passage Bacon seems to imply that the enumeration of particulars in any induction is or may be imperfect. This is certainly the case in the plurality of physical inductions; but it does not appear that the logical writers looked upon this as the primary and legitimate sense. Induction was distinguished into the complete and incomplete. “The word,” says a very modern writer, “is perhaps unhappy, as indeed it is taken in several vague senses; but to abolish it is impossible. It is the Latin translation of *ἐνσυναγωγή*, which word is used by Aristotle as a counterpart to *συλλογισμός*. He seems to consider it in a perfect or dialectic, and in an imperfect or rhetorical sense. Thus if a genus (G.) contained four species (A. B. C. D.), syllogism would argue, that what is true of G. is true of any one of the four; but perfect induction would reason, that what we can prove true of A. B. C. D. separately, we may properly state as true of G., the whole genus. This is evidently a formal argument, as demonstrative as syllogism. But the imperfect or

rhetorical induction will perhaps enumerate three only of the species, and then draw the conclusion concerning G., which virtually includes the fourth, or what is the same thing, will argue, that what is true of the three is to be believed true likewise of the fourth.” Newman’s *Lectures on Logic*, p. 73. (1837.) The same distinction between perfect and imperfect induction is made in the *Encyclopédie Française*, art. Induction, and apparently on the authority of the ancients.

It may be observed, that this imperfect induction may be put in a regular logical form, and is only vicious in syllogistic reasoning when the conclusion asserts a higher probability than the premises. If, for example, we reason thus: Some serpents are venomous. — This unknown animal is a serpent. — Therefore this is venomous; we are guilty of an obvious paralogism. If we infer only, ‘This may be venomous, our reasoning is perfectly valid in itself, at least in the common apprehension of all mankind, except dialecticians, but not regular in form. The only means that I perceive of making it so, is to put it in some such phrase as the following: All unknown serpents are affected by a certain probability of being venomous: This animal, &c. It is not necessary, of course, that the probability should be capable of being estimated, provided we mentally conceive it to be no other in the conclusion than in the major term. In the best treatises on the strict or syllogistic method, as far as I have seen, there seems a deficiency in respect to *probable* conclusions, which may have arisen from the practice of taking instances from universal or necessary, rather than contingent truths, as well as from the contracted views of reasoning which the Aristotelian

founded with the less complete form of the inductive process, namely, inferences from partial experience in similar circum-

school have always inculcated. No sophisms are so frequent in practice as the concluding generally from a partial induction, or assuming (most commonly tacitly) by what Archbishop Whately calls "a kind of logical fiction," that a few individuals are "adequate samples of representations of the class they belong to." These sophisms cannot, in the present state of things, be practised largely in physical science or natural history; but in reasonings on matter of fact they are of incessant occurrence. The "logical fiction" may indeed frequently be employed, even on subjects unconnected with the physical laws of nature; but to know when this may be, and to what extent, is just that which, far more than any other skill, distinguishes what is called a good reasoner from a bad one.

[I permit this note to remain as in former editions; but it might have been more fully and more correctly expressed. The proper nature of induction has been treated within a few years by Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh Review, vol. lvii.), by Archbishop Whately in his *Elements of Logic*, by the author of the article "Organon" in the *Penny Cyclopædia*, by M. de Rémusat, *Essais de Philosophie*, vol. ii. p. 408., by Dr. Whewell in the "History," and again in the "Philosophy, of the Inductive Sciences," and by Mr. Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. i. p. 352. The apparently various opinions of these writers, though in some degree resolving themselves into differences of definition, deserve attention from the philosophical reader; but it would be rather too extraneous from the character of the present work to examine them. I will only observe, that what has been called perfect induction, or a complete enumeration of particulars, is as barren of new truth as the syllogism itself, to which indeed, though with some variety in the formal rules, it properly belongs. For if we have already enumerated all species of fish, and asserted them to be cold-blooded, we advance not a step by saying this again of a herring or a had-dock. Mr. Mill, therefore, has well remarked, that "Induction is a process of inference; it proceeds from the known to the unknown; and any operation involving no inference, any process in

which what seems the conclusion is no wider than the premises from which it is drawn, does not fall within the meaning of the term."—*System of Logic*, vol. i. p. 352. But this inference is only rendered logically conclusive, or satisfactory to the reason, as any thing more than a probable argument, by means of a generalisation, which assumes, on some extralogical ground, such as the uniformity of physical laws, that the partial induction might have been rendered universal. If the conclusion contains more than the premises *imply*, it is manifestly fallacious. But that the inductive syllogism, ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμὸς, (*Analyt. Prin.* l. ii. c. 23.) can only lead, in *form*, to probable conclusions, even though the enumeration should be complete, appears from its being in the third figure, though after a general principle is once established by induction, when we come to apply it in new cases, the process will be in the first. Archbishop Whately and Sir W. Hamilton only differ in appearance as to this, since they look to different periods of reasoning; one, in which experience is generalised by the assumption of something unproved; another, in which a particular case is shown to fall within the generalisation. But the second is not the induction of Aristotle. What this was, I find no where more neatly delivered than in an Arabic treatise on logic, published, with a translation, in the eighth volume of the *Asiatic Researches*.

"Induction is the process of collecting particulars for the purpose of establishing a general rule respecting the nature of the whole class. Induction is of two kinds, viz. perfect and imperfect. It is perfect induction when the general rule is obtained from an examination of all the parts. For example, all animals are either endowed with speech, or not endowed with speech. But those endowed and those not endowed are both sentient; therefore all animals are sentient. This is an example of perfect induction, which produces certainty.

"It is imperfect induction when a number of individuals of a class being overlooked or excluded, a general rule is thus established respecting the whole. For instance, if it should be assumed

stances ; though this may be a very sufficient ground for practical, which is, probable knowledge. His own method rests on the same general principle, namely, the uniformity of the laws of nature, so that in certain conditions of phænomena the same effects or the same causes may be assumed ; but it endeavours to establish these laws on a more exact and finer process of reasoning than partial experience can effect. For the recurrence of antecedents and consequents does not prove a necessary connexion between them, unless we can exclude the presence of all other conditions which may determine the event. Long and continued experience of such a recurrence, indeed, raises a high probability of a necessary connexion ; but the aim of Bacon was to supersede experience in this sense, and to find a shorter road to the result ; and for this his methods of exclusion are devised. As complete and accurate a collection of facts, connected with the subject of inquiry, as possible is to be made out by means of that copious natural history which he contemplated, or from any other good sources. These are to be selected, compared, and scrutinised, according to the rules of natural interpretation delivered in the second book of the *Novum Organum*, or such others as he designed to add to them ; and if experiments are admissible, these are to be conducted according to the same rules. Experience and observation are the guides through the Baconian philosophy, which is the hand-maid and interpreter of nature. When Lord Bacon seems to decry experience, which in certain passages he might be thought to do, it is the particular and empirical observation of individuals, from which many rash generalisations had been drawn, as opposed to that founded on an accurate natural history. Such hasty inferences he reckoned still more pernicious to true knowledge than the sophisticated methods of the current philosophy ; and in a remarkable passage, after censuring this precipitancy of empirical conclusions in the chemists, and in Gilbert's *Treatise on the Magnet*, utters a prediction that if ever mankind, excited by his counsels, should seriously betake themselves to seek the guidance of experience instead of relying on the dogmatic

that all animals move the under-jaw in eating, because this is the case with man, horses, goats, and sheep, this would be an example of imperfect induction, which

does not afford certainty, because it is possible that some animals may not move the under-jaw in eating, as it is reported of the crocodile." p. 127. — 1847.]

schools of the sophists, the proneness of the human mind to snatch at general axioms would expose them to much risk of error from the theories of this superficial class of philosophers.*

44. The indignation, however, of Lord Bacon is more frequently directed against the predominant philosophy of his age, that of Aristotle and the schoolmen. His dislike of Aristotle. Though he does justice to the great abilities of the former, and acknowledges the exact attention to facts displayed in his *History of Animals*, he deems him one of the most eminent adversaries to the only method that can guide us to the real laws of nature. The old Greek philosophers, Empedocles, Leucippus, Anaxagoras, and others of their age, who had been in the right track of investigation, stood much higher in the esteem of Bacon than their successors, Plato, Zeno, Aristotle, by whose lustre they had been so much superseded, that both their works have perished, and their tenets are with difficulty collected. These more distinguished leaders of the Grecian schools were in his eyes little else than disputatious professors (it must be remembered that he had in general only physical science in his view) who seemed to have it in common with children, “*ut ad garriendum prompti sint, generare non possint* ;” so wordy and barren was their mis-called wisdom.

45. Those who object to the importance of Lord Bacon’s precepts in philosophy that mankind have practised His method much required. many of them immemorially, are rather confirming their utility than taking off much from their originality in any fair sense of that term. Every logical method is built on the common faculties of human nature, which have been exercised since the creation in discerning, better or worse, truth from falsehood, and inferring the unknown from the known. That men might have done this more correctly, is manifest from the quantity of error into which, from want of reasoning well on what came before them, they have habitually fallen. In experimental philosophy, to which the more special rules of Lord Bacon are generally referred, there was a notorious want of that very process of reasoning which he

* Nov. Organ. lib. i. 64. It may be doubted whether Bacon did full justice to Gilbert.

has supplied. It is more than probable, indeed, that the great physical philosophers of the seventeenth century would have been led to employ some of his rules, had he never promulgated them; but I believe they had been little regarded in the earlier period of science.* It is also a very defective view of the Baconian method to look only at the experimental rules given in the *Novum Organum*. The preparatory steps of completely exhausting the natural history of the subject of inquiry by a patient and sagacious consideration of it in every light are at least of equal importance, and equally prominent in the inductive philosophy.

46. The first object of Lord Bacon's philosophical writings is to prove their own necessity, by giving an unfavourable impression as to the actual state of most sciences, in consequence of the prejudices of the human mind, and of the mistaken methods pursued in their cultivation. The second was to point out a better prospect for the future. One of these occupies the treatise *De Augmentis*, and the first book of the *Novum Organum*. The other, besides many anticipations in these, is partially detailed in the second book, and would have been more thoroughly developed in those remaining portions which the author did not complete. We shall now give a very short sketch of these two famous works, which comprise the greater part of the Baconian philosophy.

Its objects.

47. The *Advancement of Learning* is divided into two books only; the treatise *De Augmentis* into nine. The first of these, in the latter, is introductory, and designed to remove prejudices against the search after truth, by indicating the causes which had hitherto obstructed it. In the second book, he lays down his celebrated partition of human learning into history, poetry, and philosophy, according to the faculties of the mind respectively concerned in them, the memory, imagination, and reason. History is natural or civil, under the latter of which ecclesiastical and literary histories are comprised. These again fall into regular subdivisions; all of which he treats in

Sketch of the treatise De Augmentis.

History.

* It has been remarked, that the famous experiment of Pascal on the barometer by carrying it to a considerable elevation, was "a crucial instance, one of the first, if not the very first, on record in physics." Herschel, p. 229.

a summary manner, and points out the deficiencies which ought to be supplied in many departments of history.

Poetry. Poetry succeeds in the last chapter of the same book, but by confining the name to fictitious narrative,

except as to ornaments of style, which he refers to a different part of his subject, he much limited his views of that literature; even if it were true, as it certainly is not, that the imagination alone, in any ordinary use of the word, is the medium of poetical emotion. The word emotion, indeed, is sufficient to show that Bacon should either have excluded poetry altogether from his enumeration of sciences and learning, or taken into consideration other faculties of the soul than those which are merely intellectual.

48. Stewart has praised with justice a short but beautiful paragraph concerning poetry, (under which title may be comprehended all the various creations of the faculty of imagination, at least as they are manifested by words,) wherein Bacon "has exhausted every thing that philosophy and good sense have yet had to offer on the subject of what has since been called the *beau idéal*." The same eminent writer and ardent admirer of Bacon observes that D'Alembert improved on the Baconian arrangement by classing the fine arts together with poetry. Injustice had been done to painting and music, especially the former, when, in the fourth book *De Augmentis*, they were counted as mere "artes voluptariæ," subordinate to a sort of Epicurean gratification of the senses, and only somewhat more liberal than cookery or cosmetics.

49. In the third book, science having been divided into theological and philosophical, and the former, or what regards revealed religion, being postponed for the present, he lays it down that all philosophy relates to God, to nature, or to man. Under natural theology, as a sort of appendix, he reckons the science or theory of angels and superhuman spirits; a more favourite theme, especially as treated independently of revelation, in the ages that preceded Lord Bacon, than it has been since. Natural philosophy is speculative or practical; the former divided into physics, in a particular sense, and metaphysics; "one of which inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes;

the other handleth the formal and final causes." Hence physics dealing with particular instances, and regarding only the effects produced, is precarious in its conclusions, and does not reach the stable principles of causation.

Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit
Uno eodemque igni.

Metaphysics, to which word he gave a sense as remote from that which it bore in the Aristotelian schools as from that in which it is commonly employed at present, had for its proper object the investigation of forms. It was "a generally received and inveterate opinion, that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out essential forms or true differences." "Formæ inventio," he says in another place, "habetur pro desperata." The word *form* itself, being borrowed from the old philosophy, is not immediately intelligible to every reader. "In the Baconian sense," says Playfair, "form differs only from cause in being permanent, whereas ^{Form of bodies} we apply cause to that which exists in order of time." Form (*natura naturans*, as it was barbarously called) is the general law, or condition of existence, in any substance or quality (*natura naturata*), which is wherever its form is.* The conditions of a mathematical figure, prescribed in its definition, might in this sense be called its form, if it did not seem to be Lord Bacon's intention to confine the word to the laws of particular sensible existences. In modern philosophy, it might be defined to be that particular combination of forces which impresses a certain modification upon matter subjected to their influence.

50. To a knowledge of such forms, or laws of essence and existence, at least in a certain degree, it might be possible, in Bacon's sanguine estimation of his own logic, for man to attain. Not that we could hope to understand the forms of complex beings, which are almost infinite in variety, but the simple and primary natures, which

* Licet enim in natura nihil vere existat præter corpora individua, edentia actus puros individuos ex lege, in doctrinis tamen illa ipsa lex, ejusque inquisitio, et inventio atque explicatio pro fundamento est tam ad sciendum quam

operandum. Eam autem legem ejusque paragraphos Formarum nomine intelligimus; præsertim cum hoc vocabulum invaluerit et familiariter occurrat. Nov. Org. ii. 2.

are combined in them. "To inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold, nay of water, of air, is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density and tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not many, and of which the essences, upheld by matter, of all creatures do consist; to inquire, I say, the true forms of these is that part of metaphysics which we now define of."* Thus, in the words he soon afterwards uses, "of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage next the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. As for the vertical point, 'Opus quod operatur Deus a principio usque ad finem,' the summary law of nature, we know not whether man's inquiry can attain unto it."†

51. The second object of metaphysics, according to Lord Bacon's notion of the word, was the investigation of final causes. It is well known that he has spoken of this, in physics, with unguarded disparagement.‡

Final causes
too much
slighted.

* In the *Novum Organum* he seems to have gone a little beyond this, and to have hoped that the form itself of concrete things might be known. *Data autem naturæ formam, sive differentiam veram, sive naturam naturantem, sive fontem emanationis, (ista enim vocabula habemus, quæ ad indicationem rei proximæ accedunt,) invenire opus et intentio est Humanæ Scientiæ. Lib. ii. 1.*

† Advancement of Learning, book ii. This sentence he has scarcely altered in the Latin.

‡ *Causa finalis tantum abest ut prosit, ut etiam scientias corrumpat, nisi in hominis actionibus. Nov. Org. ii. 2.* It must be remembered that Bacon had good reason to deprecate the admixture of theological dogmas with philosophy, which had been, and has often since been, the absolute perversion of all legitimate reasoning in science. See what Stewart has said upon Lord Bacon's objection to reasoning from final causes in *physics*. *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers*, book iii. chap. ii. sect. 4.

[It ought to be more remembered than sometimes it has been, that Bacon solely objects to the confusion of *final* with *efficient* causes, or, as some would

say, with antecedent conditions. These alone he considered to fall within the province of physics. But, as a part of metaphysical theology, he gives the former here a place. Stewart has quoted at length the passage, which entirely vindicates Bacon from the charge of depreciating the argument in favour of theism from the structure of the world: a charge not uncommonly insinuated against him in the seventeenth century, but repeated lately with the most dogmatic violence by a powerful writer, Count de Maistre. *Examen de la Philosophie de Bacon*, c. 13. et alibi. Bruxelles, 1838. This work, little known perhaps in England, is from beginning to end a violent attack upon the Baconian philosophy and its author, by a man of extraordinary vigour as a polemical writer, quick to discover any weak point, and powerful to throw upon it the light of a remarkably masculine and perspicuous style; second only perhaps in these respects to Bossuet, or rather only falling short of him in elegance of language; but, like him, a mere sworn soldier of one party, utterly destitute of an eclectic spirit in his own philosophy, or even of the power of appreciating with ordinary

“Like a virgin consecrated to God, it bears nothing ;” one of those witty conceits that sparkle over his writings, but will not bear a severe examination. It has been well remarked that almost at the moment he published this, one of the most important discoveries of his age, the circulation of the blood, had rewarded the acuteness of Harvey in reasoning on the final cause of the valves in the veins.

52. Nature, or physical philosophy, according to Lord Bacon’s partition, did not comprehend the human species. Whether this be not more consonant to popular language, adopted by preceding systems of philosophy, than to a strict and perspicuous arrangement, may by some be doubted ; though a very respectable authority, that of Dugald Stewart, is opposed to including man in the province of physics. For it is surely strange to separate the physiology of the human body, as quite a science of another class, from that of inferior animals ; and if we place this part of our being under the department of physical philosophy, we shall soon be embarrassed by what Bacon has called the “*doctrina de fœdere*,” the science of the connexion between the soul of man and his bodily frame, a vast and interesting field, even yet very imperfectly explored.

Man not included by him in physics.

53. It has pleased, however, the author to follow his own arrangement. The fourth book relates to the constitution, bodily and mental, of mankind. In this book he has introduced several subdivisions which, considered merely as such, do not always appear the most philosophical ; but the pregnancy and acuteness of his observations under each head silence all criticism of this kind. This book has nearly double the extent of the corresponding pages in the *Advancement of Learning*. The doctrine as to the substance of the thinking principle having been very slightly touched, or rather passed over, with two curious disquisitions on divination and fascination, he advances in four ensuing books to

Man, in body and mind.

candour the diversities of opinion in others ; repulsive therefore not only to all who have looked with reverence upon those whom he labours to degrade, but to all who abhor party-spirit in the research of truth ; yet not unworthy to be read even by them, since he has many just criticisms, and many acute observa-

tions ; such, however, as ought always to be tried by comparison with the text of Bacon, whom he may not designedly have misrepresented, but, having set out with the conviction that he was a charlatan and an atheist, he naturally is led to exhibit in no other light.—1847.]

the intellectual and moral faculties, and those sciences which immediately depend upon them. Logic and Ethics are the grand divisions, correlative to the reason and the will of man. Logic, according to Lord Bacon, comprises the sciences of inventing, judging, retaining, and delivering the conceptions of the mind. We invent, that is, discover new arts, or new arguments; we judge by induction or by syllogism; the memory is capable of being aided by artificial methods. All these processes of the mind are the subjects of several sciences, which it was the peculiar aim of Bacon, by his own logic, to place on solid foundations.

54. It is here to be remarked, that the sciences of logic and ethics, according to the partitions of Lord Bacon, are far more extensive than we are accustomed to consider them. Whatever concerned the human intellect came under the first; whatever related to the will and affections of the mind fell under the head of ethics. *Logica de intellectu et ratione, ethica de voluntate appetitu et affectibus disserit; altera decreta, altera actiones progignit.* But it has been usual to confine logic to the methods of guiding the understanding in the search for truth; and some, though, as it seems to me, in a manner not warranted by the best usage of philosophers*, have endeavoured to exclude every thing but the syllogistic mode of reasoning from the logical province. Whether, again, the nature and operations of the human mind, in general, ought to be reckoned a part of physics, has already been mentioned as a disputable question.

55. The science of delivering our own thoughts to others, branching into grammar and rhetoric, and including poetry, so far as its proper vehicles, metre and diction, are concerned, occupies the sixth book. In all this he finds more desiderata than, from the great attention paid to these subjects by the ancients, could have been expected. Thus his ingenious collection of antitheta, or common-places in rhetoric, though mentioned by Cicero as to the judicial species of eloquence, is first extended by Bacon himself, as he supposes, to deliberative or political orations. I do

* In altera philosophiæ parte, quæ est *quarendi* ac *discerendi*, quæ *λογική* dicitur. Cic. de Fin. i. 14.

not, however, think it probable that this branch of topics could have been neglected by antiquity, though the writings relating to it may not have descended to us ; nor can we by any means say there is nothing of the kind in Aristotle's Rhetoric. Whether the utility of these common-places, when collected in books, be very great, is another question. And a similar doubt might be suggested with respect to the elenchs, or refutations, of rhetorical sophisms, "*colores boni et mali*," which he reports as equally deficient, though a commencement had been made by Aristotle.

56. In the seventh book we come to ethical science. This he deems to have been insufficiently treated. He would have the different tempers and characters of Ethics. mankind first considered, then their passions and affections ; (neither of which, as he justly observes, find a place in the Ethics of Aristotle, though they are sometimes treated, not so appositely, in his Rhetoric ;) lastly, the methods of altering and affecting the will and appetite, such as custom, education, imitation, or society. "The main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the exemplar or platform of good, and the regiment or culture of the mind ; the one describing the nature of good, the other presenting rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto." This latter he also calls "the Georgics of the mind." He seems to place "the platform or essence of good" in seeking the good of the whole, rather than that of the individual, applying this to refute the ancient theories as to the *summum bonum*. But perhaps Bacon had not thoroughly disentangled this question, and confounds, as is not unusual, the *summum bonum*, or personal felicity, with the object of moral action, or *commune bonum*. He is right, however, in preferring, morally speaking, the active to the contemplative life against Aristotle and other philosophers. This part is translated in *De Augmentis*, with little variation, from the Advancement of Learning ; as is also what follows on the Georgics, or culture, of the mind. The philosophy of civil life, as it relates both to the conduct of men in their mutual intercourse, which is peculiarly termed prudence, and to that higher prudence, which is concerned with the administration of communities, fills up the chart of the Baconian ethics. In

the eighth book, admirable reflections on the former of these subjects occur at almost every sentence. Many, perhaps most, of these will be found in the Advancement of Learning. But in this, he had been, for a reason sufficiently obvious and almost avowed, cautiously silent upon the art of government, the craft of his king. The motives for silence were

Politics.

still so powerful, that he treats, in the *De Augmentis*, only of two heads in political science; the methods of enlarging the boundaries of a state, which James I. could hardly resent as an interference with his own monopoly, and one of far more importance to the well-being of mankind, the principles of universal jurisprudence, or rather of universal legislation, according to which standard all laws ought to be framed. These he has sketched in ninety-seven aphorisms, or short rules, which, from the great experience of Bacon in the laws, as well as his peculiar vocation towards that part of philosophy, deserve to be studied at this day. Upon such topics, the progressive and innovating spirit of his genius was less likely to be perceived; but he is here, as on all occasions, equally free from what he has happily called in one of his essays, the "froward retention of custom," the prejudice of mankind, like that of perverse children, against what is advised to them for their real good, and what they cannot deny to be conducive to it. This whole eighth book is pregnant with

Theology.

profound and original thinking. The ninth and last, which is short, glances only at some desiderata in theological science, and is chiefly remarkable as it displays a more liberal and catholic spirit than was often to be met with in a period signalised by bigotry and ecclesiastical pride. But as the abjuration of human authority is the first principle of Lord Bacon's philosophy, and the preparation for his logic, it was not expedient to say too much of its usefulness in theological pursuits.

57. At the conclusion of the whole, we may find a summary catalogue of the deficiencies which, in the course of this ample review, Lord Bacon had found worthy of being supplied by patient and philosophical inquiry. Of these desiderata, few, I fear, have since been filled up, at least in a collective and systematic manner, according to his suggestions. Great materials, useful in-

Desiderata
enumerated
by him.

timations, and even partial delineations, are certainly to be found, as to many of the rest, in the writings of those who have done honour to the last two centuries. But with all our pride in modern science, very much even of what, in Bacon's time, was perceived to be wanting, remains for the diligence and sagacity of those who are yet to come.

58. The first book of the *Novum Organum*, if it is not better known than any other part of Bacon's philosophical writings, has at least furnished more of those striking passages which shine in quotation.

*Novum
Organum :
first book.*

It is written in detached aphorisms ; the sentences, even where these aphorisms are longest, not flowing much into one another, so as to create a suspicion, that he had formed *adversaria*, to which he committed his thoughts as they arose. It is full of repetitions ; and indeed this is so usual with Lord Bacon, that whenever we find an acute reflection or brilliant analogy, it is more than an even chance that it will recur in some other place. I have already observed that he has hinted the *Novum Organum* to be a digested summary of his method, but not the entire system as he designed to develop it, even in that small portion which he has handled at all.

59. Of the splendid passages in the *Novum Organum* none are perhaps so remarkable as his celebrated division of fallacies, not such as the dialecticians had been accustomed to refute, depending upon equivocal words, or faulty disposition of premises, but lying far deeper in the natural or incidental prejudices of the mind itself. These are four in number : *idola tribûs*, to which from certain common weaknesses of human nature we are universally liable ; *idola specûs*, which from peculiar dispositions and circumstances of individuals mislead them in different manners ; *idola fori*, arising from the current usage of words, which represent things much otherwise than as they really are ; and *idola theatri*, which false systems of philosophy and erroneous methods of reasoning have introduced. Hence, as the refracted ray gives us a false notion as to the place of the object whose image it transmits, so our own minds are a refracting medium to the objects of their own contemplation, and require all the aid of a well-directed philosophy

*Fallacies.
Idola ;*

either to rectify the perception, or to make allowances for its errors.

60. These *idola*, *ειδωλα*, images, illusions, fallacies, or as Lord Bacon calls them in the Advancement of Learning, false appearances, have been often named <sup>confound-
ed with
idols.</sup> in English *idols* of the tribe, of the den, of the market-place. But it seems better, unless we retain the Latin name, to employ one of the synonymous terms given above. For the use of *idol* in this sense is little warranted by the practice of the language, nor is it found in Bacon himself; but it has misled a host of writers, whoever might be the first that applied it, even among such as are conversant with the *Novum Organum*. "Bacon proceeds," says Playfair, "to enumerate the causes of error, the *idols*, as he calls them, or false divinities to which the mind had so long been accustomed to bow." And with a similar misapprehension of the meaning of the word, in speaking of the *idola specūs*, he says, "Besides the causes of error which are common to all mankind, each individual, according to Bacon, has his own dark cavern or den, into which the light is imperfectly admitted, and in the obscurity of which a tutelary idol lurks, at whose shrine the truth is often sacrificed."* Thus also Dr. Thomas Brown; "in the inmost sanctuaries of the mind were all the idols which he overthrew;" and a later author on the *Novum Organum* fancies that Bacon "strikingly, though in his usual quaint style, calls the prejudices that check the progress of the mind by the name of idols, because mankind are apt to pay homage to these, instead of regarding truth."† Thus, too, in the translation of the *Novum Organum*, published in Mr. Basil Montagu's edition, we find *idola* rendered by idols, without explanation. We may in fact say that this meaning has been almost universally given by later writers. By whom it was introduced I cannot determine. Cudworth, in a passage where he glances at

* Preliminary Dissertation to Encyclopædia.

† Introduction to the *Novum Organum*, published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. Even Stewart seems to have fallen into the same error. "While these idols of the

den maintain their authority, the cultivation of the philosophical spirit is impossible; or rather it is in a renunciation of this idolatry that the philosophical spirit essentially consists." Dissertation, &c. — The observation is equally true, whatever sense we may give to *idol*.

Bacon, has said, "It is no *idol of the den*, to use that affected language." But, in the pedantic style of the seventeenth century, it is not impossible that idol may here have been put as a mere translation of the Greek εἰδωλον, and in the same general sense of an idea or intellectual image.* Although the popular sense would not be inapposite to the general purpose of Bacon in the first part of the *Novum Organum*, it cannot be reckoned so exact and philosophical an illustration of the sources of human error as the unfaithful image, the shadow of reality, seen through a refracting surface, or reflected from an unequal mirror, as in the Platonic hypothesis of the cave, wherein we are placed with our backs to the light, to which he seems to allude in his *idola specûs*.† And as this is also plainly the true meaning, as a comparison with the parallel passages in the *Advancement of Learning* demonstrates, there can be no pretence for continuing to employ a word which has served to mislead such men as Brown and Playfair.

61. In the second book of the *Novum Organum* we come at length to the new logic, the interpretation of nature, as he calls it, or the rules for conducting inquiries in natural philosophy according to his inductive method. It is, as we have said, a fragment of his entire system, and is chiefly confined to the "prerogative instances‡," or phænomena which are to be selected, for various reasons, as most likely to aid our investigations of nature. Fifteen of these are used to guide the intellect, five

Second book
of *Novum
Organum*.

* In Todd's edition of Johnson's Dictionary this sense is not mentioned. But in that of the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* we have these words: "An *idol* or image is also opposed to a reality; thus Lord Bacon (see the quotation from him) speaks of idols or false appearances." The quotation is from the translation of one of his short Latin tracts, which was not made by himself. It is, however, a proof that the word *idol* was once used in this sense.

† *Quisque ex phantasie suæ cellulis, tanquam ex specu Platonis, philosophatur.* *Historia Naturalis*, in præfatione. Coleridge has some fine lines in allusion to this hypothesis in that magnificent effusion of his genius, the introduction to the second book of *Joan of Arc*,

but withdrawn, after the first edition, from that poem; where he describes us as "Placed with our backs to bright reality." I am not, however, certain that Bacon meant this precise analogy by his *idola specûs*. See *De Augmentis*, lib. v. c. 4.

‡ The allusion in "*prærogativæ instantiarum*" is not to the English word *prerogative*, as Sir John Herschel seems to suppose (*Discourse on Natural Philosophy*, p. 182.), but to the *prærogativa centuria* in the Roman comitia, which being first called, though by lot, was generally found, by some prejudice or superstition, to influence the rest, which seldom voted otherwise. It is rather a forced analogy, which is not uncommon with Bacon.

to assist the senses, seven to correct the practice. This second book is written with more than usual want of perspicuity, and though it is intrinsically the Baconian philosophy in a pre-eminent sense, I much doubt whether it is very extensively read, though far more so than it was fifty years since. Playfair, however, has given an excellent abstract of it in his Preliminary Dissertation to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, with abundant and judicious illustrations from modern science. Sir John Herschel, in his admirable *Discourse on Natural Philosophy*, has added a greater number from still more recent discoveries, and has also furnished such a luminous development of the difficulties of the *Novum Organum*, as had been vainly hoped in former times. The commentator of Bacon should be himself of an original genius in philosophy. These novel illustrations are the more useful, because Bacon himself, from defective knowledge of natural phænomena, and from what, though contrary to his precepts, his ardent fancy could not avoid, a premature hastening to explain the essences of things instead of their proximate causes, has frequently given erroneous examples. It is to be observed, on the other hand, that he often anticipates with marvellous sagacity the discoveries of posterity, and that his patient and acute analysis of the phænomena of heat has been deemed a model of his own inductive reasoning. "No one," observes Playfair, "has done so much in such circumstances." He was even ignorant of some things that he might have known; he wanted every branch of mathematics; and placed in this remote corner of Europe, without many kindred minds to animate his zeal for physical science, seems hardly to have believed the discoveries of Galileo.

62. It has happened to Lord Bacon, as it has to many other writers, that he has been extolled for qualities by no means characteristic of his mind. The first aphorism of the *Novum Organum*, so frequently quoted, "Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, performs and understands so much as he has collected concerning the order of nature by observation or reason, nor do his power or his knowledge extend farther," has seemed to bespeak an extreme sobriety of imagination, a willingness to acquiesce in registering the phænomena of nature without seeking a revelation of her

Confidence
of Bacon.

secrets. And nothing is more true than that such was the cautious and patient course of inquiry prescribed by him to all the genuine disciples of his inductive method. But he was far from being one of those humble philosophers who would limit human science to the enumeration of particular facts. He had, on the contrary, vast hopes of the human intellect under the guidance of his new logic. The *Latens Schematismus*, or intrinsic configuration of bodies, the *Latens processus ad formam*, or transitional operation through which they pass from one form, or condition of nature, to another, would one day, as he hoped, be brought to light; and this not, of course, by simple observation of the senses, nor even by assistance of instruments, concerning the utility of which he was rather sceptical, but by a rigorous application of exclusive and affirmative propositions to the actual *phænomena* by the inductive method. "It appears," says Playfair, "that Bacon placed the ultimate object of philosophy too high, and too much out of the reach of man, even when his exertions are most skilfully conducted. He seems to have thought, that by giving a proper direction to our researches, and carrying them on according to the inductive method, we should arrive at the knowledge of the essences of the powers and qualities residing in bodies; that we should, for instance, become acquainted with the essence of heat, of cold, of colour, of transparency. The fact however is, that, in as far as science has yet advanced, no one essence has been discovered, either as to matter in general, or as to any of its more extensive modifications. We are yet in doubt whether heat is a peculiar motion of the minute parts of bodies, as Bacon himself conceived it to be, or something emitted or radiated from their surfaces, or, lastly, the vibrations of an elastic medium by which they are penetrated and surrounded."

63. It requires a very extensive survey of the actual dominion of science, and a great sagacity, to judge, even in the loosest manner, what is beyond the possible limits of human knowledge. Certainly, since the time when this passage was written by Playfair, more steps have been made towards realising the sanguine anticipations of Bacon than in the two centuries that had elapsed since the publication of the *Novum Organum*. We do not yet *know*

Almost justified of late;

the real nature of heat, but few would pronounce it impossible or even unlikely that we may know it, in the same degree that we know other physical realities not immediately perceptible, before many years shall have expired. The atomic theory of Dalton, the laws of crystalline substances discovered by Häuy, the development of others still subtler by Mitscherlich, instead of exhibiting, as the older philosophy had done, the *idola rerum*, the sensible appearances of concrete substance, radiations from the internal glory, admit us, as it were, to stand within the vestibule of nature's temple, and to gaze on the very curtain of the shrine. If, indeed, we could know the internal structure of one primary atom, and could tell, not of course by immediate testimony of sense, but by legitimate inference from it, through what constant laws its component, though indiscernible, molecules, the atoms of atoms, attract, retain, and repel each other, we should have before our mental vision not only the *Latens Schematismus*, the real configuration of the substance, but its *form*, or efficient nature, and could give as perfect a definition of any such substance, of gold for example, as we can of a cone or a parallelogram. The recent discoveries of animal and vegetable development, and especially the happy application of the microscope to observing chemical and organic changes in their actual course, are equally remarkable advances towards a knowledge of the *Latens processus ad formam*, the corpuscular motions by which all change must be accomplished, and are in fact a great deal more than Bacon himself would have deemed possible.*

64. These astonishing revelations of natural mysteries, fresh tidings of which crowd in upon us every day, but should be kept within bounds. may be likely to overwhelm all sober hesitation as to the capacities of the human mind, and to bring back that confidence which Bacon, in so much less favourable circumstances, has ventured to feel. There seem, however, to be good reasons for keeping within bounds this expectation

* By the *Latens processus*, he meant only what is the natural operation by which one form or condition of being is induced upon another. Thus, when the surface of iron becomes rusty, or when water is converted into steam, some

change has taken place, a *latent progress* from one form to another. This, in numberless cases, we can now answer, at least to a very great extent, by the science of chemistry.

of future improvement, which, as it has sometimes been announced in unqualified phrases, is hardly more philosophical than the vulgar supposition that the capacities of mankind are almost stationary. The phænomena of nature, indeed, in all their possible combinations, are so infinite, in a popular sense of the word, that during no period, to which the human species can be conceived to reach, would they be entirely collected and registered. The case is still stronger as to the secret agencies and processes by means of which their phænomena are displayed. These have as yet, in no one instance, so far as I know, been fully ascertained. "Microscopes," says Herschel, "have been constructed which magnify more than one thousand times in linear dimension, so that the smallest visible grain of sand may be enlarged to the appearance of one million times more bulky; yet the only impression we receive by viewing it through such a magnifier is that it reminds us of some vast fragment of a rock; while the intimate structure on which depend its colour, its hardness, and its chemical properties, remains still concealed; we do not seem to have made even an approach to a closer analysis of it by any such scrutiny."*

65. The instance here chosen is not the most favourable for the experimental philosopher. He might perhaps hope to gain more knowledge by applying the best microscope to a regular crystal or to an organised substance. But there is evidently a fundamental limitation of physical science, arising from those of the bodily senses and of muscular motions. The nicest instruments must be constructed and directed by the human hand; the range of the finest glasses must have a limit, not only in their own natural structure but in that of the human eye. But no theory in science will be acknowledged to deserve any regard, except as it is drawn immediately, and by an exclusive process, from the phænomena which our senses report to us. Thus the regular observation of definite proportions in chemical combination has suggested the atomic theory; and even this has been sceptically accepted by our cautious school of philosophy. If we are ever to go farther into the molecular analysis of substances, it must be through the means and

Limits to
our know-
ledge by
sense.

upon the authority of new discoveries exhibited to our senses in experiment. But the existing powers of exhibiting or compelling nature by instruments, vast as they appear to us, and wonderful as has been their efficacy in many respects, have done little for many years past in diminishing the number of substances reputed to be simple; and with strong reasons to suspect that some of these, at least, yield to the crucible of nature, our electric batteries have up to this hour played innocuously round their heads.

66. Bacon has thrown out, once or twice, a hint at a single principle, a summary law of nature, as if all subordinate causes resolved themselves into one great process, according to which God works his will in the universe: *Opus quod operatur Deus a principio usque ad finem*. The natural tendency towards simplification, and what we consider as harmony, in our philosophical systems, which Lord Bacon himself reckons among the *idola tribus*, the fallacies incident to the species, has led some to favour this unity of physical law. Impact and gravity have each had their supporters. But we are as yet at a great distance from establishing such a generalisation, nor does it appear by any means probable that it will ever assume any simple form.

67. The close connexion of the inductive process recommended by Bacon with natural philosophy in the common sense of that word, and the general selection of his examples for illustration from that science, have given rise to a question, whether he comprehended metaphysical and moral philosophy within the scope of his inquiry.* That they formed a part of the Instauration of Sciences, and therefore of the Baconian philosophy in the fullest sense of the word, is obvious from the fact that a large proportion of the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum* is dedicated to those subjects; and it is not less so that the *idola* of the *Novum Organum* are at least as apt to deceive us in moral as in physical argument. The question, therefore, can only be raised as to the peculiar method of conducting investigations, which is considered as his own. This would, how-

Inductive
logic;
whether
confined to
physics.

* This question was discussed some years since by the late editor of the *Edinburgh Review* on one side, and by Dugald Stewart on the other. See

Edinburgh Review, vol. iii. p. 273. and the Preliminary Dissertation to Stewart's *Philosophical Essays*.

ever, appear to have been decided by himself in very positive language. "It may be doubted, rather than objected, by some, whether we look to the perfection, by means of our method, of natural philosophy alone, or of the other sciences also, of logic, of ethics, of politics. But we certainly mean what has here been said to be understood as to them all; and as the ordinary logic, which proceeds by syllogism, does not relate to physical only, but to every other science, so ours, which proceeds by induction, comprises them all. For we as much collect a history and form tables concerning anger, fear, shame, and the like, and also concerning examples from civil life, and as much concerning the intellectual operations of memory, combination and partition, judgment and the others, as concerning heat and cold, or light, or vegetation, or such things."* But he proceeds to intimate, as far as I understand the next sentence, that, although his method or logic, strictly speaking, is applicable to other subjects, it is his immediate object to inquire into the properties of natural things, or what is generally meant by physics. To this, indeed, the second book of the *Novum Organum*, and the portions that he completed of the remaining parts of the *Instauratio Magna* bear witness.

68. It by no means follows, because the leading principles of the inductive philosophy are applicable to other topics of inquiry than what is usually comprehended under the name of physics, that we can employ all the "*prærogativæ instantiarum*," and still less the peculiar rules for conducting experiments which Bacon has

Baconian
philosophy, by
built on ob-
servation and
experiment.

* Etiam dubitabit quispiam potius quam objiciet, utrum nos de naturali tantum philosophia, an etiam de scientiis reliquis, logicis, ethicis, politicis, secundum viam nostram perficiendis loquamur. At nos certè de universis hæc, quæ dicta sunt, intelligimus; atque quemadmodum vulgaris logica, quæ regit res per syllogismum, non tantum ad naturales, sed ad omnes scientias pertinet, ita et nostra, quæ procedit per inductionem, omnia complectitur. Tam enim Historiam et Tabulas Inveniendi conficimus de ira, metu et verecundia et similibus, ac etiam de exemplis rerum civilium; nec minùs de motibus mentalibus memoriæ,

compositionis et divisionis, judicii et reliquorum, quam de calido et frigido, aut luce, aut vegetatione aut similibus. Sed tamen cum nostra ratio interpretandi, post historiam præparatam et ordinatam, non mentis tantum motus et discursus, ut logica vulgaris, sed et rerum naturam intueatur, ita mentem regimus ut ad rerum naturam se aptis per omnia modis applicare possit. Atque propterea multa et diversa in doctrina interpretationis præcipimus, quæ ad subjecti, de quo inquiremus, qualitatem et conditionem modum inveniendi nonnulla ex parte applicent. *Nov. Org.* i. 127.

given us, in moral, or even psychological disquisitions. Many of them are plainly referrible to particular manipulations, or at most to limited subjects of chemical theory. And the frequent occurrence of passages which show Lord Bacon's fondness for experimental processes, seem to have led some to consider his peculiar methods as more exclusively related to such modes of inquiry than they really are. But when the Baconian philosophy is said to be experimental, we are to remember that experiment is only better than what we may call passive observation, because it enlarges our capacity of observing with exactness and expedition. The reasoning is grounded on observation in both cases. In astronomy, where nature remarkably presents the objects of our observation without liability to error or uncertain delay, we may reason on the inductive principle as well as in sciences that require tentative operations. The inferences drawn from the difference of time in the occultation of the satellites of Jupiter at different seasons, in favour of the Copernican theory and against the instantaneous motion of light, are inductions of the same kind with any that could be derived from an *experimentum crucis*. They are exclusions of those hypotheses which might solve many phænomena, but fail to explain those immediately observed.

69. But astronomy, from the comparative solitariness, if we may so say, of all its phænomena, and the simplicity of their laws, has an advantage that is rarely found in sciences of mere observation. Bacon justly gave to experiment, or the interrogation of nature, compelling her to give up her secrets, a decided preference whenever it can be employed; and it is unquestionably true that the inductive method is tedious, if not uncertain, when it cannot resort to so compendious a process. One of the subjects selected by Bacon in the third part of the *Instauratio* as specimens of the method by which an inquiry into nature should be conducted, the History of Winds, does not greatly admit of experiments; and the very slow progress of meteorology, which has yet hardly deserved the name of a science, when compared with that of chemistry or optics, will illustrate the difficulties of employing the inductive method without their aid. It is not, therefore, that Lord Bacon's method of phi-

Advantages
of the latter,

losophising is properly experimental, but that by experiment it is most successfully displayed.

70. It will follow from hence that in proportion as, in any matter of inquiry, we can separate, in what we examine, the determining conditions, or law of form, from every thing extraneous, we shall be more able to use the Baconian method with advantage. In metaphysics, or what Stewart would have called the philosophy of the human mind, there seems much in its own nature capable of being subjected to the inductive reasoning. Such are those facts which, by their intimate connexion with physiology, or the laws of the bodily frame, fall properly within the province of the physician. In these, though exact observation is chiefly required, it is often practicable to shorten its process by experiment. And another important illustration may be given from the education of children, considered as a science of rules deduced from observation; wherein also we are frequently more able to substitute experiment for mere experience, than with mankind in general, whom we may observe at a distance, but cannot control. In politics, as well as in moral prudence, we can seldom do more than this. It seems, however, practicable to apply the close attention enforced by Bacon, and the careful arrangement and comparison of phænomena, which are the basis of his induction, to these subjects. Thus, if the circumstances of all popular seditions recorded in history were to be carefully collected with great regard to the probability of evidence, and to any peculiarity that may have affected the results, it might be easy to perceive such a connexion of antecedent and subsequent events in the great plurality of instances, as would reasonably lead us to form probable inferences as to similar tumults when they should occur. This has sometimes been done, with less universality, and with much less accuracy than the Baconian method requires, by such theoretical writers on politics as Machiavel and Bodin. But it has been apt to degenerate into pedantry, and to disappoint the practical statesman, who commonly rejects it with scorn; partly because civil history is itself defective, seldom giving a just view of events, and still less frequently of the motives of those

sometimes
applicable to
philosophy
of human
mind.

Less so to
politics and
morale.

concerned in them ; partly because the history of mankind is far less copious than that of nature, and in much that relates to politics, has not yet had time to furnish the groundwork of a sufficient induction ; but partly also from some distinctive circumstances which affect our reasonings in moral far more than in physical science, and which deserve to be considered, so far at least as to sketch the arguments that might be employed.

71. The Baconian logic, as has been already said, deduces universal principles from select observation, that is, from particular, and, in some cases of experiment, from singular instances. It may easily appear to one conversant with the syllogistic method less legitimate than the old induction which proceeded by an exhaustive enumeration of particulars*, and at most warranting but a probable conclusion. The answer to this objection can only be found in the acknowledged uniformity of the laws of nature, so that whatever has once occurred will, under absolutely similar circumstances, always occur again. This may be called the suppressed premise of every Baconian enthymem, every inference from observation of phænomena, which extends beyond the particular case. When it is once ascertained that water is composed of one proportion of oxygen to one of hydrogen, we never doubt but that such are its invariable constituents. We may repeat the experiment to secure ourselves against the risk of error in the operation, or of some unperceived condition that may have affected the result ; but when a sufficient number of trials has secured us against this, an invariable law of nature is inferred from the particular instance ; nobody conceives that one pint of pure water *can* be of a different composition from another. All men, even the most rude, reason upon this primary maxim ; but they reason inconclusively, from misapprehending the true relations of cause and effect in the phænomena to which they direct their attention. It is by the sagacity and ingenuity with which Bacon has excluded the various sources of error, and disengaged the true cause,

* [This is not quite an accurate account of the old induction, which seldom proceeded to an exhaustive enumeration,

but assumed a general truth from a particular one. — 1847.]

that his method is distinguished from that which the vulgar practise.

72. It is required, however, for the validity of this method, first, that there should be a strict uniformity in the general laws of nature, from which we can infer Reasons for this difference. that what has been will, in the same conditions, be again; and, secondly, that we shall be able to perceive and estimate all the conditions with an entire and exclusive knowledge. The first is granted in all physical phænomena; but in those which we cannot submit to experiment, or investigate by some such method as Bacon has pointed out, we often find our philosophy at fault for want of the second. Such is at present the case with respect to many parts of chemistry; for example, that of organic substances, which we can analyse, but as yet can in very few instances recompose. We do not know, and, if we did know, could not probably command, the entire conditions of organic bodies, (even structurally, not as living,) the *form*, as Bacon calls it, of blood, or milk, or oak-galls. But in attempting to subject the actions of men to this inductive philosophy, we are arrested by the want of both the necessary requisitions. Matter can only be diverted from its obedience to unvarying laws by the control of mind; but we have to inquire whether mind is equally the passive instrument of any law. We have to open the great problem of human liberty, and must deny even a disturbing force to the will, before we can assume that all actions of mankind must, under given conditions, preserve the same necessary train of sequences as a molecule of matter. But if this be answered affirmatively, we are still almost as far removed from a conclusive result as before. We cannot, without contradicting every-day experience, maintain that all men are determined alike by the same *outward* circumstances; we must have recourse to the differences of temperament, of physical constitution, of casual or habitual association. The former alone, however, are, at the best, subject to our observation, either at the time, or, as is most common, through testimony; of the latter, no being, which does not watch the movements of the soul itself, can reach more than a probable conjecture. Sylla resigned the dictatorship — therefore all men, in the circumstances of Sylla, will do the same — is

an argument false in one sense of the word circumstances, and useless at least in any other. It is doubted by many, whether meteorology will ever be well understood, on account of the complexity of the forces concerned, and their remoteness from the apprehension of the senses. Do not the same difficulties apply to human affairs? And while we reflect on these difficulties, to which we must add those which spring from the scantiness of our means of observation, the defectiveness and falsehood of testimony, especially what is called historical, and a thousand other errors to which the various "idola of the world and the cave" expose us, we shall rather be astonished that so many probable rules of civil prudence have been treasured up and confirmed by experience, than disposed to give them a higher place in philosophy than they can claim.

73. It might be alleged in reply to these considerations, that admitting the absence of a strictly scientific certainty in moral reasoning, we have yet, as seems acknowledged on the other side, a great body of probable inferences, in the extensive knowledge and sagacious application of which most of human wisdom consists. And all that is required of us in dealing either with moral evidence or with the conclusions we draw from it, is to estimate the probability of neither too high; an error from which the severe and patient discipline of the inductive philosophy is most likely to secure us. It would be added by some, that the theory of probabilities deduces a wonderful degree of certainty from things very uncertain, when a sufficient number of experiments can be made; and thus, that events depending upon the will of mankind, even under circumstances the most anomalous and apparently irreducible to principles, may be calculated with a precision inexplicable to any one who has paid little attention to the subject. This, perhaps, may appear rather a curious application of mathematical science, than one from which our moral reasonings are likely to derive much benefit, especially as the conditions under which a very high probability can mathematically be obtained involve a greater number of trials than experience will generally furnish. It is nevertheless a field that deserves to be more fully explored: the success of those who have attempted to apply analytical

Consider-
ations on the
other side.

processes to moral probabilities has not hitherto been very encouraging, inasmuch as they have often come to results falsified by experience ; but a more scrupulous regard to all the conditions of each problem may perhaps obviate many sources of error.*

74. It seems, upon the whole, that we should neither conceive the inductive method to be useless in regard to any subject but physical science, nor deny the peculiar advantages it possesses in those inquiries rather than others. What must in all studies be important, is the habit of turning round the subject of our investigation in every light, the observation of every thing that is peculiar, the exclusion of all that we find on reflection to be extraneous. In historical and antiquarian researches, in all critical examination which turns upon facts, in the scrutiny of judicial evidence, a great part of Lord Bacon's method, not, of course, all the experimental rules of the *Novum Organum*, has, as I conceive, a legitimate application.† I would refer any one who may doubt this to

Result of
the whole.

* A calculation was published not long since, said to be on the authority of an eminent living philosopher, according to which, granting a moderate probability that each of twelve jurors would decide rightly, the chances in favour of the rectitude of their unanimous verdict were made something extravagantly high, I think about 8000 to 1. It is more easy to perceive the fallacies of this pretended demonstration, than to explain how a man of great acuteness should have overlooked them. One among many is, that it assumes the giving an unanimous verdict at all to be voluntary ; whereas, in practice, the jury must decide one way or the other. We must deduct therefore a fraction expressing the probability that some of the twelve have wrongly conceded their opinions to the rest. One danger of this rather favourite application of mathematical principles to moral probabilities, as indeed it is of statistical tables (a remark of far wider extent), is that, by considering mankind merely as units, it practically habituates the mind to a moral and social levelling, as inconsistent with a just estimate of men as it is characteristic of the present age.

† The principle of Bacon's prerogative instances, and perhaps in some cases

a very analogous application of them, appear to hold in our inquiries into historical evidence. The fact sought to be ascertained in the one subject corresponds to the physical law in the other. The testimonies, as we, though rather laxly, call them, or passages in books from which we infer the fact, correspond to the observations or experiments from which we deduce the law. The necessity of a sufficient induction by searching for all proof that may bear on the question, is as manifest in one case as in the other. The exclusion of precarious and inconclusive evidence is alike indispensable in both. The selection of prerogative instances, or such as carry with them satisfactory conviction, requires the same sort of inventive and reasoning powers. It is easy to illustrate this by examples. Thus, in the controversy concerning the Icon Basilike, the admission of Gauden's claim by Lord Clarendon is in the nature of a prerogative instance ; it renders the supposition of the falsehood of that claim highly improbable. But the many second-hand and hearsay testimonies which may be alleged on the other side, to prove that the book was written by King Charles, are not prerogative instances, because their falsehood will be found to involve very little improbability. So, in a

his History of Winds, as one sample of what we mean by the Baconian method, and ask whether a kind of investigation, analogous to what is therein pursued for the sake of eliciting physical truths, might not be employed in any analytical process where general or even particular facts are sought to be known. Or if an example is required of such an investigation, let us look at the copious induction from the past and actual history of mankind upon which Malthus established his general theory of the causes which have retarded the natural progress of population. Upon all these subjects before mentioned, there has been an astonishing improvement in the reasoning of the learned, and perhaps of the world at large, since the time of Bacon, though much remains very defective. In what degree it may be owing to the prevalence of a physical philosophy founded upon his inductive logic, it might not be uninteresting to inquire.*

different controversy, the silence of some of the fathers as to the text, commonly called, of the three heavenly witnesses, even while expounding the context of the passage, may be reckoned a *prerogative instance*; a decisive proof that they did not know it, or did not believe it genuine; because if they did, no motive can be conceived for the omission. But the silence of Laurentius Valla as to its absence from the manuscripts on which he commented is no prerogative instance to prove that it was contained in them; because it is easy to perceive that he might have motives for saying nothing; and, though the negative argument, as it is called, or inference that a fact is not true, because such and such persons have not mentioned it, is, taken generally, weaker than positive testimony, it will frequently supply prerogative instances where the latter does not. Launoy, in a little treatise, *De Auctoritate Negantis Argumenti*, which displays more plain sense than ingenuity or philosophy, lays it down that a fact of a public nature, which is not mentioned by any writer within 200 years of the time, supposing, of course, that there is extant a competent number of writers who would naturally have mentioned it, is not to be believed. The period seems rather arbitrary, and was possibly so considered by himself; but the general principle is of the highest importance in historical criticism. Thus, in the once celebrated

question of Pope Joan, the silence of all writers near the time, as to so wonderful a fact, was justly deemed a kind of *prerogative* argument, when set in opposition to the many repetitions of the story in later ages. But the silence of Gildas and Bede as to the victories of Arthur is no such argument against their reality, because they were not under an historical obligation, or any strong motive which would prevent their silence. Generally speaking, the more anomalous and interesting an event is, the stronger is the argument against its truth from the silence of contemporaries, on account of the propensity of mankind to believe and recount the marvellous; and the weaker is the argument from the testimony of later times for the same reason. A similar analogy holds also in jurisprudence. The principle of our law, rejecting hearsay and secondary evidence, is founded on the Baconian rule. Fifty persons may depose that they have heard of a fact or of its circumstances; but the eye-witness is the prerogative instance. It would carry us too far to develop this at length, even if I were fully prepared to do so; but this much may lead us to think, that whoever shall fill up that lamentable *desideratum*, the logic of evidence, ought to have familiarised himself with the *Novum Organum*.

* "The effects which Bacon's writings have hitherto produced, have indeed been far more conspicuous in physics

75. It is probable that Lord Bacon never much followed up in his own mind that application of his method to psychological, and still less to moral and political subjects, which he has declared himself to intend. Bacon's aptitude for moral subjects. The distribution of the *Instauratio Magna*, which he has prefixed to it, relates wholly to physical science. He has in no one instance given an example, in the *Novum Organum*, from moral philosophy, and one only, that of artificial memory, from what he would have called logic.* But we must constantly remember that the philosophy of Bacon was left exceedingly incomplete. Many lives would not have sufficed for what he had planned, and he gave only the leisure hours of his own. It is evident that he had turned his thoughts to physical philosophy rather for an exercise of his reasoning faculties, and out of his insatiable thirst for knowledge, than from any peculiar aptitude for their subjects, much less any advantage of opportunity for their cultivation. He was more eminently the philosopher of human, than of general nature. Hence he is exact as well as profound in all his reflections on civil life and mankind, while his conjectures in natural philosophy, though often very acute, are apt to wander far from the truth in consequence of his defective acquaintance with the phenomena of nature. His *Centuries of Natural History* give abundant proof of this. He is, in all these inquiries, like one doubtfully, and by degrees, making out a distant prospect, but often deceived by the haze. But if we compare what

than in the science of mind. Even here, however, they have been great and most important, as well as in some collateral branches of knowledge, such as natural jurisprudence, political economy, criticism, and morals, which spring up from the same root, or rather which are branches of that tree of which the science of mind is the trunk." Stewart's *Philosophical Essays*, Prelim. Dissertation. The principal advantage, perhaps, of those habits of reasoning which the Baconian methods, whether learned directly or through the many disciples of that school, have a tendency to generate, is that they render men cautious and painstaking in the pursuit of truth, and therefore restrain them from deciding too soon. *Nemo reperitur qui in rebus ipsis et experientia moram fecerit legitimam.*

These words are more frequently true of moral and political reasoners than of any others. Men apply historical or personal experience, but they apply it hastily, and without giving themselves time for either a copious or an exact induction; the great majority being too much influenced by passion, party-spirit, or vanity, or perhaps by affections morally right, but not the less dangerous in reasoning, to maintain the patient and dispassionate suspense of judgment, which ought to be the condition of our inquiries.

* *Nov. Organ.* ii. 26. It may however be observed, that we find a few passages in the ethical part of *De Augmentis*, lib. vii. cap. 3., which show that he had some notions of moral induction germinating in his mind.

may be found in the sixth, seventh, and eighth books *De Augmentis*, in the *Essays*, the *History of Henry VII.*, and the various short treatises contained in his works, on moral and political wisdom, and on human nature, from experience of which all such wisdom is drawn, with the *Rhetoric*, *Ethics*, and *Politics* of Aristotle, or with the historians most celebrated for their deep insight into civil society and human character, with Thucydides, Tacitus, Philip de Comines, Machiavel, Davila, Hume, we shall, I think, find that one man may almost be compared with all of these together. When Galileo is named as equal to Bacon, it is to be remembered that Galileo was no moral or political philosopher, and in this department Leibnitz certainly falls very short of Bacon. Burke, perhaps, comes, of all modern writers, the nearest to him; but though Bacon may not be more profound than Burke, he is more copious and comprehensive.

76. The comparison of Bacon and Galileo is naturally built upon the influence which, in the same age, they exerted in overthrowing the philosophy of the schools, and in founding that new discipline of real science which has rendered the last centuries glorious. Hume has given the preference to the latter, who made accessions to the domain of human knowledge so splendid, so inaccessible to cavil, so unequivocal in their results, that the majority of mankind would perhaps be carried along with this decision. There seems, however, to be no doubt that the mind of Bacon was more comprehensive and profound. But these comparisons are apt to involve *incommensurable* relations. In their own intellectual characters, they bore no great resemblance to each other. Bacon had scarce any knowledge of geometry, and so far ranks much below not only Galileo, but Descartes, Newton, and Leibnitz, all signalised by wonderful discoveries in the science of quantity, or in that part of physics which employs it. He has, in one of the profound aphorisms of the *Novum Organum*, distinguished the two species of philosophical genius, one more apt to perceive the differences of things, the other their analogies. In a mind of the highest order neither of these powers will be really deficient, and his own inductive method is at once the best exercise of both, and the best safeguard against the excess of either. But, upon

Comparison
of Bacon and
Galileo.

the whole, it may certainly be said, that the genius of Lord Bacon was naturally more inclined to collect the resemblances of nature than to note her differences. This is the case with men like him of sanguine temper, warm fancy, and brilliant wit; but it is not the frame of mind which is best suited to strict reasoning.

77. It is no proof of a solid acquaintance with Lord Bacon's philosophy, to deify his name as the ancient schools did those of their founders, or even to exaggerate the powers of his genius. Powers they were surprisingly great, yet limited in their range, and not in all respects equal; nor could they overcome every impediment of circumstance. Even of Bacon it may be said, that he attempted more than he has achieved, and perhaps more than he clearly apprehended. His objects appear sometimes indistinct, and I am not sure that they are always consistent. In the Advancement of Learning, he aspired to fill up, or at least to indicate, the deficiencies in every department of knowledge; he gradually confined himself to philosophy, and at length to physics. But few of his works can be deemed complete, not even the treatise *De Augmentis*, which comes nearer to this than most of the rest. Hence the study of Lord Bacon is difficult, and not, as I conceive, very well adapted to those who have made no progress whatever in the exact sciences, nor accustomed themselves to independent thinking. They have never been made a text-book in our universities; though, after a judicious course of preparatory studies, by which I mean a good foundation in geometry and the philosophical principles of grammar, the first book of the *Novum Organum* might be very advantageously combined with the instruction of an enlightened lecturer.*

* It by no means is to be inferred, that because the actual text of Bacon is not always such as can be well understood by very young men, I object to their being led to the real principles of inductive philosophy, which alone will teach them to think, firmly but not presumptuously, for themselves. Few defects, on the contrary, in our system of education are more visible than the want of an adequate course of logic; and this is not likely to be rectified so long as the Aristotelian methods challenge that de-

nomination exclusively of all other aids to the reasoning faculties. The position that nothing else is to be called logic, were it even agreeable to the derivation of the word, which it is not, or to the usage of the ancients, which is by no means uniformly the case, or to that of modern philosophy and correct language, which is certainly not at all the case, is no answer to the question, whether what we call logic does not deserve to be taught at all.

A living writer of high reputation,

78. The ignorance of Bacon in mathematics, and, what was much worse, his inadequate notions of their utility,

who has at least fully understood his own subject, and illustrated it better than his predecessors, from a more enlarged reading and thinking, wherein his own acuteness has been improved by the writers of the Baconian school, has been unfortunately instrumental, by the very merits of his treatise on Logic, in keeping up the prejudices on this subject, which have generally been deemed characteristic of the university to which he belonged. All the reflection I have been able to give to the subject has convinced me of the inefficacy of the syllogistic art in enabling us to think rightly for ourselves, or, which is part of thinking rightly, to detect those fallacies of others which might impose on our understanding before we have acquired that art. It has been often alleged, and, as far as I can judge, with perfect truth, that no man, who can be worth answering, ever commits, except through mere inadvertence, any paralogisms which the common logic serves to point out. It is easy enough to construct syllogisms which sin against its rules; but the question is, by whom they were employed. For though it is not uncommon, as I am aware, to represent an adversary as reasoning illogically, this is generally effected by putting his argument into our own words. The great fault of all, over-induction, or the assertion of a general premise upon an insufficient examination of particulars, cannot be discovered or cured by any *logical* skill; and this is the error into which men really fall, not that of omitting to *distribute the middle term*, though it comes in effect, and often in appearance, to the same thing. I do not contend that the rules of syllogism, which are very short and simple, ought not to be learned; or that there may not be some advantage in occasionally stating our own argument, or calling on another to state his, in a regular form (an advantage, however, rather dialectical, which is, in other words, rhetorical, than one which affects the reasoning faculties themselves); nor do I deny that it is philosophically worth while to know that all *general reasoning by words* may be reduced into syllogism, as it is to know that most of plane geometry may be resolved into the superposition of equal triangles; but to repre-

sent this portion of logical science as the whole, appears to me almost like teaching the scholar Euclid's axioms, and the axiomatic theorem to which I have alluded, and calling this the science of geometry. The following passage from the Port-Royal logic is very judicious and candid, giving as much to the Aristotelian system as it deserves: "Cette partie, que nous avons maintenant à traiter, qui comprend les règles du raisonnement, est estimée la plus importante de la logique, et c'est presque l'unique qu'on y traite avec quelque soin; mais il y a sujet de douter si elle est aussi utile qu'on se l'imagine. La plupart des erreurs des hommes, comme nous avons déjà dit ailleurs, viennent bien plus de ce qu'ils raisonnent sur de faux principes, que non pas de ce qu'ils raisonnent mal suivant leurs principes. Il arrive rarement qu'on se laisse tromper par des raisonnemens qui ne soient faux que parce que la conséquence en est mal tirée; et ceux qui ne seroient pas capables d'en reconnoître la fausseté par la seule lumière de la raison, ne le seroient pas ordinairement d'entendre les règles que l'on en donne, et encore moins de les appliquer. Néanmoins, quand on ne considéreroit ces règles que comme des vérités spéculatives, elles serviroient toujours à exercer l'esprit; et de plus, on ne peut nier qu'elles n'aient quelque usage en quelques rencontres, et à l'égard de quelques personnes, qui, étant d'un naturel vif et pénétrant, ne se laissent quelquefois tromper par des fausses conséquences, que faute d'attention, à quoi la réflexion qu'ils feroient sur ces règles seroit capable de remédier." Art de Penser, part iii. How different is this sensible passage from one quoted from some anonymous writer in Whately's Logic, p. 34. "A fallacy consists of an ingenious mixture of truth and falsehood so entangled, so intimately blended, that the fallacy is, in the chemical phrase, held in solution; *one drop of sound logic* is that test which immediately disunites them, makes the foreign substance visible, and precipitates it to the bottom." One fallacy, it might be answered, as common as any, is the *false analogy*, the misleading the mind by a comparison, where there is no real proportion or re-

must be reckoned among the chief defects in his philosophical writings. In a remarkable passage of the *Advancement of Learning*, he held mathematics to be a part of metaphysics; but the place of this is altered in the *Latin*, and they are treated as merely auxiliary or instrumental to physical inquiry. He had some prejudice against pure mathematics, and thought they had been unduly elevated in comparison with the realities of nature. "I know not," he says, "how it has arisen that mathematics and logic, which ought to be the serving-maids of physical philosophy, yet affecting to vaunt the certainty that belongs to them, presume to exercise a dominion over her." It is, in my opinion, erroneous to speak of geometry, which relates to the realities of space, and to natural objects so far as extended, as a mere hand-maid of physical philosophy, and not rather a part of it. Playfair has made some good remarks on the

His prejudice against mathematics.

semblance. The chemist's test is the necessary means of detecting the foreign substance; if the "drop of sound logic" be such, it is strange that lawyers, mathematicians, and mankind in general, should so sparingly employ it; the fact being notorious, that those most eminent for strong reasoning powers are rarely conversant with the syllogistic method. It is also well known, that these "intimately blended mixtures of truth and falsehood" perplex no man of plain sense, except when they are what is called *extra-logical*; cases wherein the art of syllogism is of no use.

[The syllogistic logic appears to have been more received into favour of late among philosophers, both here and on the Continent, than it was in the two preceding centuries. The main question, it is to be kept in mind, does not relate to its principles as a science, but to the practical usefulness of its rules as an art. An able writer has lately observed, that "he must be fortunate in the clearness of his mind, who, knowing the logical mode, is never obliged to have recourse to it to destroy ambiguity or heighten evidence, and particularly so in his opponents, who, in verbal or written controversy, never finds it necessary to employ it in trying their arguments." Penny *Cyclopædia*, art. Syllogism. Every one must judge of this by his own experience: the profound thinker whose hand seems

discernible in this article, has a strong claim to authority in favour of the utility of the syllogistic method; yet we cannot help remembering that it is very rarely employed even in controversy, where I really believe it to be a valuable weapon against an antagonist, and capable of producing no small effect on the indifferent reader or hearer, especially if he is not of a very sharp apprehension; and moreover that, as I at least believe, the proportion of mathematical, political, or theological reasoners, who have acquired or retained any tolerable expertness in the *technical* part of logic, is far from high, nor am I aware that they fall into fallacies for want of knowledge of it; but I mean strictly such fallacies as the syllogistic method alone seems to correct. What comes nearest to syllogistic reasoning in practice is that of geometry; as thus, $A = B$: but $C = A$; ergo, $C = B$, is essentially a syllogism, but not according to form. If, however, equality of magnitude may be considered as identity, according to the dictum of Aristotle, *ἐν τοῖς ἢ ἰσότης ἐνότης*, the foregoing is regular in logical form; and if we take A , B , and C for *ratios*, which are properly identical, not equal, this may justly be called a syllogism. But those who contend most for the formal logic, seldom much regard its use in geometrical science. — 1847.]

advantages derived to experimental philosophy itself from the mere application of geometry and algebra. And one of the reflections which this ought to excite is, that we are not to conceive, as some hastily do, that there can be no real utility to mankind, even of that kind of utility which consists in multiplying the conveniences and luxuries of life, springing from theoretical and speculative inquiry. The history of algebra, so barren in the days of Tartaglia and Vieta, so productive of *wealth*, when applied to dynamical calculations in our own, may be a sufficient answer.

79. One of the petty blemishes, which, though lost in the splendour of Lord Bacon's excellencies, it is not Bacon's excess of wit. unfair to mention, is connected with the peculiar characteristics of his mind; he is sometimes too metaphorical and witty. His remarkable talent for discovering analogies seems to have inspired him with too much regard to them as arguments, even when they must appear to any common reader fanciful and far-fetched. His terminology, chiefly for the same reason, is often a little affected, and, in Latin, rather barbarous. The divisions of his prerogative instances in the *Novum Organum* are not always founded upon intelligible distinctions. And the general obscurity of the style, neither himself nor his assistants being good masters of the Latin language, which at the best is never flexible or copious enough for our philosophy, renders the perusal of both his great works too laborious for the impatient reader. Brucker has well observed that the *Novum Organum* has been neglected by the generality, and proved of far less service than it would otherwise have been in philosophy, in consequence of these very defects, as well as the real depth of the author's mind.*

80. What has been the fame of Bacon, "the wisest, greatest, of mankind," it is needless to say. What Fame of Bacon on the Continent. has been his real influence over mankind, how much of our enlarged and exact knowledge may be at-

* *Legenda ipsa nobilissima tractatio ab illis est, qui in rerum naturalium inquisitione feliciter progredi cupiunt. Quæ si paulo plus luminis et perspicuitatis haberet, et novorum terminorum et partitionum artificio lectorem non remo-*

raretur, longè plura, quam factum est, contulisset ad philosophiæ emendationem. His enim obstantibus a plerisque hoc organum neglectum est. Hist. Philos. v. 99.

tributed to his inductive method, what of this again has been due to a thorough study of his writings, and what to an indirect and secondary acquaintance with them, are questions of another kind, and less easily solved. Stewart, the philosopher who has dwelt most on the praises of Bacon, while he conceives him to have exercised a considerable influence over the English men of science in the seventeenth century, supposes, on the authority of Montucla, that he did not "command the general admiration of Europe," till the publication of the preliminary discourse to the French Encyclopædia by Diderot and D'Alembert. This, however, is by much too precipitate a conclusion. He became almost immediately known on the Continent. Gassendi was one of his most ardent admirers. Descartes mentions him, I believe, once only, in a letter to Mersenne in 1632*; but he was of all men the most unwilling to praise a contemporary. It may be said that these were philosophers, and that their testimony does not imply the admiration of mankind. But writers of a very different character mention him in a familiar manner. Richelieu is said to have highly esteemed Lord Bacon.† And it may in some measure be due to this, that in the *Sentimens de l'Académie Française sur le Cid*, he is alluded to, simply by the name Bacon, as one well known.‡ *Voiture*, in a letter to *Costar*, about the same time, bestows high eulogy on some passages of Bacon which his correspondent had sent to him, and observes that *Horace* would have been astonished to hear a barbarian Briton discourse in such a style.§ The treatise *De Augmentis* was republished in France in 1624, the year after its appearance in England. It was translated into French as early as 1632; no great

* Vol. vi. p. 210. edit. Cousin.

† The only authority that I can now quote for this is not very good, that of *Aubrey's Manuscripts*, which I find in *Steward's Anecdotes*, iv. 328. But it seems not improbable. The same book quotes *Balzac* as saying, "Croyons donc, pour l'amour du Chancelier Bacon, que toutes les folies des anciens sont sages; et tous leurs songes mystères, et de celles-là qui sont estimées pures fables, il n'y en a pas une, quelque bizarre et extravagante qu'elle soit, qui n'ait son fondement dans l'histoire, si l'on en veut croire

Bacon, et qui n'ait été déguisée de la sorte par les sages du vieux temps pour la rendre plus utile aux peuples.

‡ P. 44. (1633.)

§ J'ai trouvé parfaitement beau tout ce que vous me mandez de Bacon. Mais ne vous semble t'il pas qu' *Horace* qui disoit, *Visam Britannos hospitibus feros*, seroit bien étonné d'entendre un barbare discourir comme cela? *Costar* is said by *Bayle* to have borrowed much from Bacon. *La Mothe le Vayer* mentions him in his *Dialogues*; in fact, instances are numerous.

proofs of neglect. Editions came out in Holland, 1645, 1652, and 1662. Even the *Novum Organum*, which, as has been said, never became so popular as his other writings, was thrice printed in Holland, in 1645, 1650, and 1660.* Leibnitz and Puffendorf are loud in their expressions of admiration, the former ascribing to him the revival of true philosophy as fully as we can at present.† I should be more inclined to doubt whether he were adequately valued by his countrymen in his own time, or in the immediately subsequent period. Under the first Stuarts, there was little taste among studious men but for theology, and chiefly for a theology which, proceeding with an extreme deference to authority, could not but generate a disposition of mind, even upon other subjects, alien to the progressive and inquisitive spirit of the inductive philosophy.‡ The institution

* Montagu's *Life of Bacon*, p. 407. He has not mentioned an edition at Strasburg, 1635, which is in the British Museum.

There is also an edition without time or place, in the catalogue of the British Museum.

† Brucker, v. 95. Stewart says that "Bayle does not give above twelve lines to Bacon;" but he calls him one of the greatest men of his age, and the length of an article in Bayle was never designed to be a measure of the merit of its subject. — [The reception of Bacon's philosophical writings on the Continent has been elaborately proved against Stewart, in a dissertation by Mr. Macvey Napier, published in the eighth volume of the *Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*. — 1842.]

‡ It is not uncommon to meet with persons, especially who are or have been engaged in teaching others dogmatically what they have themselves received in the like manner, to whom the inductive philosophy appears a mere school of scepticism, or at best wholly inapplicable to any subjects which require entire conviction. A certain deduction from certain premises is the only reasoning they acknowledge. Lord Bacon has a remarkable passage on this in the 9th book *De Augmentis*. Postquam articuli et principia religionis jam in sedibus suis fuerint locata, ita ut a rationis examine penitus eximantur, tum demum conceditur ab illis illationes derivare ac dedu-

cere, secundum analogiam ipsorum. In rebus quidem naturalibus hoc non tenet. Nam et ipsa principia examini subji-cuntur; per inductionem. inquam, licet minime per syllogismum. Atque eadem illa nullam habent cum ratione repugnantiam, ut ab eodem fonte cum primæ propositiones, tum mediæ, deducantur. Aliter fit in religione: ubi et primæ propositiones authopystatæ sunt atque per se subsistentes; et rursus non reguntur ab illa ratione quæ propositionis consequentes deducit. Neque tamen hoc fit in religione sola, sed etiam in aliis scientiis, tam gravioribus, quam levioribus, ubi scilicet propositiones humanæ placita sunt, non posita; siquidem et in illis rationis usus absolutus esse non potest. Videmus enim in ludis, puta schæcorum, aut similibus, priores ludi normas et leges merè positivas esse, et ad placitum; quas recipi, non in disputationem vocari, prorsus oporteat; ut vero vincas, et peritè lusum instituas, ad artificiosum est et rationale. Eodem modo fit et in legibus humanis; in quibus haud paucæ sunt maximæ, ut loquuntur, hoc est, placita mera juris, quæ auctoritate magis quam ratione nituntur, neque in disceptionem veniunt. Quid vero sit justissimum, non absolutè, sed relativè, hoc est ex analogiâ illarum maximarum, id demum rationale est, et latum disputationi campum præbet. This passage, well weighed, may show us where, why, and by whom, the synthetic and syllogistic methods have been preferred to the inductive and analytical.

of the Royal Society, or rather the love of physical science out of which that institution arose, in the second part of the seventeenth century, made England resound with the name of her illustrious chancellor. Few now spoke of him without a kind of homage that only the greatest men receive. Yet still it was by natural philosophers alone that the writings of Bacon were much studied. The editions of his works, except the *Essays*, were few; the *Novum Organum* never came separately from the English press.* They were not even frequently quoted; for I believe it will be found that the fashion of referring to the brilliant passages of the *De Augmentis* and the *Novum Organum*, at least in books designed for the general reader, is not much older than the close of the last century. Scotland has the merit of having led the way; Reid, Stewart, Robison, and Playfair turned that which had been a blind veneration into a rational worship; and I should suspect that more have read Lord Bacon within these thirty years than in the two preceding centuries. It may be an usual consequence of the enthusiastic panegyrics lately poured upon his name, that a more positive efficacy has sometimes been attributed to his philosophical writings than they really possessed, and it might be asked whether Italy, where he was probably not much known, were not the true school of experimental philosophy in Europe, whether his methods of investigation were not chiefly such as men of sagacity and lovers of truth might simultaneously have devised. But, whatever may have been the case with respect to actual discoveries in science, we must give to written wisdom its proper meed; no books prior to those of Lord Bacon carried mankind so far on the road to truth; none have obtained so thorough a triumph over arrogant usurpation without seeking to substitute another; and he may be compared to those liberators of nations, who have

* The *De Augmentis* was only once published after the first edition, in 1638. An indifferent translation, by Gilbert Watts, came out in 1640. No edition of Bacon's Works was published in England before 1730; another appeared in 1740, and there have been several

since. But they had been printed at Frankfort in 1665. It is unnecessary to observe, that many copies of the foreign editions were brought to this country. This is mostly taken from Mr. Montagu's account.

scheme of any philosophy beyond those of his contemporaries. He deemed his time of life immature for so stupendous a task. But at the age of thirty-three, with little notice to his friends, he quitted Paris, convinced that absolute retirement was indispensable for that rigorous investigation of first principles which he now determined to institute, and retired into Holland. In this country he remained eight years so completely aloof from the distractions of the world, that he concealed his very place of residence, though preserving an intercourse of letters with many friends in France.

84. In 1637 he broke upon the world with a volume containing the Discourse upon Method, the Dioptrics, the Meteors, and the Geometry. It is only with the first that we are for the present concerned.* In this discourse, the most interesting, perhaps, of Descartes' writings, on account of the picture of his life, and of the progress of his studies that it furnishes, we find the Cartesian metaphysics, which do not consist of many articles, almost as fully detailed as in any of his later works. In the *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*, published in 1641, these fundamental principles are laid down again more at length. He invited the criticism of philosophers on these famous *Meditations*. They did not refuse the challenge; and seven sets of objections, from as many different quarters, with seven replies from Descartes himself, are subjoined to the later editions of the *Meditations*. The *Principles of Philosophy*, published in Latin in 1644, contains what may be reckoned the final statement, which occupies most of the first book, written with uncommon conciseness and precision. The beauty of philosophical style which distinguishes Descartes is never more seen than in this first book of the *Principia*, the translation of which was revised by Clerselier, an eminent friend of the author. It is a contrast at once to the elliptical brevity of Aristotle, who hints, or has been supposed to hint, the most important positions in a short clause, and to the verbose, figurative declamation of many modern metaphysicians. In this admirable perspicuity Descartes was imitated by his disciples Arnaud and Malebranche, especially the former. His unfinished posthumous treatise, the "Inquiry after Truth by

His publications.

* Œuvres de Descartes, par Cousin, Paris, 1824, vol. i. p. 121 — 212.

Natural Reason," is not carried farther than a partial development of the same leading principles of Cartesianism. There is, consequently, a great deal of apparent repetition in the works of Descartes, but such as on attentive consideration will show, not perhaps much real variance, but some new lights that had occurred to the author in the course of his reflections.*

85. In pursuing the examination of the first principles of knowledge, Descartes perceived not only that he had cause to doubt of the various opinions which he had found current among men, from that very circumstance of their variety, but that the sources of all which he had received for truth themselves, namely, the senses, had afforded him no indisputable certainty. ^{He begins by doubting all.} He began to recollect how often he had been misled by appearances, which had at first sight given no intimation of their fallacy, and asked himself in vain, by what infallible test he could discern the reality of external objects, or at least their conformity to his idea of them. The strong impressions made in sleep led him to inquire whether all he saw and felt might not be in a dream. It was true that there seemed to be some notions more elementary than the rest, such as extension, figure, duration, which could not be reckoned fallacious; nor could he avoid owning that, if there were not an existing triangle in the world, the angles of one conceived by the mind, though it were in sleep, must appear equal to two right angles. But even in this certitude of demonstration he soon found something deficient: to err in geometrical reasoning is not impossible; why might he not err in this? especially in a train of consequences, the particular terms of which are not at the same instant present to the mind. But above all, there might be a superior being, powerful enough and willing to deceive him. It was no kind of answer to treat this as improbable, or as an arbitrary hypothesis. He had laid down as a maxim that nothing could be received as truth which was not demonstrable; and in one place, rather hyperbolically, and indeed extravagantly in

* A work has lately been published, *Essais Philosophiques, suivis de la Métaphysique de Descartes, assemblée et mise en ordre par L. A. Gruyer*, 4 vols., Bruxelles, 1832. In the fourth volume we find the metaphysical passages in the writings of Descartes, including his cor-

respondence, arranged methodically in his own words, but with the omission of a large part of the objections to the Meditations and of his replies. I did not, however, see this work in time to make use of it.

appearance, says that he made little difference between merely probable and false suppositions ; meaning this, however, as we may presume, in the sense of geometers, who would say the same thing.

86. But, divesting himself thus of all belief in what the world deemed most unquestionable, plunged in an abyss, as it seemed for a time, he soon found his feet on a rock, from which he sprang upwards to an unclouded sun. His first step in knowledge. Doubting all things, abandoning all things, he came to the question, what is it that doubts and denies ? Something it must be ; he might be deceived by a superior power, but it was he that was deceived. He felt his own existence ; the proof of it was that he did feel it ; that he had affirmed, that he now doubted, in a word, that he was a thinking substance. *Cogito ; Ergo sum*—this famous enthymem of the Cartesian philosophy veiled in rather formal language that which was to him, and must be to us all, the eternal basis of conviction, which no argument can strengthen, which no sophistry can impair, the consciousness of a self within, a percipient indivisible Ego.* The only proof of this is that it admits of no proof, that no man can pretend to doubt of his own existence with sincerity, or to express a doubt without absurd and inconsistent language.

87. The scepticism of Descartes, it appears, which is merely provisional, is not at all similar to that of the Pyrrhonists, though some of his arguments may have been shafts from their quiver. Nor did he make use, which is somewhat remarkable, of the reasonings afterwards employed by Berkley against the material world, though no one more frequently distinguished than Descartes between the objective reality, as it was then supposed to be, of ideas in the mind, and the external or sensible reality of things. His mind not sceptical. Scepticism, in fact, was so far from being

* This word, introduced by the Germans, or originally perhaps by the old Cartesians, is rather awkward, but far less so than the English pronoun I, which is also equivocal in sound. Stewart has adopted it as the lesser evil, and it seems reasonable not to scruple the use of a word so convenient, if not necessary, to express the unity of the conscious principle. If it had been employed earlier,

I am apt to think that some great metaphysical extravagances would have been avoided, and some fundamental truths more clearly apprehended. Fichte is well known to have made the grand division of *Ich* and *Nicht Ich*, *Ego* and *Non Ego*, the basis of his philosophy ; in other words, the difference of subjective and objective reality.

characteristic of his disposition, that his errors sprang chiefly from the opposite source, little as he was aware of it, from an undue positiveness in theories which he could not demonstrate, or even render highly probable.*

88. The certainty of an existing Ego easily led him to that of the operations of the mind, called afterwards by Locke ideas of reflection, the believing, doubting, willing, loving, fearing, which he knew by consciousness, and indeed by means of which alone he knew that the Ego existed. He now proceeded a step farther; and, reflecting on the simplest truths of arithmetic and geometry, saw that it was as impossible to doubt of them as of the acts of his mind. But as he had before tried to doubt even of these, on the hypothesis that he might be deceived by a superior intelligent power, he resolved to inquire whether such a power existed, and if it did, whether it could be a deceiver. The affirmative of the former, and the negative of the latter question Descartes established by that extremely subtle reasoning so much celebrated in the seventeenth century, but which has less frequently been deemed conclusive in later times. It is at least that which no man, not fitted by long practice for metaphysical researches, will pretend to embrace.

He arrives at more certainty.

89. The substance of his argument was this. He found within himself the idea of a perfect Intelligence, eternal, infinite, necessary. This could not come from himself, nor from external things, because both were

His proof of a Deity.

* One of the rules Descartes lays down in his posthumous art of logic, is that we ought never to busy ourselves except about objects concerning which our understanding appears capable of acquiring an unquestionable and certain knowledge, vol. xi. p. 204. This is at least too unlimited a proposition, and would exclude, not indeed all probability, but all inquiries which must by necessity end in nothing more than probability. Accordingly we find in the next pages, that he made little account of any sciences but arithmetic and geometry, or such others as equal them in certainty. "From all this," he concludes, "we may infer, not that arithmetic and geometry are the only sciences which we must learn, but that he who seeks the road to

truth should not trouble himself with any object of which he cannot have as certain a knowledge as of arithmetical and geometrical demonstrations." It is unnecessary to observe what havoc this would make with investigations, even in physics, of the highest importance to mankind.

Beattie, in the essay on Truth, part ii. chap. 2., has made some unfounded criticisms on the scepticism of Descartes, and endeavours to turn into ridicule his Cogito; ergo sum. Yet if any one should deny his own, or our existence, I do not see how we could refute him, were he worthy of refutation, but by some such language; and, in fact, it is what Beattie himself says, more paraphrastically, in answering Hume.

imperfect, and there could be no more in the effect than there is in the cause. And this idea requiring a cause, it could have none but an actual being, not a possible being, which is undistinguishable from mere non-entity. If, however, this should be denied, he inquires whether he, with this idea of God, could have existed by any other cause, if there were no God. Not, he argues, by himself; for if he were the author of his own being, he would have given himself every perfection, in a word, would have been God. Not by his parents, for the same might be said of them, and so forth, if we remount to a series of productive beings. Besides this, as much power is required to preserve as to create, and the continuance of existence in the effect implies the continued operation of the cause.

90. With this argument, in itself sufficiently refined, Descartes blended another still more distant from common apprehension. Necessary existence is involved in the idea of God. All other beings are conceivable in their essence, as things possible; in God alone his essence and existence are inseparable. Existence is necessary to perfection; hence a perfect being, or God, cannot be conceived without necessary existence. Though I do not know that I have misrepresented Descartes in this result of his very subtle argument, it is difficult not to treat it as a sophism. And it was always objected by his adversaries, that he inferred the necessity of the thing from the necessity of the idea, which was the very point in question. It seems impossible to vindicate many of his expressions, from which he never receded in the controversy to which his *Meditations* gave rise. But the long habit of repeating in his mind the same series of reasonings gave Descartes, as it will always do, an inward assurance of their certainty, which could not be weakened by any objection. The former argument for the being of God, whether satisfactory or not, is to be distinguished from the present.*

Another
proof of it.

* "From what is said already of the ignorance we are in of the essence of mind, it is evident that we are not able to know whether any mind be necessarily existent by a necessity *à priori* founded in its essence, as we have showed time and space to be. Some philosophers

think that such a necessity may be demonstrated of God from the nature of perfection. For God being infinitely, that is, absolutely perfect, they say he must needs be necessarily existent; because, say they, necessary existence is one of the greatest of perfections. But I

91. From the idea of a perfect being Descartes immediately deduced the truth of his belief in an external world, and in the inferences of his reason. For to deceive his creatures would be an imperfection in God; but God is perfect. Whatever, therefore, is clearly and distinctly apprehended by our reason must be true. We have only to be on our guard against our own precipitancy and prejudice, or surrender of our reason to the authority of others. It is not by our understanding, such as God gave it to us, that we

His deductions from this.

take this to be one of those false and imaginary arguments, that are founded in the abuse of certain terms; and of all others this word, perfection, seems to have suffered most this way. I wish I could clearly understand what these philosophers mean by the word perfection, when they thus say, that necessity of existence is perfection. Does perfection here signify the same thing that it does when we say that God is infinitely good, omnipotent, omniscient? Surely perfections are properly asserted of the several powers that attend the essences of things and not of any thing else, but in a very unnatural and improper sense. Perfection is a term of relation, and its sense implies a fitness or agreement to some certain end, and most properly to some power in the thing that is denominated perfect. The term, as the etymology of it shows, is taken from the operation of artists. When an artist proposes to himself to make any thing that shall be serviceable to a certain effect, his work is called more or less perfect, according as it agrees more or less with the design of the artist. From arts, by a similitude of sense, this word has been introduced into morality, and signifies that quality of an agent by which it is able to act agreeable to the end its actions tend to. The metaphysicians who reduce every thing to transcendental considerations have also translated this term into their science, and use it to signify the agreement that any thing has with that idea, which it is required that thing should answer to. This perfection, therefore, belongs to those attributes that constitute the essence of a thing; and that being is properly called the most perfect which has all, the best, and each the completest in its kind of those attributes, which can be united in one essence. Perfection, therefore, belongs to the es-

sence of things, and not properly to their existence; which is not a perfection of any thing, no attribute of it, but only the mere constitution of it *in rerum natura*. Necessary existence, therefore, which is a mode of existence, is not a perfection, it being no attribute of the thing no more than existence is, which it is a mode of. But it may be said, that though necessary existence is not a perfection in itself, yet it is so in its cause, upon account of that attribute of the entity from whence it flows; that that attribute must of all others be the most perfect and most excellent, which necessary existence flows from, it being such as cannot be conceived otherwise than as existing. But what excellency, what perfection is there in all this? Space is necessarily existent on account of extension, which cannot be conceived otherwise than as existing. But what perfection is there in space upon this account, which can in no manner act on any thing, which is entirely devoid of all power, wherein I have showed all perfections to consist? Therefore necessary existence, abstractedly considered, is no perfection; and therefore the idea of infinite perfection does not include, and consequently not prove, God to be necessarily existent. If he be so, it is on account of those attributes of his essence which we have no knowledge of."

I have made this extract from a very short tract, called *Contemplatio Philosophica*, by Brook Taylor, which I found in an unpublished memoir of his life printed by the late Sir William Young in 1793. It bespeaks the clear and acute understanding of this celebrated philosopher, and appears to me an entire refutation of the scholastic argument of Descartes; one more fit for the Anselms and such dealers in words, from whom it came, than for himself.

are deceived: but the exercise of our free-will, a high prerogative of our nature, is often so incautious as to make us not discern truth from falsehood, and affirm or deny, by a voluntary act, that which we do not distinctly apprehend. The properties of quantity, founded on our ideas of extension and number, are distinctly perceived by our minds, and hence the sciences of arithmetic and geometry are certainly true. But when he turns his thoughts to the phenomena of external sensation, Descartes cannot wholly extricate himself from his original concession, the basis of his doubt, that the senses do sometimes deceive us. He endeavours to reconcile this with his own theory, which had built the certainty of all that we clearly hold certain on the perfect veracity of God.

92. It is in this inquiry that he reaches that important distinction between the primary and secondary properties of matter, (the latter being modifications of the former, relative only to our apprehension, but not inherent in things,) which, without being wholly new, contradicted the Aristotelian theories of the schools*; and he

PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY
QUALITIES

* See Stewart's First Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy. This writer has justly observed, that many persons conceive colour to be inherent in the object, so that the censure of Reid on Descartes and his followers, as having pretended to discover what no one doubted, was least unreasonable in this respect. A late writer has gone so far as to say, "Nothing at first can seem a more rational, obvious and incontrovertible conclusion, than that the colour of a body was inherent quality, like its weight, hardness &c.; and that to see the object, and to see it of its own colour, when no other interposes between our eyes and it, are one and the same thing. Yet this is only a prejudice." &c. Herschel's *Dissertation on Nat. Phil.* p. 52. I almost even suspect that the notion of sounds and smells being secondary or mere sensible qualities is not distinct in all men's minds. But after we are becoming familiar with correct ideas, it is not easy to revive prejudices in our imagination. In the same page of Stewart's Dissertation, he has been led by dislike of the university of Oxford to misconstrue, in an extraordinary manner, a passage of Addison in the *Guardian*, which is evidently a sportive ridicule of

the Cartesian theory, and is absolutely inapplicable to the Aristotelian.

The most remarkable circumstance in Reid's animadversion on Descartes, as having announced nothing but what was generally known, is that he had himself, in his *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, contended very dogmatically in favour of the vulgar notion that secondary qualities exist in bodies, independently of sensation. "This scarlet rose which is before me, is still a scarlet rose when I shut my eyes, and was so at midnight when no eye saw it. The colour remains when the appearance ceases; it remains the same when the appearance changes." Chap. vi. § 4. He even uses similar language as to perfumes, which, indeed, stand on the same ground, though we feel less of the prejudice in favour of their reality than of that of colours. Nothing can be more obvious than the reply: the colour remains only on the tacit hypothesis that some one is looking at the object; at midnight we can hardly say that the rose is red, except by an additional hypothesis, that the day should break. "We never," he proceeds, "as far as I can judge, give the name of colour to the sensation, but to the quality only." How then do we talk of bright,

remarked that we are never, strictly speaking, deceived by our senses, but by the inferences which we draw from them.

93. Such is nearly the substance, exclusive of a great variety of more or less episodical theories, of the three metaphysical works of Descartes, the history of the soul's progress from opinion to doubt, and from doubt to certainty. Few would dispute, at the present day, that he has destroyed too much of his foundations to render his superstructure stable ; and to readers averse from metaphysical reflection, he must seem little else than an idle theorist, weaving cobwebs for pastime which common sense sweeps away. It is fair, however, to observe, that no one was more careful than Descartes to guard against any practical scepticism in the affairs of life. He even goes so far as to maintain, that a man having adopted any practical opinion on such grounds as seem probable, should pursue it with as much steadiness as if it were founded on demonstration ; observing, however, as a general rule, to choose the most moderate opinions among those which he should find current in his own country.*

94. The objections adduced against the Meditations are in a series of seven. The first are by a theologian named Caterus, the second by Mersenne, the third by Hobbes, the fourth by Arnauld, the fifth by Gassendi, the sixth by some anonymous writers, the seventh by a Jesuit of the name of Bourdin. To all of these Descartes replied with spirit and acuteness. By far the most important controversy was with Gassendi, whose objections were stated more briefly, and, I think, with less skill, by Hobbes. It was the first trumpet in the new philosophy of an ancient war between the sensual and ideal schools of psychology. Descartes had revived, and placed in a clearer light, the doctrine of mind, as not absolutely dependent upon the senses, nor of the same nature as their objects.

Objections
made to his
Meditations.

dull, glaring, gay, dazzling colours? Do not these words refer to a sensation, rather than to a configuration of parts in the coloured body by which it reflects or refracts light? But this first production of Reid, though abounding with acute and original remarks, is too much disfigured by a tendency to halloo on the multitude against speculative philosophy. The appeal to common

sense, that is, the crude notions of men who had never reflected, even enough to use language with precision, would have been fatal to psychology. Reid afterwards laid aside the popular tone in writing on philosophy, though, perhaps, he was always too much inclined to cut knots when he could not untie them. — 1847.]

* Vol. i. p. 147. Vol. iii. p. 64.

Descartes does not acknowledge him as the first teacher of the soul's immateriality. "That many of the schoolmen, and that the wisest of the ancient philosophers, when they described the mind as a spirit, or as a spark of celestial fire, employed these expressions, not with any intention to materialise its essence, but merely from want of more unexceptionable language, might be shown with demonstrative evidence, if this were the proper place for entering into the discussion." * But though it cannot be said that Descartes was absolutely the first who maintained the strict immateriality of the soul, it is manifest to any one who has read his correspondence, that the tenet, instead of being general, as we are apt to presume, was by no means in accordance with the common opinion of his age. The fathers, with the exception, perhaps the single one, of Augustin, had taught the corporeity of the thinking substance. Arnauld seems to consider the doctrine of Descartes as almost a novelty in modern times. "What you have written concerning the distinction between the soul and body appears to me very clear, very evident, and quite divine; and as nothing is older than truth, I have had singular pleasure to see that almost the same things have formerly been very perspicuously and agreeably handled by St. Augustin in all his tenth book on the Trinity, but chiefly in the tenth chapter." † But Arnauld himself, in his objections to the *Meditations*, had put it as at least questionable, whether that which thinks is not something extended, which, besides the usual properties of extended substances, such as mobility and figure, has also this particular virtue and power of thinking. ‡ The reply of Descartes removed the difficulties of the illustrious Jansenist, who became an ardent and almost complete disciple of the new philosophy. In a placard against the Cartesian philosophy, printed in 1647, which seems to have come from Revius, professor of theology at Leyden, it is said, "As far as regards the nature of things, nothing seems to hinder but that the soul may be either a substance, or a mode of corporeal substance." § And More, who had carried on a metaphysical correspondence with Descartes, whom he professed to admire, at least

* Dissertation, ubi suprà.

† Descartes, x. 138.

‡ Descartes, ii. 14.

§ Id. x. 73.

at that time, above all philosophers that had ever existed, without exception of his favourite Plato, extols him after his death in a letter to Clerselier, as having best established the foundations of religion. "For the peripatetics," he says, "pretend that there are certain substantial forms emanating from matter, and so united to it that they cannot subsist without it, to which class these philosophers refer the souls of almost all living beings, even those to which they allow sensation and thought; while the Epicureans, on the other hand, who laugh at substantial forms, ascribe thought to matter itself, so that it is M. Descartes alone, of all philosophers, who has at once banished from philosophy all these substantial forms or souls derived from matter, and absolutely divested matter itself of the faculty of feeling and thinking."*

95. It must be owned that the firm belief of Descartes in the immateriality of the Ego, or thinking principle, was accompanied with what in later times would have been deemed rather too great concessions to the materialists. He held the imagination and the memory to be portions of the brain, wherein the images of our sensations are bodily preserved; and even assigned such a motive force to the imagination, as to produce those involuntary actions which we often perform, and all the movements of brutes. "This explains how all the motions of all animals arise, though we grant them no knowledge of things, but only an imagination entirely corporeal, and how all those

Theory of
memory
and imagin-
ation.

* Descartes, x. 386. Even More seems to have been perplexed at one time by the difficulty of accounting for the knowledge and sentiment of disembodied souls, and almost inclined to admit their corporeity. "J'aiderois mieux dire avec les Platoniciens, les anciens pères, et presque tous les philosophes, que les ames humaines, tous les génies tant bons que mauvais, sont corporels, et que par conséquent ils ont un sentiment réel, c'est à dire, qui leur vient du corps dont ils sont revêtus." This is in a letter to Descartes in 1649, which I have not read in Latin (vol. x. p. 249.). I do not quite understand whether he meant only

that the soul, when separated from the gross body, is invested with a substantial clothing, or that there is what we may call an interior body, a supposed monad, to which the thinking principle is indissolubly united. This is what all materialists mean, who have any clear notions whatever; it is a possible, perhaps a plausible, perhaps even a highly probable, hypothesis, but one which will not prove their theory. The former seems almost an indispensable supposition, if we admit sensibility to phenomena at all in the soul after death; but it is rather, perhaps, a theological than a metaphysical speculation.

operations which do not require the concurrence of reason are produced in us." But the whole of his notions as to the connexion of the soul and body, and indeed all his physiological theories, of which he was most enamoured, do little credit to the Cartesian philosophy. They are among those portions of his creed which have lain most open to ridicule, and which it would be useless for us to detail. He seems to have expected more advantage to psychology from anatomical researches than in that state of the science, or even probably in any future state of it, anatomy could afford. When asked once where was his library, he replied, showing a calf he was dissecting, This is my library.* His treatise on the passions, a subject so important in the philosophy of the human mind, is made up of crude hypotheses, or at best irrelevant observations, on their physical causes and concomitants.

96. It may be considered as a part of this syncretism, as we may call it, of the material and immaterial hypotheses, that Descartes fixed the seat of the soul in the conarion, or pineal gland, which he selected as the only part of the brain which is not double. By some means of communication which he did not profess to explain, though later metaphysicians have attempted to do so, the unextended intelligence, thus confined to a certain spot, receives the sensations which are immediately produced through impressions on the substance of the brain. If he did not solve the problem, he it remembered that the problem has never since been solved. It was objected by a nameless correspondent, who signs himself Hyperaspistes, that the soul being incorporeal could not leave by its operations a trace on the brain, which his theory seemed to imply. Descartes answered, in rather a remarkable passage, that as to things purely intellectual, we do not, properly speaking, remember them at all, as they are equally original thoughts every time they present themselves to the mind, except that they are habitually joined, as it were, and associated with

* Descartes was very fond of dissection: C'est un exercice où je me suis souvent occupé depuis onze ans, et je

crois qu'il n'y a guère de médecins qui y ait regardé de si près que moi. Vol. viii. p. 100., also p. 174. and 180.

certain names, which, being bodily, make us remember them.*

97. If the orthodox of the age were not yet prepared for a doctrine which seemed so favourable at least to natural religion as the immateriality of the soul, it may be readily supposed, that Gassendi, like Hobbes, had imbibed too much of the Epicurean theory to acquiesce in the spiritualising principles of his adversary. In a sportive style he addresses him, *O anima!* and Descartes replying more angrily, retorts upon him the name *O caro!* which he frequently repeats. Though we may lament such unhappy efforts at wit in these great men, the names do not ill represent the spiritual and carnal philosophies; the school that produced Leibnitz, Kant, and Stewart, contrasted with that of Hobbes, Condillac, and Cabanis.

98. It was a matter of course that the vulnerable passages of the six Meditations would not escape the spear of so skilful an antagonist as Gassendi. But many of his objections appear to be little more than cavils; and upon the whole, Descartes leaves me with the impression of his great superiority in metaphysical acuteness. It was indeed impossible that men should agree, who persisted in using a different definition of the important word, *idea*; and the same source of interminable controversy has flowed ever since for their disciples. Gassendi adopting the scholastic maxim, "Nothing is in the understanding, which has not been in the sense," carried it so much farther than those from whom it came that he denied any thing to be an idea but what was imagined by the mind. Descartes repeatedly desired both him and Hobbes, whose philosophy was built on the same notion, to remark that he meant by idea, whatever can be conceived by the understanding, though not capable of being represented by the imagination.† Thus we imagine a triangle,

Gassendi's
attacks on
the Medita-
tions.

Superiority
of Descartes.

* This passage I must give in French, finding it obscure, and having translated more according to what I guess than literally. Mais pour ce qui est des choses purement intellectuelles, à proprement parler on n'en a aucun ressouvenir; et la première fois qu'elles se présentent à l'esprit, on les pense aussi-bien que la seconde, si ce n'est peut-être qu'elles ont

coutume d'être jointes et comme attachées à certains noms qui, étant corporels, font que nous nous ressouvenons aussi d'elles. Vol. viii. p. 271.

† Par le nom d'idée, il veut seulement qu'on entende ici les images des choses matérielles dépeintes en la fantaisie corporelle; et cela étant supposé, il lui est aisé de montrer qu'on ne peut

but we can only conceive a figure of a thousand sides ; we know its existence, and can reason about its properties, but we have no image whatever in the mind, by which we can distinguish such a polygon from one of a smaller or greater number of sides. Hobbes in answer to this threw out a paradox which he has not, perhaps, at least in so unlimited a manner, repeated, that by reason, that is, by the process of reasoning, we can infer nothing as to the nature of things, but only as to their names.* It is singular that a man conversant at least with the elements of geometry should have fallen into this error. For it does not appear that he meant to speak only of natural substances, as to which his language might seem to be a bad expression of what was afterwards clearly shown by Locke. That the understanding can conceive and reason upon that which the imagination cannot delineate, is evident not only from Descartes' instance of a polygon, but

avoir propre et véritable idée de Dieu ni d'un ange : mais j'ai souvent averti, et principalement en celui là même, que je prends le nom d'idée pour tout ce qui est conçu immédiatement par l'esprit ; en sorte que, lorsque je veux et que je crains, parceque je conçois en même temps, que je veux et que je crains, ce vouloir et cette crainte sont mis par moi en nombre des idées ; et je me suis servi de ce mot, parcequ'il étoit déjà communément reçu par les philosophes pour signifier les formes des conceptions de l'entendement divin, encore que nous ne reconnoissons en Dieu aucune fantaisie ou imagination corporelle, et je n'en savois point de plus propre. Et je pense avoir assez expliqué l'idée de Dieu pour ceux qui veulent concevoir les sens que je donne à mes paroles ; mais pour ceux qui s'attachent à les entendre autrement que je ne fais, je ne le pourrais jamais assez. Vol. i. p. 404. This is in answer to Hobbes ; the objections of Hobbes, and Descartes' replies, turn very much on this primary difference between ideas as images, which alone our countryman could understand, and ideas as intellects, conceptions, *νοούμενα*, incapable of being imagined, but not less certainly known and reasoned upon. The French is a translation, but made by Clerelier under the eye of Descartes, so that it may be quoted as an original.

* Que dirons-nous maintenant si peut-

être le raisonnement n'est rien autre chose qu'un assemblage et un enchaînement de noms par ce mot *est* ? D'où il s'ensuivroit que par la raison nous ne concluons rien de tout touchant la nature des choses, mais seulement touchant leurs appellations, c'est à dire que par elle nous voyons simplement si nous assemblons bien ou mal les noms des choses, selon les conventions que nous avons faites à notre fantaisie touchant leurs significations. p. 476. Descartes merely answered : — L'assemblage qui se fait dans le raisonnement n'est pas celui des noms, mais bien celui des choses, signifiées par les noms ; et je m'étonne que le contraire puisse venir en l'esprit de personne. Descartes treated Hobbes, whom he did not esteem, with less attention than his other correspondents. Hobbes could not understand what have been called ideas of reflection, such as fear, and thought it was nothing more than the idea of the object feared. "For what else is the fear of a lion," he says, "than the idea of this lion, and the effect which it produces in the heart, which leads us to run away ? But this running is not a thought ; so that nothing of thought exists in fear but the idea of the object." Descartes only replied, "It is self-evident that it is not the same thing to see a lion and fear him, that it is to see him only." p. 483.

more strikingly by the whole theory of infinities, which are certainly somewhat more than bare words, whatever assistance words may give us in explaining them to others or to ourselves.*

99. Dugald Stewart has justly dwelt on the signal service rendered by Descartes to psychological philosophy, by turning the mental vision inward upon itself, and accustoming us to watch the operations of our intellect, which, though employed upon ideas obtained through the senses, are as distinguishable from them as the workman from his work. He has given, indeed, to Descartes a very proud title, Father of the experimental philosophy of the human mind, as if he were to man what Bacon was to nature.† By patient observation of what passed within him, by holding his soul, as it were, like an object in a microscope, which is the only process of a good metaphysician, he became habituated to throw away those integuments of sense which hide us from ourselves. Stewart has censured him for the paradox, as he calls it, that the *essence* of mind consists in thinking, and that of

Stewart's
remarks on
Descartes.

* I suspect, from what I have since read, that Hobbes had a different, and what seems to me a very erroneous view of infinite, or infinitesimal quantities in geometry. For he answers the old sophism of Zeno, Quicquid dividi potest in partes infinitas est infinitum, in a manner which does not meet the real truth of the case: Dividi posse in partes infinitas nihil aliud est quam dividi posse in partes quotcumque quis velit. *Logica sive Computatio*, c. v. p. 38. (edit. 1667.)

† *Dissertation on Progress of Philosophy*. The word experiment must be taken in the sense of observation. Stewart very early took up his admiration for Descartes. "He was the first philosopher who stated in a clear and satisfactory manner the distinction between mind and matter, and who pointed out the proper plan for studying the intellectual philosophy. It is chiefly in consequence of his precise ideas with respect to this distinction, that we may remark in all his metaphysical writings a perspicuity which is not observable in those of any of his predecessors." *Elem. of Philos. of Human Mind*, vol. i. (published in 1792), note A. "When Descartes," he says in the dissertation before quoted, "established it as a general principle,

that *nothing conceivable by the power of imagination could throw any light on the operations of thought*, a principle which I consider as exclusively his own, he laid the foundations of the experimental philosophy of the human mind. That the same truth had been previously perceived more or less distinctly by Bacon and others, appears probable from the general complexion of their speculations; but which of them has expressed it with equal precision, or laid it down as a fundamental maxim in their logic?" The words which I have put in italics seem too vaguely and not very clearly expressed, nor am I aware that they are borne out in their literal sense, by any position of Descartes; nor do I apprehend the allusion to Bacon. But it is certain that Descartes, and still more his disciples Arnaud and Malebranche, take better care to distinguish what can be imagined from what can be conceived or understood, than any of the school of Gassendi in this or other countries. One of the great merits of Descartes as a metaphysical writer, not unconnected with this, is that he is generally careful to avoid figurative language in speaking of mental operations, wherein he has much the advantage over Locke.

matter in extension. That the act of thinking is as inseparable from the mind as extension is from matter, cannot, indeed, be proved; since, as our thoughts are successive, it is not inconceivable that there may be intervals of duration between them; but it can hardly be reckoned a paradox. But whoever should be led by the word essence to suppose, that Descartes confounded the percipient thinking substance, the Ego, upon whose bosom, like that of the ocean, the waves of perception are raised by every breeze of sense, with the perception itself, or even, what is scarcely more tenable, with the reflective action, or thought; that he anticipated this strange paradox of Hume in his earliest work, from which he silently withdrew in his Essays, would not only do great injustice to one of the acutest understandings that ever came to the subject, but overlook several clear assertions of the distinction, especially in his answer to Hobbes. "The thought," he says, "differs from that which thinks, as the mode from the substance."* And Stewart has in his earliest work justly corrected Reid in this point as to the Cartesian doctrine.†

100. Several singular positions which have led to an undue depreciation of Descartes in general as a philosopher occur in his metaphysical writings. Such was his denial of thought, and, as is commonly said, sensation to brutes, which he seems to have founded on the mechanism of the bodily organs, a cause sufficient, in his opinion, to explain all the phænomena of the motions of animals, and to obviate the difficulty of assigning to them immaterial souls‡; his

Paradoxes of
Descartes.

* Vol. i. p. 470. Arnaud objected, in a letter to Descartes, Comment se peut-il faire que la pensée constitue l'essence de l'esprit, puisque l'esprit est une substance, et que la pensée semble n'en être qu'un mode? Descartes replied that thought in general, la pensée, ou la nature qui pense, in which he placed the essence of the soul, was very different from such or such particular acts of thinking. vol. vi. p. 153. 160.

† Philosophy of Human Mind, vol. i. note A. See the Principia, § 63.

‡ It is a common opinion that Descartes denied all life and sensibility to brutes. But this seems not so clear. Il faut remarquer, he says in a letter to More, where he has been arguing against the existence in brutes of any thinking

principe, que je parle de la pensée, non de la vie, ou du sentiment; car je n'ôte la vie à aucun animal, ne la faisant consister que dans la seule chaleur du cœur. Je ne leur refuse pas même le sentiment autant qu'il dépend des organes du corps. vol. x. p. 208. In a longer passage, if he does not express himself very clearly, he admits passions in brutes, and it seems impossible that he could have ascribed passions to what has no sensation. Much of what he here says is very good. Bien que Montaigne et Charron aient dit, qu'il y a plus de différence d'homme à homme que d'homme à bête, il n'est toutefois jamais trouvé aucune bête si parfaite, qu'elle ait usé de quelque signe pour faire entendre à d'autres animaux quelque chose que n'eût point de rapport à

rejection of final causes in the explanation of nature, as far above our comprehension, and unnecessary to those who had the internal proof of God's existence; his still more paradoxical tenet, that the truth of geometrical theorems, and every other axiom of intuitive certainty, depended upon the will of God; a notion that seems to be a relic of his original scepticism, but which he pertinaciously defends throughout his letters.* From remarkable errors men of original and independent genius are rarely exempt; Descartes had pulled down an edifice constructed by the labours of near two thousand years, with great reason in many respects, yet perhaps with too unlimited a disregard of his predecessors; it was his destiny, as it had been theirs, to be sometimes refuted and depreciated in his turn. But the single fact of his having first established, both in philosophical and popular belief, the proper immateriality of the soul, were we even to forget the other great accessions which he made to psychology, would declare

ses passions; et il n'y a point d'homme si imparfait qu'il n'en use; en sorte que ceux qui sont sourds et muets inventent des signes particuliers par lesquels ils expriment leurs pensées; ce qui me semble un très-fort argument pour prouver que ce qui fait que les bêtes ne parlent point comme nous, est qu'elles n'ont aucune pensée, et non point que les organes leur manquent. Et on ne peut dire qu'elles parlent entre elles, mais que nous ne les entendons pas; car comme les chiens et quelques autres animaux nous expriment leurs passions, ils nous exprimeroient aussi-bien leurs pensées s'ils en avoient. Je sais bien que les bêtes font beaucoup de choses mieux que nous, mais je ne m'en étonne pas; car cela même sert à prouver qu'elles agissent naturellement, et par ressorts, ainsi qu'un horloge; laquelle montre bien mieux l'heure qu'il est, que notre jugement nous l'enseigne. . . . On peut seulement dire que, bienque les bêtes ne fassent aucune action qui nous assure qu'elles pensent, toutefois, à cause que les organes de leurs corps ne sont pas fort différens des nôtres, on peut conjecturer qu'il y a quelque pensée jointe à ces organes, ainsi que nous expérimentons en nous, bienque la leur soit beaucoup moins parfaite; à quoi je n'ai rien à répondre, si non que si elles pensoient aussi que nous, elles auroient une ame immortelle aussi-bien que

nous; ce qui n'est pas vraisemblable, à cause qu'il n'y a point de raison pour le croire de quelques animaux, sans le croire de tous, et qu'il y en a plusieurs trop imparfaits pour pouvoir croire cela d'eux, comme sont les huitres, les éponges, &c. vol. ix. p. 425. I do not see the meaning of une ame immortelle in the last sentence; if the words had been une ame immatérielle, it would be to the purpose. More, in a letter to which this is a reply, had argued as if Descartes took brutes for insensible machines, and combats the paradox with the arguments which common sense furnishes. He would even have preferred ascribing immortality to them, as many ancient philosophers did. But surely Descartes, who did not acknowledge any proofs of the immortality of the human soul to be valid, except those founded on revelation, needed not to trouble himself much about this difficulty.

* C'est en effet parler de Dieu comme d'un Jupiter ou d'un Saturne, et l'assujettir au Styx et aux destinées, que de dire que ces vérités sont indépendantes de lui. Ne craignez point, je vous prie, d'assurer et de publier partout que c'est Dieu qui a établi ces lois en la nature, ainsi qu'un roi établit les lois en son royaume. vol. vi. p. 109. He argues as strenuously the same point in p. 132. and p. 307.

the influence he has had on human opinion. From this immateriality, however, he did not derive the tenet of its immortality. He was justly contented to say, that from the intrinsic difference between mind and body, the dissolution of the one could not necessarily take away the existence of the other, but that it was for God to determine whether it should continue to exist; and this determination, as he thought, could only be learned from his revealed will. The more powerful arguments, according to general apprehension, which reason affords for the sentient being of the soul after death, did not belong to the metaphysical philosophy of Descartes, and would never have been very satisfactory to his mind. He says, in one of his letters, that "laying aside what faith assures us of, he owns that it is more easy to make conjectures for our own advantage, and entertain promising hopes, than to feel any confidence in their accomplishment."*

101. Descartes was perhaps the first who saw that definitions of words, already as clear as they can be made, are nugatory or impracticable. This alone would distinguish his philosophy from that of the Aristotelians, who had wearied and confused themselves for twenty centuries with unintelligible endeavours to grasp by definition what refuses to be defined. "Mr. Locke," says Stewart, "claims this improvement as entirely his own, but the merit of it unquestionably belongs to Descartes, although it must be owned that he has not always sufficiently attended to it in his researches."† A still more decisive passage to

His just notion of definitions.

* Vol. ix. p. 369.

† Dissertation, ubi suprâ. Stewart, in his Philosophical Essays, note A, had censured Reid for assigning this remark to Descartes and Locke, but without giving any better reason than that it is found in a work written by Lord Stair; earlier, certainly, than Locke, but not before Descartes. It may be doubtful, as we shall see hereafter, whether Locke has not gone beyond Descartes, or at least distinguished undefinable words more strictly.

[Sir William Hamilton remarks on this passage, where Reid assigns the observation to Descartes and Locke: "This is incorrect. Descartes has little, and Locke no praise for this observation. It had been made by Aristotle, and after him by many others; while, subsequently

to Descartes, and previous to Locke, Pascal, and the Port-Royal logicians, to say nothing of a paper of Leibnitz in 1684, had reduced it to a matter of common-place. In this instance, Locke can indeed be proved a borrower." Hamilton's edition of Reid, p. 220. But this very learned writer quotes no passage from Aristotle to this effect, and certainly the practice of that philosopher and his followers was to attempt definitions of every thing. Nor could Aristotle, or even Descartes, have distinguished undefinable words by their expressing simple ideas of sense or reflection, as Locke has done, when they have not made that classification of ideas into simple and complex, which forms so remarkable a part of his philosophy.—1847.]

this effect, than that referred to by Stewart in the *Principia* will be found in the posthumous dialogue on the Search after Truth. It is objected by one of the interlocutors, as it had actually been by Gassendi, that, to prove his existence by the act of thinking, he should first know what existence and what thought is. "I agree with you," the representative of Descartes replies, "that it is necessary to know what doubt is, and what thought is, before we can be fully persuaded of this reasoning—I doubt, therefore I am—or what is the same—I think, therefore I am. But do not imagine that for this purpose you must torture your mind to find out the next genus, or the essential differences, as the logicians talk, and so compose a regular definition. Leave this to such as teach or dispute in the schools. But whoever will examine things by himself, and judge of them according to his understanding, cannot be so senseless as not to see clearly, when he pays attention, what doubting, thinking, being, are, or to have any need to learn their distinctions. Besides, there are things which we render more obscure in attempting to define them, because, as they are very simple and very clear, we cannot know and comprehend them better than by themselves. And it should be reckoned among the chief errors that can be committed in science for men to fancy that they can define that which they can only conceive, and distinguish what is clear in it from what is obscure, while they do not see the difference between that which must be defined before it is understood, and that which can be fully known by itself. Now, among things which can thus be clearly known by themselves, we must put doubting, thinking, being. For I do not believe any one ever existed so stupid as to need to know what being is before he could affirm that he is; and it is the same of thought and doubt. Nor can he learn these things except by himself, nor be convinced of them but by his own experience, and by that consciousness and inward witness which every man finds in himself when he examines the subject. And as we should define whiteness in vain to a man who can see nothing, while one who can open his eyes and see a white object requires no more, so to know what doubting is, and what thinking is, it is only necessary to doubt and

to think.”* Nothing could more tend to cut short the verbal cavils of the schoolmen, than this limitation of their favourite exercise, definition. It is due, therefore, to Descartes, so often accused of appropriating the discoveries of others, that we should establish his right to one of the most important that the new logic has to boast.

102. He seems, at one moment, to have been on the point of taking another step very far in advance of his age. His notion of substances “Let us take,” he says, “a piece of wax from the honey-comb; it retains some taste and smell, it is hard, it is cold, it has a very marked colour, form, and size. Approach it to the fire; it becomes liquid, warm, inodorous, tasteless; its form and colour are changed, its size is increased. Does the same wax remain after these changes? It must be allowed that it does; no one doubts it, no one thinks otherwise. What was it then that we so distinctly knew to exist in this piece of wax? Nothing certainly that we observed by the senses, since all that the taste, the smell, the sight, the touch reported to us has disappeared, and still the same wax remains.” This something which endures under every change of sensible qualities cannot be imagined; for the imagination must represent some of these qualities, and none of them are essential to the thing; it can only be conceived by the understanding.†

103. It may seem almost surprising to us, after the writings of Locke and his followers on the one hand, not quite correct. and the chemist with his crucible on the other, have chased these abstract substances of material objects from their sanctuaries, that a man of such prodigious acuteness and intense reflection as Descartes should not have remarked that the identity of wax after its liquefaction is merely nominal, and depending on arbitrary language, which in many cases gives new appellations to the same aggregation of particles after a change of their sensible qualities; and that all we call substances are but aggregates of resisting movable corpuscles, which by the laws of nature are capable of affecting our senses differently, according to the combinations they may enter into, and the changes they may successively undergo. But if he had distinctly seen this, which I do not apprehend that he did, it

* Vol. xi. p. 369.

† Méditation Seconde, i. 256.

is not likely that he would have divulged the discovery. He had already given alarm to the jealous spirit of orthodoxy by what now appears to many so self-evident, that they have treated the supposed paradox as a trifling with words, the doctrine that colour, heat, smell, and other secondary qualities, or accidents of bodies, do not exist in them, but in our own minds, and are the effects of their intrinsic or primary qualities. It was the tenet of the schools that these were sensible realities, inherent in bodies ; and the church held as an article of faith, that the substance of bread being withdrawn from the consecrated wafer, the accidents of that substance remained as before, but independent, and not inherent in any other. Arnauld raised this objection, which Descartes endeavoured to repel by a new theory of transubstantiation ; but it always left a shade of suspicion, in the Catholic church of Rome, on the orthodoxy of Cartesianism.

104. "The paramount and indisputable authority which, in all our reasonings concerning the human mind, he ascribes to the evidence of consciousness," is reckoned by Stewart among the great merits of Descartes. ^{His notions of intuitive truth.} It is certain that there are truths which we know, as it is called, intuitively, that is, by the mind's immediate inward glance. And reasoning would be interminable, if it did not find its ultimate limit in truths which it cannot prove. Gassendi imputed to Descartes, that, in his fundamental enthymem, *Cogito, ergo sum*, he supposed a knowledge of the major premise, *Quod cogitat, est*. But Descartes replied that it was a great error to believe that our knowledge of particular propositions must always be deduced from universals, according to the rules of logic ; whereas, on the contrary, it is by means of our knowledge of particulars that we ascend to generals, though it is true that we descend again from them to infer other particular propositions.* It is probable that Gassendi did not make this objection very seriously.

* Vol. ii. p. 305. See, too, the passage, quoted above, in his posthumous dialogue.

[Perhaps the best answer might have been, that *Cogito, ergo sum*, though

thrown into the form of an enthymem, was not meant so much for a logical inference, as an assertion of consciousness. It has been observed, that *Cogito* is equivalent to *Sum cogitans*, and involves the

155. Thus the logic of Descartes, using that word for principles that guide our reasoning, was an instrument of defence both against the scepticism of a former scepticism, that of the Pyrrhonic school, and against the dogmatism of those who pretended to serve under the banner of Aristotle. He who begins in his own consciousness, or who begins in first principles of human knowledge, though he cannot be said to silence his adversary, should have the good sense to be silent himself, which puts equally an end to debate. But so far as we are concerned with the investigation of truth, the Cartesian appeal to our own consciousness, of which Newton was very fond, just as it is in principle, may end in an assumption of our own prejudices as the standard of belief. Nothing can be truly self-evident, but that which a clear, an honest, and an experienced understanding is another man acknowledges to be so.

156. Descartes has left a treatise highly valuable, but not very much known, on the art of logic, or rules for the conduct of the understanding.* Once only, in a letter, he has alluded to the name of Bacon.† There are, perhaps, a few passages in this short tract that remind us of the *Novum Organum*. But I do not know that the coinci-

coincidence. It is impossible to employ rules of logic upon operations of the mind which are anterior to all reasoning. — 157.

* M. Cuvier has translated and republished two works of Descartes which had only appeared in *Opera Postuma Cartesii*, Amstelredam, 1701. Their authenticity, from external and intrinsic grounds, is out of question. One of these is that mentioned in the text; entitled “*Rules for the Direction of the Understanding*,” which, though logical in its subject, takes most of its illustrations from mathematics. The other is a dialogue, left imperfect, in which he sustains the metaphysical principles of his philosophy. Of these two little tracts their editor has said, “that they equal in vigour and perhaps surpass in arrangement the *Meditations* and *Discourse on Method*.” We see in these more unequivocally the main object of Descartes, and the spirit of the revolution which has created modern philosophy, and placed in the understanding itself the

principle of all certainty, the point of departure for all legitimate inquiry. They might seem written but yesterday, and for the present age.” Vol. xi. preface, p. i. I may add to this, that I consider the *Rules for the Direction of the Understanding* as one of the best works on logic (in the enlarged sense) which I have ever read; more practically useful, perhaps, to young students, than the *Novum Organum*; and though, as I have said, his illustrations are chiefly mathematical, most of his rules are applicable to the general discipline of the reasoning powers. It occupies little more than one hundred pages, and I think that I am doing a service in recommending it. Many of the rules will, of course, be found in later books; some possibly in earlier. This tract, as well as the dialogue which follows it, is incomplete, a portion being probably lost.

† Si quelqu’un de cette humeur vouloit entreprendre d’écrire l’histoire des apparences célestes selon la méthode de Verulamius. Vol. vi. p. 210.

dence is such as to warrant a suspicion that he was indebted to it ; we may reckon it rather a parallel, than a derivative logic ; written in the same spirit of cautious, inductive procedure, less brilliant and original in its inventions, but of more general application than the *Novum Organum*, which is with some difficulty extended beyond the province of natural philosophy. Descartes is as averse as Bacon to syllogistic forms. "Truth," he says, "often escapes from these fetters, in which those who employ them remain entangled. This is less frequently the case with those who make no use of logic, experience showing that the most subtle of sophisms cheat none but sophists themselves, not those who trust to their natural reason. And to convince ourselves how little this syllogistic art serves towards the discovery of truth, we may remark that the logicians can form no syllogism with a true conclusion, unless they are already acquainted with the truth that the syllogism develops. Hence it follows that the vulgar logic is wholly useless to him who would discover truth for himself, though it may assist in explaining to others the truth he already knows, and that it would be better to transfer it as a science from philosophy to rhetoric."*

107. It would occupy too much space to point out the many profound and striking thoughts which this treatise on the conduct of the understanding, and indeed most of the writings of Descartes, contain. ^{Merits of his writings.} "The greater part of the questions on which the learned dispute are but questions of words. These occur so frequently that, if philosophers would agree on the signification of their words, scarce any of their controversies would remain." This has been continually said since ; but it is a proof of some progress in wisdom, when the original thought of one age becomes the truism of the next. No one had been so much on his guard against the equivocation of words, or knew so well their relation to the operations of the mind. And it may be said generally, though not without exception, of the metaphysical writings of Descartes, that we find in them a perspicuity which springs from his unremitting attention to the logical process of inquiry, admitting no doubtful or ambiguous posi-

* Vol. xi. p. 255.

tion, and never requiring from his reader a deference to any authority but that of demonstration. It is a great advantage in reading such writers that we are able to discern when they are manifestly in the wrong. The sophisms of Plato, of Aristotle, of the schoolmen, and of a great many recent metaphysicians, are disguised by their obscurity; and while they creep insidiously into the mind of the reader, are always denied and explained away by partial disciples.

108. Stewart has praised Descartes for having recourse to the evidence of consciousness in order to prove the liberty of the will. But he omits to tell us that the notions entertained by this philosopher were not such as have been generally thought compatible with free agency in the only sense that admits of controversy. It was an essential part of the theory of Descartes that God is the cause of all human actions. "Before God sent us into the world," he says in a letter, "he knew exactly what all the inclinations of our will would be; it is he that has implanted them in us; it is he also that has disposed all other things, so that such or such objects should present themselves to us at such or such times, by means of which he has known that our free-will would determine us to such or such actions, and he has willed that it should be so; but he has not willed to compel us thereto." * "We could not demonstrate," he says at another time, "that God exists, except by considering him as a being absolutely perfect; and he could not be absolutely perfect, if there could happen any thing in the world which did not spring entirely from him. . . . Mere philosophy is enough to make us know that there cannot enter the least thought into the mind of man, but God must will and have willed from all eternity that it should enter there." † This is in a letter to his highly intelligent friend, the Princess Palatine Elizabeth, grand-daughter of James I.; and he proceeds to declare himself strongly in favour of predestination, denying wholly any particular providence, to which she had alluded, as changing the decrees of God, and all efficacy of prayer, except as one link in the chain of his determinations. Descartes, therefore, whatever some of his disciples may have become, was far enough from an Arminian theology. "As

His notions
of free-will.

* Vol. ix. p. 374.

† Id. p. 246.

to free-will," he says elsewhere, "I own that thinking only of ourselves we cannot but reckon it independent, but when we think of the infinite power of God we cannot but believe that all things depend on him, and that consequently our free-will must do so too. . . . But since our knowledge of the existence of God should not hinder us from being assured of our free-will, because we feel and are conscious of it in ourselves, so that of our free-will should not make us doubt of the existence of God. For the independence which we experience and feel in ourselves, and which is sufficient to make our actions praiseworthy or blamable, is not incompatible with a dependence of another nature, according to which all things are subject to God." *

109. A system so novel, so attractive to the imagination by its bold and brilliant paradoxes as that of Descartes, could not but excite the attention of an age Fame of his system, and attacks upon it. already roused to the desire of a new philosophy, and to the scorn of ancient authority. His first treatises appeared in French; and, though he afterwards employed Latin, his works were very soon translated by his disciples, and under his own care. He wrote in Latin with great perspicuity; in French with liveliness and elegance. His mathematical and optical writings gave him a reputation which envy could not take away, and secured his philosophy from that general ridicule which sometimes overwhelms an obscure author. His very enemies, numerous and vehement as they were, served to enhance the celebrity of the Cartesian system, which he seems to have anticipated by publishing their objections to his *Meditations* with his own replies. In the universities, bigoted for the most part to Aristotelian authority, he had no chance of public reception; but the influence of the universities was much diminished in France, and a new theory had perhaps better chances in its favour on account of their opposition. But the Jesuits, a more powerful body, were in general adverse to the Cartesian system, and especially some time afterwards, when it was supposed to have the countenance of several leading Jansenists. The Epicurean school,

* Vol. ix. p. 368. This had originally been stated in the *Principia* with less confidence, the free-will of man and pre-determination of God being both asserted as true, but their co-existence incomprehensible. Vol. iii. p. 86.

led by Gassendi and Hobbes, presented a formidable phalanx ; since it in fact comprehended the wits of the world, the men of indolence and sensuality, quick to discern the many weaknesses of Cartesianism, with no capacity for its excellencies. It is unnecessary to say how predominant this class was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both in France and England.

110. Descartes was evidently in considerable alarm lest the church should bear with its weight upon his philosophy.* He had the censure on Galileo before his eyes, and certainly used some chicane of words as to the earth's movement upon this account. It was, however, in the Protestant country which he had chosen as his harbour of refuge that he was doomed to encounter the roughest storm. Gisbert Voet, an eminent theologian in the university of Utrecht, and the head of the party in the church of Holland, which had been victorious in the synod of Dort, attacked Descartes with all the virulence and bigotry characteristic of his school of divinity. The famous demonstration of the being of God he asserted to be a cover for atheism, and thus excited a flame of controversy, Descartes being not without supporters in the university, especially Regius, professor of medicine. The philosopher was induced by these assaults to change his residence from a town in the province of Utrecht to Leyden. Voet did not cease to pursue him with outrageous calumny, and succeeded in obtaining decrees of the senate and university of Utrecht, which interdicted Regius from teaching that "new and unproved (*præsumpta*) philosophy" to his pupils. The war of libels on the Voetian side did not cease for some years, and Descartes replied with no small acrimony against Voet himself. The latter had recourse to the civil power, and instituted a prosecution against Descartes, which was quashed by the interference of the Prince of Orange. But many in the university of Leyden, under the influence of a notable theologian of that age, named Triglandius, one of the stoutest champions of Dutch orthodoxy,

* On a tellement assujetti la théologie à Aristote, qu'il est impossible d'expliquer une autre philosophie qu'il ne semble d'abord qu'elle soit contre la foi. Et à propos de ceci, je vous prie de me mander

s'il n'y a rien de déterminé en la foi touchant l'étendue du monde : savoir s'il est fini ou plutôt infini, et si tout ce qu'on appelle espaces imaginaires soient des corps créés et véritables. Vol. vi. p. 73.

raised a cry against the Cartesian philosophy as being favourable to Pelagianism and popery, the worst names that could be given in Holland; and it was again through the protection of the Prince of Orange that he escaped a public censure. Regius, the most zealous of his original advocates, began to swerve from the fidelity of a sworn disciple, and published a book containing some theories of his own, which Descartes thought himself obliged to disavow. Ultimately he found, like many benefactors of mankind, that he had purchased reputation at the cost of peace; and, after some visits to France, where, probably from the same cause, he never designed to settle, found an honourable asylum and a premature death at the court of Christina. He died in 1651, having worked a more important change in speculative philosophy than any who had preceded him since the revival of learning; for there could be no comparison in that age, between the celebrity and effect of his writings and those of Lord Bacon.*

111. The prejudice against Descartes, especially in his own country, was aggravated by his indiscreet and not very warrantable assumption of perfect originality.† No one, I think, can fairly refuse to own, that the Cartesian metaphysics, taken in their consecutive arrangement, form truly an original system; and it would be equally unjust to deny the splendid discoveries he developed in algebra and optics. But upon every one subject which Descartes treated, he has not escaped the charge of plagiarism; pro-

Charges of
plagiarism.

* The life of Descartes was written, very fully and with the warmth of a disciple, by Baillet, in two volumes quarto, 1691, of which he afterwards published an abridgement. In this we find at length the attacks made on him by the Voetian theologians. Brucker has given a long and valuable account of the Cartesian philosophy, but not favourable, and perhaps not quite fair. Vol. v. p. 200—334. Buhle is, as usual, much inferior to Brucker. But those who omit the mathematical portion will not find the original works of Descartes very long, and they are well worthy of being read.

† I confess, he says in his logic, that I was born with such a temper, that the chief pleasure I find in study is not from learning the arguments of others, but by

inventing my own. This disposition alone impelled me in youth to the study of science; hence, whenever a new book promised by its title some new discovery, before sitting down to read it, I used to try whether my own natural sagacity could lead me to any thing of the kind, and I took care not to lose this innocent pleasure by too hasty a perusal. This answered so often that I at length perceived that I arrived at truth, not as other men do, after blind and precarious guesses, by good luck rather than skill, but that long experience had taught me certain fixed rules, which were of surprising utility, and of which I afterwards made use to discover more truths. Vol. xi. p. 252.

fessing always to be ignorant of what had been done by others, he falls perpetually into their track; more, as his adversaries maintained, than the chances of coincidence could fairly explain. Leibnitz has summed up the claims of earlier writers to the pretended discoveries of Descartes; and certainly it is a pretty long bill to be presented to any author. I shall insert this passage in a note, though much of it has no reference to this portion of the Cartesian philosophy.* It

* Dogmata ejus metaphysica, velut circa ideas a sensibus remotas, et animæ distinctionem a corpore, et fluxam per se rerum materialium fidem, prorsus Platonica sunt. Argumentum pro existentia Dei, ex eo, quod ens perfectissimum, vel quo majus intelligi non potest, existentiam includit, fuit Anselmi, et in libro "Contra insipientem" inscripto extat inter ejus opera, passimque a scholasticis examinatur. In doctrina de continuo, pleno et loco Aristotelem noster secutus est, Stoicosque in re morali penitus expressit, floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant. In explicatione rerum mechanica Leucippum et Democritum præeuntes habuit qui et vortices ipsos jam docuerant. Jordanus Brunus easdem fere de magnitudine universi ideas habuisse dicitur, quemadmodum et notavit V. CC. Stephanus Spleissius, ut de Gilberto nil dicam, cujus magneticæ considerationes tum per se, tum ad systema universi applicatæ, Cartesio plurimum profuerunt. Explicationem gravitatis per materiæ solidioris rejectionem in tangente, quod in physica Cartesianapropepulcherrimum est, didicit ex Keplero, qui similitudine palearum motu aquæ in vase gyrantis ad centrum contrusarum rem explicuit primus. Actionem lucis in distans, similitudine baculi pressi jam veteres adumbrare. Circa iridem a M. Antonio de Dominis non parum lucis accepit. Keplerum fuisse primum suum in dioptrici magistrum, et in eo argumento omnes ante se mortales longo intervallo antegressum, fatetur Cartesius in epistolis familiaribus; nam in scriptis, quæ ipse edidit, longè abest a tali confessione aut laude; tametsi illa ratio, quæ rationum directionem explicat, ex compositione nimirum duplicis conatûs perpendicularis ad superficiem et ad eandem paralleli, disertè apud Keplerum extet, qui eodem, ut Cartesius, modo æqualitatem angulorum incidentiæ et reflexi-

onis hinc deducit. Idque gratam mentionem ideo merebatur, quod omnis prope Cartesii ratiocinatio huic innititur principio. Legem refractionisprimum invenisse Willebroodum Snellium, Isaacus Vossius patefecit, quanquam non ideo negare ausim, Cartesium in eadem incidere potuisse de suo. Negavit in epistolis Vietam sibi lectum, sed Thomæ Harrioti Angli libros analyticos posthumos anno 1631 editos vidisse multi vix dubitant; usque adeo magnus est eorum consensus cum calculo geometriæ Cartesianæ. Sane jam Harriotus æquationem nihilo æqualem posuit, et hinc derivavit, quomodo oriatur æquatio ex multiplicatione radicum in se invicem, et quomodo radicum auctione, diminutione, multiplicatione aut divisione variari æquatio possit, et quomodo proinde natura, et constitutio æquationum et radicum cognosci possit ex terminorum habitudine. Itaque narrat celeberrimus Wallisius, Robervalium, qui miratus erat, unde Cartesio in mentem venisset palmarium illud, æquationem ponere æqualem nihilo ad instar unius quantitatis, ostenso sibi a Domino de Cavendish libro Harrioti exclamasse, il l'a vu! il l'a vu! vidit, vidit. Reductionem quadrato-quadratæ æquationis ad cubicam superiori jam sæculo inventit Ludovicus Ferrarius, cujus vitam reliquit Cardanus ejus familiaris. Denique fuit Cartesius, ut a viris doctis dudum notatum est, et ex epistolis nimium apparet, immodicus contemptor aliorum, et famæ cupiditate ab artificiis non abstinens, quæ parum generosa videri possunt. Atque hæc profecto non dico animo obtreectandi viro, quem mirificè æstimo, sed eo consilio, ut cuique suum tribuatur, nec unus omnium laudes absorbeat; justissimum enim est, ut inventoribus suis honos constet, nec sublati virtutum præmiis præclara faciendi studium refrigescat. Leibnitz, apud Brucker, v. 255.

may perhaps be thought by candid minds, that we cannot apply the doctrine of chances to coincidence of reasoning in men of acute and inquisitive spirits, as fairly as we may to that of style or imagery; but, if we hold strictly that the old writer may claim the exclusive praise of a philosophical discovery, we must regret to see such a multitude of feathers plucked from the wing of an eagle.

112. The name of Descartes as a great metaphysical writer has revived in some measure of late years; and this has been chiefly owing, among ourselves, Recent increase of his fame. to Dugald Stewart, in France, to the growing disposition of their philosophers to cast away their idols of the eighteenth century. "I am disposed," says our Scottish philosopher, "to date the origin of the true philosophy of mind from the *Principia* (why not the earlier works?) of Descartes, rather than from the *Organum* of Bacon, or the *Essays* of Locke; without, however, meaning to compare the French author with our two countrymen, either as a contributor to our stock of *facts* relating to the intellectual phenomena, or as the author of any important conclusion concerning the general laws to which they may be referred." The excellent edition by M. Cousin, in which alone the entire works of Descartes can be found, is a homage that France has recently offered to his memory, and an important contribution to the studios both of metaphysical and mathematical philosophy. I have made use of no other, though it might be desirable for the inquirer to have the Latin original at his side, especially in those works which had not been seen in French by their author.

SECT. IV.

On the Metaphysical Philosophy of Hobbes.

113. THE metaphysical philosophy of Hobbes was promulgated in his treatise on Human Nature, which appeared in 1650. This, with his other works, *De Cive* and *De Corpore Politico*, were fused into that Metaphysical treatises of Hobbes. great and general system, which he published in 1651 with

the title of *Leviathan*. The first part of the *Leviathan*, "Of Man," follows the several chapters of the treatise on Human Nature with much regularity; but so numerous are the enlargements or omissions, so many are the variations with which the author has expressed the same positions, that they should much rather be considered as two works, than as two editions of the same. They differ more than Lord Bacon's treatise, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, does from his *Advancement of Learning*. I shall, however, blend the two in a single analysis, and this I shall generally give, as far as is possible, consistently with my own limits, in the very words of Hobbes. His language is so lucid and concise, that it would be almost as improper to put an algebraical process in different terms as some of his metaphysical paragraphs. But as a certain degree of abridgement cannot be dispensed with, the reader must not take it for granted, even where inverted commas denote a closer attention to the text, that nothing is omitted, although, in such cases, I never hold it permissible to make any change.

114. All single thoughts, it is the primary tenet of Hobbes, are representations or appearances of some quality of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. "There is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original."* In the treatise on Human Nature he dwells long on the immediate causes of sensation; and if no alteration had been made in his manuscript since he wrote his dedication to the Earl of Newcastle in 1640, he must be owned to have anticipated Descartes in one of his most celebrated doctrines. "Because the image in vision, consisting in colour and shape, is the knowledge we have of the qualities of the object of that sense, it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion, that the same colour and shape are the very qualities themselves; and for the same cause, that sound and noise are the qualities of the bell, or of the air. And this opinion hath been so long received, that the contrary must needs appear a great paradox; and yet the introduction of species visible and intelligible (which is

His theory of
sensation

coincident
with Des-
cartes.

* *Leviathan*, c. 1.

necessary for the maintenance of that opinion), passing to and fro from the object, is worse than any paradox, as being a plain impossibility. I shall, therefore, endeavour to make plain these points: 1. That the subject wherein colour and image are inherent is not the object or thing seen. 2. That there is nothing without us (really) which we call an image or colour. 3. That the said image or colour is but an apposition unto us of the motion, agitation or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some external substance of the head. 4. That, as in vision, so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses, the subject of their inherence is not the object, but the sentient.”* And this he goes on to prove. Nothing of this will be found in the *Discours sur la Méthode*, the only work of Descartes then published; and, even, if we believe Hobbes to have interpolated this chapter after he had read the *Meditations*, he has stated the principles so clearly and illustrated it so copiously, that, so far especially as Locke and the English metaphysicians took it up, we may almost reckon him another original source.

115. The second chapter of the *Leviathan*, “On Imagination,” begins with one of those acute and original observations we often find in Hobbes: “That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat stay it, though the reason be the same, namely that nothing can change itself, is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves; and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain and lassitude, think every thing else grows weary of motion and seeks repose of its own accord.” The physical principle had lately been established, but the reason here given for the contrary prejudice, though not the sole one, is ingenious and even true. Imagination he defines to be “conception remaining, and by little and little decaying after the act of sense.”† This he afterwards expressed less happily, “the gradual decline of the motion in which sense consists;” his phraseology becoming more and

Imagination and memory.

* Hum. Nat. c. 2.

† Id. c. 3.

more tiuctured with the materialism which he affected in all his philosophy. Neither definition seems at all applicable to the imagination which calls up long past perceptions. "This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself (I mean fancy itself), we call imagination, but when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old and past, it is called memory. So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names."* It is however evident that imagination and memory are distinguished by something more than their names." The second fundamental error of Hobbes in his metaphysics, his extravagaint nominalism, if so it should be called, appears in this sentence, as the first, his materialism, does in that previously quoted.

116. The phenomena of dreaming and the phantasms of waking men are considered in this chapter with the keen observation and cool reason of Hobbes.† I am not sure that he has gone more profoundly into psychological speculations in the *Leviathan* than in the earlier treatise; but it bears witness more frequently to what had probably been the growth of the intervening period, a proneness to political and religious allusion, to magnify civil and to depreciate ecclesiastical power. "If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it prognostics from dreams, false prophecies and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty and ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience. And this ought to be the work of the schools; but they rather nourish such doctrine."‡

117. The fourth chapter on Human Nature, and the corresponding third chapter of the *Leviathan*, entitled *On Discourse, or the Consequence and Train of Imagination*, are among the most remarkable in Hobbes, as they contain the elements of that theory of association, which was slightly touched afterwards by Locke, but developed and pushed to a far greater extent by Hartley. "The cause," he says, "of the coherence or consequence of one conception to another is their first coherence or consequence at that time when they are produced by sense: as

Discourse
or train of
imagin-
ation.

* Lev. c. 2.

† Hum. Nat. c. 3.

‡ Id. *ibid.*

for instance, from St. Andrew the mind runneth to St. Peter, because their names are read together ; from St. Peter to a stone, from the same cause ; from stone to foundation, because we see them together ; and for the same cause from foundation to church, and from church to people, and from people to tumult ; and according to this example the mind may run almost from any thing to any thing.”* This he illustrates in the Leviathan by the well-known anecdote of a question suddenly put by one, in conversation about the death of Charles I., “ What was the value of a Roman penny ? ” Of this *discourse*, as he calls it, in a larger sense of the word than is usual with the logicians, he mentions several kinds ; and after observing that the remembrance of succession of one thing to another, that is, of what was antecedent and what consequent and what concomitant, is called an experiment, adds, that “ to have had many experiments, is what we call experience, which is nothing else but remembrance of what antecedents have been followed by what consequents.”†

118. “ No man can have a conception of the future, for the future is not yet, but of our conceptions of the past we make a future, or rather call past future ^{Experience.} relatively.”‡ And again : “ The present only has a being in nature ; things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all ; the future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past to the actions that are present, which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough. And though it be called prudence, when the event answereth our expectation, yet in its own nature it is but presumption.”§ “ When we have observed antecedents and consequents frequently associated, we take one for a sign of the other, as clouds foretell rain, and rain is a sign there have been clouds. But signs are but conjectural, and their assurance is never full or evident. For though a man have always seen the day and night to follow one another hitherto, yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so, eternally. Experience

* Hum. Nat. c. 4. § 2.

† Id.

‡ Hum. Nat. c. 4. § 7.

§ Lev. c. 3.

concludeth nothing universally. But those who have most experience conjecture best, because they have most signs to conjecture by; hence old men, *cæteris paribus*, and men of quick parts, conjecture better than the young or dull.* "But experience is not to be equalled by any advantage of natural and extemporary wit, though perhaps many young men think the contrary." There is a presumption of the past as well as the future founded on experience, as when from having often seen ashes after fire, we infer from seeing them again that there has been fire. But this is as conjectural as our expectations of the future.†

119. In the last paragraph of the chapter in the *Leviathan* than he adds, what is a very leading principle in the philosophy of Hobbes, but seems to have no particular relation to what has preceded. "Whatsoever we imagine is finite; therefore there is no idea or conception of any thing we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the things named, having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible and his greatness and power are inconceivable, but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever, as I said before, we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man, therefore, can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place, and indeed with some determinate magnitude, and which may be divided into parts, nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time, nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once. For none of these things ever have, or can be incident to sense, but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived or deceiving schoolmen." This, we have seen in the last section, had been already discussed with Descartes. The para-

Unconceiv-
ableness of
infinity.

* Hum. Nat. c. 4.

† Lev. c. 3.

logism of Hobbes consists in his imposing a limited sense on the word idea or conception, and assuming that what cannot be conceived according to that sense has no signification at all.

120. The next chapter being the fifth in one treatise, and the fourth in the other, may be reckoned, perhaps, the most valuable as well as original, in the writings of Hobbes. It relates to speech and language. ^{Origin of language.} "The invention of printing," he begins by observing, "though ingenious, compared with the invention of letters, is no great matter. . . . But the most noble and profitable invention of all others, was that of speech, consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion, whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation ; without which there had been amongst men neither commonwealth, nor society, nor content nor peace, no more than among lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight ; for the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion, and to join them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood ; and so by succession of time so much language might be gotten as he had found use for, though not so copious as an orator or philosopher has need of."*

121. This account of the original of language appears in general as probable as it is succinct and clear. But the assumption that there could have been no society or mutual peace among mankind without language, ^{His political theory interferes.} the ordinary instrument of contract, is too much founded upon his own political speculations. Nor is it proved by the comparison to lions, bears, and wolves, even if the analogy could be admitted ; since the state of warfare which he here intimates to be natural to man, does not commonly subsist in these wild animals of the same species. *Sævis inter se convenit ursis*, is an old remark. But taking mankind with as much propensity to violence towards each other as Hobbes could suggest, is it speech, or reason and the sense of self-

* *Leviathan*, c. 4.

interest, which has restrained him within the boundaries imposed on it by civil society? The position appears to be, that man, with every other faculty and attribute of his nature, except language, could never have lived in community with his fellows. It is manifest, that the mechanism of such a community would have been very imperfect. But possessing his rational powers, it is hard to see why he might not have devised signs to make known his special wants, or why he might not have attained the peculiar prerogative of his species and foundation of society, the exchange of what he liked less for what he liked better.

122. This will appear more evident, and the exaggerated notions of the school of Hobbes as to the absolute necessity of language to the mutual relations of mankind will be checked, by considering what was not so well understood in his age as at present, the intellectual capacities of those who are born deaf, and the resources which they are able to employ. It can hardly be questioned, but that a number of families thrown together in this unfortunate situation, without other intercourse, could by the exercise of their natural reason, as well as the domestic and social affections, constitute themselves into a sort of commonwealth, at least as regular as that of ants and bees. But those whom we have known to want the use of speech have also wanted the sense of hearing, and have thus been shut out from many assistances to the reasoning faculties, which our hypothesis need not exclude. The fair supposition is that of a number of persons merely dumb; and although they would not have laws or learning, it does not seem impossible that they might maintain at least a patriarchal, if not a political, society for many generations. Upon the lowest supposition, they could not be inferior to the Chimpanzees, who are said to live in communities in the forests of Angola.

123. The succession of conceptions in the mind depending wholly on that which they had one to another when produced by the senses, they cannot be recalled at our choice and the need we have of them, "but as it chanceth us to hear and see such things as shall bring them to our mind. Hence brutes are unable to call what they want to mind, and often, though they hide food, do not know where

Capacity
of speech ex-
aggerated.

Use of
language.

to find it. But man has the power to set up marks or sensible objects, and remember thereby somewhat past. The most eminent of these are names or articulate sounds, by which we recall some conception of things to which we give those names; as the appellation white bringeth to remembrance the quality of such objects as produce that colour or conception in us. It is by names that we are capable of science, as for instance, that of number; for beasts cannot number for want of words, and do not miss one or two out of their young, nor could a man without repeating orally or mentally the words of number know how many pieces of money may be before him.* We have here another assumption, that the numbering faculty is not stronger in man than in brutes, and also that the former could not have found out how to divide a heap of coins into parcels without the use of words of number. The experiment might be tried with a deaf and dumb child.

124. Of names some are proper, and some common to many or universal, there being nothing in the world universal but names, for the things named are every one of them individual and singular. "One universal name is imposed on many things for their similitude in some quality or other accidents; and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many."† "The universality of one name to many things hath been the cause that men think the things are themselves universal, and so seriously contend that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet something else that we call man, viz. man in general, deceiving themselves by taking the universal or general appellation for the thing it signifieth.‡

Names universal not realities.

* Ilum. Nat. c. 5.

† Lev. c. 4.

‡ "An universal," he says in his Logic, "is not a name of many things collectively, but of each taken separately (sigillatim sumptorum). Man is not the name of the human species, in general, but of each single man, Peter, John, and the rest, separately. Therefore this universal name is not the name of any thing existing in nature, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always

of some word or name. Thus when an animal, or a stone, or a ghost (spectrum), or any thing else is called universal, we are not to understand that any man or stone or any thing else was, or is, or can be, an universal, but only that these words animal, stone, and the like, are universal names, that is, names common to many things, and the conceptions corresponding to them in the mind are the images and phantasms of single animals or other things. And therefore we do not

For if the painter desire the painter to draw him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in general, he himself is to draw. Which Hobbes seems to suppose of them that are of such sort, or say we, some of which are indefinite. But what he would have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular person, he instructs the painter so that one person be chosen. It is plain, therefore, that there is nothing improper for names, which are therefore called indefinite.*

§ 25. "By this imposition of names, some of which, some ^{be a} ^{man} of another signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations."— Hence he thinks that though a man with text and mind might by meditation show that the angles of one triangle are equal to two right ones, he could not, in seeing another triangle of different shape, under the same without a similar process. But by the help of words after having observed the equality is not consequent in any thing peculiar to one triangle, but on the number of sides and angles which is common to all, he registers his discovery in a proposition. This is surely to confound the antecedent process of reasoning with what he calls the register, which follows it. The instance, however, is not happily chosen, and Hobbes has conceded the whole point in question, by admitting that the truth of the proposition could be observed, which cannot require the use of

words, in order to understand what is meant by an intellect, any other faculty than that of imagination, by which we remember that such words have excited the conception in our minds sometimes of one particular thing, sometimes of another. Cap. 2. § 9. Imagination and memory are used by Hobbes almost as synonyms.

* *Ibid.* Nat. c. 5.

† It may deserve to be remarked that Hobbes himself, nominalist as he was, did not limit reasoning to comparison of propositions, as some later writers have been inclined to do, and as in his objections to Descartes he might seem to do himself. This may be inferred from the sentence quoted in the text, and more

expressly, though not quite perspicuously, from a passage in the *Compendio sive Logica*, his Latin treatise published after the *Leviathan*. *Quomodo autem animo sine verbis factis cogitationibus ratiocinando cadere et subsistere solimus uno aut altero exemplo ostendendum est. Si quis ergo e longinquo aliquid obscure videat, etsi nulla sint imposita vocabula, habet tamen ejus rei ideam eandem propter quam impositis nunc vocabulis dicit eam rem esse corpus. Postquam autem propius accesserit, videritque eandem rem certo quodam modo nunc uno, nunc alio in loco esse, habebit ejusdem ideam novam, propter quam nunc talem rem animatam vocat, &c. p. 2.*

words.* He expresses the next sentence with more felicity. "And thus the consequence found in one particular comes to be registered and remembered as an universal rule, and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind saving the first, and makes that which was found true here and now to be true in all times and places."†

126. The equivocal use of names makes it often difficult to recover those conceptions for which they were designed "not only in the language of others, The subject continued. wherein we are to consider the drift and occasion and contexture of the speech, as well as the words themselves, but in our own discourse, which being derived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth unto us not our own conceptions. It is, therefore, a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of language, to deliver himself from equivocation, and to find out the true meaning of what is said; and this is it we call understanding."‡ "If speech be peculiar to man, as for ought I know it is, then is understanding peculiar to him also; understanding being nothing else but conception caused by speech."§ This definition is arbitrary and not conformable to the usual sense. "True and false," he observes afterwards, "are attributes of speech not of things; where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood, though there may be error. Hence as truth consists in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeks precise truth hath need to remember what every word he uses stands for and place it

* The demonstration of the thirty-second proposition of Euclid could leave no one in doubt whether this property were common to all triangles, after it had been proved in a single instance. It is said, however, to be recorded by an ancient writer, that this discovery was first made as to equilateral, afterwards as to isosceles, and lastly as to other triangles. Stewart's *Philosophy of Human Mind*, vol. ii. chap. iv. sect. 2. The mode of proof must have been different from that of Euclid. And this might possibly lead us to suspect the truth of the tradition. For if the equality of the angles of a triangle to two right angles admitted of

any *elementary* demonstration, such as might occur in the infancy of geometry, without making use of the property of parallel lines, assumed in the twelfth axiom of Euclid, the difficulties consequent on that assumption would readily be evaded. See the Note on Euclid, i. 29., by Playfair, who has given a demonstration of his own, but one which involves the idea of motion rather more than was usual with the Greeks in their elementary propositions.

† Lev.

‡ Hum. Nat.

§ Lev.

accordingly. In geometry, the only science hitherto known, men begin by definitions. And every man who aspires to true knowledge should examine the definitions of former authors, and either correct them or make them anew. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid without reckoning anew from the beginning in which lies the foundation of their errors. . . . In the right definition of names, lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science. And in wrong or no definitions lies the first abuse from which proceed all false and senseless tenets, which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrine, ignorance is in the middle. Words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools."*

127. "The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourse of men of inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affections are but conceptions, when we conceive the same thoughts differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive be the same, yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions. And therefore, in reasoning, a man must take heed of words, which, besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man calleth wisdom what another calleth fear, and one cruelty what another justice; one prodigality what another magnanimity, and one gravity what another stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any

Names differently imposed.

ratiocination. No more can metaphors and tropes of speech, but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy, which the other do not."* Thus ends this chapter of the *Leviathan*, which, with the corresponding one in the treatise on *Human Nature*, are, notwithstanding what appear to me some erroneous principles, as full, perhaps, of deep and original thoughts as any other pages of equal length on the art of reasoning and philosophy of language. Many have borrowed from Hobbes without naming him; and in fact he is the founder of the nominalist school in England. He may probably have conversed with Bacon on these subjects; we see much of that master's style of illustration. But as Bacon was sometimes too excursive to sift particulars, so Hobbes has sometimes wanted a comprehensive view.

128. "There are," to proceed with Hobbes, "two kinds of knowledge; the one, sense, or knowledge original, and remembrance of the same; the other, science, ^{Knowledge.} or knowledge of the truth of propositions, derived from understanding. Both are but experience, one of things from without, the other from the proper use of words in language, and experience being but remembrance, all knowledge is remembrance. Knowledge implies two things, truth and evidence; the latter is the concomitance of a man's conception with the words that signify such conception in the act of ratiocination." If a man does not annex a meaning to his words, his conclusions are not evident to him. "Evidence is to truth as the sap to the tree, which, so far as it creepeth along with the body and branches, keepeth them alive; when it forsaketh them they die; for this evidence, which is meaning with our words, is the life of truth." "Science is evidence of truth, from some beginning or principle of sense. The first principle of knowledge is that we have such and such conceptions; the second, that we have thus and thus named the things whereof they are conceptions; the third is, that we have joined those names in such manner as to make true propositions; the fourth and last is, that we have joined these propositions in such manner as they be concluding, and the truth of the conclusion said to be known."†

* Lev.

† Hum. Nat. c. 6.

129. Reasoning is the addition or subtraction of parcels.

Reasoning.

"In whatever matter there is room for addition and subtraction, there is room for reason; and where these have no place, then reason has nothing at all to do." * This is neither as perspicuously expressed, nor as satisfactorily illustrated, as is usual with Hobbes; but it is true that all syllogistic reasoning is dependent upon quantity alone, and consequently upon that which is capable of addition and subtraction. This seems not to have been clearly perceived by some writers of the old Aristotelian school, or perhaps by some others, who, as far as I can judge, have a notion that the relation of a genus to a species, or a predicate to its subject, considered merely as to syllogism or deductive reasoning, is something different from that of a whole to its parts; which would deprive that logic of its chief boast, its axiomatic evidence. But, as this would appear too dry to some readers, I shall pursue it farther in a note.†

* Lev. c. 5.

† Dugald Stewart (Elements of Philosophy, &c. vol. ii. ch. ii. sect. 2.) has treated this theory of Hobbes on reasoning, as well as that of Condillac, which seems much the same, with great scorn, as "too puerile to admit of (i. e. require) refutation." I do not myself think the language of Hobbes, either here, or as quoted by Stewart from his Latin treatise on Logic, so perspicuous as usual. But I cannot help being of opinion that he is substantially right. For surely, when we assert that A is B, we assert that all things which fall under the class B, taken collectively, comprehend A; or, that $B = A + X$: B being here put, it is to be observed, not for the *res prædicata* itself, but for the concrete, *de quibus prædicandum est*. I mention this, because this elliptical use of the word predicate seems to have occasioned some confusion in writers on logic. The predicate, strictly taken, being an attribute or quality, cannot be said to include or contain the subject. But to return, when we say $B = A + X$, or $B - X = A$, since we do not compare, in such a proposition, as is here supposed, A with X, we only mean that $A = A$, or, that a certain part of B is the same as itself. Again, in a particular affirmative, Some A is B, we assert that part of

A, or $A - Y$, is contained in B, or that B may be expressed by $A - Y + X$. So also when we say, Some A is not B, we equally divide the class or genus B into $A - Y$ and X, or assert that $B = A - Y + X$; but, in this case, the subject is no longer $A - Y$, but the remainder, or other part of A, namely, Y; and this is not found in either term of the predicate. Finally, in the universal negative, No A (neither $A - Y$ nor Y) is B, the $A - Y$ of the predicate vanishes or has no value, and B becomes equal to X, which is incapable of measurement with A, and consequently with either $A - Y$ or Y, which make up A. Now if we combine this with another proposition, in order to form a syllogism, and say that C is A, we find, as before, that $A = C + Z$; and substituting this value of A in the former proposition, it appears that $B = C + Z + X$. Then, in the conclusion, we have, C is B; that is, C is a part of $C + Z + X$. And the same in the three other cases or moods of the figure. This seems to be, in plainer terms, what Hobbes means by addition or subtraction of parcels, and what Condillac means by rather a lax expression, that equations and propositions are at bottom the same, or, as he phrases it better, "l'évidence de rai-

130. A man may reckon without the use of words in particular things, as in conjecturing from the sight of any thing what is likely to follow; and if he reckons

False reasoning.

son consiste uniquement dans l'identité." If we add to this, as he probably intended, non-identity, as the condition of all negative conclusions, it seems to be no more than is necessarily involved in the fundamental principle of syllogism, the *dictum de omni et nullo*; which may be thus reduced to its shortest terms: "Whatever can be divided into parts, includes all those parts, and nothing else." This is not limited to mathematical quantity, but includes every thing which admits of more and less. Hobbes has a good passage in his *Logic* on this: *Non putandum est computationi, id est, ratiocinationi in numeris tantum locum esse, tanquam hominibus a cæteris animantibus, quod censuisse narratur Pythagoras, sola numerandi facultate distinctus esset; nam et magnitudo magnitudini, corpus corpori, motus motui, tempus tempori, gradus qualitatis gradui, actio actioni, conceptus conceptui, proportio proportioni, oratio orationi, nomen nomini, in quibus omne philosophiæ genus continetur, adjici adimique potest.*

But it does not follow by any means that we should assent to the strange passages quoted by Stewart from Condillac and Diderot, which reduce all *knowledge* to identical propositions. Even in geometry, where the objects are strictly magnitudes, the countless variety in which their relations may be exhibited constitutes the riches of that inexhaustible science; and in moral or physical propositions, the relation of quantity between the subject and predicate, as concretes, which enables them to be compared, though it is the sole foundation of all *general deductive reasoning*, or syllogism, has nothing to do with the other properties or relations, of which we obtain a knowledge by means of that comparison. In mathematical reasoning, we infer as to quantity through the medium of quantity; in other reasoning, we use the same medium, but our inference is as to truths which do not lie within that category. Thus in the hackneyed instance, All men are mortal; that is, mortal creatures include men and something more, it is absurd to assert, that we only know that men are men. It is true that our knowledge of the

truth of the proposition comes by the help of this comparison of men in the subject with men in the predicate; but the very nature of the proposition discovers a constant relation between the individuals of the human species and that mortality which is predicated of them along with others; and it is in this, not in an identical equation, as Diderot seems to have thought, that our *knowledge* consists.

The remarks of Stewart's friend, M. Prevost of Geneva, on the principle of identity as the basis of mathematical science, and which the former has candidly subjoined to his own volume, appear to me very satisfactory. Stewart comes to admit that the dispute is nearly verbal; but we cannot say that he originally treated it as such; and the principle itself, both as applied to geometry and to logic, is, in my opinion, of some importance to the clearness of our conceptions as to those sciences. It may be added, that Stewart's objection to the principle of identity as the basis of geometrical reasoning is less forcible in its application to syllogism. He is willing to admit that magnitudes capable of coincidence by immediate superposition may be reckoned identical, but scruples to apply such a word to those which are dissimilar in figure, as the rectangles of the means and extremes of four proportional lines. Neither one nor the other are, in fact, identical as real quantities, the former being necessarily conceived to differ from each other by position in space, as much as the latter; so that the expression he quotes from Aristotle, *ἐν τοιούτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἐνός*, or any similar one of modern mathematicians, can only refer to the abstract magnitude of their areas, which being divisible into the same number of equal parts, they are called the same. And there seems no real difference in this respect between two circles of equal radii and two such rectangles as are supposed above, the identity of their magnitudes being a distinct truth, independent of any consideration either of their figure or their position. But, however this may be, the identity of the subject with part of the predicate in an affirmative propo-

wrong, it is error. But in reasoning on general words, to fall on a false inference is not error, though often so called,

which is never fictitious but real. It means that the persons or things in the one are strictly the same beings with the persons or things to which they are compared in the other, though through some difference of relations or other circumstance, they are expressed in different language. It is needless to give examples, as all those who can read this note at all will know how to find them.

I will here take the liberty to remark, though not closely connected with the present subject, that Archbishop Whately is not quite right in saying (*Elements of Logic*, p. 46.) that in affirmative propositions the predicate is *never* distributed. Besides the numerous instances where this is, in point of fact, the case, all which he justly excludes, there are many in which it is involved in the very form of the proposition. Such are those which assert identity or equality, and such also are all those particular affirmations which have previously been *converted* from universals. Of the first sort are all the theorems in geometry, asserting an equality of magnitudes or ratios, in which the subject and predicate may always change places. It is true that in the instance given in the work quoted, that equilateral triangles are equiangular, the converse requires a separate proof, and so in many similar cases. But in these the predicate is not distributed by the form of the proposition; they assert no equality of magnitude.

The position, that where such equality is affirmed, the predicate is not *logically* distributed, would lead to the consequence that it can only be *converted* into a particular affirmation. Thus after proving that the square of the hypotenuse, in all right-angled triangles, is equal to those of the sides, we could only infer that the squares of the sides are *sometimes* equal to that of the hypotenuse, which could not be maintained without rendering the rules of logic ridiculous. The most general mode of considering the question, is to say, as we have done above, that, in an universal affirmative, the predicate B (that is, the class of which B is predicated) is composed of A the subject, and X, an unknown remainder. But if, by the very nature of the proposition, we perceive

that X is nothing, or has no value, it is plain that the subject measures the entire predicate, and vice versa, the predicate measures the subject; in other words, each is taken universally, or distributed.

A critic upon the first edition has observed, that "nothing is clearer than that in these propositions the predicate is not necessarily distributed;" and even hints a doubt whether I understood the terms rightly. *Edinburgh Review*, vol. lxxiii. p. 215. This suspicion of my ignorance as to the meaning of the two commonest words in logic I need not probably repeat: as to the peremptory assertion of this critic, without any proof beyond his own authority, that in propositions denoting equality of magnitude, the predicate is not *necessarily* distributed, if his own reflections do not convince him, I can only refer him to Aristotle's words: *ἐν τοιούτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἐξέτασται*; and I presume he does not doubt that in identical propositions of the form, A est A, the distribution of the predicate, or the convertibility of the proposition, which is the same thing, is manifest. — 1842.]

[Reid observes, in his *Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic*, that "the doctrine of the conversion of propositions is not so complete as it appears. How, for instance, shall we convert this proposition, God is omniscient?" Sir W. Hamilton, who, as editor of Reid, undertakes the defence against him of every thing in the established logic, rather curiously answers, in his notes on this passage: "By saying, An, or The, omniscient is God." (Hamilton's edition of Reid, p. 697.) The rule requires, "An omniscient," a conversion into the particular; but, as this would be shocking, he substitutes, as an alternative, *the*, which is to take generally or distribute the predicate in the first proposition; and to this the nature of the proposition leads us, as it does in innumerable cases. However, as logical writers, especially the recent, commonly exclude all consideration of the subject-matter of propositions, it may be correct to say, with Archbishop Whately, that, as a rule of syllogism, the predicate is not distributed. Aristotle himself, though he lays this down as a formal rule, does not hesitate to say, that where the predicate is the *proprium* (*ἰδιον*) or cha-

but absurdity.* “If a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle, or accidents of bread in cheese, or immaterial substances, or of a free subject, a free will, or any free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd.” Some of these propositions, it will occur, are intelligible in a reasonable sense, and not contradictory, except by means of an arbitrary definition which he who employs them does not admit. It may be observed here, as we have done before, that Hobbes does not confine reckoning, or reasoning, to universals, or even to words.

131. Man has the exclusive privilege of forming general theorems. But this privilege is allayed by another, Its frequency. that is, by the privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And of men those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy. . . . For there is not one that begins his ratiocination from the definitions or explications of the names they are to use, which is a method used only in geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable. He then enumerates seven causes of absurd conclusions; the first of which is the want of definitions, the others are erroneous imposition of names. If we can avoid these errors, it is not easy to fall into absurdity, (by which he of course only means any wrong conclusion) except perhaps by the length of a reasoning. “For all men,” he says, “by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. Hence it appears that reason is not as sense

racteristic of the subject, and of nothing else, it may be reciprocated (*ἀντικατηγορεῖται*) with the subject; as if it is the *proprium* of a man to be capable of learning grammar, all men are capable of being grammarians, and all who are such are men. *Topica*, i. 4. And in the well-known passage upon inductive syllogism, *Analyt. Prior.*, l. ii. c. 23., he shows the minor premise to be convertible into an universal affirmative, by which alone such a syllogism differs from the logical form called *Darapti*. But as Aristotle notoriously considers syllogisms in their matter as well as form, the modern writers, who confine themselves to the latter, are not concluded by his authority. Their theory, which not only reduces all logic to syllogism, but all syllogism to a very

few rules of form, so that we may learn every thing that can be learned in this art through the letters A, B, and C, without any examples at all, appears to render it more jejune and unprofitable than ever. The comparison which some have made of this literal logic with algebra, is surely not to the purpose, for we cannot move a step in algebra without known as well as unknown quantities. As soon as we substitute real examples, we must perceive that the predicate *is* sometimes distributed in affirmative propositions by the sense of the propositions themselves, and without any extrinsic proof, which is all that I meant. — 1847.]

* *Lev.* c. 5.

and memory born with us, nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is, but attained by industry, in apt imposing of names, and in getting a good and orderly method of proceeding from the elements to assertions, and so to syllogisms. Children are not endued with reason at all till they have attained the use of speech, but are called reasonable creatures, for the possibility of having the use of reason hereafter. And reasoning serves the generality of mankind very little, though with their natural prudence without science they are in better condition than those who reason ill themselves, or trust those who have done so.”* It has been observed by Buhle, that Hobbes had more respect for the Aristotelian forms of logic than his master Bacon. He has in fact written a short treatise, in his *Elementa Philosophiæ*, on the subject; observing, however, therein, that a true logic will be sooner learned by attending to geometrical demonstrations than by drudging over the rules of syllogism, as children learn to walk not by precept but by habit.†

132. “No discourse whatever,” he says truly in the seventh chapter of the *Leviathan*, “can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or to come. For as to the knowledge of fact, it is originally sense; and ever after memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute but conditional. No man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be, which is to know absolutely; but only that if this is, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be; which is to know conditionally, and that not the consequence of one thing to another, but of one name of a thing to another name of the same thing. And therefore when the discourse is put into speech and begins with the definitions of words, and pro-

Knowledge
of fact not
derived
from rea-
soning.

* Lev. c. 5.

† Citius multo veram logicam discunt qui mathematicorum demonstrationibus, quam qui logicorum syllogizandi præceptis legendis tempus conterunt, haud aliter quam parvuli pueri gressum formare discunt non præceptis sed sæpe gradiendo. C. iv. p. 30. Atque hæc sufficiunt, (he says afterwards) de syllogismo, qui est tanquam gressus philosophiæ;

nam et quantum necesse est ad cognoscendum unde vim suam habeat omnis argumentatio legitima, tantum diximus; et omnia accumulare quæ dici possunt, æque superfluum esset ac si quis ut dixi puerulo ad gradiendum præcepta dare velit; acquiritur enim ratiocinandi ars non præceptis sed usu et lectione eorum librorum in quibus omnia severis demonstrationibus transiguntur. C. v. p. 35.

ceeds by connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of those again into syllogisms, the end or last sum is called the conclusion, and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge of the consequence of words which is commonly called science. But if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions; or if definitions be not rightly joined together in syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is again opinion, namely, of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood.”*

133. “Belief, which is the admitting of propositions upon trust, in many cases is no less free from doubt than perfect and manifest knowledge; for as there is Belief. nothing whereof there is not some cause, so when there is doubt, there must be some cause thereof conceived. Now there be many things which we receive from the report of others, of which it is impossible to imagine any cause of doubt; for what can be opposed against the consent of all men, in things they can know and have no cause to report otherwise than they are, such as is great part of our histories, unless a man would say that all the world had conspired to deceive him?”† Whatever we believe on the authority of the speaker, he is the object of our faith. Consequently when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and trust is in the church, whose word we take and acquiesce therein. Hence all we believe on the authority of men, whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.‡ We have no certain knowledge of the truth of Scripture, but trust the holy men of God’s church succeeding one another from the time of those who saw the wondrous works of God Almighty in the flesh. And as we believe the Scriptures to be the word of God on the authority of the church, the interpretation of the Scripture in case of controversy ought to be trusted to the church rather than private opinion.§

134. The ninth chapter of the Leviathan contains a synoptical chart of human science or “knowledge of consequences,” also called philosophy. He divides it Chart of science.

* Lev. c. 7.

† Hum. Nat. c. 6.

‡ Lev. c. 7.

§ Hum. Nat. c. 11.

into natural and civil, the former into consequences from accidents common to all bodies, quantity and motion, and those from qualities otherwise called physics. The first includes astronomy, mechanics, architecture, as well as mathematics. The second he distinguishes into consequences from qualities of bodies transient, or meteorology, and from those of bodies permanent, such as the stars, the atmosphere, or terrestrial bodies. The last are divided again into those without sense, and those with sense; and these into animals and men. In the consequences from the qualities of animals generally he reckons optics and music; in those from men we find ethics, poetry, rhetoric, and logic. These altogether constitute the first great head of natural philosophy. In the second, or civil philosophy, he includes nothing but the rights and duties of sovereigns and their subjects. This chart of human knowledge is one of the worst that has been propounded, and falls much below that of Bacon.*

135. This is the substance of the philosophy of Hobbes, so far as it relates to the intellectual faculties, and especially to that of reasoning. In the seventh and two following chapters of the treatise on Human Nature, in the ninth and tenth of the *Leviathan*, he proceeds to the analysis of the passions. The motion in some internal substance of the head, if it does not stop there, producing mere conceptions, proceeds to the heart, helping or hindering the vital motions, which he distinguishes from the voluntary, exciting in us pleasant or painful affections, called passions. We are solicited by these to draw near to that which pleases us, and the contrary. Hence pleasure, love, appetite, desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing. As all conceptions we have immediately by the sense are delight or pain or appetite or fear, so are all the imaginations after sense. But as they are weaker imaginations, so are they also weaker pleasures, or weaker pains.† All delight is appetite, and presupposes a further end. There is no utmost end in this world, for while we live we have desires, and desire presupposes a further end. We are not therefore to wonder that men desire more, the more they possess; for felicity, by which we mean continual delight, consists not in

Analysis of
passions.

* *Lev.* c. 9.

† *Hum. Nat.* c. 7.

having prospered, but in prospering.* Each passion, being, as he fancies, a continuation of the motion which gives rise to a peculiar conception, is associated with it. They all, except such as are immediately connected with sense, consist in the conception of a power to produce some effect. To honour a man, is to conceive that he has an excess of power over some one with whom he is compared; hence qualities indicative of power, and actions significant of it, are honourable; riches are honoured as signs of power, and nobility is honourable as a sign of power in ancestors.†

136. "The constitution of man's body is in perpetual mutation, and hence it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appe- ^{Good and evil relative terms.} tites and aversions; much less can all men consent in the desire of any one object. But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it, which he for his part calls good, and the object of his hate and aversion, evil, or of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person using them; there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves, but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth, or in a commonwealth from the person that represents us, or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof."‡

137. In prosecuting this analysis all the passions are resolved into self-love, the pleasure that we take in ^{His paradoxes.} our own power, the pain that we suffer in wanting it. Some of his explications are very forced. Thus weeping is said to be from a sense of our want of power. And here comes one of his strange paradoxes. "Men are apt to weep that prosecute revenge, when the revenge is suddenly stopped or frustrated by the repentance of their adversary; *and such are the tears of reconciliation.*"§ So resolute was he to resort to any thing the most preposterous, rather than admit a moral feeling in human nature. His account of laughter is better known, and perhaps more probable,

* Hum. Nat. c. 7. Lev. c. 11.

† Lev. c. 6.

† Hum. Nat. c. 8.

§ Hum. Nat. c. 9. Lev. c. 6. and 10.

though not explaining the whole of the case. After justly observing that whatsoever it be that moves laughter, it must be new and unexpected, he defines it to be "a sudden glory arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly, for men laugh at the follies of themselves past." It might be objected, that those are most prone to laughter, who have least of this glorying in themselves, or undervaluing of their neighbours.

138. "There is a great difference between the desire of a man when indefinite, and the same desire limited to one person, and this is that love which is the great theme of poets. But notwithstanding their praises, it must be defined by the word need; for it is a conception a man hath of his need of that one person desired."* "There is yet another passion sometimes called love, but more properly good-will or charity. There can be no greater argument to a man of his own power than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs; and this is that conception wherein consists charity. In which first is contained that natural affection of parents towards their children, which the Greeks call *στοργή*, as also that affection wherewith men seek to assist those that adhere unto them. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits on strangers is not to be called charity, but either contract, whereby they seek to purchase friendship, or fear, which makes them to purchase peace."† This is equally contrary to notorious truth, there being neither fear nor contract in generosity towards strangers. It is, however, not so extravagant as a subsequent position, that in beholding the danger of a ship in a tempest, though there is pity, which is grief, yet "the delight in our own security is so far predominant, that men usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of their friends."‡

139. As knowledge begins from experience, new experience is the beginning of new knowledge. What-
Curiosity. ever, therefore, happens new to a man gives him the

* Hum. Nat. c. 9. † Id. *ibid.* of some well-known lines of Lucretius,
‡ Id. *ibid.* This is an exaggeration which are themselves exaggerated.

hope of knowing somewhat he knew not before. This appetite of knowledge is curiosity. It is peculiar to man; for beasts never regard new things, except to discern how far they may be useful, while man looks for the cause and beginning of all he sees.* This attribute of curiosity seems rather hastily denied to beasts. And as men, he says, are always seeking new knowledge, so are they always deriving some new gratification. There is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind while we live here, because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense. "What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know than enjoy, being joys that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of schoolmen, beatifical vision, is unintelligible."†

140. From the consideration of the passions Hobbes advances to inquire what are the causes of the difference in the intellectual capacities and dispositions of men.‡ Their bodily senses are nearly alike, whence he precipitately infers there can be no great difference in the brain. Yet men differ much in their bodily constitution, whence he derives the principal differences in their minds; some being addicted to sensual pleasures are less curious as to knowledge, or ambitious as to power. This is called dulness, and proceeds from the appetite of bodily delight. The contrary to this is a quick ranging of mind accompanied with curiosity in comparing things that come into it, either as to unexpected similitude, in which fancy consists, or dissimilitude in things appearing the same, which is properly called judgment; "for to judge is nothing else, but to distinguish and discern. And both fancy and judgment are commonly comprehended under the name of wit, which seems to be a tenuity and agility of spirits, contrary to that restiness of the spirits supposed in those who are dull."§

141. We call it levity, when the mind is easily diverted, and the discourse is parenthetical; and this proceeds from curiosity with too much equality and indifference; for when

* Hum. Nat. c. 9.

† Lev. c. 6. and c. 1.

‡ Hum. Nat. c. 10.

§ Hum. Nat.

all things make equal impression and delight, they equally throng to be expressed. A different fault is indocibility, or difficulty of being taught; which must arise from a false opinion that men know already the truth of what is called in question; for certainly they are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as not to discern the difference of what is proved and what is not, and therefore if the minds of men were all of white paper, they would all most equally be disposed to acknowledge whatever should be in right method, and by right ratiocination delivered to them. But when men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as authentical records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men, than to write legibly on a paper already scribbled over. The immediate cause, therefore, of indocibility is prejudice, and of prejudice false opinion of our own knowledge.*

142. Intellectual virtues are such abilities as go by the name of a good wit, which may be natural or
Wit and
fancy. acquired. "By natural wit," says Hobbes, "I mean not that which a man hath from his birth, for that is nothing else but sense; wherein men differ so little from one another and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned among virtues. But I mean that wit which is gotten by use only and experience, without method, culture, or instruction, and consists chiefly in celerity of imagining and steady direction. And the difference in this quickness is caused by that of men's passions that love and dislike some one thing, some another, and therefore some men's thoughts run one way, some another; and are held to, and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination." Fancy is not praised without judgment and discretion, which is properly a discerning of times, places, and persons; but judgment and discretion is commended for itself without fancy: without steadiness and direction to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madness, such as they have who lose themselves in long digressions and parentheses. If the defect of discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a want of wit.†

* Hum. Nat.

† Lev. c. 8.

143. The causes of the difference of wits are in the passions ; and the difference of passions proceeds partly from the different constitution of the body and partly from different education. Those passions are chiefly the desire of power, riches, knowledge, or honour ; all which may be reduced to the first, for riches, knowledge, and honour are but several sorts of power. He who has no great passion for any of these, though he may be so far a good man as to be free from giving offence, yet cannot possibly have either a great fancy or much judgment. To have weak passions is dulness, to have passions indifferently for every thing giddiness and distraction, to have stronger passions for any thing than others have is madness. Madness may be the excess of many passions ; and the passions themselves, when they lead to evil, are degrees of it. He seems to have had some notion of what Butler is reported to have thrown out as to the madness of a whole people. "What argument for madness can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends ? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those by whom all their lifetime before they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man."*

Differences
in the pas-
sions.

Madness.

144. There is a fault in some men's habit of discoursing which may be reckoned a sort of madness, which is when they speak words with no signification at all. "And this is incident to none but those that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible as the schoolmen, or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore by those other egregious persons counted idiots. But to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples ; which if any man require let him take a schoolman into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point, as the Trinity, the Deity, the nature of Christ, transubstantiation, free-will, &c. into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the same intelligible, or into any tolerable Latin,

Unmeaning
language.

* Lev. c. 8.

such as they were acquainted with, that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar." And after quoting some words from Suarez, he adds, "When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others so?"*

145. The eleventh chapter of the *Leviathan*, on manners, by which he means those qualities of mankind which Manners. concern their living together in peace and unity, is full of Hobbes's caustic remarks on human nature. Often acute, but always severe, he ascribes overmuch to a deliberate and calculating selfishness. Thus the reverence of antiquity is referred to "the contention men have with the living, not with the dead, to these ascribing more than due that they may obscure the glory of the other." Thus, also, "to have received from one to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than we can hope to requite, disposes to counterfeit love, but really to secret hatred, and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thralldom; and unrequitable obligation perpetual thralldom, which is to one's equal hateful." He owns, however, that to have received benefits from a superior, disposes us to love him; and so it does where we can hope to requite even an equal. If these maxims have a certain basis of truth, they have at least the fault of those of Rochefoucault; they are made too generally characteristic of mankind.

146. Ignorance of the signification of words disposes men to take on trust not only the truth they know not, Ignorances and prejudice. but also errors and nonsense. For neither can be detected without a perfect understanding of words. "But ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice, disposes a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions, in such manner as to think that unjust which it has been the custom to punish, and that just, of the impunity and approbation of which they can produce an example, or, as the lawyers which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent." "Men appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom as it serves their turn, receding from custom when

their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them ; which is the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed both by the pen and the sword ; whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not so, because men care not in that subject what is truth, as it is a thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square, that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was able."* This excellent piece of satire has been often quoted, and sometimes copied, and does not exaggerate the pertinacity of mankind in resisting the evidence of truth, when it thwarts the interests and passions of any particular sect or community. In the earlier part of the paragraph it seems not so easy to reconcile what Hobbes has said with his general notions of right and justice ; since if these resolve themselves, as is his theory, into mere force, there can be little appeal to reason, or to any thing else than custom and precedent, which are commonly the exponents of power.

147. In the conclusion of this chapter of the *Leviathan* as well as in the next, he dwells more on the nature of religion than he had done in the former treatise, and ^{His theory of religion.} so as to subject himself to the imputation of absolute atheism, or at least of a denial of most attributes which we assign to the Deity. "Curiosity about causes," he says, "led men to search out one after the other, till they came to this necessary conclusion, that there is some eternal cause which men call God. But they have no more idea of his nature, than a blind man has of fire, though he knows that there is something that warms him. So by the visible things of this world and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of him in his mind. And they that make little inquiry into the natural causes of things are inclined to feign several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations. And this fear of things invisible is the natural seed of that

* Lev. c. 11.

which every one in himself calleth religion, and in them that worship or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition.”

148. “As God is incomprehensible, it follows that we can have no conception or image of the Deity ; and consequently all his attributes signify our inability or defect of power to conceive any thing concerning his nature, and not any conception of the same, excepting only this, that there is a God. Men that by their own meditation arrive at the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God, choose rather to confess this is incomprehensible and above their understanding, than to define his nature by spirit incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible.”* For concerning such spirits he holds that it is not possible by natural means only to come to the knowledge of so much as that there are such things.†

149. Religion he derives from three sources — the desire of
Its supposed sources. men to search for causes, the reference of every thing that has a beginning to some cause, and the observation of the order and consequence of things. But the two former lead to anxiety, for the knowledge that there have been causes of the effects we see, leads us to anticipate that they will in time be the causes of effects to come ; so that every man, especially such as are over-provident, is “like Prometheus, the prudent man, as his name implies, who was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where an eagle feeding on his liver devoured as much by day as was repaired by night ; and so he who looks too far before him, has his heart all day long gnawed by the fear of death, poverty, or other calamity, and has no repose nor pause but in sleep.” This is an allusion made in the style of Lord Bacon. The ignorance of causes makes men fear some invisible agent, like the gods of the Gentiles ; but the investigation of them leads us to a God eternal, infinite, and omnipotent. This ignorance, however, of second causes, conspiring with three other prejudices of mankind, the belief in ghosts, or spirits of subtile bodies, the devotion and reverence generally shown towards what we fear as having power to hurt us, and the taking of things casual for prognostics, are altogether the natural seed

* Lev. c. 12.

† Hum. Nat. c. 11.

of religion, which by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men hath grown up into ceremonies so different that those which are used by one man are for the most part ridiculous to another. He illustrates this by a variety of instances from ancient superstitions. But the forms of religion are changed when men suspect the wisdom, sincerity, or love of those who teach it, or its priests.* The remaining portion of the *Leviathan*, relating to moral and political philosophy, must be deferred to our next chapter.

150. The *Elementa Philosophiæ* were published by Hobbes in 1655, and dedicated to his constant patron the Earl of Devonshire. These are divided into three parts; entitled *De Corpore*, *De Homine*, and *De Cive*. And the first part has itself three divisions; Logic, the First Philosophy, and Physics. The second part, *De Homine*, is neither the treatise of Human Nature, nor the corresponding part of the *Leviathan*, though it contains many things substantially found there. A long disquisition on optics and the nature of vision, chiefly geometrical, is entirely new. The third part, *De Cive*, is the treatise by that name, reprinted, as far as I am aware, without alteration.

151. The first part of the first treatise, entitled *Computativa Logica*, is by no means the least valuable among the philosophical writings of Hobbes. In forty pages the subject is very well and clearly explained, nor do I know that the principles are better laid down, or the rules more sufficiently given in more prolix treatises. Many of his observations, especially as to words, are such as we find in his English works, and perhaps his nominalism is more clearly expressed than it is in them. Of the syllogistic method, at least for the purpose of demonstration, or teaching others, he seems to have entertained a favourable opinion, or even to have held it necessary for real demonstration, as his definition shows. Hobbes appears to be aware of what I do not remember to have seen put by others, that in the natural process of reasoning, the minor premise commonly precedes the major.† It is for want of attending to this, that syllogisms,

* Lev. c. 12.

† In Whately's *Logic*, p. 90., it is observed, that "the *proper order* is to

place the major premise first, and the minor second; but this does not constitute the major and minor premises," &c.

as usually stated, are apt to have so formal and unnatural a construction. The process of the mind in this kind of reasoning is explained, in general, with correctness, and, I believe, with originality in the following passage, which I shall transcribe from the Latin, rather than give a version of my own; few probably being likely to read the present section, who are unacquainted with that language. The style of Hobbes, though perspicuous, is concise, and the original words will be more satisfactory than any translation.

152. *Syllogismo directo cogitatio in animo respondens est hujusmodi. Primo concipitur phantasma rei nominatæ cum accidente sive affectu ejus propter quem appellatur eo nomine quod est in minore propositione subjectum; deinde animo occurrit phantasma ejusdem rei cum accidente sive affectu propter quem appellatur, quod est in eadem propositione prædicatum. Tertio redit cogitatio rursus ad rem nominatam cum affectu propter quem eo nomine appellatur, quod est in prædicato propositionis majoris. Postremo cum meminerit eos affectus esse omnes unius et ejusdem rei, concludit tria illa nomina ejusdem quoque rei esse nomina; hoc est, conclusionem esse veram. Exempli causa, quando fit syllogismus hic, Homo est Animal, Animal est Corpus, ergo Homo est Corpus, occurrit animo imago hominis loquentis vel differentis [sic, sed lege disserentis], meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari hominem. Deinde occurrit eadem imago ejusdem hominis sese moventis, meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari animal. Tertio recurrit eadem imago hominis*

It may be the proper order in one sense, as exhibiting better the foundation of syllogistic reasoning; but it is not that which we commonly follow, either in thinking, or in proving to others. In the rhetorical use of syllogism it can admit of no doubt, that the opposite order is the most striking and persuasive; such as in Cato, "If there be a God, he must delight in virtue; And that which he delights in must be happy." In Euclid's demonstrations this will be found the form usually employed. And, though the rules of grammar are generally illustrated by examples, which is beginning with the major premise, yet the process of reasoning which a boy employs in construing a Latin sentence

is the reverse. He observes a nominative case, a verb in the third person, and then applies his general rule, or major, to the particular instance, or minor, so as to infer their agreement. In criminal jurisprudence, the Scots begin with the major premise, or relevancy of the indictment, when there is room for doubt; the English with the minor, or evidence of the fact, reserving the other for what we call motion in arrest of judgment. Instances of both orders are common, but by far the most frequent are of that which the Archbishop of Dublin reckons the less proper of the two. Those logicians who fail to direct the student's attention to this, really do not justice to their own favourite science.

locum aliquem sive spatium occupantis, meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari corpus.* Postremo cum meminere rem illam quæ et extendebatur secundum locum, et loco movebatur, et oratione utebatur, unam et eandem fuisse, concludit etiam nomina illa tria, Homo, Animal, Corpus, ejusdem rei esse nomina, et proinde, Homo est Corpus, esse propositionem veram. Manifestum hinc est conceptum sive cogitationem quæ respondens syllogismo ex propositionibus universalibus in animo existit, nullam esse in iis animalibus quibus deest usus nominum, cum inter syllogizandum oporteat non modo de re sed etiam alternis vicibus de diversis rei nominibus, quæ propter diversas de re cogitationes adhibitæ sunt, cogitare.

153. The metaphysical philosophy of Hobbes, always bold and original, often acute and profound, without producing an immediate school of disciples like that of Descartes, struck, perhaps, a deeper root in the minds of reflecting men, and has influenced more extensively the general tone of speculation. Locke, who had not read much, had certainly read Hobbes, though he does not borrow from him so much as has sometimes been imagined. The French metaphysicians of the next century found him nearer to their own theories than his more celebrated rival in English philosophy. But the writer who has built most upon Hobbes, and may be reckoned, in a certain sense, his commentator, if he who fully explains and develops a system may deserve that name, was Hartley. The theory of association is implied and intimated in many passages of the elder philosopher, though it

* This is the questionable part of Hobbes's theory of syllogism. According to the common and obvious understanding, the mind, in the major premise, Animal est Corpus, does not reflect on the subject of the minor, Homo, as occupying space, but on the subject of the major, Animal, which includes, indeed, the former, but is mentally substituted for it. It may sometimes happen, that where this predicate of the minor term is manifestly a collective word that comprehends the subject, the latter is not as it were absorbed in it, and may be contemplated by the mind distinctly in the major; as if we say, John is a man; a

man feels; we may perhaps have no image in the mind of any man but John. But this is not the case where the predicated quality appertains to many things visibly different from the subject; as in Hobbes's instance, Animal est Corpus, we may surely consider other animals as being extended and occupying space besides men. It does not seem that otherwise there could be any ascending scale from particulars to generals, as far as the reasoning faculties, independent of words, are concerned. And if we begin with the major premise of the syllogism, this will be still more apparent.

was first expanded and applied with a diligent, ingenious, and comprehensive research, if sometimes in too forced a manner, by his disciple. I use this word without particular inquiry into the direct acquaintance of Hartley with the writings of Hobbes; the subject had been frequently touched in intermediate publications, and, in matters of reasoning, as I have intimated above, little or no presumption of borrowing can be founded on coincidence. Hartley also resembles Hobbes in the extreme to which he has pushed the nominalist theory, in the proneness to materialise all intellectual processes, and either to force all things mysterious to our faculties into something imaginable, or to reject them as unmeaning, in the want, much connected with this, of a steady perception of the difference between the Ego and its objects, in an excessive love of simplifying and generalising, and in a readiness to adopt explanations neither conformable to reason nor experience, when they fall in with some single principle, the key that was to unlock every ward of the human soul.

154. In nothing does Hobbes deserve more credit than in having set an example of close observation in the philosophy of the human mind. If he errs, he errs like a man who goes a little out of the right track, not like one who has set out in a wrong one. The eulogy of Stewart on Descartes, that he was the father of this experimental psychology, cannot be strictly wrested from him by Hobbes, inasmuch as the publications of the former are of an earlier date; but we may fairly say that the latter began as soon, and prosecuted his inquiries farther. It seems natural to presume that Hobbes, who is said to have been employed by Bacon in translating some of his works into Latin, had at least been led by him to the inductive process which he has more than any other employed. But he has seldom mentioned his predecessor's name; and indeed his mind was of a different stamp; less excursive, less quick in discovering analogies, and less fond of reasoning from them, but more close, perhaps more patient, and more apt to follow up a predominant idea, which sometimes becomes one of the "*idola specûs*" that deceive him.

CHAPTER IV.

HISTORY OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND OF JURISPRUDENCE, FROM 1600 TO 1650.

SECT. I.

ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

*Casuists of the Roman Church — Suarez on Moral Law — Selden — Charron —
La Mothe le Vayer — Bacon's Essays — Feltham — Browne's Religio
Medici — Other Writers.*

1. IN traversing so wide a field as moral and political philosophy, we must still endeavour to distribute the subject according to some order of subdivision, so far at least as the contents of the books themselves which come before us will permit. And we give the first place to those which, relating to the moral law both of nature and revelation, connect the proper subject of the present chapter with that of the second and third.

2. We meet here a concourse of volumes occupying no small space in old libraries, the writings of the casuists, chiefly within the Romish church. None perhaps in the whole compass of literature are more neglected by those who do not read with what we may call a professional view; but to the ecclesiastics of that communion they have still a certain value, though far less than when they were first written. The most vital discipline of that church, the secret of the power of its priesthood, the source of most of the good and evil it can work, is found in the confessional. It is there that the keys are kept; it is there that the lamp burns, whose rays diverge to

Casualtical
writers.

Importance
of confes-
sion.

every portion of human life. No church that has relinquished this prerogative can ever establish a permanent dominion over mankind; none that retains it in effective use can lose the hope or the prospect of being their ruler.

3. It is manifest that in the common course of this rite, no particular difficulty will arise, nor is the confessor likely to weigh in golden scales the scruples or excuses of ordinary penitents. But peculiar circumstances might be brought before him, wherein there would be a necessity for possessing some rule; lest by sanctioning the guilt of the self-revealing party he should incur as much of his own. Treatises therefore of casuistry were written as guides to the confessor, and became the text-books in every course of ecclesiastical education. These were commonly digested in a systematic order, and, what is the unfailing consequence of system, or rather almost part of its definition, spread into minute ramifications, and aimed at comprehending every possible emergency. Casuistry is itself allied to jurisprudence, especially to that of the canon law; and it was natural to transfer the subtilty of distinction and copiousness of partition usual with the jurists, to a science which its professors were apt to treat upon very similar principles.

4. The older theologians seem, like the Greek and Roman moralists, when writing systematically, to have made general morality their subject, and casuistry but their illustration. Among the monuments of their ethical philosophy, the *Secunda Secundæ* of Aquinas is the most celebrated. Treatises, however, of casuistry, which is the expansion and application of ethics, may be found both before and during the sixteenth century; and while the confessional was actively converted to so powerful an engine, they could not conveniently be wanting. Casuistry, indeed, is not much required by the church in an ignorant age; but the sixteenth century was not an age of ignorance. Yet it is not till about the end of that period that we find casuistical literature burst out, so to speak, with a profusion of fruit. "Uninterruptedly afterwards," says Eichhorn, "through the whole seventeenth century, the moral and casuistical literature of the church of Rome was immensely rich; and it caused a lively and extensive movement in a province which had long

Necessity of
rules for the
confessor.

Increase of
casuistical
literature.

been at peace. The first impulse came from the Jesuits, to whom the Jansenists opposed themselves. We must distinguish from both the theological moralists, who remained faithful to their ancient teaching." *

5. We may be blamed, perhaps, for obtruding a pedantic terminology, if we make the most essential distinction in morality, and one for want of which, more than any other, its debatable controversies have arisen, that between the subjective and objective rectitude of actions; in clearer language, between the provinces of conscience and of reason, between what is well meant and what is well done. The chief business of the priest is naturally with the former. The walls of the confessional are privy to the whispers of self-accusing guilt. No doubt can ever arise as to the subjective character of actions which the conscience has condemned, and for which the penitent seeks absolution. Were they even objectively lawful, they are sins in him, according to the unanimous determination of casuists. But though what the conscience reclaims against is necessarily wrong, relatively to the agent, it does not follow that what it may fail to disapprove is innocent. Choose whatever theory we may please as to the moral standard of actions, they must have an objective rectitude of their own, independently of their agent, without which there could be no distinction of right and wrong, nor any scope for the dictates of conscience. The science of ethics, as a science, can only be conversant with objective morality. Casuistry is the instrument of applying this science, which, like every other, is built on reasoning, to the moral nature and volition of man. It rests for its validity on the great principle, that it is our duty to know, as far as lies in us, what is right, as well as to do what we know to be such. But its application was beset with obstacles; the extenuations of ignorance and error were so various, the difficulty of representing the moral position of the penitent to the judgment of the confessor by any process of language so insuperable, that the most acute understanding might be foiled in the task of bringing home a conviction of guilt to the self-deceiving

Distracted
of subjective
and
objective
morality.

* Geschichte der Cultur, vol. vi. part i. p. 390.

sinner. Again, he might aggravate needless scruples, or disturb the tranquil repose of innocence.

6. But though past actions are the primary subject of auricular confession, it was a necessary consequence that the priest would be frequently called upon to advise as to the future, to bind or loose the will in incomplete or meditated lines of conduct. And as all without exception must come before his tribunal, the rich, the noble, the counsellors of princes, and princes themselves, were to reveal their designs, to expound their uncertainties, to call, in effect, for his sanction in all they might have to do, to secure themselves against transgression by shifting the responsibility on his head. That this tremendous authority of direction, distinct from the rite of penance, though immediately springing from it, should have produced a no more overwhelming influence of the priesthood than it has actually done, great as that has been, can only be ascribed to the reaction of human inclinations which will not be controlled, and of human reason which exerts a silent force against the authority it acknowledges.

7. In the directory business of the confessional, far more than in the penitential, the priest must strive to bring about that union between subjective and objective rectitude in which the perfection of a moral act consists, without which in every instance, according to their tenets, some degree of sinfulness, some liability to punishment remains, and which must at least be demanded from those who have been made acquainted with their duty. But when he came from the broad lines of the moral law, from the decalogue and the Gospel, or even from the ethical systems of theology, to the indescribable variety of circumstance which his penitents had to recount, there arose a multitude of problems, and such as perhaps would most command his attention, when they involved the practice of the great, to which he might hesitate to apply an unbending rule. The questions of casuistry, like those of jurisprudence, were often found to turn on the great and ancient doubt of both sciences, whether we should abide by the letter of a general law, or let in an equitable interpretation of its spirit. The consulting party would be apt to plead for the one; the guide of conscience

Directory
office of
the confes-
sor.

Difficulties
of casuistry.

would more securely adhere to the other. But he might also perceive the severity of those rules of obligation which conduce, in the particular instance, to no apparent end, or even defeat their own principle. Hence there arose two schools of casuistry, first in the practice of confession, and afterwards in the books intended to assist it; one strict and uncomplying, the other more indulgent and flexible to circumstances.

8. The characteristics of these systems were displayed in almost the whole range of morals. They were, however, chiefly seen in the rules of veracity and especially in promissory obligations. According to the fathers Strict and lax schemes of it. of the church, and to the rigid casuists in general, a lie was never to be uttered, a promise was never to be broken. The precepts especially of Revelation, notwithstanding their brevity and figurativeness, were held complete and literal. Hence promises obtained by mistake, fraud, or force, and above all, gratuitous vows, where God was considered as the promisee, however lightly made, or become intolerably onerous by supervenient circumstances, were strictly to be fulfilled, unless the dispensing power of the church might sometimes be sufficient to release them. Besides the respect due to moral rules, and especially those of Scripture, there had been from early times in the Christian church a strong disposition to the ascetic scheme of religious morality; a prevalent notion of the intrinsic meritoriousness of voluntary self-denial, which discountenanced all regard in man to his own happiness, at least in this life, as a sort of flinching from the discipline of suffering. And this had doubtless its influence upon the severe casuists.

9. But there had not been wanting those, who, whatever course they might pursue in the confessional, found the convenience of an accommodating morality in Convenience of the latter. the secular affairs of the church. Oaths were broken, engagements entered into without faith, for the ends of the clergy, or of those whom they favoured in the struggles of the world. And some of the ingenious sophistry, by which these breaches of plain rules are usually defended, was not unknown before the Reformation. But casuistical writings at that time were comparatively few. The Jesuits have the credit of first rendering public a scheme of false morals,

which has been denominated from them, and enhanced the obloquy that overwhelmed their order. Their volumes of casuistry were exceedingly numerous ; some of them belong to the last twenty years of the sixteenth, but a far greater part to the following century.

10. The Jesuits were prone for several reasons to embrace the laxer theories of obligation. They were less tainted than the old monastic orders with that superstition which had flowed into the church from the East, the meritoriousness of self-inflicted suffering for its own sake. They embraced a life of toil and danger, but not of habitual privation and pain. Dauntless in death and torture, they shunned the mechanical asceticism of the convent. And, secondly, their eyes were bent on a great end, the good of the Catholic church, which they identified with that of their own order. It almost invariably happens, that men who have the good of mankind at heart, and actively prosecute it, become embarrassed, at some time or other, by the conflict of particular duties with the best method of promoting their object. An unaccommodating veracity, an unswerving good faith, will often appear to stand, or stand really, in the way of their ends ; and hence the little confidence we repose in enthusiasts, even when, in a popular mode of speaking, they are most sincere ; that is, most convinced of the rectitude of their aim.

11. The course prescribed by Loyola led his disciples not to solitude, but to the world. They became the associates and counsellors, as well as the confessors, of the great. They had to wield the powers of the earth for the service of heaven. Hence, in confession itself, they were often tempted to look beyond the penitent, and to guide his conscience rather with a view to his usefulness than his integrity. In questions of morality, to abstain from action is generally the means of innocence, but to act is indispensable for positive good. Thus their casuistry had a natural tendency to become more objective, and to entangle the responsibility of personal conscience in an inextricable maze of reasoning. They had also to retain their influence over men not wholly submissive to religious control, nor ready to abjure the pleasant paths in which they trod ; men of the court and the city, who might serve the church though they did not

Favoured by
the Jesuits.

The causes
of this.

adorn it, and for whom it was necessary to make some compromise in furtherance of the main design.

12. It must also be fairly admitted, that the rigid casuists went to extravagant lengths. Their decisions were often not only harsh, but unsatisfactory; the reason demanded in vain a principle of their iron law; and the common sense of mankind imposed the limitations, which they were incapable of excluding by any thing better than a dogmatic assertion. Thus, in the cases of promissory obligation, they were compelled to make some exceptions, and these left it open to rational inquiry whether more might not be found. They diverged unnecessarily, as many thought, from the principles of jurisprudence; for the jurists built their determinations, or professed to do so, on what was just and equitable among men; and though a distinction, frequently very right, was taken between the *forum exterius* and *interius*, the provinces of jurisprudence and casuistry, yet the latter could not, in these questions of mutual obligation, rest upon wholly different ground from the former.

Extravagance of the strict casuists.

13. The Jesuits, however, fell rapidly into the opposite extreme. Their subtilty in logic, and great ingenuity in devising arguments, were employed in sophisms that undermined the foundations of moral integrity in the heart. They warred with these arms against the conscience which they were bound to protect. The offences of their casuistry, as charged by their adversaries, are very multifarious. One of the most celebrated is the doctrine of equivocation; the innocence of saying that which is true in a sense meant by the speaker, though he is aware that it will be otherwise understood. Another is that of what was called probability; according to which it is lawful, in doubtful problems of morality, to take the course which appears to ourselves least likely to be right, provided any one casuistical writer of good repute has approved it. The multiplicity of books, and want of uniformity in their decisions, made this a broad path for the conscience. In the latter instance, as in many others, the *subjective* nature of moral obligation was lost sight of; and to this the scientific treatment of casuistry inevitably contributed.

Opposite faults of Jesuits.

14. Productions so little regarded as those of the jesuitical

casuists cannot be dwelt upon. Thomas Sanchez of Cordova is author of a large treatise on matrimony, published in 1592; the best, as far as the canon law is concerned, which has yet been published. But in the casuistical portion of this work, the most extraordinary indecencies occur, such as have consigned it to general censure.* Some of these, it must be owned, belong to the rite of auricular confession itself, as managed in the church of Rome, though they give scandal by their publication and apparent excess beyond the necessity of the case. The *Summa Casuum Conscientiæ* of Toletus, a Spanish Jesuit and cardinal, which, though published in 1602, belongs to the sixteenth century, and the casuistical writings of Less, Busenbaum, and Escobar, may just be here mentioned. The *Medulla Casuum Conscientiæ* of the second, (Munster, 1645,) went through fifty-two editions, the *Theologia Moralis* of the last, (Lyon, 1646,) through forty.† Of the opposition excited by the laxity in moral rules ascribed to the Jesuits, though it began in some manner during this period, we shall have more to say in the next.

15. Suarez of Granada, by far the greatest man in the department of moral philosophy whom the order of Suarez
De Legibus. Loyola produced in this age, or perhaps in any other, may not improbably have treated of casuistry in some part of his numerous volumes. We shall, however, gladly leave this subject to bring before the reader a large treatise of Suarez, on the principles of natural law, as well as of all positive jurisprudence. This is entitled, *Tractatus de legibus ac Deo legislatore in decem libros distributus, utriusque fori hominibus non minus utilis, quam necessarius*. It might with no great impropriety, perhaps, be placed in any of the three sections of this chapter, relating not only to moral philosophy, but to politics in some degree, and to jurisprudence.

16. Suarez begins by laying down the position, that all legislative, as well as all paternal, power is derived Titles of his
ten books. from God, and that the authority of every law resolves itself into his. For either the law proceeds immediately from God, or, if it be human, it proceeds from man

* Bayle, art. Sanchez, expatiates on this, and condemns the Jesuit; Catilina Cethegum. The later editions of Sanchez De Matrimonio are *castigate*.

† Ranke, die Päpste, vol. iii.

as his vicar and minister. The titles of the ten books of this large treatise are as follows: 1. On the nature of law in general, and on its causes and consequences; 2. On eternal, natural law, and that of nations; 3. On positive human law in itself, considered relatively to human nature, which is also called civil law; 4. On positive ecclesiastical law; 5. On the differences of human laws, and especially of those that are penal, or in the nature of penal; 6. On the interpretation, the alteration, and the abolition of human laws; 7. On unwritten law, which is called custom; 8. On those human laws which are called favourable, or privileges; 9. On the positive divine law of the old dispensations; 10. On the positive divine law of the new dispensation.

17. This is a very comprehensive chart of general law, and entitles Suarez to be accounted such a precursor of Grotius and Puffendorf as occupied most of their ^{Heads of the second book.} ground, especially that of the latter, though he cultivated it in a different manner. His volume is a closely printed folio of 700 pages in double columns. The following heads of chapters in the second book will show the questions in which Suarez dealt, and in some degree his method of stating and conducting them: 1. Whether there be any eternal law, and what is its necessity; 2. On the subject of eternal law, and on the acts it commands; 3. In what act the eternal law exists (*existit*), and whether it be one or many; 4. Whether the eternal law be the cause of other laws, and obligatory through their means; 5. In what natural law consists; 6. Whether natural law be a preceptive divine law; 7. On the subject of natural law, and on its precepts; 8. Whether natural law be one; 9. Whether natural law bind the conscience; 10. Whether natural law obliges not only to the act (*actus*) but to the mode (*modum*) of virtue. This obscure question seems to refer to the subjective nature, or motive, of virtuous actions, as appears by the next; 11. Whether natural law obliges us to act from love or charity (*ad modum operandi ex caritate*); 12. Whether natural law not only prohibits certain actions, but invalidates them when done; 13. Whether the precepts of the law of nature are intrinsically immutable; 14. Whether any human authority can alter or dispense with the natural law; 15. Whether

God by his absolute power can dispense with the law of nature ; 16. Whether an equitable interpretation can ever be admitted in the law of nature ; 17. Whether the law of nature is distinguishable from that of nations ; 18. Whether the law of nations enjoins or forbids any thing ; 19. By what means we are to distinguish the law of nature from that of nations ; 20. Certain corollaries ; and that the law of nations is both just, and also mutable.

18. These heads may give some slight notion to the reader of the character of the book, as the book itself may serve as a typical instance of that form of theology, of metaphysics, of ethics, of jurisprudence, which occupies the unread and unreadable folios of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially those issuing from the church of Rome, and may be styled generally the scholastic method. Two remarkable characteristics strike us in these books, which are sufficiently to be judged by reading their table of contents, and by taking occasional samples of different parts. The extremely systematic form they assume, and the multiplicity of divisions render this practice more satisfactory than it can be in works of less regular arrangement. One of these characteristics is that spirit of system itself, and another is their sincere desire to exhaust the subject by presenting it to the mind in every light, and by tracing all its relations and consequences. The fertility of those men who, like Suarez, superior to most of the rest, were trained in the scholastic discipline, to which I refer the methods of the canonists and casuists, is sometimes surprising ; their views are not one-sided ; they may not solve objections to our satisfaction, but they seldom suppress them ; they embrace a vast compass of thought and learning ; they write less for the moment, and are less under the influence of local and temporary prejudices than many who have lived in better ages of philosophy. But, again, they have great defects ; their distinctions confuse instead of giving light ; their systems being not founded on clear principles become embarrassed and incoherent ; their method is not always sufficiently consecutive ; the difficulties which they encounter are too arduous for them ; they labour under the multitude, and are entangled by the discordance, of their authorities.

Character of
such scholas-
tic treatises.

19. Suarez, who discusses all these important problems of his second book with acuteness, and, for his circumstances, with an independent mind, is weighed down by the extent and nature of his learning. If Grotius quotes philosophers and poets too frequently, what can we say of the perpetual reference to Aquinas, Cajetan, Soto, Turrecremata, Vasquius, Isidore, Vincent of Beauvais or Alensis, not to mention the canonists and fathers, which Suarez employs to prove or disprove every proposition? The syllogistic forms are unsparingly introduced. Such writers as Soto or Suarez held all kinds of ornament not less unfit for philosophical argument than they would be for geometry. Nor do they ever appeal to experience or history for the rules of determination. Their materials are nevertheless abundant, consisting of texts of Scripture, sayings of the fathers and schoolmen, established theorems in natural theology and metaphysics, from which they did not find it hard to select premises which, duly arranged, gave them conclusions.

Quotations
of Suarez.

20. Suarez, after a prolix discussion, comes to the conclusion, that "eternal law is the free determination of the will of God, ordaining a rule to be observed, either, first, generally by all parts of the universe as a means of a common good, whether immediately belonging to it in respect of the entire universe, or at least in respect of the singular parts thereof; or, secondly, to be specially observed by intellectual creatures in respect of their free operations."* This is not instantly perspicuous; but definitions of a complex nature cannot be rendered such. It is true, however, what the reader may think curious, that this crabbed piece of scholasticism is nothing else, in substance, than the celebrated sentence on law, which concludes the first book of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity. Whoever takes the pains to understand Suarez, will perceive that he asserts exactly that which is unrolled in the majestic eloquence of our countryman.

His definition of
eternal law.

* *Legem æternam esse decretum liberum voluntatis Dei statuentis ordinem servandum, aut generaliter ab omnibus partibus universi in ordine ad commune bonum, vel immediatè illi conveniens ratione totius universi, vel saltem ratione*

singularum specierum ejus, aut specialiter servandum a creaturis intellectualibus quoad liberas operationes earum. c. 3. § 6. Compare with Hooker: Of Law no less can be said than that her throne is the bosom of God, &c.

21. By this eternal law God is not necessarily bound. But this seems to be said rather for the sake of avoiding phrases which were conventionally rejected by the scholastic theologians, since, in effect, his theory requires the affirmative, as we shall soon perceive ; and he here says that the law is God himself (*Deus ipse*), and is immutable. This eternal law is not immediately known to man in this life, but either “in other laws, or through them,” which he thus explains. “Men, while pilgrims here (*viatores homines*), cannot learn the divine will in itself, but only as much as by certain signs or effects is proposed to them ; and hence it is peculiar to the blessed in heaven that, contemplating the divine will, they are ruled by it as by a direct law. The former know the eternal law, because they partake of it by other laws, temporal and positive ; for, as second causes display the first, and creatures the Creator, so temporal laws (by which he means laws respective of man on earth), being streams from that eternal law, manifest the fountain whence they spring. Yet all do not arrive even at this degree of knowledge, for all are not able to infer the cause from the effect. And thus, though all men necessarily perceive some participation of the eternal laws in themselves, since there is no one endowed with reason who does not in some manner acknowledge that what is morally good ought to be chosen, and what is evil rejected, so that in this sense men have all some notion of the eternal law, as St. Thomas, and Hales, and Augustin say ; yet nevertheless they do not all know it formally, nor are aware of their participation of it, so that it may be said the eternal law is not universally known in a direct manner. But some attain that knowledge, either by natural reasoning, or, more properly, by revelation of faith ; and hence we have said that it is known by some only in the inferior laws, but by others through the means of those laws.”*

22. In every chapter, Suarez propounds the arguments of doctors on either side of the problem, ending with his own determination, which is frequently a middle course. On the question, Whether natural law is of itself preceptive, or merely indicative of what is intrinsically right or wrong, or, in other words, whether God, as to

Whether
God is a
legislator ?

* Lib. ii. c. 4. § 9.

this law, is a legislator, he holds this middle line with Aquinas and most theologians (as he says); contending that natural law does not merely indicate right and wrong, but commands the one and prohibits the other on divine authority; though this will of God is not the whole ground of the moral good and evil which belongs to the observance or transgression of natural law, inasmuch as it presupposes a certain intrinsic right and wrong in the actions themselves, to which it superadds the special obligation of a divine law. God therefore may be truly called a legislator in respect of natural law.*

23. He next comes to a profound but important inquiry, closely connected with the last, whether God could have permitted by his own law actions against natural reason? Ockham and Gerson had resolved this in the affirmative, Aquinas the contrary way. Suarez assents to the latter, and thus determines that the law is strictly immutable. It must follow of course that the pope cannot alter or dispense with the law of nature, and he might have spared the fourteenth chapter, wherein he controverts the doctrine of Sanchez and some casuists who had maintained so extraordinary a prerogative.† This, however, is rather episodal. In the fifteenth chapter he treats more at length the question, Whether God can dispense with the law of nature? which is not, perhaps decided in denying his power to repeal it. He begins by distinguishing three classes of moral laws. The first are the most general, such as that good is to be done rather than evil; and with these it is agreed that God cannot dispense. The second is of such as the precepts of the decalogue, where the chief difficulty had arisen. Ockham, Peter d'Ailly, Gerson, and others, incline to say that he can dispense with all these, inasmuch as they are only prohibitions which he has himself imposed. This tenet, Suarez observes, is rejected by all other theologians as false and

Whether
God could
permit or
command
wrong ac-
tions?

* Hæc Dei voluntas, prohibitio aut præceptio non est tota ratio bonitatis et malitiæ quæ est in observatione vel transgressionem legis naturalis, sed supponit in ipsis actibus necessariam quandam honestatem vel turpitudinem, et illis adjungit specialem legis divinæ obligationem. c. 6. § 11.

† Nulla potestas humana, etiamsi pontificia sit, potest proprium aliquod præceptum legis naturalis abrogare, nec illud proprie et in se minuere, neque in ipso dispensare. § 8.

absurd. He decidedly holds that there is an intrinsic goodness or malignity in actions independent of the command of God. Scotus had been of opinion that God might dispense with the commandments of the second table, but not those of the first. Durand seems to have thought the fifth commandment (our sixth) more dispensable than the rest, probably on account of the case of Abraham. But Aquinas, Cajetan, Soto, with many more, deny absolutely the dispensability of the decalogue in any part. The Gordian knot about the sacrifice of Isaac is cut by a distinction, that God did not act here as a legislator, but in another capacity, as lord of life and death, so that he only used Abraham as an instrument for that which he might have done himself. The third class of moral precepts is of those not contained in the decalogue, as to which he decides also, that God cannot dispense with them, though he may change the circumstances upon which their obligation rests, as when he releases a vow.

24. The Protestant churches were not generally attentive to casuistical divinity, which smelt too much of the opposite system. Eichhorn observes that the first book of that class, published among the Lutherans, was by a certain Baldwin of Wittenberg, in 1628.* A few books of casuistry were published in England during this period, though nothing, as well as I remember, that can be reckoned a system, or even a treatise, of moral philosophy. Perkins, an eminent Calvinistic divine of the reign of Elizabeth, is the first of these in point of time. His *Cases of Conscience* appeared in 1606. Of this book I can say nothing from personal knowledge. In the works of Bishop Hall several particular questions of this kind are treated, but not with much ability. His distinctions are more than usually feeble. Thus usury is a deadly sin, but it is very difficult to commit it unless we love the sin for its own sake; for almost every possible case of lending money will be found by his limitations of the rule to justify the taking a profit for the loan.† His casuistry about selling goods is of the same description: a man must take no advantage of the scarcity of the commodity, unless there should be just reason

English
casuists—
Perkins,
Hall.

* Vol. vi. part i. p. 346.

† Hall's Works (edit. Pratt), vol. viii. p. 375.

to raise the price, which he admits to be often the case in a scarcity. He concludes by observing that, in this, as in other well-ordered nations, it would be a happy thing to have a regulation of prices. He decides, as all the old casuists did, that a promise extorted by a robber is binding. Sanderson was the most celebrated of the English casuists. His treatise, *De Juramenti Obligatione*, appeared in 1647.

25. Though no proper treatise of moral philosophy came from any English writer in this period, we have one which must be placed in this class, strangely as the subject has been handled by its distinguished author. Selden published in 1640 his learned work, *De Jure Naturali et Gentium juxta Disciplinam Ebræorum*.* The object of the author was to trace the opinions of the Jews on the law of nature and nations, or of moral obligation, as distinct from the Mosaic law; the former being a law to which they held all mankind to be bound. This theme had been of course untouched by the Greek and Roman philosophers, nor was much to be found upon it in modern writers. His purpose is therefore rather historical than argumentative; but he seems so generally to adopt the Jewish theory of natural law that we may consider him the disciple of the rabbis as much as their historian.

Selden,
*De Jure
Naturali
juxta He-
bræos.*

26. The origin of natural law was not drawn by the Jews, as some of the jurists imagined it ought to be, from the habits and instincts of all animated beings, *quod natura omnia animalia docuit*, according to the definition of the Pandects. Nor did they deem, as many have done, the consent of mankind and common customs of nations to be a sufficient basis for so permanent and invariable a standard. Upon the discrepancy of moral sentiments and practices among mankind Selden enlarges in the tone which Sextus Empiricus had taught scholars, and which the world had learned from Montaigne. Nor did unassisted reason seem equal to determine moral questions, both from its natural feebleness, and because reason alone does not create an obligation, which depends wholly on the command of a su-

Jewish
theory of
natural law.

* *Juxta* for *secundum*, we need hardly say, is bad Latin: it was, however, very common, and is even used by Joseph Scaliger, as Vossius mentions in his treatise, *De Vitiis Sermonis*.

perior.* But God, as the ruler of the universe, has partly implanted in our minds, partly made known to us by exterior revelation, his own will, which is our law. These positions he illustrates with a superb display of erudition, especially Oriental, and certainly with more prolixity, and less regard to opposite reasonings, than we should desire.

27. The Jewish writers concur in maintaining that certain short precepts of moral duty were orally enjoined by God on the parent of mankind, and afterwards on the sons of Noah. Whether these were simply preserved by tradition, or whether, by an innate moral faculty, mankind had the power of constantly discerning them, seems to have been an unsettled point. The principal of these divine rules are called, for distinction, The Seven Precepts of the Sons of Noah. There is, however, some variance in the lists, as Selden has given them from the ancient writers. That most received consists of seven prohibitions; namely, of idolatry, blasphemy, murder, adultery, theft, rebellion, and cutting a limb from a living animal. The last of these, the sense of which, however, is controverted, as well as the third, but no other, are indicated in the ninth chapter of Genesis.

28. Selden pours forth his unparalleled stores of erudition on all these subjects, and upon those which are suggested in the course of his explanations. These digressions are by no means the least useful part of his long treatise. They elucidate some obscure passages of Scripture. But the whole work belongs far more to theological than to philosophical investigation; and I have placed it here chiefly out of conformity to usage; for undoubtedly Selden, though a man of very strong reasoning faculties, had not greatly turned them to the principles of natural law. His reliance on the testimony of Jewish writers, many of them by no means ancient, for those primæval traditions as to the sons of Noah, was in the character of his times, but it will scarcely suit the more rigid criticism of our own. His book, however, is excellent for its proper purpose, that of re-

Seven precepts of the sons of Noah.

Character of Selden's work.

* Selden says, in his Table Talk, that he can understand no law of nature but a law of God. He might mean this in the sense of Suarez, without denying an intrinsic distinction of right and wrong.

presenting Jewish opinion, and is among the greatest achievements in erudition that any English writer has performed.

29. The moral theories of Grotius and Hobbes are so much interwoven with other parts of their philosophy, in the treatise *De Jure Belli* and in the *Leviathan*, Grotius and Hobbes. that it would be dissecting those works too much, were we to separate what is merely ethical from what falls within the provinces of politics and jurisprudence. The whole must therefore be reserved for the ensuing sections of this chapter. Nor is there much in the writings of Bacon or of Descartes which falls, in the sense we have hitherto been considering it, under the class of moral philosophy. We may, therefore, proceed to another description of books, relative to the passions and manners of mankind, rather than, in a strict sense, to their duties, though of course there will frequently be some intermixture of subjects so intimately allied.

30. In the year 1601, Peter Charron, a French ecclesiastic, published his treatise on Wisdom. The reputation of this work has been considerable; his Charron on Wisdom. countrymen are apt to name him with Montaigne; and Pope has given him the epithet of "more wise" than his predecessor, on account, as Warburton expresses it, of his "moderating every where the extravagant Pyrrhonism of his friend." It is admitted that he has copied freely from the *Essays* of Montaigne; in fact, a very large portion of the treatise on Wisdom, not less, I should conjecture, than one fourth, is extracted from them with scarce any verbal alteration. It is not the case that he moderates the sceptical tone which he found there; on the contrary, the most remarkable passages of that kind have been transcribed; but we must do Charron the justice to say, that he has retrenched the indecencies, the egotism, and the superfluities. Charron does not dissemble his debts. "This," he says in his preface, "is the collection of a part of my studies; the form and method are my own. What I have taken from others, I have put in their words, not being able to say it better than they have done." In the political part he has borrowed copiously from Lipsius and Bodin, and he is said to have obligations to Duvair.* The ancients also

* Biogr. Universelle.

must have contributed their share. It becomes, therefore, difficult to estimate the place of Charron as a philosopher, because we feel a good deal of uncertainty whether any passage may be his own. He appears to have been a man formed in the school of Montaigne, not much less bold in pursuing the novel opinions of others, but less fertile in original thoughts, so that he often falls into the common-places of ethics ; with more reading than his model, with more disciplined habits as well of arranging and distributing his subject, as of observing the sequence of an argument ; but, on the other hand, with far less of ingenuity in thinking, and of sprightliness of language.

31. A writer of rather less extensive celebrity than Charron belongs full as much to the school of Montaigne, though he does not so much pillage his Essays. This was La Mothe le Vayer, a man distinguished by his literary character in the court of Louis XIII., and ultimately preceptor both to the Duke of Orleans and the young king (Louis XIV.) himself. La Mothe was habitually and universally a sceptic. Among several smaller works we may chiefly instance his Dialogues published many years after his death under the name of Horatius Tubero. They must have been written in the reign of Louis XIII., and belong, therefore, to the present period. In attacking every established doctrine, especially in religion, he goes much farther than Montaigne, and seems to have taken some of his metaphysical system immediately from Sextus Empiricus. He is profuse of quotation, especially in a dialogue entitled *Le Banquet Sceptique*, the aim of which is to show that there is no uniform taste of mankind as to their choice of food. His mode of arguing against the moral sense is entirely that of Montaigne, or, if there be any difference, is more full of the two fallacies by which that lively writer deceives himself : namely, the accumulating examples of things arbitrary and fanciful, such as modes of dress and conventional usages, with respect to which no one pretends that any natural law can be found ; and, when he comes to subjects more truly moral, the turning our attention solely to the external action, and not to the motive or principle, which

La Mothe
le Vayer.
His Dia-
logues.

under different circumstances may prompt men to opposite courses.

32. These dialogues are not unpleasing to read, and exhibit a polite though rather pedantic style, not uncommon in the seventeenth century. They are, however, very diffuse, and the sceptical paradoxes become merely common-place by repetition. One of them is more grossly indecent than any part of Montaigne. La Mothe le Vayer is not, on the whole, much to be admired as a philosopher; little appears to be his own, and still less is really good. He contributed, no question, as much as any one, to the irreligion and contempt for morality prevailing in that court where he was in high reputation. Some other works of this author may be classed under the same description.

33. We can hardly refer Lord Bacon's Essays to the school of Montaigne, though their title may lead us to suspect that they were in some measure suggested by that most popular writer. The first edition, containing ten essays only, and those much shorter than as we now possess them, appeared, as has been already mentioned, in 1597. They were reprinted with very little variation in 1606. But the enlarged work was published in 1612, and dedicated to Prince Henry. He calls them, in this dedication, "certain brief notes, set down rather significantly than curiously, which I have called Essays. The word is late, but the thing is ancient; for Seneca's Epistles to Lucilius, if you mark them well, are but Essays, that is, dispersed meditations, though conveyed in the form of epistles." The resemblance, at all events, to Montaigne, is not greater than might be expected in two men equally original in genius, and entirely opposite in their characters and circumstances. One, by an instinctive felicity, catches some of the characteristics of human nature; the other, by profound reflection, scrutinises and dissects it. One is too negligent for the inquiring reader, the other too formal and sententious for one who seeks to be amused. We delight in one, we admire the other; but this admiration has also its own delight. In one we find more of the sweet temper and tranquil contemplation of Plutarch, in the other more of the practical wisdom and somewhat ambitious prospects of Seneca. It is characteristic of Bacon's philosophical writings,

Bacon's
Essays.

that they have in them a spirit of movement, a perpetual reference to what man is to do in order to an end, rather than to his mere speculation upon what is. In his *Essays* this is naturally still more prominent. They are, as quaintly described in the title-page of the first edition, "places (loci) of persuasion and dissuasion;" counsels for those who would be great as well as wise. They are such as sprang from a mind ardent in two kinds of ambition, and hesitating whether to found a new philosophy, or to direct the vessel of the state. We perceive, however, that the immediate reward attending greatness, as is almost always the case, gave it a preponderance in his mind; and hence his *Essays* are more often political than moral; they deal with mankind, not in their general faculties or habits, but in their mutual strife, their endeavours to rule others, or to avoid their rule. He is more cautious and more comprehensive, though not more acute, than Machiavel, who often becomes too dogmatic through the habit of referring every thing to a particular aspect of political societies. Nothing in the *Prince* or the *Discourses on Livy* is superior to the *Essays on Seditions*, on *Empire*, on *Innovations*, or generally those which bear on the dexterous management of a people by their rulers. Both these writers have what to our more liberal age appears a counselling of governors for their own rather than their subjects' advantage; but as this is generally represented to be the best means, though not, as it truly is, the real end, their advice tends, on the whole, to promote the substantial benefits of government.

34. The transcendent strength of Bacon's mind is visible in the whole tenor of these *Essays*, unequal as they must be from the very nature of such compositions. Their excellence. They are deeper and more discriminating than any earlier, or almost any later work in the English language, full of recon-dite observation long matured and carefully sifted. It is true that we might wish for more vivacity and ease; Bacon, who had much wit, had little gaiety; his *Essays* are consequently stiff and grave, where the subject might have been touched with a lively hand; thus it is in those on *Gardens* and on *Building*. The sentences have sometimes too apophthegmatic a form, and want coherence; the historical instances, though far less frequent than with Montaigne, have a little

the look of pedantry to our eyes. But it is from this condensation, from this gravity, that the work derives its peculiar impressiveness. Few books are more quoted, and what is not always the case with such books, we may add that few are more generally read. In this respect they lead the van of our prose literature; for no gentleman is ashamed of owning that he has not read the Elizabethan writers; but it would be somewhat derogatory to a man of the slightest claim to polite letters, were he unacquainted with the Essays of Bacon. It is indeed little worth while to read this or any other book for reputation's sake; but very few in our language so well repay the pains, or afford more nourishment to the thoughts. They might be judiciously introduced, with a small number more, into a sound method of education, one that should make wisdom, rather than mere knowledge, its object, and might become a text-book of examination in our schools.

35. It is rather difficult to fix upon the fittest place for bringing forward some books, which, though moral in their subject, belong to the general literature of the age, and we might strip the province of polite letters of what have been reckoned its chief ornaments. I shall therefore select here such only as are more worthy of consideration for their matter than for the style in which it is delivered. Several that might range, more or less, under the denomination of moral essays, were published both in English and in other languages. But few of them are now read, or even much known by name. One, which has made a better fortune than the rest, demands mention, the *Resolves* of Owen ^{Feltham's} Feltham. Of this book, the first part of which was published in 1627, the second not till after the middle of the century, it is not uncommon to meet with high praises in those modern writers, who profess a faithful allegiance to our older literature. For myself, I can only say that Feltham appears not only a laboured and artificial, but a shallow writer. Among his many faults none strikes me more than a want of depth, which his pointed and sententious manner renders more ridiculous. There are certainly exceptions to this vacuity of original meaning in Feltham; it would be possible to fill a few pages with extracts not undeserving of being read, with thoughts just and judicious, though never deriving much

lustre from his diction. He is one of our worst writers in point of style; with little vigour, he has less elegance; his English is impure to an excessive degree, and full of words unauthorised by any usage. Pedantry, and the novel phrases which Greek and Latin etymology was supposed to warrant, appear in most productions of this period; but Feltham attempted to bend the English idiom to his own affectations. The moral reflections of a serious and thoughtful mind are generally pleasing, and to this perhaps is partly owing the kind of popularity which the *Resolves* of Feltham have obtained; but they may be had more agreeably and profitably in other books.*

36. A superior genius to that of Feltham is exhibited in the *Religio Medici* of Sir Thomas Browne. This little book made a remarkable impression; it was soon translated into several languages, and is highly extolled by Conringius and others, who could only judge through these versions. Patin, though he rather slights it himself, tells us in one of his letters that it was very popular at Paris. The character which Johnson has given of the *Religio Medici* is well known; and, though perhaps rather too favourable, appears in general just.† The mind of Browne was fertile, and, according to the current use of the word, ingenious; his analogies are original and sometimes brilliant;

* This is a random sample of Feltham's style:—"Of all objects of sorrow a distressed king is the most pitiful, because it presents us most the frailty of humanity, and cannot but most *midnight* the soul of him that is fallen. The sorrows of a deposed king are like the *distortments* of a *darted* conscience, which none can know but he that hath lost a crown." Cent. i. 61. We find not long after the following precious phrase:—"The nature that is *arted* with the subtleties of time and practice." i. 63. In one page we have *obnubilate*, *nested*, *parallel* (as a verb), *frile* (failings), *uncurtain*, *depraving* (calumniating). i. 50. And we are to be disgusted with such vile English, or properly no English, for the sake of the sleepy saws of a trivial morality. Such defects are not compensated by the better and more striking thoughts we may occasionally light upon. In reading

Feltham, nevertheless, I seemed to perceive some resemblance to the tone and way of thinking of the Turkish Spy, which is a great compliment to the former; for the Turkish Spy is neither disagreeable nor superficial. The resemblance must lie in a certain contemplative melancholy, rather serious than severe, in respect to the world and its ways; and as Feltham's *Resolves* seem to have a charm, by the editions they have gone through, and the good name they have gained, I can only look for it in this.

† "The *Religio Medici* was no sooner published than it excited the attention of the public by the novelty of paradoxes, the dignity of sentiment, the quick succession of images, the multitude of abstruse allusions, the subtlety of disquisition, and the strength of language." *Life of Browne* (in Johnson's Works, xii. 275.).

and as his learning is also in things out of the beaten path, this gives a peculiar and uncommon air to all his writings, and especially to the *Religio Medici*. He was, however, far removed from real philosophy, both by his turn of mind and by the nature of his erudition; he seldom reasons, his thoughts are desultory, sometimes he appears sceptical or paradoxical, but credulity and deference to authority prevail. He belonged to the class, numerous at that time in our church, who halted between popery and protestantism; and this gives him, on all such topics, an appearance of vacillation and irresoluteness which probably represents the real state of his mind. His paradoxes do not seem very original, nor does he arrive at them by any process of argument; they are more like traces of his reading casually suggesting themselves, and supported by his own ingenuity. His style is not flowing, but vigorous; his choice of words not elegant, and even approaching to barbarism as English phrase; yet there is an impressiveness, an air of reflection and sincerity in Browne's writings, which redeem many of their faults. His egotism is equal to that of Montaigne, but with this difference, that it is the egotism of a melancholy mind, which generally becomes unpleasing. This melancholy temperament is characteristic of Browne. "Let's talk of graves and worms and epitaphs" seems his motto. His best written work, the *Hydriotaphia*, is expressly an essay on sepulchral urns; but the same taste for the circumstances of mortality leavens also the *Religio Medici*.

37. The thoughts of Sir Walter Raleigh on moral prudence are few, but precious. And some of the bright sallies of Selden recorded in his Table Talk are of ^{Selden's} Table Talk. the same description, though the book is too miscellaneous to fall under any single head of classification. The editor of this very short and small volume, which gives, perhaps, a more exalted notion of Selden's natural talents than any of his learned writings, requests the reader to distinguish times, and "in his fancy to carry along with him the when and the why many of these things were spoken." This intimation accounts for the different spirit in which he may seem to combat the follies of the prelates at one time, and of the presbyterians or fanatics at another. These sayings are not always, apparently, well reported; some seem to have been

misunderstood, and in others the limiting clauses to have been forgotten. But on the whole they are full of vigour, raciness, and a kind of scorn of the half-learned, far less rude, but more cutting than that of Scaliger. It has been said that the *Table Talk* of Selden is worth all the *Ana* of the Continent. In this I should be disposed to concur; but they are not exactly works of the same class.

38. We must now descend much lower, and could find little worth remembering. Osborn's Advice to his Son. Osborn's *Advice to his Son* may be reckoned among the moral and political writings of this period. It is not very far above mediocrity, and contains a good deal that is common-place, yet with a considerable sprinkling of sound sense and observation. The style is rather apophthegmatic, though by no means more so than was then usual.

39. A few books, English as well as foreign, are purposely deferred for the present; I am rather apprehensive that I shall be found to have overlooked some not unworthy of notice. John Valentine Andreæ. One written in Latin by a German writer has struck me as displaying a spirit which may claim for it a place among the livelier and lighter class, though with serious intent, of moral essays. John Valentine Andreæ was a man above his age, and a singular contrast to the narrow and pedantic herd of German scholars and theologians. He regarded all things around him with a sarcastic but benevolent philosophy, keen in exposing the errors of mankind, yet only for the sake of amending them. It has been supposed by many that he invented the existence of the famous Rosicrucian society, not so much, probably, for the sake of mystification, as to suggest an institution so praiseworthy and philanthropic as he delineated for the imitation of mankind. This, however, is still a debated problem in Germany.* But among his numerous writings, that alone of which I know any thing is entitled, in the original Latin, *Mythologiæ Christianæ, sive Virtutum et Vitiorum Vitæ Humanæ Imaginum Libri Tres*. (Strasburg, 1618.) Herder has translated a part of this book in the fifth volume of his *Zerstreute Blätter*; and it is here that I have met with it. Andreæ wrote, I believe, solely

* Brucker, iv. 735. Biogr. Univ. art. Andreæ, et alibi.

in Latin, and his works appear to be scarce, at least in England. These short apologues, which Herder has called Parables, are written with uncommon terseness of language, a happy and original vein of invention, and a philosophy looking down on common life without ostentation and without passion. He came, too, before Bacon, but he had learned to scorn the disputes of the schools, and had sought for truth with an entire love, even at the hands of Cardan and Campanella. I will give a specimen, in a note, of the peculiar manner of Andreæ, but my translation does not, perhaps, justice to that of Herder. The idea, it may be observed, is now become more trite.*

SECT. II.—ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Change in the Character of political Writings — Bellenden and others — Patriarchal Theory refuted by Suarez — Althusius — Political Economy of Serra — Hobbes — and Analysis of his political Treatises.

40. THE recluse philosopher, who, like Descartes in his country-house near Utrecht, investigates the properties of quantity, or the operations of the human mind, while nations are striving for conquest and factions for ascendancy, hears

* "The Pen and the Sword strove with each other for superiority, and the voices of the judges were divided. The men of learning talked much and persuaded many; the men of arms were fierce, and compelled many to join their side. Thus nothing could be determined; it followed that both were left to fight it out, and settle their dispute in single combat.

"On one side books rustled in the libraries, on the other arms rattled in the arsenals; men looked on in hope and fear, and waited the end.

"The Pen, consecrated to truth, was notorious for much falsehood; the Sword, a servant of God, was stained with innocent blood; both hoped for the aid of heaven, both found its wrath.

"The State, which had need of both, and disliked the manners of both, would put on the appearance of caring for the

weal and woe of neither. The Pen was weak, but quick, glib, well exercised, and very bold, when one provoked it. The Sword was stern, implacable, but less compact and subtle, so that on both sides the victory remained uncertain. At length, for the security of both, the common weal pronounced that both in turn should stand by her side and bear with each other. For that only is a happy country where the Pen and the Sword are faithful servants, not where either governs by its arbitrary will and passion."

If the touches in this little piece are not always clearly laid on, it may be ascribed as much, perhaps, to their having passed through two translations, as to the fault of the excellent writer. But in this early age we seldom find the entire neatness and felicity which later times attained.

that tumultuous uproar but as the dash of the ocean waves at a distance, and it may even serve, like music that falls upon the poet's ear, to wake in him some new train of high thought, or at the least to confirm his love of the absolute and the eternal, by comparison with the imperfection and error that besets the world. Such is the serene temple of philosophy, which the Roman poet has contrasted with the storm and the battle, with the passions of the great and the many, the perpetual struggle of man against his fellows. But if he who might dwell on this vantage-ground descends into the plain, and takes so near a view of the world's strife, that he sees it as a whole very imperfectly, while the parts to which he approaches are magnified beyond their proportion; if especially he mingles with the combat, and shares its hopes and its perils, though in many respects he may know more than those who keep aloof, he will lose something of that faculty of equal and comprehensive vision, in which the philosophical temper consists. Such has very frequently, or more or less, perhaps, in almost every instance, been the fate of the writer on general politics; if his pen has not been solely employed with a view to the questions that engage attention in his own age, it has generally been guided in a certain degree by regard to them.

41. In the sixteenth century, we have seen that notions of popular rights, and of the admissibility of sovereign power for misconduct, were alternately broached by the two great religious parties of Europe, according to the necessity in which they stood for such weapons against their adversaries. Passive obedience was preached as a duty by the victorious, rebellion was claimed as a right by the vanquished. The history of France and England, and partly of other countries, was the clue to these politics. But in the following period, a more tranquil state of public opinion, and a firmer hand upon the reins of power, put an end to such books as those of Languet, Buchanan, Rose, and Mariana. The last of these, by the vindication of tyrannicide, in his treatise *De Rege*, contributed to bring about a re-action in political literature. The Jesuits in France, whom Henry IV. was inclined to favour, publicly condemned the doctrine of Mariana in 1606. A book by

Abandon-
ment of
anti-monar-
chical
theories.

Becanus, and another by Suarez, justifying regicide, were condemned by the parliament of Paris, in 1612.* The assassination, indeed, of Henry IV., committed by one, not perhaps, metaphysically speaking, sane, but whose aberration of intellect had evidently been either brought on or nourished by the pernicious theories of that school, created such an abhorrence of the doctrine, that neither the Jesuits nor others ventured afterwards to teach it. Those also who magnified, as far as circumstances would permit, the alleged supremacy of the see of Rome over temporal princes, were little inclined to set up, like Mariana, a popular sovereignty, a right of the multitude not emanating from the Church, and to which the Church itself might one day be under the necessity of submitting. This became, therefore, a period favourable to the theories of absolute power; not so much shown by means of their positive assertion through the press as by the silence of the press, comparatively speaking, on all political theories whatever.

42. The political writings of this part of the seventeenth century assumed in consequence more of an historical, or, as we might say, a statistical character. Learning was employed in systematical analyses of ancient or modern forms of government, in dissertations explanatory of institutions, in copious and exact statements of the true, rather than arguments upon the right or the expedient. Some of the very numerous works of Herman Conringius, a professor at Helmstadt, seem to fall within this description. But none are better known than a collection, made by the Elzevirs, at different times near the middle of this century, containing accounts, chiefly published before, of the political constitutions of European commonwealths. This collection, which is in volumes of the smallest size, may be called for distinction the *Elzevir Republics*. It is very useful in respect of the knowledge of facts it imparts, but rarely contains any thing of a philosophical nature. Statistical descriptions of countries are much allied to these last; some indeed are included in the Elzevir series. They were as yet not frequent; but I might have mentioned, while upon the sixteenth century, one of the earliest, the *Descrip-*

Political
literature
becomes
historical.

* Mezeray, *Hist. de la Mère et du Fils*.

tion of the Low Countries by Ludovico Guicciardini, brother of the historian.

43. Those, however, were not entirely wanting who took a more philosophical view of the social relations of mankind. Among these a very respectable place should be assigned to a Scotsman, by name Bellenden, whose treatise *De Statu*, in three Books, is dedicated to Prince Charles in 1615. The first of these books is entitled *De Statu prisci orbis in religione, re politica et literis*; the second, *Ciceronis Princeps, sive de statu principis et imperii*; the third, *Ciceronis Consul, Senator, Senatusque Romanus, sive de statu reipublicæ et urbis imperantis orbi*. The first two books are, in a general sense, political; the last relates entirely to the Roman polity, but builds much political precept on this. Bellenden seems to have taken a more comprehensive view of history in his first book, and to have reflected more philosophically on it, than perhaps any one had done before; at least, I do not remember any work of so early an age which reminds me so much of Vico and the *Grandeur et Décadence* of Montesquieu. We can hardly make an exception for Bodin, because the Scot is so much more regularly historical, and so much more concise. The first book contains little more than forty pages. Bellenden's learning is considerable, and without that pedantry of quotation which makes most books of the age intolerable. The latter parts have less originality and reach of thought. This book was reprinted, as is well known, in 1787; but the celebrated preface of the editor has had the effect of eclipsing the original author; Parr was constantly read and talked of, Bellenden never.

44. The Politics of Campanella are warped by a desire to please the court of Rome, which he recommends as fit to enjoy an universal monarchy, at least by supreme control; and observes, with some acuteness, that no prince had been able to obtain an universal ascendant over Christendom, because the presiding vigilance of the Holy See has regulated their mutual contentions, exalting one and depressing another, as seemed expedient for the good of religion.* This book is pregnant with deep reflection on

* Nullus hactenus Christianus princeps monarchiam super cunctos Christianos populos sibi conservare potuit.

Quoniam papa præest illis, et dissipat erigitque illorum conatus prout religioni expedit. C. 8.

history; it is enriched, perhaps, by the study of Bodin, but is much more concise. In one of the Dialogues of La Mothe le Vayer, we find the fallacy of some general maxims in politics drawn from a partial induction well exposed, by showing the instances where they have wholly failed. Though he pays high compliments to Louis XIII. and to Richelieu, he speaks freely enough, in his sceptical way, of the general advantages of monarchy.

45. Gabriel Naudé, a man of extensive learning, acute understanding, and many good qualities, but rather lax in religious and moral principle, excited some attention by a very small volume, entitled *Considerations sur les coups d'état*, which he wrote while young, at Rome, in the service of the Cardinal de Bagne. In this he maintains the bold contempt of justice and humanity in political emergencies which had brought disgrace on the Prince of Machiavel, blaming those who, in his own country, had abandoned the defence of the St. Bartholomew massacre. The book is in general heavy and not well written, but coming from a man of cool head, clear judgment, and considerable historical knowledge, it contains some remarks not unworthy of notice.

46. The ancient philosophers, the civil lawyers, and by far the majority of later writers, had derived the origin of government from some agreement of the community. Bodin explicitly rejecting this hypothesis, referred it to violent usurpation. But, in England, about the beginning of the reign of James, a different theory gained ground with the church; it was assumed, for it did not admit of proof, that a patriarchal authority had been transferred by primogeniture to the heir-general of the human race; so that kingdoms were but enlarged families, and an indefeasible right of monarchy was attached to their natural chief, which, in consequence of the impossibility of discovering him, devolved upon the representative of the first sovereign who could be historically proved to have reigned over any nation. This had not perhaps hitherto been maintained at length in any published book, but will be found to have been taken for granted in more than one. It was of course in favour with James I., who had a very strong hereditary

La Mothe
le Vayer.

Naudé's
Coups
d'Etat.

Patriarchal
theory of
government.

title ; and it might seem to be countenanced by the fact of Highland and Irish clanship, which does really affect to rest on a patriarchal basis.

47. This theory as to the origin of political society, or one akin to it, appears to have been espoused by some Refuted by Suarez. on the Continent. Suarez, in the second book of his great work on law, observes, in a remarkable passage, that certain canonists hold civil magistracy to have been conferred by God on some prince, and to remain always in his heirs by succession ; but “that such an opinion has neither authority nor foundation. For this power, by its very nature, belongs to no one man, but to a multitude of men. This is a certain conclusion, being common to all our authorities, as we find by St. Thomas, by the civil laws, and by the great canonists and casuists ; all of whom agree that the prince has that power of law-giving which the people have given him. And the reason is evident, since all men are born equal, and consequently no one has a political jurisdiction over another, nor any dominion ; nor can we give any reason from the nature of the thing, why one man should govern another rather than the contrary. It is true that one might allege the primacy which Adam at his creation necessarily possessed, and hence deduce his government over all men, and suppose that to be derived by some one, either through primogenitary descent, or through the special appointment of Adam himself. Thus Chrysostom has said that the descent of all men from Adam signifies their subordination to one sovereign. But in fact we could only infer from the creation and natural origin of mankind that Adam possessed a domestic or patriarchal (*œconomicam*), not a political, authority ; for he had power over his wife, and afterwards a paternal power over his sons till they were emancipated ; and he might even in course of time have servants and a complete family, and that power in respect of them which is called patriarchal. But after families began to be multiplied, and single men who were heads of families to be separated, they had each the same power with respect to their own families. Nor did political power begin to exist till many families began to be collected into one entire community. Hence, as that community did not begin by Adam’s creation, nor by any will of his, but by that of all who formed

it, we cannot properly say, that Adam had naturally a political headship in such a society; for there are no principles of reason from which this could be inferred, since by the law of nature it is no right of the progenitor to be even king of his own posterity. And if this cannot be proved by the principles of natural law, we have no ground for asserting that God has given such a power by a special gift or providence, inasmuch as we have no revelation or scripture testimony to the purpose." * So clear, brief and dispassionate a refutation might have caused our English divines, who became very fond of this patriarchal theory, to blush before the Jesuit of Granada.

48. Suarez maintains it to be of the essence of a law that it be enacted for the public good. An unjust law is no law, and does not bind the conscience. † In ^{His opinion of law.} this he breathes the spirit of Mariana. But he shuns some of his bolder assertions. He denies the right of rising in arms against a tyrant, unless he is an usurper; and though he is strongly for preserving the concession made by the kings of Spain to their people, that no taxes shall be levied without the consent of the Cortes, does not agree with those who lay it down as a general rule, that no prince can impose taxes on his people by his own will. ‡ Suarez asserts the direct power of the church over heretical princes, but denies it as to infidels. § In this last point, as has been seen, he follows the most respectable authorities of his nation.

49. Bayle has taken notice of a systematic treatise on Politics by John Althusius, a native of Germany. Of this I have only seen an edition published at Groningen in 1615, and dedicated to the states of West Friesland. It seems, however, from the article in Bayle, that there was one printed at Herborn in 1603. Several German writers inveigh against this work as full of seditious principles, inimical to every government. It is a political system, taken chiefly from preceding authors, and very freely from Bodin; with great learning, but not very profitable to read. The ephori, as he calls them, by which he means the estates of a kingdom, have the right to resist a tyrant. But this right he denies to the

* Lib. ii. c. 2. § 3.

† Lib. i. c. 7.; and lib. iii. c. 22.

‡ Lib. v. c. 17.

§ Lib. iii. c. 10.

private citizen. His chapter on this subject is written more in the tone of the sixteenth than of the seventeenth century, which indeed had scarcely commenced.* He answers in it Albericus Gentilis, Barclay and others who had contended for passive obedience, not failing to draw support from the canonists and civilians whom he quotes. But the strongest passage is in his dedication to the States of Friesland. Here he declares his principle, that the supreme power or sovereignty (*jus majestatis*), does not reside in the chief magistrate, but in the people themselves, and that no other is proprietor or usufructuary of it, the magistrate being the administrator of this supreme power, but not its owner, nor entitled to use it for his benefit. And these rights of sovereignty are so much confined to the whole community, that they can no more alienate them to another, whether they will or not, than a man can transfer his own life.†

50. Few, even among the Calvinists, whose form of government was in some cases republican, would in the seventeenth century have approved this strong language of Althusius. But one of their noted theologians, Paræus, incurred the censure of the university of Oxford in 1623, for some passages in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, which seemed to impugn their orthodox tenet of unlimited submission. He merely holds that subjects, when not private men, but inferior magistrates, may defend themselves, and the state, and the true religion, even by arms against the sovereign under certain conditions; because these superior magistrates are themselves responsible to the laws of God and of the state.‡ It was, in truth, impossible to deny the right of resistance in such cases without “branding the unsmirched

* Cap. 38. De tyrannide et ejus remediis.

† Administratorem, procuratorem, gubernatorem *jurium majestatis*, principem agnosco. Proprietarium vero et usufructuarium *majestatis* nullum alium quam populum universum in corpus unum symbioticum ex pluribus minoribus consociationibus consociatum, &c.

‡ Subditi non privati, sed in magistratu inferiori constituti, adversus superiorem magistratum se et rempublicam et ecclesiam seu veram religionem etiam

armis defendere jure possunt, his positis conditionibus: 1. Cum superior magistratus degenerat in tyrannum; 2. Aut ad manifestam idololatriam atque blasphemias ipsos vel subditos alios vult cogere; 3. Cum ipsis atrox infertur injuria; 4. Si aliter incolumes fortunis vita et conscientia esse non possint; 5. Ne prætextu religionis aut justitiæ sua quærant; 6. Servata semper *enkeia* et moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ juxta leges. Paræus in Epist. ad Roman. col. 1350.

brow" of protestantism itself; for by what other means had the reformed religion been made to flourish in Holland and Geneva, or in Scotland? But in England, where it had been planted under a more auspicious star, there was little occasion to seek this vindication of the protestant church, which had not, in the legal phrase, come in by disseisin of the state, but had united with the state to turn out of doors its predecessor. That some of the Anglican refugees under Mary were ripe enough for resistance, or even regicide, has been seen in another place by an extract from one of their most distinguished prelates.

51. Bacon ought to appear as a prominent name in political philosophy, if we had never met with it in any other.

Bacon.

But we have anticipated much of his praise on this score; and it is sufficient to repeat generally that on such subjects he is among the most sagacious of mankind. It would be almost ridiculous to descend from Bacon, even when his giant shadow does but pass over our scene, to the feebleness of political moralists, such as Suavedra, author of *Idea di un principe politico*, a wretched effort of Spain in her degeneracy; but an Italian writer must not be neglected, from the remarkable circumstance that he is esteemed one of the first who have treated the science of political œconomy. It must, however, be understood that, besides what may be found on the subject in the ancients, many valuable observations which must be referred to political œconomy occur in Bodin, that the Italians had, in the sixteenth century, a few tracts on coinage, that Botero touches some points of the science, and that in England there were, during the same age, pamphlets on public wealth, especially one entitled, *A Brief Conceit of English Policy*.*

Political
œconomy.

52. The author to whom we allude is Antonio Serra, a native of Cosenza, whose short treatise on the causes which may render gold and silver abundant in countries that have no mines is dedicated to the Count de Lemos, "from the prison of Vicaria this tenth

Serra on the
means of ob-
taining mo-
ney without
mines.

* This bears the initials of W. S., which some have idiotically taken for William Shakspeare. I have some reason to believe, that there was an edition considerably earlier than that of 1684, but,

from circumstances unnecessary to mention, cannot produce the manuscript authority on which this opinion is founded. It has been reprinted more than once, if I mistake not, in modern times.

day of July, 1613." It has hence been inferred, but without a shadow of proof, that Serra had been engaged in the conspiracy of his fellow-citizen Campanella fourteen years before. The dedication is in a tone of great flattery, but has no allusion to the cause of his imprisonment, which might have been any other. He proposes, in his preface, not to discuss political government in general, of which he thinks that the ancients have treated sufficiently, if we well understood their works, and still less to speak of justice and injustice, the civil law being enough for this, but merely of what are the causes that render a country destitute of mines abundant in gold and silver, which no one has ever considered, though some have taken narrow views, and fancied that a low rate of exchange is the sole means of enriching a country.

53. In the first part of this treatise, Serra divides the causes of wealth, that is, of abundance of money, into His causes of wealth. general and particular accidents (*accidenti communi e proprj*), meaning by the former circumstances which may exist in any country, by the latter such as are peculiar to some. The common accidents are four; abundance of manufactures, character of the inhabitants, extent of commerce, and wisdom of government. The peculiar are, chiefly, the fertility of the soil, and convenience of geographical position. Serra prefers manufactures to agriculture; one of his reasons is their indefinite capacity of multiplication; for no man whose land is fully cultivated by sowing a hundred bushels of wheat, can sow with profit a hundred and fifty; but in manufactures he may not only double the produce, but do this a hundred times over, and that with less proportion of expense. Though this is now evident, it is perhaps what had not been much remarked before.

54. Venice, according to Serra, held the first place as a commercial city, not only in Italy, but in Europe; His praise of Venice. "for experience demonstrates that all the merchandizes which come from Asia to Europe pass through Venice, and thence are distributed to other parts." But as this must evidently exclude all the traffic by the Cape of Good Hope, we can only understand Serra to mean the trade with the Levant. It is, however, worthy of observation, that we are apt to fall into a vulgar error in supposing that Venice was

crushed, or even materially affected, as a commercial city, by the discoveries of the Portuguese.* She was in fact more opulent, as her buildings of themselves may prove, in the sixteenth century, than in any preceding age. The French trade from Marseilles to the Levant, which began later to flourish, was what impoverished Venice, rather than that of Portugal with the East Indies. This republic was the perpetual theme of admiration with the Italians. Serra compares Naples with Venice; one, he says, exports grain to a vast amount, the other imports its whole subsistence; money is valued higher at Naples, so that there is a profit in bringing it in, its export is forbidden; at Venice it is free; at Naples the public revenues are expended in the kingdom; at Venice they are principally hoarded. Yet Naples is poor and Venice rich. Such is the effect of her commerce and of the wisdom of her government, which is always uniform, while in kingdoms, and far more in viceroyalties, the system changes with the persons. In Venice the method of choosing magistrates is in such perfection, that no one can come in by corruption or favour, nor can any one rise to high offices who has not been tried in the lower.

55. All causes of wealth, except those he has enumerated, Serra holds to be subaltern or temporary; thus the low rate of exchange is subject to the common accidents of commerce. It seems, however, to have been a theory of superficial reasoners on public wealth, that it depended on the exchanges far more than is really the case; and in the second part of this treatise Serra opposes a particular writer, named De Santis, who had accounted in this way alone for abundance of money in a state. Serra thinks that to reduce the weight of coin may sometimes be an allow-

Low rate of
exchange not
essential to
wealth.

* [Perhaps it is too much to say that Venice was not materially affected by the Portuguese commerce with India; when, though she became positively richer in the sixteenth century than before, her progress would have been more rapid, had the monopoly of the spice trade remained in her hands. A remarkable proof of the apprehensions which the discovery of the passage by the Cape excited at Venice, appears by a letter of Luigi da Porto, author of the novel on Romeo and Juliet, written so early as

1509, just ten years after the voyage of Vasco di Gama. One of the senators recommended his colleagues to employ their money in inducing the sultan of Egypt to obstruct the voyages of the Portuguese to Calicut, so that the state might possess again the whole commerce in spices: *il che è stato sin qua gran parte della ricchezza nostra, e 'l non poter più farlo, fra breve dovrà esser cagione della nostra povertà e della nostra rovina. Lettere di L. da Porto, 1832, vol. ii. p. 476.—1847.]*

able expedient, and better than to raise its denomination. The difference seems not very important. The coin of Naples was exhausted by the revenues of absentee proprietors, which some had proposed to withhold; a measure to which Serra justly objects. This book has been reprinted at Milan in the collection of Italian æconomists, and, as it anticipates the principles of what has been called the mercantile theory, deserves some attention in following the progress of opinion. The once celebrated treatise of Mun, England's Treasure by foreign Trade, was written before 1640; but not being published till after the Restoration, we may postpone it to the next period.

56. Last in time among political philosophers before the middle of the century we find the greatest and most famous, Thomas Hobbes. His treatise *De Cive* was printed in 1642 for his private friends. It obtained, however, a considerable circulation, and excited some animadversion. In 1647 he published it at Amsterdam, with notes to vindicate and explain what had been censured. In 1650 an English treatise, with the Latin title, *De Corpore Politico*, appeared; and in 1651 the complete system of his philosophy was given to the world in the *Leviathan*. These three works bear somewhat the same relation to one another that the *Advancement of Learning* does to the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*; they are in effect the same; the same order of subjects, the same arguments, and in most places either the same words, or such variations as occurred to the second thoughts of the writer; but much is more copiously illustrated and more clearly put in the latter than in the former; while much also, from whatever cause, is withdrawn or considerably modified. Whether the *Leviathan* is to be reckoned so exclusively his last thoughts that we should presume him to have retracted the passages that do not appear in it, is what every one must determine for himself. I shall endeavour to present a comparative analysis of the three treatises, with some preference to the last.

Hobbes.
His political
works.

57. Those, he begins by observing, who have hitherto written upon civil policy have assumed that man is an animal framed for society; as if nothing else were required for the institution of commonwealths, than

Analysis of
his three
treatises.

that men should agree upon some terms of compact which they call laws. But this is entirely false. That men do naturally seek each other's society, he admits by a note in the published edition of *De Cive*; but political societies are not mere meetings of men, but unions founded on the faith of covenants. Nor does the desire of men for society imply that they are fit for it. Many may desire it who will not readily submit to its necessary conditions.* This he left out in the two other treatises, thinking it, perhaps, too great a concession to admit any desire of society in man.

58. Nature has made little odds among men of mature age as to strength or knowledge. No reason, therefore, can be given why one should by any intrinsic superiority command others, or possess more than they. But there is a great difference in their passions; some through vain-glory seeking pre-eminence over their fellows, some willing to allow equality, but not to lose what they know to be good for themselves. And this contest can only be decided by battle, showing which is the stronger.

59. All men desire to obtain good and to avoid evil, especially death. Hence they have a natural right to preserve their own lives and limbs, and to use all means necessary for this end. Every man is judge for himself of the necessity of the means, and the greatness of the danger. And hence he has a right by nature to all things, to do what he wills to others, to possess and enjoy all he can. For he is the only judge whether they tend or not to his preservation. But every other man has the same right. Hence there can be no injury towards another in a state of nature. Not that in such a state a man may not sin against God, or transgress the laws of nature.† But injury, which is doing any thing without right, implies human laws that limit right.

60. Thus the state of man in natural liberty is a state of

* *Societates autem civiles non sunt meri congressus, sed fœdera, quibus faciendis fides et pacta necessaria sunt. . . . Alia res est appetere, alia esse pacem. Appetunt enim illi qui tamen conditiones æquas, sine quibus societas esse non potest, accipere per superbiam non dignantur.*

† *Non quod in tali statu peccare in*

Deum, aut leges naturales violare impossibile sit. Nam injustitia erga homines supponit leges humanas, quales in statu naturali nullæ sunt. De Cive, c. 1. This he left out in the later treatises. He says afterward (sect. 28.) omne damnum homini illatum legis naturalis violatio atque in Deum injuria est.

war, a war of every man against every man, wherein the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place. Irresistible might gives of itself right, which is nothing but the physical liberty of using our power as we will for our own preservation and what we deem conducive to it. But as, through the equality of natural powers, no man possesses this irresistible superiority, this state of universal war is contrary to his own good, which he necessarily must desire. Hence his reason dictates that he should seek peace as far as he can, and strengthen himself by all the helps of war against those with whom he cannot have peace. This then is the first fundamental law of nature. For a law of nature is nothing else than a rule or precept found out by reason for the avoiding what may be destructive to our life.

61. From this primary rule another follows, that a man should be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down his right to all things, and to be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow to other men against himself. This may be done by renouncing his right to any thing, which leaves it open to all, or by transferring it specially to another. Some rights, indeed, as those to his life and limbs, are inalienable, and no man lays down the right of resisting those who attack them. But, in general, he is bound not to hinder those to whom he has granted or abandoned his own right, from availing themselves of it; and such hinderance is injustice or injury; that is, it is *sine jure*, his *jus* being already gone. Such injury may be compared to absurdity in argument, being in contradiction to what he has already done, as an absurd proposition is in contradiction to what the speaker has already allowed.

62. The next law of nature, according to Hobbes, is that men should fulfil their covenants. What contracts and covenants are, he explains in the usual manner. None can covenant with God, unless by special revelation; therefore vows are not binding, nor do oaths add any thing to the swearer's obligation. But covenants entered into by fear he holds to be binding in a state of nature, though they may be annulled by the law. That the observance of justice, that is, of our covenants, is never against reason, Hobbes labours to

prove; for if ever its violation may have turned out successful, this being contrary to probable expectation ought not to influence us. "That which gives to human actions the relish of justice, is a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage rarely found; by which a man scorns to be beholden for the contentment of his life to fraud or breach of promise."* A short gleam of something above the creeping selfishness of his ordinary morality!

63. He then enumerates many other laws of nature, such as gratitude, complaisance, equity, all subordinate to the main one of preserving peace by the limitation of the natural right, as he supposes, to usurp all. These laws are immutable and eternal; the science of them is the only true science of moral philosophy. For that is nothing but the science of what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind. In a state of nature private appetite is the measure of good and evil. But all men agree that peace is good, and therefore the means of peace, which are the moral virtues or laws of nature, are good also, and their contraries evil. These laws of nature are not properly called such, but conclusions of reason as to what should be done or abstained from; they are but theorems concerning what conduces to conservation and defence; whereas law is strictly the word of him that by right has command over others. But so far as these are enacted by God in Scripture, they are truly laws.

64. These laws of nature, being contrary to our natural passions, are but words of no strength to secure any one without a controlling power. For till such a power is erected, every man will rely on his own force and skill. Nor will the conjunction of a few men or families be sufficient for security, nor that of a great multitude guided by their own particular judgments and appetites. "For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice and other laws of nature without a common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same, and then there neither would be, nor need to be, any civil government or commonwealth at all, because there would be peace without subjection."† Hence it becomes necessary to confer all their power on one man, or assembly of men, to

* *Leviathan*, c. 15.

† *Id.* c. 17.

bear their person or represent them ; so that every one shall own himself author of what shall be done by such representative. It is a covenant of each with each, that he will be governed in such a manner, if the other will agree to the same. This is the generation of the great Leviathan, or mortal God, to whom, under the immortal God, we owe our peace and defence. In him consists the essence of the commonwealth, which is one person, of whose acts a great multitude by mutual covenant have made themselves the authors.

65. This person (including, of course, an assembly as well as an individual) is the sovereign, and possesses sovereign power. And such power may spring from agreement or from force. A commonwealth by agreement or institution is when a multitude do agree and covenant one with another that whatever the major part shall agree to represent them, shall be the representative of them all. After this has been done, the subjects cannot change their government without its consent, being bound by mutual covenant to own its actions. If any one man should dissent, the rest would break their covenant with him. But there is no covenant with the sovereign. He cannot have covenanted with the whole multitude, as one party, because it has no collective existence till the commonwealth is formed ; nor with each man separately, because the acts of the sovereign are no longer his sole acts, but those of the society, including him who would complain of the breach. Nor can the sovereign act unjustly towards a subject ; for he who acts by another's authority cannot be guilty of injustice towards him ; he may, it is true, commit iniquity, that is violate the laws of God and nature, but not injury.

66. The sovereign is necessarily judge of all proper means of defence, of what doctrines shall be taught, of all disputes and complaints, of rewards and punishments, of war and peace with neighbouring commonwealths, and even of what shall be held by each subject in property. Property, he admits in one place, existed in families before the institution of civil society ; but between different families there was no *meum* and *tuum*. These are by the law and command of the sovereign ; and hence, though every subject may have a right of property against his fellow, he can have none against the sovereign. These rights are incommunicable, and inseparable

from the sovereign power ; there are others of minor importance, which he may alienate ; but if any one of the former is taken away from him, he ceases to be truly sovereign.

67. The sovereign power cannot be limited nor divided. Hence there can be but three simple forms of commonwealth ; monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The first he greatly prefers. The king has no private interest apart from the people, whose wealth, honour, security from enemies, internal tranquillity, are evidently for his own good. But in the other forms each man may have a private advantage to seek. In popular assemblies, there is always an aristocracy of orators, interrupted sometimes by the temporary monarchy of one orator. And though a king may deprive a man of all he possesses to enrich a flatterer or favourite, so may also a democratic assembly, where there may be as many Neros as orators, each with the whole power of the people he governs. And these orators are usually more powerful to hurt others than to save them. A king may receive counsel of whom he will, an assembly from those only who have a right to belong to it, nor can their counsel be secret. They are also more inconstant both from passion and from their numbers ; the absence of a few often undoing all that had been done before. A king cannot disagree with himself, but an assembly may do so, even to producing civil war.

68. An elective or limited king is not the sovereign, but the sovereign's minister ; nor can there be a perfect form of government, where the present ruler has not power to dispose of the succession. His power, therefore, is wholly without bounds, and correlative must be the people's obligation to obey. Unquestionably there are risks of mischiefs and inconveniences attending a monarchy ; but these are less than in the other forms ; and the worst of them is not comparable to those of civil war, or the anarchy of a state of nature, to which the dissolution of the commonwealth would reduce us.

69. In the exercise of government the sovereign is to be guided by one maxim, which contains all his duty : *Salus populi suprema lex*. And in this is to be reckoned not only the conservation of life, but all that renders it happy. For this is the end for which men entered into civil society, that they might enjoy as much happiness as human nature can

attain. It would be therefore a violation of the law of nature, and of the trust reposed in them, if sovereigns did not study, as far as by their power it may be, that their subjects should be furnished with every thing necessary, not for life alone but for the delights of life. And even those who have acquired empire by conquest must desire to have men fit to serve them, and should, in consistency with their own aims, endeavour to provide what will increase their strength and courage. Taxes, in the opinion of Hobbes, should be laid equally, and rather on expenditure than on revenue; the prince should promote agriculture, fisheries, and commerce, and in general whatever makes men happy and prosperous. Many just reflections on the art of government are uttered by Hobbes, especially as to the inexpediency of interfering too much with personal liberty. No man, he observes in another place, is so far free as to be exempted from the sovereign power; but if liberty consists in the paucity of restraining laws, he sees not why this may not be had in monarchy as well as in a popular government. The dream of so many political writers, a wise and just despotism, is pictured by Hobbes as the perfection of political society.

70. But, most of all, is the sovereign to be free from any limitation by the power of the priesthood. This is chiefly to be dreaded, that he should command any thing under the penalty of death, and the clergy forbid it under the penalty of damnation. The pretensions of the see of Rome, of some bishops at home, and those of even the lowest citizens to judge for themselves and determine upon public religion, are dangerous to the state and the frequent cause of wars. The sovereign therefore is alone to judge whether religions are safely to be admitted or not. And it may be urged, that princes are bound to cause such doctrine as they think conducive to their subjects' salvation to be taught, forbidding every other, and that they cannot do otherwise in conscience. This, however, he does not absolutely determine. But he is clearly of opinion that, though it is not the case where the prince is infidel*, the head of the state, in a Chris-

* Imperantibus autem non Christianis in temporalibus quidem omnibus eandem deberi obedientiam etiam a cive Christiano extra controversiam est: in spi-

ritualibus vero, hoc est, in iis quæ pertinent ad modum colendi Dei sequenda est ecclesia aliqua Christianorum. De Cive, c. 18. § 3.

tian commonwealth, is head also of the church ; that he rather than any ecclesiastics, is the judge of doctrines ; that a church is the same as a commonwealth under the same sovereign, the component members of each being precisely the same. This is not very far removed from the doctrine of Hooker, and still less from the practice of Henry VIII.

71. The second class of commonwealths, those by forcible acquisition, differ more in origin than in their subsequent character from such as he has been discussing. The rights of sovereignty are the same in both. Dominion is acquired by generation or by conquest ; the one parental, the other despotical. Parental power, however, he derives not so much from having given birth to, as from having preserved, the child ; and, with originality and acuteness, thinks it belongs by nature to the mother rather than to the father, except where there is some contract between the parties to the contrary. The act of maintenance and nourishment conveys, as he supposes, an unlimited power over the child, extending to life and death, and there can be no state of nature between parent and child. In his notion of patriarchal authority he seems to go as far as Filmer ; but, more acute than Filmer, perceives that it affords no firm basis for political society. By conquest and sparing the lives of the vanquished they become slaves ; and so long as they are held in bodily confinement, there is no covenant between them and their master ; but in obtaining corporal liberty they expressly or tacitly covenant to obey him as their lord and sovereign.

72. The political philosophy of Hobbes had much to fix the attention of the world and to create a sect of admiring partisans. The circumstances of the time, and the character of the passing generation, no doubt powerfully conspired with its intrinsic qualities ; but a system so original, so intrepid, so disdainful of any appeal but to the common reason and common interests of mankind, so unaffectedly and perspicuously proposed, could at no time have failed of success. From the two rival theories, on the one hand, that of original compact between the prince and people, derived from antiquity, and sanctioned by the authority of fathers and schoolmen, on the other, that of an absolute patriarchal transmuted

into an absolute regal power, which had become prevalent among part of the English clergy, Hobbes took as much as might conciliate a hearing from both, an original covenant of the multitude, and an unlimited authority of the sovereign. But he had a substantial advantage over both these parties, and especially the latter, in establishing the happiness of the community as the sole final cause of government, both in its institution and its continuance; the great fundamental theorem upon which all political science depends, but sometimes obscured or lost in the pedantry of theoretical writers.

73. In the positive system of Hobbes we find less cause for praise. We fall in at the very outset with a strange and indefensible paradox; the natural equality of human capacities, which he seems to have adopted rather in opposition to Aristotle's notion of a natural right in some men to govern, founded on their superior qualities, than because it was at all requisite for his own theory. By extending this alleged equality, or slightness of difference, among men to physical strength, he has more evidently shown its incompatibility with experience. If superiority in mere strength has not often been the source of political power it is for two reasons; first, because, though there is a vast interval between the strongest man and the weakest, there is generally not much between the former and him who comes next in vigour; and, secondly, because physical strength is multiplied by the aggregation of individuals, so that the stronger few may be overpowered by the weaker many; while in mental capacity, comprehending acquired skill and habit as well as natural genius and disposition, both the degrees of excellence are removed by a wider distance, and what is still more important, the aggregation of the powers of individuals does not regularly and certainly augment the value of the whole. That the real or acknowledged superiority of one man to his fellows has been the ordinary source of power is sufficiently evident from what we daily see among children, and must, it should seem, be admitted by all who derive civil authority from choice or even from conquest, and therefore is to be inferred from the very system of Hobbes.

74. That a state of nature is a state of war, that men, or at least a very large proportion of men, employ force of every

kind in seizing to themselves what is in the possession of others, is a proposition for which Hobbes incurred as much obloquy as for any one in his writings ; yet it is one not easy to controvert. But soon after the publication of the *Leviathan*, a dislike of the Calvinistic scheme of universal depravity, as well as of his own, led many considerable men into the opposite extreme of elevating too much the dignity of human nature ; if by that term they meant, and in no other sense could it be applicable to this question, the real practical character of the majority of the species. Certainly the sociableness of man is as much a part of his nature as his selfishness ; but whether this propensity to society would necessarily or naturally have led to the institution of political communities, may not be very clear ; while we have proof enough in historical traditions, and in what we observe of savage nations, that mutual defence by mutual concession, the common agreement not to attack the possessions of each other, or to permit strangers to do so, has been the true basis, the final aim, of those institutions, be they more or less complex, to which we give the appellation of commonwealths.

75. In developing, therefore, the origin of civil society, Hobbes, though not essentially differing from his predecessors, has placed the truth in a fuller light. It does not seem equally clear, that his own theory of a mutual covenant between the members of an unanimous multitude to become one people and to be represented, in all time to come, by such a sovereign government as the majority should determine, affords a satisfactory groundwork for the rights of political society. It is, in the first place, too hypothetical as a fact. That such an agreement may have been sometimes made by independent families, in the first coming together of communities, it would be presumptuous to deny—it carries upon the face of it no improbability, except as to the design of binding posterity, which seems too refined for such a state of mankind as we must suppose ; but it is surely possible to account for the general fact of civil government in a simpler way ; and what is most simple, though not always true, is on the first appearance most probable. If we merely suppose an agreement, unanimous of course in those who

concur in it, to be governed by one man, or by one council, promising that they shall wield the force of the whole against any one who shall contravene their commands issued for the public good, the foundation is as well laid, and the commonwealth as firmly established, as by the double process of a mutual covenant to constitute a people, and a popular determination to constitute a government. It is true that Hobbes distinguishes a commonwealth by institution, which he supposes to be founded on this unanimous consent, from one by acquisition, for which force alone is required. But as the force of one man goes but a little way towards compelling the obedience of others, so as to gain the name of sovereign power, unless it is aided by the force of many who voluntarily conspire to its ends, this sort of commonwealth by conquest will be found to involve the previous institution of the more peaceable kind.

76. This theory of a mutual covenant is defective also in a most essential point. It furnishes no adequate basis for any commonwealth beyond the lives of those who established it. The right, indeed, of men to bind their children, and through them a late posterity, is sometimes asserted by Hobbes, but in a very transient manner, and as if he was aware of the weakness of his ground. It might be inquired whether the force on which alone he rests the obligation of children to obey, can give any right beyond its own continuance; whether the absurdity he imputes to those who do not stand by their own engagements is imputable to such as disregard the covenants of their forefathers; whether, in short, any law of nature requires our obedience to a government we deem hurtful, because, in a distant age, a multitude whom we cannot trace bestowed unlimited power on some unknown persons from whom that government pretends to derive its succession.

77. A better ground for the subsisting rights of his Leviathan, is sometimes suggested, though faintly, by Hobbes himself. "If one refuse to stand to what the major part shall ordain, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly: and whether he be of the congregation or not, whether his consent be asked or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be

left in the condition of war he was in before, wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.”* This renewal of the state of war which is the state of nature, this denial of the possibility of doing an injury to any one who does not obey the laws of the commonwealth, is enough to silence the question why we are obliged still to obey. The established government and those who maintain it, being strong enough to wage war against gainsayers, give them the option of incurring the consequences of such warfare or of complying with the laws. But it seems to be a corollary from this, that the stronger part of a commonwealth, which may not always be the majority, have not only a right to despise the wishes but the interests of dissentients. Thus the more we scrutinise the theories of Hobbes, the more there appears a deficiency of that which only a higher tone of moral sentiment can give, a security for ourselves against the appetites of others, and for them against our own. But it may be remarked that his supposition of a state of war, not as a permanent state of nature, but as just self-defence, is perhaps the best footing on which we can place the right to inflict severe, and especially capital, punishment upon offenders against the law.

78. The positions so dogmatically laid down as to the impossibility of mixing different sorts of government were, even in the days of Hobbes, contradicted by experience. Several republics had lasted for ages under a mixed aristocracy and democracy; and there had surely been sufficient evidence that a limited monarchy might exist, though, in the revolution of ages, it might one way or other, pass into some new type of polity. And these prejudices in favour of absolute power are rendered more dangerous by paradoxes unusual for an Englishman, even in those days of high prerogative when Hobbes began to write, that the subject has no property relatively to the sovereign, and, what is the fundamental error of his whole system, that nothing done by the prince can be injurious to any one else. This is accompanied by the other portents of Hobbism, scattered through these treatises, especially the *Leviathan*, that the distinctions of right and

* Lev. c. 18.

wrong, moral good and evil, are made by the laws, that no man can do amiss who obeys the sovereign authority, that though private belief is of necessity beyond the prince's control, it is according to his will, and in no other way, that we must worship God.

79. The political system of Hobbes, like his moral system, of which, in fact, it is only a portion, sears up the heart. It takes away the sense of wrong, that has consoled the wise and good in their dangers, the proud appeal of innocence under oppression, like that of Prometheus to the elements, uttered to the witnessing world, to coming ages, to the just ear of Heaven. It confounds the principles of moral approbation, the notions of good and ill desert, in a servile idolatry of the monstrous Leviathan it creates, and after sacrificing all right at the altar of power, denies to the Omnipotent the prerogative of dictating the laws of his own worship.

SECT. III.

Roman Jurisprudence — Grotius on the Laws of War and Peace — Analysis of this Work — Defence of it against some Strictures.

80. IN the Roman jurisprudence we do not find such a cluster of eminent men during this period as in the sixteenth century; and it would of course be out of our province to search for names little now remembered, perhaps, even in forensic practice. Many of the writings of Fabre of Savoy, who has been mentioned in the present volume, belong to the first years of this century. Farinacci, or Farinaceus, a lawyer of Rome, obtained a celebrity, which, after a long duration, has given way in the progress of legal studies, less directed than formerly towards a superfluous erudition.* But the work of Menochius de præsumptionibus, or, as we should express it, on the rules of evidence, is said to have lost none of its usefulness, even since the decline of the civil

Civil jurists
of this pe-
riod.

* Biogr. Univ.

law in France.* No book, perhaps, belonging to this period is so generally known as the commentaries of Vinnius on the Institutes, which, as far as I know, has not been superseded by any of later date. Conringius of Helmstadt may be reckoned in some measure among the writers on jurisprudence, though chiefly in the line of historical illustration. The *Elementa Juris Civilis*, by Zouch, is a mere epitome, but neatly executed, of the principal heads of the Roman law, and nearly in its own words. Arthur Duck, another Englishman, has been praised even by foreigners, for a succinct and learned, though elementary and popular, treatise on the use and authority of the civil law in different countries of Europe. This little book is not disagreeably written ; but it is not, of course, from England that much could be contributed towards Roman jurisprudence.

81. The larger principles of jurisprudence, which link that science with general morals, and especially such as relate to the intercourse of nations, were not left Suarez on laws. untouched in the great work of Suarez on laws. I have not however made myself particularly acquainted with this portion of his large volume. Spain appears to have been the country in which these questions were originally discussed upon principles broader than precedent, as well as upon precedents themselves ; and Suarez, from the general comprehensiveness of his views in legislation and ethics, is likely to have said well whatever he may have said on the subject of international law. But it does not appear that he is much quoted by later writers.

82. The name of Suarez is obscure in comparison of one who soon came forward in the great field of natural jurisprudence. This was Hugo Grotius, whose Grotius De Jure Belli et Pacis. famous work, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, was published at Paris in 1625. It may be reckoned a proof of the extraordinary diligence as well as quickness of parts which distinguished this writer, that it had occupied a very short part of his life. He first mentions, in a letter to the younger Thuanus in August, 1623, that he was employed in examining the principal questions which belong to the law of na-

tions.* In the same year he recommends the study of that law to another of his correspondents in such terms as bespeak his own attention to it.† According to one of his letters to Gassendi, quoted by Stewart, the scheme was suggested to him by Peiresc.

83. It is acknowledged by every one that the publication of this treatise made an epoch in the philosophical, and almost we might say in the political history of Europe. Those who sought a guide to their own conscience or that of others, those who dispensed justice, those who appealed to the public sense of right in the intercourse of nations, had recourse to its copious pages for what might direct or justify their actions. Within thirty or forty years from its publication, we find the work of Grotius generally received as authority by professors of the continental universities, and deemed necessary for the student of civil law, at least in the protestant countries of Europe. In England, from the difference of laws and from some other causes which might be assigned, the influence of Grotius was far slower, and even ultimately much less general. He was, however, treated with great respect as the founder of the modern law of nations, which is distinguished from what formerly bore that name by its more continual reference to that of nature. But when a book is little read it is easily misrepresented; and as a new school of philosophers rose up, averse to much of the principles of their predecessors, but,

* Versor in examinandis controversiis præcipuis quæ ad jus gentium pertinent. Epist. 75. This is not from the folio collection of his epistles, so often quoted in a preceding chapter of this volume (Part. III. Chap. II.), but from one antecedently published in 1648, and entitled Grotii Epistolæ ad Gallos.

† Hoc spatio exacto, nihil restat quod tibi æque commendem atque studium juris, non illius privati, ex quo leguleii et rabulæ vicitant, sed gentium ac publici; quam præstabilem scientiam Cicero vocans consistere ait in fœderibus, pacti-
onibus, conditionibus populorum, regum, nationum, in omni denique jure belli et pacis. Hujus juris principia quomodo ex morali philosophia petenda sunt, monstrare poterunt Platonis ac Ciceronis de

legibus liber. Sed Platonis summas aliquas legisse suffecerit. Neque poeniteat ex scholasticis Thomam Aquinatem, si non perlegere, saltem inspicere secundam partem secundæ partis libri, quem Summam Theologiæ inscripsit; præsertim ubi de justitia agit ac de legibus. Usus propius monstrabunt Pandectæ, libro primo atque ultimo; et codex Justinianæus, libro primo et tribus postremis. Nostri temporis juris consulti pauci juris gentium ac publici controversias attigere, eoque magis eminent, qui id fecere, Vasquius, Hottomannus, Gentilis. Epist. xvi. This passage is useful in showing the views Grotius himself entertained as to the subject and ground-work of his treatise.

above all things, to their tediousness, it became the fashion not so much to dispute the tenets of Grotius, as to set aside his whole work, among the barbarous and obsolete schemes of ignorant ages. For this purpose various charges have been alleged against it by men of deserved eminence, not, in my opinion, very candidly, or with much real knowledge of its contents. They have had, however, the natural effect of creating a prejudice, which, from the sort of oblivion fallen upon the book, is not likely to die away. I shall, therefore, not think myself performing an useless task in giving an analysis of the treatise *De Jure Belli et Pacis*; so that the reader, having seen for himself what it is, may not stand in need of any arguments or testimony to refute those who have represented it as it is not.

84. The book may be considered as nearly original, in its general platform, as any work of man in an advanced stage of civilisation and learning can be. ^{Its originality.}

It is more so, perhaps, than those of Montesquieu and Smith. No one had before gone to the foundations of international law so as to raise a complete and consistent superstructure; few had handled even separate parts, or laid down any satisfactory rules concerning it. Grotius enumerates a few preceding writers, especially Ayala and Albericus Gentilis, but does not mention Soto in this place. Gentilis, he says, is wont in determining controverted questions to follow either a few precedents not always of the best description, or even the authority of modern lawyers in their answers to cases, many of which are written with more regard to what the consulting parties desire, than to what real justice and equity demand.

85. The motive assigned for this undertaking is the noblest. "I saw," he says, "in the whole Christian world a licence of fighting, at which even bar- ^{Its motive and object.}barians might blush, wars begun on trifling pretexts or none at all, and carried on without reverence for any divine or human law, as if that one declaration of war let loose every crime." The sight of such a monstrous state of things had induced some, like Erasmus, to deny the lawfulness of any war to a Christian. But this extreme, as he justly observes, is rather pernicious than otherwise; for when a tenet so

paradoxical and impracticable is maintained, it begets a prejudice against the more temperate course which he prepares to indicate. "Let, therefore," he says afterwards, "the laws be silent in the midst of arms; but those laws only which belong to peace, the laws of civil life and public tribunals, not such as are eternal, and fitted for all seasons, unwritten laws of nature, which subsist in what the ancient form of the Romans denominated 'a pure and holy war.'"^{*}

86. "I have employed in confirmation of this natural and national law the testimonies of philosophers,
His authorities. of historians, of poets, lastly, even of orators; not that we should indiscriminately rely upon them; for they are apt to say what may serve their party, their subject, or their cause; but because when many at different times and places affirm the same thing for certain, we may refer this unanimity to some general cause, which in such questions as these can be no other than either a right deduction from some natural principle or some common agreement. The former of these denotes the law of nature, the latter that of nations; the difference whereof must be understood, not by the language of these testimonies, for writers are very prone to confound the two words, but from the nature of the subject. For whatever cannot be clearly deduced from true premises, and yet appears to have been generally admitted, must have had its origin in free consent. . . . The sentences of poets and orators have less weight than those of history; and we often make use of them not so much to corroborate what we say, as to throw a kind of ornament over it." "I have abstained," he adds afterwards, "from all that belongs to a different subject, as what is expedient to be done; since this has its own science, that of politics, which Aristotle has rightly treated by not intermingling any thing extraneous to it, while Bodin has confounded that science with this which we are about to treat. If we sometimes allude to utility, it is but in passing, and distinguishing it from the question of justice."[†]

^{*} *Eas res puro pioque duello repetundas censeo.* It was a case prodigiously frequent in the opinion of the Romans.

[†] *Prolegomena in librum de Jure Belli.*

87. Grotius derives the origin of natural law from the sociable character of mankind. "Among things common to mankind is the desire of society, that is, not of every kind of society, but of one that is peaceable and ordered according to the capacities of his nature with others of his species. Even in children before all instruction a propensity to do good to others displays itself, just as pity in that age is a spontaneous affection." We perceive by this remark that Grotius looked beyond the merely rational basis of natural law to the moral constitution of human nature. The conservation of such a sociable life is the source of that law which is strictly called natural; which comprehends, in the first place, the abstaining from all that belongs to others, and the restitution of it if by any means in our possession, the fulfilment of promises, the reparation of injury, and the right of human punishment. In a secondary sense, natural law extends to prudence, temperance, and fortitude, as being suitable to man's nature. And in a similar lax sense we have that kind of justice itself called distributive (*διανεμητική*), which prefers a better man to a worse, a relation to a stranger, a poorer man to a richer, according to the circumstances of the party and the case.* And this natural law is properly defined, "the dictate of right reason, pointing out a moral guilt or rectitude to be inherent in any action, on account of its agreement or disagreement with our rational and social nature; and consequently that such an action is either forbidden or enjoined by God the author of nature."† It is so immutable, that God himself cannot alter it; a position which he afterwards limits by a restriction we have seen in Suarez; that if God command any one to be killed, or his goods to be taken, this would not render murder or theft lawful, but being commanded by the lord of life and all things, it would cease to be murder or theft. This seems little better than a sophism unworthy of Grotius; but he meant to distinguish between

* Prolegomena, &c. § 6—10.

† Jus naturale est dictatum rectæ rationis, indicans actui alicui, ex ejus convenientia aut disconvenientia cum ipsa natura rationali ac sociali, inesse moralem

turpitudinem aut necessitatem moralem, ac consequenter ab auctore naturæ Deo talem actum aut vetari aut præcipi. L. i. c. i. § 10.

an abrogation of the law of nature, and a dispensation with it in a particular instance. The original position, in fact, is not stated with sufficient precision or on a right principle.

88. Voluntary or positive law is either human or revealed. The former is either that of civil communities, which are assemblages of freemen, living in society for the sake of laws and common utility, or that of nations, which derives its obligation from the consent of all or many nations; a law which is to be proved, like all unwritten law, by continual usage and the testimony of the learned. The revealed law he divides in the usual manner, but holds that no part of the Mosaic, so far as it is strictly a law, is at present binding upon us. But much of it is confirmed by the Christian Scriptures, and much is also obligatory by the law of nature. This last law is to be applied, *à priori*, by the conformity of the act in question to the natural and social nature of man; *à posteriori*, by the consent of mankind; the latter argument, however, not being conclusive, but highly probable, when the agreement is found in all, or in all the more civilised nations.*

89. Perfect rights, after the manner of the jurists, he distinguishes from imperfect. The former are called *sua*, our own, properly speaking, the objects of what they styled commutative justice — the latter are denominated fitnesses (*aptitudines*), such as equity, gratitude, or domestic affection prescribe, but which are only the objects of distributive or equitable justice. This distinction is of the highest importance in the immediate subject of the work of Grotius; since it is agreed on all hands, that no law gives a remedy for the denial of these, nor can we justly, in a state of nature, have recourse to arms in order to enforce them.†

90. War, however, as he now proceeds to show, is not absolutely unlawful either by the law of nature or that of nations, or of revelation. The proof is, as usual with Grotius, very diffuse; his work being in fact a magazine of arguments and examples with rather a superero-

Positive
law.

Perfect and
imperfect
rights.

Lawful cases
of war.

* Lib. i. c. 1.

† Id. *ibid.*

gatory profusion.* But the Anabaptist and Quaker superstition has prevailed enough to render some of his refutation not unnecessary. After dividing war into public and private, and showing that the establishment of civil justice does not universally put an end to the right of private war, since cases may arise, when the magistrate cannot be waited for, and others, where his interference cannot be obtained, he shows that the public war may be either solemn and regular according to the law of nations, or less regular on a sudden emergency of self-defence; classing also under the latter any war, which magistrates not sovereign may in peculiar circumstances levy.† And this leads him to inquire what constitutes sovereignty; defining, after setting aside other descriptions, that power to be sovereign, whose acts cannot be invalidated at the pleasure of any other human authority, except one, which, as in the case of a successor, has exactly the same sovereignty as itself.‡

91. Grotius rejects the opinion of those who hold the people to be every where sovereign, so that they may restrain and punish kings for misgovernment; Resistance by subjects unlawful. quoting many authorities for the irresponsibility of kings. Here he lays down the principles of non-resistance, which he more fully inculcates in the next chapter. But this is done with many distinctions as to the nature of the principality, which may be held by very different conditions. He speaks of patrimonial kingdoms, which, as he supposes, may be alienated like an inheritance. But where the government can be traced to popular consent, he owns that this power of alienation should not be presumed to be comprised in the grant. Those, he says, are much deceived who think that in kingdoms where the consent of a senate or other body is required for new laws, the sovereignty itself is divided; for these restrictions must be understood to have been imposed by the prince on his own will, lest he should be entrapped into something contrary to his deliberate intention.|| Among other things in this chapter, he determines that neither an

* C. 2.

† C. 3.

‡ Summa potestas illa dicitur, cujus actus alterius juri non subjacet, ita ut

alterius voluntatis humanæ arbitrio irriti possint reddi. § 7.

|| § 18.

unequal alliance, that is, where one party retains great advantages, nor a feudal homage take away the character of sovereignty from the inferior, so far at least as authority over his own subjects is concerned.

92. In the next chapter, Grotius dwells more at length on the alleged right of subjects to resist their governors, and altogether repels it, with the exception of strict self-defence, or the improbable case of a hostile spirit, on the prince's part, extending to the destruction of his people. Barclay, the opponent of Buchanan and the Jesuits, had admitted the right of resistance against enormous cruelty. If the king has abdicated the government, or manifestly relinquished it, he may, after a time, be considered merely a private person. But mere negligence in government is by no means to be reckoned a relinquishment.* And he also observes, that if the sovereignty be divided between a king and part of his subjects or the whole, he may be resisted by force in usurping their share, because he is no longer sovereign as to that; which he holds to be the case, even if the right of war be in him, since that must be understood of a foreign war, and it could not be maintained that those who partake the sovereignty have not the right to defend it; in which predicament a king may lose even his own share by the right of war. He proceeds to the case of usurpation; not such as is warranted by long prescription, but while the circumstances that led to the unjust possession subsist. Against such an usurper he thinks it lawful to rebel, so long as there is no treaty or voluntary act of allegiance, at least if the government *de jure* sanctions the insurrection. But where there may be a doubt whether the lawful ruler has not acquiesced in the usurpation, a private person ought rather to stand by possession, than to take the decision upon himself.†

93. The right of war, which we must here understand in the largest sense, the employment of force to resist force, though by private men, resides in all mankind. Solon, he says, taught us that those commonwealths

All men naturally have right of war.

* Si rex aut alius quis imperium abdicavit, aut manifeste habet pro derelicto, in eum post id tempus omnia licent, quæ in privatum. Sed minimè

pro derelicto habere rem censendus est, qui eam tractat negligentius. C. 4. § 9.

† § 20.

would be happy, wherein each man thought the injuries of others were like his own.* The mere sociability of human nature ought to suggest this to us. And, though Grotius does not proceed with this subject, he would not have doubted that we are even bound by the law of nature, not merely that we have a right, to protect the lives and goods of others against lawless violence, without the least reference to positive law or the command of a magistrate.† If this has been preposterously doubted, or affected to be doubted, in England of late years, it has been less owing to the pedantry which demands an express written law upon the most pressing emergency, than to lukewarmness, at the best, in the public cause of order and justice. The expediency of vindicating these by the slaughter of the aggressors must depend on the peculiar circumstances; but the right is paramount to any positive laws, even if, which with us is not the case, it were difficult to be proved from them.

94. We now arrive at the first and fundamental inquiry, what is the right of self-defence, including the defence of what is our own. There can, says Grotius, ^{Right of self-defence.} be no just cause of war (that is, of using force, for he is now on the most general ground) but injury. For this reason he will not admit of wars to preserve the balance of power. An imminent injury to ourselves or our property renders repulsion of the aggressor by force legitimate. But here he argues rather weakly and inconsistently through excess of charity, and acknowledging the strict right of killing one who would otherwise kill us, thinks it more praiseworthy to accept the alternative.‡ The right of killing one who inflicts a smaller personal injury he wholly denies; and with respect to a robber, while he admits he may be slain by natural law, is of opinion that the Gospel has greatly limited the privilege of defending our property by such means. Almost all jurists and theologians of his day, he says, carry it farther than he

* *Εν ᾗ των ἀδικουμένων ουχ ἥττον οἱ μὴ ἀδικουμένοι προβαλλονται καὶ κολάζουσι τοὺς ἀδικούντας.* Ut cætera desint vincula, sufficit humanæ naturæ communio.

† He lays this down expressly afterwards. L. ii. c. 20.

‡ I. lib. ii. c. 1. § 8. Gronovius observes pithily and truly on this: melius occidi quam occidere injuria; non melius occidi injuria quam occidere jure.

does.* To public warfare he gives a greater latitude than to private self-defence, but without assigning any satisfactory reason; the true reason being that so rigid a scheme of ethics would have rendered his book an Utopian theory, instead of a practicable code of law.

95. Injury to our rights, therefore, is a just cause of war. But what are our rights? What is property? whence does it come? what may be its subjects? in whom does it reside? Till these questions are determined, we can have but crude and indefinite notions of injury, and consequently of the rights we have to redress it. The disquisition is necessary, but it must be long; unless, indeed, we acquiesce in what we find already written, and seek for no stable principles upon which this grand and primary question in civil society, the rights of property and dominion, may rest. Here then begins what has seemed to many the abandonment by Grotius of his general subject, and what certainly suspends for a considerable time the inquiry into international law, but still not, as it seems to me, an episodal digression, at least for the greater part, but a natural and legitimate investigation, springing immediately from the principal theme of the work, connected with it more closely at several intervals, and ultimately reverting into it. But of this the reader will judge as we proceed with the analysis.

96. Grotius begins with rather too romantic a picture of the early state of the world, when men lived on the spontaneous fruits of the earth, with no property except in what each had taken from the common mother's lap. But this happy condition did not, of course, last very long, and mankind came to separate and exclusive possession, each for himself and against the world. Original occupancy by persons, and division of lands by the community, he rightly holds to be the two sources of territorial propriety. Occupation is of two sorts, one by the community (*per universitatem*), the other (*per fundos*) by several possession. What is not thus occupied is still the domain of the state. Grotius conceives that mankind have reserved a

*Its origin
and limit-
ations.*

* *Hodie omnes ferme tam jurisconsulti quam theologi doceant recte homines a nobis interfici rerum defendendarum causa.* § 13.

right of taking what belongs to others in extreme necessity. It is a still more remarkable limitation of the right of property, that it carries very far his notions of that of transit, maintaining that not only rivers, but the territory itself of a state may be peaceably entered, and that permission cannot be refused, consistently with natural law, even in the case of armies; nor is the apprehension of incurring the hostility of the power who is thus attacked by the army passing through our territory a sufficient excuse.* This of course must now be exploded. Nor can, he thinks, the transit of merchandise be forbidden or impeded by levying any further tolls than are required for the incident expenses. Strangers ought to be allowed to settle, on condition of obeying the laws, and even to occupy any waste tracts in the territory†; a position equally untenable. It is less unreasonably that he maintains the general right of mankind to buy what they want, if the other party can spare it; but he extends too far his principle, that no nation can be excluded by another from privileges which it concedes to the rest of the world. In all these positions, however, we perceive the enlarged and philanthropic spirit of the system of Grotius, and his disregard of the usages of mankind, when they clashed with his Christian principles of justice. But as the very contrary supposition has been established in the belief of the present generation, it may be doubtful whether his own testimony will be thought sufficient.

97. The original acquisition of property was, in the infancy of human societies, by division or by occupancy; it is now by occupancy alone. Paullus has reckoned ^{Right of occupancy.} as a mode of original acquisition, if we have caused any thing to exist, *si quid ipsi, ut in rerum natura esset, fecimus*. This, though not well expressed, must mean the produce of labour. Grotius observes, that this resolves itself into a continuance of a prior right, or a new one by occupancy, and therefore no peculiar mode of acquisition. In those things which naturally belong to no one, there may be two sorts of occupation, dominion or sovereignty, and property. And in the former

* Sic etiam metus ab eo in quem bellum justum movet is qui transit, ad negandum transitum non valet. Lib. ii. c. 2. § 13.

† § 16, 17.

sense at least, rivers and bays of the sea are capable of occupation. In what manner this may be done he explains at length.* But those who occupy a portion of the sea have no right to obstruct others in fishing. This had been the subject of a controversy with Selden; the one in his *Mare Liberum* denying, the other in his *Mare Clausum* sustaining, the right of England to exclude the fishermen of Holland from the seas which she asserted to be her own.

98. The right of occupancy exists as to things derelict or abandoned by their owners. But it is of more importance to consider the presumptions of such relinquishment by sovereign states, as distinguished from mere prescription. The non-claim of the owner during a long period seems the only means of giving a right where none originally existed. It must be the silent acquiescence of one who knows his rights and has his free will. But when this abandonment has once taken place, it bars unborn claimants; for he who is not born, Grotius says, has no rights; *ejus qui nondum est natus nullum est jus*.†

99. A right over persons may be acquired in three ways, by generation, by their consent, by their crime. In children we are to consider three periods; that of imperfect judgment, or infancy, that of adult age in the father's family, and that of emancipation or *foris-familiation*, when they have ceased to form a part of it. In the first of these, a child is capable of property in possession but not in enjoyment. In the second, he is subject to the parent only in actions which affect the family. In the third, he is wholly his own master. All beyond this is positive law. The paternal power was almost peculiar to the Romans, though the Persians are said to have had something of the same. Grotius, we perceive, was no ally of those who elevated the patriarchal power, in order to found upon it a despotic polity; nor does he raise it by any means so high as Bodin. The customs of Eastern nations would, perhaps, have warranted somewhat more than he concedes.‡

100. Consent is the second mode of acquiring dominion. The consociation of male and female is the first species of it, which is principally in marriage, for

By consent.
In marriage.

* C. 3.

† Id. 4.

‡ Id. 5.

which the promise of the woman to be faithful is required. But he thinks that there is no mutual obligation by the law of nature ; which seems designed to save the polygamy of the patriarchs. He then discusses the chief questions as to divorce, polygamy, clandestine marriages, and incest ; holding, that no unions are forbidden by natural law except in the direct line. Concubines, in the sense of the Roman jurisprudence, are true Christian wives.*

101. In all other consociations except marriage, it is a rule that the majority can bind the minority. Of these the principal is a commonwealth. And here In common-wealths. he maintains the right of every citizen to leave his country, and that the state retains no right over those whom it has banished. Subjection, which may arise from one kind of consent, is either private or public ; the former is of several species, among which adoption, in the Roman sense, is the noblest, and servitude the meanest. In the latter case, the master has not the right of life and death over his servants, though some laws give him impunity. He is perplexed about the right over persons born in slavery, since his theory of its origin will not support it. But, in the case of public subjection, where one state becomes voluntarily subject to another, he finds no difficulty about the unborn, because the people is the same, notwithstanding the succession of individuals ; which seems paying too much deference to a legal fiction.†

102. The right of alienating altogether the territory he grants to patrimonial sovereigns. But he denies that a part can be separated from the rest without its consent, either by the community, or by the sovereign, however large his authority may be. This he extends to subjection of the kingdom to vassalage. The right of alienating private property by testament is founded, he thinks, in natural law‡ ; a position wherein I can by no means concur. In conformity with this, he derives the right of succession by intestacy from the presumed intention of the deceased, and proceeds to dilate on the different rules of succession established by civil laws. Yet the rule that paternal and maternal heirs shall take respectively what descended from the ancestors on each side, he conceives to be

Right of alienating subjects.

Alienation by testament.

* C. 5.

† Id.

‡ C. 6. § 14.

founded in the law of nature, though subject to the right of bequest.*

103. In treating of the acquisition of property by the law of nations, he means only the arbitrary constitutions of the Roman and other codes. Some of these he deems founded in no solid reason, though the law-givers of every country have a right to determine such matters as they think fit. Thus the Roman law recognises no property in animals, *feræ naturæ*, which that of modern nations gives, he says, to the owner of the soil where they are found, not unreasonably any more than the opposite maxim is unreasonable. So of a treasure found in the earth, and many other cases, wherein it is hard to say that the law of nature and reason prescribes one rule more than another.†

104. The rights of sovereignty and property may terminate by extinction of the ruling or possessing family without provision of successors. Slaves then become free, and subjects their own masters. For there can be no new right by occupancy in such. But a people or community may cease to exist, though the identity of persons or even of race is not necessary for its continuance. It may expire by voluntary dispersion, or by subjugation to another state. But mere change of place by simultaneous emigration will not destroy a political society, much less a change of internal government. Hence a republic becoming a monarchy, it stands in the same relation to other communities as before, and in particular, is subject to all its former debts.‡

* C. 7. In this chapter Grotius decides that parents are not bound by strict justice to maintain their children. The case is stronger the other way, in return for early protection. Barbeyrac thinks that alimēt is due to children by strict right during infancy.

† § 8.

‡ § 2. At the end of this chapter, Grotius unfortunately raises a question, his solution of which laid him open to censure. He inquires to whom the countries formerly subject to the Roman empire belong? And here he comes to the inconceivable paradox that that empire and the rights of the citizens of Rome still subsist. Gronovius bitterly

remarks, in a note on this passage: *Mirum est hoc loco summum virum, cum in præcipua questione non male sentiret, in tot salebras se conjecisse, totque monstra et chimæras confinxisse, ut aliquid novum diceret, et Germanis potius ludibrium deberet, quam Gallis et Papæ parum placeret.* This, however, is very uncandid, as Barbeyrac truly points out; since neither of these could take much interest in a theory which reserved a supremacy over the world to the Roman people. It is probably the weakest passage in all the writings of Grotius, though there are too many which do not enhance his fame.

105. In a chapter on the obligations which the right of property imposes on others than the proprietor, we find some of the more delicate questions in the casuistry of natural law, such as relate to the bonâ fide possessor of another's property. Grotius, always siding with the stricter moralists, asserts that he is bound not only to restore the substance but the intermediate profits, without any claim for the valuable consideration which he may have paid. His commentator, Barbeyrac, of a later and laxer school of casuistry, denies much of this doctrine.*

Some casuistical questions.

106. That great branch of ethics which relates to the obligation of promises has been so diffusively handled by the casuists, as well as philosophers, that Grotius deserves much credit for the brevity with which he has laid down the simple principles, and discussed some of the more difficult problems. That mere promises, or *nuda pacta*, where there is neither mutual benefit, nor what the jurists call synallagmatic contract, are binding on the conscience, whatever they may be, or ought to be, in law, is maintained against a distinguished civilian, Francis Connan; nor does Barbeyrac seem to dispute this general tenet of moral philosophers. Puffendorf however says, that there is a tacit condition in promises of this kind, that they can be performed without great loss to the promiser, and Cicero holds them to be released, if their performance would be more detrimental to one party, than serviceable to the other. This gives a good deal of latitude; but, perhaps, they are in such cases open to compensation without actual fulfilment. A promise given without deliberation, according to Grotius himself, is not binding. Those founded on deceit or error admit of many distinctions; but he determines, in the celebrated question of extorted promises, that they are valid by the natural, though their obligation may be annulled by the civil law. But the promisee is bound to release a promise thus unduly obtained.† These instances are sufficient

Promises.

* C. 10. Our own jurisprudence goes upon the principles of Grotius, and even denies the possessor by a bad title, though bonâ fide, any indemnification for what he may have laid out to the benefit

of the property, which seems hardly consonant to the strictest rules of natural law.

† C. 11. § 7. It is not very probable that the promisee will fulfil this obliga-

to show the spirit in which Grotius always approaches the decision of moral questions; serious and learned, rather than profound in seeking a principle, or acute in establishing a distinction.. In the latter quality he falls much below his annotator Barbeyrac, who had, indeed, the advantage of coming nearly a century after him.

107. In no part of his work has Grotius dwelt so much on the rules and distinctions of the Roman law, as Contracts. in his chapter on contracts, nor was it very easy or desirable to avoid it.* The wisdom of those great men, from the fragments of whose determinations the existing jurisprudence of Europe, in subjects of this kind, has been chiefly derived, could not be set aside without presumption, nor appropriated without ingratitude. Less fettered, at least in the best age of Roman jurisprudence, by legislative interference than our modern lawyers have commonly been, they resorted to no other principles than those of natural justice. That the Roman law, in all its parts, coincides with the best possible platform of natural jurisprudence it would be foolish to assert; but that in this great province, or rather demesne land, of justice, the regulation of contracts between man and man, it does not considerably deviate from the right line of reason, has never been disputed by any one in the least conversant with the Pandects.

108. It will be manifest, however, to the attentive reader of Grotius in this chapter that he treats the subject of contract as a part of ethics rather than of jurisprudence; and it is only by the frequent parallelism of the two sciences that the contrary could be suspected. Thus he maintains that, equality being the principle of the contract

Considered ethically. tion in such a case; and the decision of Grotius, though conformable to that of the theological casuists in general, is justly rejected by Puffendorf and Barbeyrac, as well as by many writers of the last century. The principle seems to be, that right and obligation in matters of agreement are correlative, and where the first does not arise, the second cannot exist. Adam Smith and Paley incline to think the promise ought, under certain circumstances, to be kept; but the reasons they give are not founded on the *justitia expletrix*, which the proper obli-

gation of promises, as such, requires. It is also a proof how little the moral sense of mankind goes along with the rigid casuists in this respect, that no one is blamed for defending himself against a bond given through duress or illegal violence, if the plea be a true one.

In a subsequent passage, l. iii. c. 19. § 4., Grotius seems to carry this theory of the duty of releasing an unjust promise so far, as to deny the obligation of the latter, and thus circuitously to agree with the opposite class of casuists,

* C. 12.

by sale, either party is forced to restore the difference arising from a misapprehension of the other, even without his own fault; and this whatever may be the amount, though the civil law gives a remedy only where the difference exceeds one half of the price.* And in several other places he diverges equally from that law. Not that he ever contemplated what Smith seems to have meant by "natural jurisprudence," a theory of the principles which ought to run through and to be the foundation of the laws of all nations. But he knew that the judge in the tribunal, and the inward judge in the breast, even where their subjects of determination appear essentially the same, must have different boundaries to their jurisdiction; and that, as the general maxims and inflexible forms of external law, in attempts to accommodate themselves to the subtleties of casuistry, would become uncertain and arbitrary, so the finer emotions of the conscience would lose all their moral efficacy, by restraining the duties of justice to that which can be enforced by the law. In the course of this twelfth chapter we come to a question much debated in the time of Grotius, the lawfulness of usury. After admitting, against the common opinion, that it is not repugnant to the law of nature, he yet maintains the prohibition in the Mosaic code to be binding on all mankind.† An extraordinary position, it would seem, in one who had denied any part of that system to be truly an universal law. This was, however, the usual determination of casuists; but he follows it up, as was also usual, with so many exceptions as materially relax and invalidate the application of his rule.

109. The next chapter, on promissory oaths, is a corollary to the last two. It was the opinion of Grotius, as it had been of all theologians, and, in truth, of ^{Promissory oaths.} all mankind, that a promise or contract not only becomes more solemn, and entails on its breach a severer penalty, by means of this adjuration of the Supreme Being, but may even acquire a substantial validity by it in cases where no prior obligation would subsist.‡ This chapter is distin-

* § 12.

† § 20.

‡ C. 13.

guished by a more than usually profuse erudition. But notwithstanding the rigid observance of oaths which he deems incumbent by natural and revealed law, he admits of a considerable authority in the civil magistrate, or other superior, as a husband or father, to annul the oaths of inferiors beforehand, or to dispense with them afterwards; not that they can release a moral obligation, but that the obligation itself is incurred under a tacit condition of their consent. And he seems, in rather a singular manner, to hint a kind of approval of such dispensations by the church.*

Engage-
ments of
kings to-
wards
subjects.

110. Whatever has been laid down by Grotius in the last three chapters as to the natural obligations of mankind, has an especial reference to the main purport of this great work, the duties of the supreme power. But the engagements of sovereigns give rise to many questions which cannot occur in those of private men. In the chapter which ensues, on the promises, oaths, and contracts of sovereigns, he confines himself to those engagements which immediately affect their subjects. These it is of great importance, in the author's assumed province of the general confessor or casuist of kings, to place on a right footing; because they have never wanted subservient counsellors, who would wrest the law of conscience, as well as that of the land, to the interests of power. Grotius, in denying that the sovereign may revoke his own contracts, extends this case to those made by him during his minority, without limitation to such as have been authorised by his guardians. † His contracts with his subjects create a true obligation, of which they may claim, though not enforce, the performance. He hesitates whether to call this obligation a civil or only a natural one; and in fact it can only be determined by positive law. ‡ Whether the successors of a sovereign are bound by his engagements, must depend, he observes, on the political constitution, and on the nature of the engagement. Those of an usurper he determines not to be binding, which should probably be limited to domestic contracts, though his lan-

* § 20. Ex hoc fundamento defendi possunt absolutiones juramentorum, quæ olim a principibus, nunc ipsorum prin-

cipum voluntate, quo magis cautum sit pietati, ab ecclesiæ præsidibus exercentur.

† C. 14. § 1.

‡ § 6.

guage seems large enough to comprise engagements towards foreign states.*

111. We now return from what, in strict language, may pass for a long digression, though not a needless one, to the main stream of international law. The title of the fifteenth chapter is on Public Treaties. After several divisions, which it would at present be thought unnecessary to specify so much at length, Grotius enters on a question not then settled by theologians, whether alliances with infidel powers were in any circumstances lawful. Francis I. had given great scandal in Europe by his league with the Turk. And though Grotius admits the general lawfulness of such alliances, it is under limitations which would hardly have borne out the court of France in promoting the aggrandisement of the common enemy of Christendom. Another, and more extensive head in the casuistry of nations relates to treaties that have been concluded without the authority of the sovereign. That he is not bound by these engagements is evident as a leading rule; but the course which, according to natural law, ought to be taken in such circumstances is often doubtful. The famous capitulation of the Roman army at the Caudine Forks is in point. Grotius, a rigid casuist, determines that the senate were not bound to replace their army in the condition from which the treaty had delivered them. And this seems to be a rational decision, though the Romans have sometimes incurred the censure of ill faith for their conduct. But if the sovereign has not only by silence acquiesced in the engagement of his ambassador or general, which of itself, according to Grotius, will not amount to an implied ratification, but recognised it by some overt act of his own, he cannot afterwards plead the defect of sanction.†

112. Promises consist externally in words, really in the intention of the parties. But as the evidence of this intention must usually depend on words, we should adapt our general rules to their natural meaning. Common usage is to determine the interpretation of agreements, except

Public
treaties.

Their inter-
pretation.

* Contractibus vero eorum qui sine jus obligandi populum non habuerunt.
jure imperium invaserunt, non tene- § 14.
buntur populi aut veri reges, nam hi † C. 15.

where terms of a technical sense have been employed. But if the expressions will bear different senses, or if there is some apparent inconsistency in different clauses, it becomes necessary to collect the meaning conjecturally, from the nature of the subject, from the consequences of the proposed interpretation, and from its bearing on other parts of the agreement. This serves to exclude unreasonable and unfair constructions from the equivocal language of treaties, such as was usual in former times to a degree which the greater prudence of contracting parties, if not their better faith, has rendered impossible in modern Europe. Among other rules of interpretation, whether in private or public engagements, he lays down one, familiar to the jurists, but concerning the validity of which some have doubted, that things favourable, as they style them, or conferring a benefit, are to be construed largely; things odious, or onerous to one party are not to be stretched beyond the letter. Our own law, as is well known, adopts this distinction between remedial and penal statutes; and it seems (wherever that which is favourable in one sense is not odious in another) the most equitable principle in public conventions. The celebrated question, the cause, or, as Polybius more truly calls it, the pretext of the second Punic war, whether the terms of a treaty binding each party not to attack the allies of the other shall comprehend those who have entered subsequently into alliance, seems, but rather on doubtful grounds, to be decided in the negative. Several other cases from history are agreeably introduced in this chapter.*

113. It is often, he observes, important to ascertain, whether a treaty be personal or real, that is, whether it affect only the contracting sovereign or the state. The treaties of republics are always real or permanent, even if the form of government should become monarchical; but the converse is not true as to those of kings, which are to be interpreted according to the probable meaning where there are no words of restraint or extension. A treaty subsists with a king though he may be expelled by his subjects; nor is it any breach of faith to take up arms against an usurper with the lawful sovereign's consent. This is not a doctrine which would now be endured.†

* C. 16.

† § 17.

114. Besides those rules of interpretation which depend on explaining the words of an engagement, there are others which must sometimes be employed to extend or limit the meaning beyond any natural construction. Thus in the old law case, a bequest, in the event of the testator's posthumous son dying, was held valid, where none was born, and instances of this kind are continual in the books of jurisprudence. It is equally reasonable sometimes to restrain the terms of a promise, where they clearly appear to go beyond the design of the promiser, or where supervenient circumstances indicate an exception which he would infallibly have made. A few sections in this place, seem, perhaps, more fit to have been inserted in the eleventh chapter.

115. There is a natural obligation to make amends for injury to the natural rights of another, which is extended by means of the establishment of property and of civil society to all which the laws have accorded him.* Hence a correlative right arises, but a right which is to be distinguished from fitness or merit. The jurists were accustomed to treat expletive justice, which consists in giving to every one what is strictly his own, separately from attributive justice, the equitable and right dispensation of all things according to desert. With the latter Grotius has nothing to do; nor is he to be charged with introducing the distinction of perfect and imperfect rights, if indeed those phrases are as objectionable as some have accounted them. In the far greater part of this chapter he considers the principles of this important province of natural law, the obligation to compensate damage, rather as it affects private persons than sovereign states. As, in most instances, this falls within the jurisdiction of civil tribunals, the rules laid down by Grotius may to a hasty reader seem rather intended as directory to the judge, than to the conscience of the offending party. This, however, is not by any means the case; he is here, as almost every where else, a master in morality and not in law. That he is not obsequiously following the Roman law will appear by his determining against the natural responsibility of the owner for injuries committed, without his fault,

Obligation
to repair
injury.

* C. 17.

by a slave or a beast.* But sovereigns, he holds, are answerable for the piracies and robberies of their subjects when they are able to prevent them. This is the only case of national law which he discusses. But it is one of high importance, being in fact one of the ordinary causes of public hostility. This liability, however, does not exist, where subjects having obtained a lawful commission by letters of marque become common pirates, and do not return home.

116. Thus far, the author begins in the eighteenth chapter, we have treated of rights founded on natural law, with some little mixture of the arbitrary law of nations. We come now to those which depend wholly on the latter. Such are the rights of ambassadors.

We have now, therefore, to have recourse more to the usage of civilised people than to theoretical principles. The practice of mankind has, in fact, been so much more uniform as to

the privileges of ambassadors than other matters of national intercourse, that they early acquired the authority and denomination of public law. The obligation to receive ambassadors from other sovereign states, the respect due to them, their impunity in offences committed by their principals or by themselves, are not indeed wholly founded on custom, to the exclusion of the reason of the case; nor have the customs of mankind, even here, been so unlike themselves as to furnish no contradictory precedents; but they afford perhaps the best instance of a tacit agreement, distinguishable both from moral right and from positive convention, which is specifically denominated the law of nations. It may be mentioned, that Grotius determines in favour of the absolute impunity of ambassadors, that is, their irresponsibility to the tribunals of the country where they reside, in the case of personal crimes, and even of conspiracy against the government. This, however, he founds altogether upon what he conceives to have been the prevailing usage of civilised states.†

* This is against what we read in the 8th title of the 4th book of the Institutes: *Si quadrupes pauperiem fecerit. Pauperies*, in the legal sense, which has also

some classical authority, means *damnum sine injuria*.

† C. 18.

117. The next chapter, on the right of sepulture, appears more excursive than any other in the whole treatise. The right of sepulture can hardly become a public question, except in time of war, and as such it might have been shortly noticed in the third book. It supplies Grotius, however, with a brilliant prodigality of classical learning.* But the next is far more important. It is entitled, On Punishments. The injuries done to us by others give rise to our right of compensation and to our right of punishment. We have to examine the latter with the more care, that many have fallen into mistakes from not duly apprehending the foundation and nature of punishment. Punishment is, as Grotius rather quaintly defines it, *Malum passionis, quod infligitur ob malum actionis*, evil inflicted on another for the evil which he has committed. It is not a part of attributive and hardly of expletive justice, nor is it, in its primary design, proportioned to the guilt of the criminal, but to the magnitude of the crime. All men have naturally a right to punish crimes, except those who are themselves equally guilty; but though the criminal would have no ground to complain, the mere pleasure of revenge is not a sufficient motive to warrant us; there must be an useful end to render punishment legitimate. This end may be the advantage of the criminal himself, or of the injured party, or of mankind in general. The interest of the injured party here considered is not that of reparation, which, though it may be provided for in punishment, is no proper part of it, but security against similar offences of the guilty party or of others. All men may naturally seek this security by punishing the offender, and though it is expedient in civil society that this right should be transferred to the judge, it is not taken away, where recourse cannot be had to the law. Every man may even, by the law of nature, punish crimes by which he has sustained no injury; the public good of society requiring security against offenders, and rendering them common enemies.†

118. Grotius next proceeds to consider whether these rights of punishment are restrained by revelation, and concludes that a private Christian is not at liberty to punish any

* C. 19.

† Id. 20.

criminal, especially with death, for his own security or that of the public, but that the magistrate is expressly empowered by Scripture to employ the sword against malefactors. It is rather an excess of scrupulousness, that he holds it unbecoming to seek offices which give a jurisdiction in capital cases.*

119. Many things essentially evil are not properly punishable by human laws. Such are thoughts and intentions, errors of frailty, or actions from which, though morally wrong, human society suffers no mischief; or the absence of such voluntary virtues as compassion and gratitude. Nor is it always necessary to inflict lawful punishment, many circumstances warranting its remission. The ground of punishment is the guilt of the offender, its motive is the advantage expected from it. No punishment should exceed what is deserved, but it may be diminished according to the prospect of utility, or according to palliating circumstances. But though punishments should bear proportion to offences, it does not follow that the criminal should suffer no more evil than he has occasioned, which would give him too easy a measure of retribution. The general tendency of all that Grotius has said in this chapter is remarkably indulgent and humane, beyond the practice or even the philosophy of his age.†

120. War is commonly grounded upon the right of punishing injuries, so that the general principles upon which this right depends upon mankind ought well to be understood before we can judge of so great a matter of national law. States, Grotius thinks, have a right, analogous to that of individuals out of society, to punish heinous offences against the law of nature or of nations, though not affecting themselves, or even any other independent community. But this is to be done very cautiously, and does not extend to violations of the positive divine law, or to any merely barbarous and irrational customs. Wars undertaken only on this score are commonly suspicious. But he goes on to determine that war may be justly waged against those who deny the being and providence of God, though not against idolaters, much less for the sake of compelling any nation to embrace Chris-

* C. 20.

† Id.

tianity, unless they prosecute its professors, in which case they are justly liable to punishment. He pronounces strongly in this place against the prosecution of heretics.*

121. This is the longest chapter in the work of Grotius. Several of his positions, as the reader may probably have observed, would not bear a close scrutiny; the rights of individuals in a state of nature, of magistrates in civil society, and of independent communities, are not kept sufficiently distinct; the equivocal meaning of right, as it exists correlatively between two parties, and as it comprehends the general obligations of moral law, is not always guarded against. It is, notwithstanding these defects, a valuable commentary, regard being had to the time when it appeared, on the principles both of penal jurisprudence and of the rights of war.

122. It has been a great problem, whether the liability to punishment can be transmitted from one person to another. This may be asked as to those who have ^{Their re-} ^{sponsibility.} been concerned in the crime, and those who have not. In the first case, they are liable as for their own offence, in having commanded, connived at, permitted, assisted, the actors in the crime before or after its perpetration. States are answerable for the delinquencies of their subjects when unpunished. They are also bound either to punish, or to deliver up, those who take refuge within their dominions from the justice of their own country. He seems, however, to admit afterwards, that they need only command such persons to quit the country. But they have a right to inquire into and inform themselves of the guilt alleged, the ancient privileges of suppliants being established for the sake of those who have been unjustly persecuted at home. The practice of modern Europe, he owns, has limited this right of demanding the delivery or punishment of refugees within narrow bounds. As to the punishment of those who have been wholly innocent of the offence, Grotius holds it universally unjust, but distinguishes it from indirect evil, which may often fall on the innocent. Thus, when the estate of a father is confiscated, his children suffer, but are not punished; since their succession was only a right contingent on his possession at

his death.* It is a consequence from this principle, that a people, so far subject to its sovereign as to have had no control upon his actions, cannot justly incur punishment on account of them.

123. After distinguishing the causes of war into pretexts and motives, and setting aside wars without any assignable justification as mere robberies, he mentions several pretexts which he deems insufficient, such as the aggrandisement of a neighbour, his construction of fortresses, the right of discovery, where there is already a possessor, however barbarous, the necessity of occupying more land. And here he denies, both to single men and to a people, the right of taking up arms in order to recover their liberty. He laughs at the pretended right of the emperor or of the pope to govern the world; and concludes with a singular warning against wars undertaken upon any pretended explanation of scriptural prophecies.† It will be anticipated from the scrupulousness of Grotius in all his casuistry, that he enjoins sovereigns to abstain from war in a doubtful cause, and to use all convenient methods of avoiding it by conference, arbitration, or even by lot. Single combat itself, as a mode of lot, he does not wholly reject in this place. In answer to a question often put, Whether a war can be just on both sides? he replies that, in relation to the cause or subject, it cannot be so, since there cannot be two opposite rights; but since men may easily be deceived as to the real right, a war may be just on both sides with respect to the agents.‡ In another part of his work, he observes that resistance, even where the cause is not originally just, may become such by the excess of the other party.

Insufficient
causes of war.

Duty of
avoiding it.

* C. 21. § 10. Hence it would follow, by the principle of Grotius, that our law of forfeiture in high treason is just, being part of the direct punishment of the guilty; but that of attainder, or corruption of blood, is unjust, being an infliction on the innocent alone. I incline to concur in this distinction, and think it at least plausible, though it was seldom or never taken in the discussions concerning those two laws. Confiscation is

no more unjust towards the posterity of an offender than fine, from which of course it only differs in degree; and, on the other hand, the law has as much right to exclude that posterity from enjoying property at all, as from enjoying that which descends from a third party through the blood, as we call it, of a criminal ancestor.

† C. 22.

‡ Id. 23.

124. The duty of avoiding war, even in a just cause, as long as possible, is rather part of moral virtue in a large sense, than of mere justice. But, besides the obligations imposed on us by humanity and by Christian love, it is often expedient for our own interests to avoid war. Of this, however, he says little, it being plainly a matter of civil prudence with which he has no concern.* Dismissing, therefore, the subject of this chapter, he comes to the justice of wars undertaken for the sake of others. Sovereigns, he conceives, are not bound to take up arms in defence of any one of their subjects who may be unjustly treated. Hence, a state may abandon those whom it cannot protect without great loss to the rest; but whether an innocent subject may be delivered up to an enemy is a more debated question. Soto and Vasquez, casuists of great name, had denied this; Grotius, however, determines it affirmatively. This seems a remarkable exception from the general inflexibility of his adherence to the rule of right. For on what principle of strict justice can a people, any more than private persons, sacrifice, or put in jeopardy, the life of an innocent man? Grotius is influenced by the supposition, that the subject ought voluntarily to surrender himself into the hands of the enemy for the public good: but no man forfeits his natural rights by refusing to perform an action not of strict social obligation.†

125. Next to subjects are allies, whom the state has bound itself to succour; and friendly powers, though without alliance, may also be protected from unjust attack. This extends even to all mankind; though war in behalf of strangers is not obligatory. It is also lawful to deliver the subjects of others from extreme manifest oppression of their rulers; and though this has often been a mere pretext, we are not on that account to deny the justice of an honest interference. He even thinks the right of foreign powers, in such a case, more unequivocal than that of the oppressed people themselves. At the close of this chapter he protests strongly against those who serve in any cause for the mere sake of pay, and holds them worse than the common executioner, who puts none but criminals to death.‡

* C. 24.

† C. 25.

‡ Id.

126. In the twenty-sixth and concluding chapter of this second book, Grotius investigates the lawfulness of bearing arms at the command of superiors, and determines that subjects are indispensably bound not to serve in a war which they conceive to be clearly unjust. He even inclines, though admitting the prevailing opinion to be otherwise, to think that, in a doubtful cause, they should adhere to the general moral rule in case of doubt, and refuse their personal service. This would evidently be impracticable, and ultimately subversive of political society. It, however, denotes the extreme scrupulosity of his mind. One might smile at another proof of this, where he determines that the hangman, before the performance of his duty, should satisfy himself as to the justice of the sentence.*

127. The rights of war, that is, of commencing hostility, have thus far been investigated with a comprehensiveness that has sometimes almost hidden the subject. We come now, in the third book, to rights in war. Whatever may be done in war is permitted either by the law of nature or that of nations. Grotius begins with the first. The means morally, though not physically, necessary to attain a lawful end are themselves lawful; a proposition which he seems to understand relatively to the rights of others, not to the absolute moral quality of actions: distinctions which are apt to embarrass him. We have, therefore, a right to employ force against an enemy, though it may be the cause of suffering to innocent persons. The principles of natural law authorise us to prevent neutrals from furnishing an enemy with the supplies of war, or with any thing else essential for his resistance to our just demands of redress, such as provisions in a state of siege. And it is remarkable that he refers this latter question to natural law, because he had not found any clear decision of it by the positive law of nations.†

128. In acting against an enemy force is the nature of war. But it may be inquired, whether deceit is not also a lawful means of success? The practice of nations and the authority of most writers seem to warrant

None to
serve in an
unjust war.

Rights in
war.

Use of
deceit.

* C. 26.

† L. iii. c. 1.

it. Grotius dilates on different sorts of artifice, and after admitting the lawfulness of such as deceive by indications, comes to the question of words equivocal or wholly false. This he first discusses on the general moral principle of veracity, more prolixly, and with more deference to authority, than would suit a modern reader; yet this basis is surely indispensable for the support of any decision in public casuistry. The right, however, of employing falsehood towards an enemy, which he generally admits, does not extend to promises, which are always to be kept, whether express or implied, especially when confirmed by oath. And more greatness of mind, as well as more Christian simplicity, would be shown by abstaining wholly from falsehood in war. The law of nature does not permit us to tempt any one to do that which in him would be criminal, as to assassinate his sovereign, or to betray his trust. But we have a right to make use of his voluntary offers.*

129. Grotius now proceeds from the consideration of natural law or justice to that of the general customs of mankind, in which, according to him, the arbitrary law of nations consists. By this, in the first place, though naturally no one is answerable for another, it has been established that the property of every citizen is, as it were, mortgaged for the liabilities of the state to which he belongs. Hence, if justice is refused to us by the sovereign, we have a right to indemnification out of the property of his subjects. This is commonly called reprisals; and it is a right which every private person would enjoy, were it not for the civil laws of most countries, which compel him to obtain the authorisation of his own sovereign, or of some tribunal. By an analogous right the subjects of a foreign state have sometimes been seized in return for one of our own subjects unjustly detained by their government.†

Rules and
customs of
nations.
Reprisals.

130. A regular war, by the law of nations, can only be waged between political communities. Wherever there is a semblance of civil justice and fixed law, such a community exists, however violent may be its actions. But a body of pirates or robbers are not one. Absolute independence, however, is not required for the right of war.

Declarations
of war.

* L. iii. c. 1.

† C. 2.

A formal declaration of war, though not necessary by the law of nature, has been rendered such by the usage of civilised nations. But it is required, even by the former, that we should demand reparation for an injury, before we seek redress by force. A declaration of war may be conditional or absolute; and it has been established as a ratification of regular hostilities, that they may not be confounded with the unwarranted acts of private men. No interval of time is required for their commencement after declaration.*

131. All is lawful during war, in one sense of the word, which by the law and usage of nations is punishable. And this, in formal hostilities, is as much the right of one side as of the other. The subjects of our enemy, whether active on his side or not, become liable to these extreme rights of slaughter and pillage; but it seems that, according to the law of nations, strangers should be exempted from them, unless by remaining in the country they serve his cause. Women, children, and prisoners may be put to death; quarter or capitulation for life refused. On the other hand, if the law of nations is less strict in this respect than that of nature, it forbids some things which naturally might be allowable means of defence, as the poisoning an enemy, or the wells from which he is to drink. The assassination of an enemy is not contrary to the law of nations, unless by means of traitors, and even this is held allowable against a rebel or robber, who are not protected by the rules of formal war. But the violation of women is contrary to the law of nations.† The rights of war with respect to enemies' property are unlimited, without exception even of churches or sepulchral monuments, sparing always the bodies of the dead.‡

132. By the law of nature, Grotius thinks that we acquire a property in as much of the spoil as is sufficient to indemnify us, and to punish the aggressor. But the law of nations carries this much farther, and gives an unlimited property in all that has been acquired by conquest, which mankind are bound to respect. This right commences as soon as the enemy has lost all chance of recovering his losses;

* C. 3.

† C. 4.

‡ C. 5.

Rights by
law of na-
tions over
enemies.

which is, in movables, as soon as they are in a place within our sole power. The transfer of property in territories is not so speedy. The goods of neutrals are not thus transferred, when found in the cities or on board the vessels of an enemy. Whether the spoil belongs to the captors, or to their sovereign, is so disputed a question, that it can hardly be reckoned a part of that law of nations, or universal usage, with which Grotius is here concerned. He thinks, however, that what is taken in public enterprises appertains to the state ; and that this has been the general practice of mankind. The civil laws of each people may modify this, and have frequently done so.*

133. Prisoners, by the law of nations, become slaves of the captor, and their posterity also. He may treat them as he pleases with impunity. This has been established by the custom of mankind, in order that the conqueror might be induced to spare the lives of the vanquished. Some theologians deny the slave, even when taken in an unjust war, the right of making his escape, from whom Grotius dissents. But he has not a right, in conscience, to resist the exercise of his master's authority. This law of nations as to the slavery of prisoners, as he admits, has not been universally received, and is now abolished in Christian countries out of respect to religion.† But, strictly, as an individual may be reduced into slavery, so may a whole conquered people. It is of course at the discretion of the conqueror to remit a portion of his right, and to leave as much of their liberties and possessions untouched as he pleases.‡

Prisoners
become
slaves.

134. The next chapter relates to the right of postliminium, one depending so much on the peculiar fictions of the Roman jurists, that it seems strange to discuss it as part of an universal law of nations at all. Nor does it properly belong to the rights of war, which are between belligerent parties. It is certainly consonant to natural justice that a citizen returning from captivity should be fully restored to every privilege and all property that he had enjoyed at home. In modern Europe there is little to which the *jus postliminii* can even by analogy be applied. It has been determined, in courts of admiralty, that vessels recap-

Right of
postlimi-
nium.

* C. 6.

† C. 7.

‡ C. 8.

tured after a short time do not revert to their owner. This chapter must be reckoned rather episodical.*

135. We have thus far looked only at the exterior right, accorded by the law of nations to all who wage regular hostilities in a just or unjust quarrel. This right is one of impunity alone, but before our own conscience, or the tribunal of moral approbation in mankind, many things hitherto spoken of as lawful must be condemned. In the first place, an unjust war renders all acts of force committed in its prosecution unjust, and binds the aggressor before God to reparation. Every one, general or soldier, is responsible in such cases for the wrong he has commanded or perpetrated. Nor can any one knowingly retain the property of another obtained by such a war, though he should come to the possession of it with good faith.† And as nothing can be done, consistently with moral justice, in an unjust war, so, however legitimate our ground for hostilities may be, we are not at liberty to transgress the boundaries of equity and humanity. In this chapter, Grotius, after dilating with a charitable abundance of examples and authorities in favour of clemency in war, even towards those who have been most guilty in provoking it, specially indicates women, old men, and children, as always to be spared, extending this also to all whose occupations are not military. Prisoners are not to be put to death, nor are towns to be refused terms of capitulation. He denies that the law of retaliation, or the necessity of striking terror, or the obstinate resistance of an enemy, dispense with the obligation of saving his life. Nothing but some personal crime can warrant the refusal of quarter or the death of a prisoner. Nor is it allowable to put hostages to death.‡

136. All unnecessary devastation ought to be avoided, such as the destruction of trees, of houses, especially ornamental and public buildings, and of every thing not serviceable in war, nor tending to prolong it, as pictures and statues. Temples and sepulchres are to be spared for the same or even stronger reasons. Though it is not the object of Grotius to lay down any political maxims, he cannot refrain in this place from pointing out several con-

Moral limit-
ation of
rights in
war.

Moderation
required as
to spoil.

* C. 9.

† C. 10.

‡ C. 11.

siderations of expediency, which should induce us to restrain the licence of arms within the limits of natural law.* There is no right by nature to more booty, strictly speaking, than is sufficient for our indemnity, wherein are included the expenses of the war. And the property of innocent persons, being subjects of our enemies, is only liable in failure of those who are primarily aggressors.†

137. The persons of prisoners are only liable, in strict moral justice, so far as is required for satisfaction of our injury. The slavery into which they may be And as to prisoners. reduced ought not to extend farther than an obligation of perpetual servitude in return for maintenance. The power over slaves by the law of nature is far short of what the arbitrary law of nations permits, and does not give a right of exacting too severe labour, or of inflicting punishment beyond desert. The peculium, or private acquisitions of a slave by œconomy or donation, ought to be reckoned his property. Slaves, however, captured in a just war, though one in which they have had no concern, are not warranted in conscience to escape and recover their liberty. But the children of such slaves are not in servitude by the law of nature, except so far as they have been obliged to their master for subsistence in infancy. With respect to prisoners, the better course is to let them redeem themselves by a ransom, which ought to be moderate.‡

138. The acquisition of that sovereignty which was enjoyed by a conquered people, or by their rulers, is Also in conquest. not only legitimate, so far as is warranted by the punishment they have deserved, or by the value of our own loss, but also so far as the necessity of securing ourselves extends. This last is what is often unsafe to remit out of clemency. It is a part of moderation in victory to incorporate the conquered with our own citizens on equal terms, or to leave their independence on reasonable precautions for our own security. If this cannot be wholly conceded, their civil laws and municipal magistracies may be preserved, and, above all, the free exercise of their religion. The interests of conquerors are as much consulted, generally, as their reputation, by such lenient use of their advantages.§

* C. 12.

† C. 13.

‡ C. 14.

§ C. 15.

139. It is consonant to natural justice that we should restore to the original owners all of which they have been despoiled in an unjust war, when it falls into our hands by a lawful conquest, without regard to the usual limits of postliminium. Thus, if an ambitious state comes to be stripped of its usurpations, this should be not for the benefit of the conqueror but of the ancient possessors. Length of time, however, will raise the presumption of abandonment.* Nothing should be taken in war from neutral states, except through necessity and with compensation. The most ordinary case is that of the passage of troops. The neutral is bound to strict impartiality in a war of doubtful justice.† But it seems to be the opinion of Grotius, that by the law of nature, every one, even a private man, may act in favour of the innocent party as far as the rights of war extend, except that he cannot appropriate to himself the possessions of the enemy; that right being one founded on indemnification. But civil and military laws have generally restrained this to such as obey the express order of their government.‡

140. The licence of war is restrained either by the laws of nature and nations, which have been already discussed, or by particular engagement. The obligation of promises extends to enemies, who are still parts of the great society of mankind. Faith is to be kept even with tyrants, robbers, and pirates. He here again adverts to the case of a promise made under an unjust compulsion; and possibly his reasoning on the general principle is not quite put in the most satisfactory manner. It would now be argued that the violation of engagements towards the worst of mankind, who must be supposed to have some means of self-defence, on account of which we propose to treat with them, would produce a desperation among men in similar circumstances injurious to society. Or it might be urged, that men do not lose by their crimes a right to the performance of all engagements, especially when they have fulfilled their own share in them, but only of such as involve a positive injustice towards the other party. In this place he repeats his former doctrine, that the most invalid promise may

And in re-
stitution to
right owners.

Promises to
enemies and
pirates.

* C. 16.

† C. 17.

‡ C. 19.

be rendered binding by the addition of an oath. It follows, from the general rule, that a prince is bound by his engagements to rebel subjects; above all, if they have had the precaution to exact his oath. And thus a change in the constitution of a monarchy may legitimately take place, and it may become mixed instead of absolute by the irrevocable concession of the sovereign. The rule, that promises made under an unjust compulsion are not obligatory, has no application in a public and regular war.* Barbeyrac remarks on this, that if a conqueror, like Alexander, subdues an unoffending people with no specious pretext at all, he does not perceive why they should be more bound in conscience to keep the promises of obedience they may have been compelled to enter into, than if he had been an ordinary bandit. And this remark shows us, that the celebrated problem in casuistry, as to the obligation of compulsory promises, has far more important consequences than the payment of a petty sum to a robber. In two cases, however, Grotius holds that we are dispensed from keeping an engagement towards an enemy. One of these is, when it has been conditional, and the other party has not fulfilled his part of the convention. This is of course obvious, and can only be open to questions as to the precedence of the condition. The other case is where we retain what is due to us by way of compensation, notwithstanding our promise. This is permissible in certain instances.†

141. The obligation of treaties of peace depends on their being concluded by the authority which, according to the constitution of the state, is sovereign for this purpose. Kings who do not possess a patrimonial sovereignty cannot alienate any part of their dominions without the consent of the nation or its representatives; they must even have the consent of the city or province which is thus to be transferred. In patrimonial kingdoms, the sovereign may alienate the whole, but not always a part, at pleasure. He seems, however, to admit an ultimate right of sovereignty, or *dominium eminens*, by which all states may dispose of the

Treaties concluded by competent authority.

* C. 19. § 11. There seems, as has been intimated above, to be some inconsistency in the doctrine of Grotius with respect to the general obligation of such

promises, which he maintains in the second book; and now, as far as I collect his meaning, denies by implication.

† C. 19.

property of their subjects, and consequently alienate it for the sake of a great advantage, but subject to the obligation of granting them an indemnity. He even holds that the community is naturally bound to indemnify private subjects for the losses they sustain in war, though this right of reparation may be taken away by civil laws. The right of alienation by a treaty of peace is only questionable between the sovereign and his subjects; foreign states may presume its validity in their own favour.*

142. Treaties of peace are generally founded on one of two principles; that the parties shall return to the condition wherein they were before the commencement of hostilities, or that they shall retain what they possess at their conclusion. The last is to be presumed in a case of doubtful interpretation. A treaty of peace extinguishes all public grounds of quarrel, whether known to exist or not, but does not put an end to the claims of private men subsisting before the war, the extinguishment of which is never to be presumed. The other rules of interpretation which he lays down are, as usual with him, derived rather from natural equity than the practice of mankind, though with no neglect or scorn of the latter. He maintains the right of giving an asylum to the banished, but not of receiving large bodies of men who abandon their country.†

143. The decision of lot may be adopted in some cases, in order to avoid a war, wherein we have little chance of resisting an enemy. But that of single combat, according to Grotius's opinion, though not repugnant to the law of nature, is incompatible with Christianity; unless in the case where a party, unjustly assailed, has no other means of defence. Arbitration by a neutral power is another method of settling differences, and in this we are bound to acquiesce. Wars may also be terminated by implicit submission or by capitulation. The rights which this gives to a conqueror have been already discussed. He concludes this chapter with a few observations upon hostages and pledges. With respect to the latter he holds that they may be reclaimed after any lapse of time, unless there is a presumption of tacit abandonment.‡

Matters relating to them.

* C. 20.

† Id.

‡ Id.

144. A truce is an interval of war, and does not require a fresh declaration at its close. No act of hostility is lawful during its continuance; the infringement of this rule by either party gives the other a right to take up arms without delay. Safe conducts are to be construed liberally, rejecting every meaning of the words which does not reach their spirit. Thus a safe conduct to go to a place implies the right of returning unmolested. The ransom of prisoners ought to be favoured.* A state is bound by the conventions in war made by its officers, provided they are such as may reasonably be presumed to lie within their delegated authority, or such as they have a special commission to warrant, known to the other contracting party. A state is also bound by its tacit ratification in permitting the execution of any part of such a treaty, though in itself not obligatory, and also by availing itself of any advantage thereby. Grotius dwells afterwards on many distinctions relating to this subject, which however, as far as they do not resolve themselves into the general principle, are to be considered on the ground of positive regulation.†

145. Private persons, whether bearing arms or not, are as much bound as their superiors by the engagements they contract with an enemy. This applies particularly to the parole of a prisoner. The engagement not to serve again, though it has been held null by some jurists, as contrary to our obligation towards our country, is valid. It has been a question, whether the state ought to compel its citizens to keep their word towards the enemy? The better opinion is that it should do so; and this has been the practice of the most civilised nations.‡ Those who put themselves under the protection of a state engage to do nothing hostile towards it. Hence such actions as that of Zopyrus, who betrayed Babylon under the guise of a refugee, are not excusable. Several sorts of tacit engagements are established by the usage of nations, as that of raising a white flag in token of a desire to suspend arms. These are exceptions from the general rule which authorises deceit in war.§ In the concluding chapter of the whole treatise Grotius briefly

Truces and conventions.

Those of private persons.

* C. 21.

† C. 22.

‡ C. 23.

§ C. 24.

exhorts all states to preserve good faith and to seek peace at all times, upon the mild principles of Christianity.*

146. If the reader has had the patience to make his way through the abstract of Grotius, *De Jure Belli*, that we have placed before him, he will be fully prepared to judge of the criticisms made upon this treatise by Paley and Dugald Stewart. "The writings of Grotius and Puffendorf," says the former, "are of too forensic a cast, too much mixed up with civil law and with the jurisprudence of Germany, to answer precisely the design of a system of ethics, the direction of private consciences in the general conduct of human life." But it was not the intention of Grotius (we are not at present concerned with Puffendorf) to furnish a system of ethics; nor did any one ever hold forth his treatise in this light. Upon some most important branches of morality he has certainly dwelt so fully as to answer the purpose of "directing the private conscience in the conduct of life." The great aim, however, of his inquiries was to ascertain the principles of natural right applicable to independent communities.

147. Paley, it must be owned, has a more specious ground of accusation in his next charge against Grotius for the profusion of classical quotations. "To any thing more than ornament they can make no claim. To propose them as serious arguments, gravely to attempt to establish or fortify a moral duty by the testimony of a Greek or Roman poet, is to trifle with the reader, or rather take off his attention from all just principles in morals."

148. A late eminent writer has answered this from the text of Grotius, but in more eloquent language than Grotius could have employed. "Another answer," says Mackintosh, "is due to some of those who have criticised Grotius, and that answer might be given in the words of Grotius himself. He was not of such a stupid and servile cast of mind, as to quote the opinions of poets or orators, of historians and philosophers, as those of judges from whose decision there was no appeal. He quotes them, as he tells us himself, as witnesses, whose conspiring testimony, mightily

Objections to
Grotius made
by Paley un-
reasonable.

Reply of
Mackintosh.

strengthened and confirmed by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race on the great rules of duty and the fundamental principles of morals. On such matters, poets and orators are the most unexceptionable of all witnesses ; for they address themselves to the general feelings and sympathies of mankind ; they are neither warped by system, nor perverted by sophistry ; they can attain none of their objects, they can neither please nor persuade, if they dwell on moral sentiments not in unison with those of their readers. No system of moral philosophy can surely disregard the general feelings of human nature, and the according judgment of all ages and nations. But where are these feelings and that judgment recorded and preserved ? In those very writings which Grotius is gravely blamed for having quoted. The usages and laws of nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, the sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observation of common life, are, in truth, the materials out of which the science of morality is formed ; and those who neglect them are justly chargeable with a vain attempt to philosophise without regard to fact and experience, the sole foundation of all true philosophy.”*

149. The passage in Grotius which has suggested this noble defence will be found above. It will be seen on reference to it, that he proposes to quote the poets and orators cautiously, and rather as ornamental than authoritative supports of his argument. In no one instance, I believe, will he be found to “enforce a moral duty,” as Paley imagines, by their sanction. It is nevertheless to be fairly acknowledged, that he has sometimes gone a good deal farther than the rules of a pure taste allow in accumulating quotations from the poets, and that, in an age so impatient of prolixity as the last, this has stood much in the way of the general reader.

150. But these criticisms of Paley contain very trifling censure in comparison with the unbounded scorn poured on Grotius by Dugald Stewart, in his first Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy. I have never

*Censures of
Stewart.*

* Mackintosh, *Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations*, p. 23. (edit. 1828.)

read these pages of an author whom I had unfortunately not the opportunity of personally knowing, but whose researches have contributed so much to the delight and advantage of mankind, without pain and surprise. It would be too much to say that, in several parts of this Dissertation, by no means in the first class of Stewart's writings, other proofs of precipitate judgment do not occur; but that he should have spoken of a work so distinguished by fame, and so effective, as he himself admits, over the public mind of Europe, in terms of unmingled depreciation, without having done more than glanced at some of its pages, is an extraordinary symptom of that tendency towards prejudices, hasty but inveterate, of which this eminent man seems to have been not a little susceptible. The attack made by Stewart on those who have taken the law of nature and nations as their theme, and especially on Grotius who stands forward in that list, is protracted for several pages, and it would be tedious to examine every sentence in succession. Were I to do so, it is not, in my opinion, an exaggeration to say that almost every successive sentence would lie open to criticism. But let us take the chief heads of accusation.

151. "Grotius," we are told, "under the title, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, has aimed at a complete system of natural law. Condillac says, that he chose the title in order to excite a more general curiosity." The total erroneousness of this passage must appear to every one who has seen what Grotius declares to have been his primary object. He chose the title because it came nearest to express that object—the ascertainment of laws binding on independent communities in their mutual relations, whether of war or peace. But as it was not possible to lay down any solid principles of international right till the notions of right, of sovereignty, of dominion over things and persons, of war itself, were clearly established, it became indispensable to build upon a more extensive basis than later writers on the law of nations, who found the labour performed to their hands, have thought necessary. All ethical philosophy, even in those parts which bear a near relation to jurisprudence and to international law, was in the age of Grotius a chaos of incoherent and arbitrary notions, brought in from various

Answer to
them.

sources ; from the ancient schools, from the Scriptures, the fathers, the canons, the casuistical theologians, the rabbins, the jurists, as well as from the practice and sentiments of every civilised nation, past and present, the Jews, the Greeks, and Romans, the trading republics, the chivalrous kingdoms of modern Europe. If Grotius has not wholly disentangled himself from this bewildering maze, through which he painfully traces his way by the lights of reason and revelation, he has at least cleared up much, and put others still oftener in the right path, where he has not been able to follow it. Condillac, as here quoted by Stewart, has anticipated Paley's charge against Grotius, of labouring to support his conclusions by the authority of others, and of producing a long string of quotations to prove the most indubitable propositions. In what degree this very exaggerated remark is true we have already seen. But it should be kept in mind, that neither the disposition of the age in which Grotius lived, nor the real necessity of illustrating every part of his inquiries by the precedent usages of mankind, would permit him to treat of moral philosophy as of the abstract theorems of geometry. If his erudition has sometimes obstructed or misled him, which perhaps has not so frequently happened as these critics assume, it is still true that a contemptuous ignorance of what has been done or has been taught, such as belonged to the school of Condillac and to that of Paley, does not very well qualify the moral philosopher for inquiry into the principles which are to regulate human nature.

152. "Among the different ideas," Stewart observes, "which have been formed of natural jurisprudence, one of the most common, especially in the earlier systems, supposes its object to be—to lay down those rules of justice which would be binding on men living in a social state without any positive institutions ; or, as it is frequently called by writers on this subject, living together in a state of nature. This idea of the province of jurisprudence seems to have been uppermost in the mind of Grotius in various parts of his treatise." After some conjectures on the motives which led the early writers to take this view of national law, and admitting that the rules of justice are in every case precise and indispensable, and that their authority is altogether indepen-

dent of that of the civil magistrate, he deems it " obviously absurd to spend much time in speculating about the principles of this natural law, as applicable to men before the institution of governments." It may possibly be as absurd as he thinks it. But where has Grotius shown that this condition of natural society was uppermost in his thoughts? Of the state of nature, as it existed among individuals before the foundation of any civil institutions, he says no more than was requisite in order to exhibit the origin of those rights which spring from property and government. But that he has, in some part especially of his second book, dwelt upon the rules of justice binding on men subsequent to the institution of property, but independently of positive laws, is most certain; nor is it possible for any one to do otherwise, who does not follow Hobbes in confounding moral with legal obligation; a theory to which Mr. Stewart was of all men the most averse.

153. Natural jurisprudence is a term that is not always taken in the same sense. It seems to be of English origin; nor am I certain, though my memory may deceive me, that I have ever met with it in Latin or in French. Strictly speaking, as jurisprudence means the science of law, and is especially employed with respect to the Roman, natural jurisprudence must be the science of morals, or the law of nature. It is, therefore, in this sense, co-extensive with ethics, and comprehends the rules of temperance, liberality, and benevolence, as much as those of justice. Stewart, however, seems to consider this idea of jurisprudence as an arbitrary extension of the science derived from the technical phraseology of the Roman law. " Some vague notion of this kind," he says, " has manifestly given birth to many of the digressions of Grotius." It may have been seen by the analysis of the entire treatise of Grotius above given, that none of his digressions, if such they are to be called, have originated in any vague notion of an identity, or proper analogy, between the strict rules of justice and those of the other virtues. The Aristotelian division of justice into commutative and distributive, which Grotius has adopted, might seem in some respect to bear out this supposition; but it is evident, from the context of Stewart's observations, that he

was referring only to the former species, or justice in its more usual sense, the observance of perfect rights, whose limits may be accurately determined, and whose violation may be redressed.

154. Natural jurisprudence has another sense imposed upon it by Adam Smith. According to this sense, its object, in the words of Stewart, is "to ascertain the general principles of justice which ought to be recognised in every municipal code, and to which it ought to be the aim of every legislator to accommodate his institutions." Grotius, in Smith's opinion, was "the first who attempted to give the world any thing like a system of those principles which ought to run through, and to be the foundation of, the laws of all nations; and his treatise on the laws of peace and war, with all its imperfections, is perhaps at this day the most complete book that has yet been given on the subject."

155. The first probably, in modern times, who conceived this idea of an universal jurisprudence was Lord Bacon. He places among the desiderata of political science, the province of universal justice, or the sources of law. "*Id nunc agatur, ut fontes justitiæ et utilitatis publicæ petantur, et in singulis juris partibus character quidam et idea justi exhibeatur, ad quem particularium regnorum et rerum publicarum leges probare, atque inde emendationem moliri, quisque, cui hæc cordi erit et curæ, possit.*"* The maxims which follow are an admirable illustration of the principles which should regulate the enactment and expression of laws, as well as of much that should guide, in a general manner, the decision of courts of justice. They touch very slightly, if at all, any subject which Grotius has handled; but certainly come far closer to natural jurisprudence, in the sense of Smith, inasmuch as they contain principles which have no limitation to the circumstances of particular societies. These maxims of Bacon, and all others that seem properly to come within the province of jurisprudence in this sense, which is now become not uncommon, the science of universal *law*, are resolvable partly into those of natural justice, partly into those of public expediency. Little, however, could be objected against the admission of universal jurisprudence, in this sense, among

* De Augmentis, lib. viii.

the sciences. But if it is meant that any systematic science, whether by the name of jurisprudence or legislation, can be laid down as to the principles which ought to determine the institutions of all nations, or that, in other words, the laws of each separate community ought to be regulated by any universal standard, in matters not depending upon eternal justice, we must demur to receiving so very disputable a proposition. It is probable that Adam Smith had no thoughts of asserting it; yet his language is not very clear, and he seems to have assigned some object to Grotius, distinct from the establishment of natural and international law. "Whether this was," says Stewart, "or was not, the leading object of Grotius, it is not material to decide; but if this was his object, it will not be disputed that he has executed his design in a very desultory manner, and that he often seems to have lost sight of it altogether, in the midst of those miscellaneous speculations on political, ethical, and historical subjects, which form so large a portion of his treatise, and which so frequently succeed each other without any apparent connexion or common aim."

156. The unfairness of this passage it is now hardly incumbent upon me to point out. The reader has been enabled to answer that no political speculation will be found in the volume, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, unless the disquisition on the origin of human society is thus to be denominated; that the instances continually adduced from history are always in illustration of the main argument; and that what are here called ethical speculations are in fact the real subject of the book, since it avowedly treats of obligations on the conscience of mankind, and especially of their rulers. Whether the various topics in this treatise "succeed each other without apparent connexion or common aim," may best be seen by the titles of the chapters, or by the analysis of their contents. There are certainly a very few of these that have little in common, even by deduction or analogy, with international law, though scarce any, I think, which do not rise naturally out of the previous discussion. Exuberances of this kind are so common in writers of great reputation, that where they do not transgress more than Grotius

has done, the censure of irrelevancy has been always reckoned hypercritical.

157. "The Roman system of jurisprudence," Mr. Stewart proceeds, "seems to have warped in no inconsiderable degree the notions of Grotius on all questions connected with the theory of legislation, and to have diverted his attention from that philosophical idea of law so well expressed by Cicero. 'Non a prætoris edicto, neque a duodecim tabulis, sed penitus ex intima philosophia hauriendam juris disciplinam.' In this idolatry, indeed, of the Roman law, he has not gone so far as some of his commentators, who have affirmed that it is only a different name for the law of nature: but that his partiality for his professional pursuits has often led him to overlook the immense difference between the state of society in ancient and modern Europe will not, I believe, now be disputed." It is probable that it will be disputed by all who are acquainted with Grotius. The questions connected with the theory of legislation which he has discussed are chiefly those relating to the acquisition and alienation of property in some of the earlier chapters of the second book. That he has not, in these disquisitions, adopted all the determinations of the Roman jurists is certain; whether he may in any particular instance have adhered to them more than the best theory of legislation would admit, is a matter of variable opinion. But Stewart, wholly unacquainted with the civil laws, appears to have much underrated their value. In most questions of private right, they form the great basis of every modern legislation; and, as all civilised nations, including our own, have derived a large portion of their jurisprudence from this source, so even the theorists, who would disdain to be ranked as disciples of Paullus and Papinian, are not ashamed to be their plagiarists.

158. It has been thrown out against Grotius by Rousseau*, and the same insinuation may be found in other writers, that he confounds the fact with the right, and the duties of nations with their practice. How little foundation there is for this calumny is sufficiently apparent to our readers. Scrupulous, as a casuist, to an excess hardly reconcilable with the security and welfare of

Grotius
vindicated
against
Rousseau.

* Contrat Social.

good men, he was the first, beyond the precincts of the confessional or the church, to pour the dictates of a saint-like innocence into the ears of princes. It is true that in recognising the legitimacy of slavery, and in carrying too far the principles of obedience to government, he may be thought to have deprived mankind of some of their security against injustice; but this is exceedingly different from a sanction to it. An implicit deference to what he took for divine truth was the first axiom in the philosophy of Grotius; if he was occasionally deceived in his application of this principle, it was but according to the notions of his age; but those who wholly reject the authority must of course want a common standard by which his speculations in moral philosophy can be reconciled with their own.

159. I must now quit a subject upon which, perhaps, I have dwelt too long. The high fame of Dugald Stewart has rendered it a sort of duty to vindicate from his hasty censures the memory of one still more illustrious in reputation, till the lapse of time, and the fickleness of literary fashion, conspired with the popularity of his assailants to magnify his defects, and meet the very name of his famous treatise with a kind of scornful ridicule. That Stewart had never read much of Grotius, or even gone over the titles of his chapters, is very manifest; and he displays a similar ignorance as to the other writers on natural law, who for more than a century afterwards, as he admits himself, exercised a great influence over the studies of Europe. I have commented upon very few, comparatively, of the slips which occur in his pages on this subject.

160. The arrangement of Grotius has been blamed as His arrangement. unscientific by a more friendly judge, Sir James Mackintosh. Though I do not feel very strongly the force of his objections, it is evident that the law of nature might have been established on its basis, before the author passed forward to any disquisition upon its reference to independent communities. This would have changed a good deal the principal object that Grotius had in view, and brought his treatise, in point of method, very near to that of Puffendorf. But assuming, as he did, the authority recognised by those for whom he wrote, that of the Scrip-

tures, he was less inclined to dwell on the proof which reason affords for a natural law, though fully satisfied of its validity even without reference to the Supreme Being.

161. The real faults of Grotius, leading to erroneous determinations, seem to be rather an unnecessary scrupulousness, and somewhat of old theological ^{His defects.} prejudice, from which scarce any man in his age, who was not wholly indifferent to religion, had liberated himself. The notes of Barbeyrac seldom fail to correct this leaning. Several later writers on international law have treated his doctrine of an universal law of nations founded on the agreement of mankind as an empty chimera of his invention. But if he only meant by this the tacit consent, or, in other words, the general custom of civilised nations, it does not appear that there is much difference between his theory and that of Wolf or Vattel.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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